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     States are complex organizations, not least because of 
their sovereignty and their acquired power as organizers of politics. 
States as organizations, as a specific type of rational collective 
actor, were long ignored in Norwegian political science, though 
states and state power have been an area of concern within radical 
European social science over a long period. The overarching 
problem is: Has the state had an autonomous role relative to actors 
in civil society, in the transformation of the Norwegian economy 
from subsistence agriculture to a growth-oriented, industrial 
capitalism? Or, as some variants of both pluralist and Marxist state 
theories imply, have state activities and policies been mere 
expressions for dominant actors outside the state (political parties, 
interest organizations, specific social classes, the "people" etc.)? 
 The study is a contribution to a "critique" of political science, in 
the sense that it attempts to relate political phenomena as they are 
defined within social science disciplines to some of the economic 
processes in society, and through that confrontation, to question, or 
test the validity of central common concepts describing the 
Norwegian state, historically and today. It attempts to draw on 
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historical knowledge and research methods, especially in the 
analysis of the selected case studies (the transverse studies). It tries 
to utilize economic concepts and data to develop a description of the 
distribution of economic power between the state and the main 
social classes. And it uses organization theory, with its focus on 
roles, action models and decision-making within institutionalized 
norms and expectations. The study puts focus on the question of 
autonomy, whether and under what conditions the state can be seen 
as an independent actor, relative to the main class and group 
formations in society and what power the state had and mobilized to 
implement its chosen policies. 
 This book is a revised version of a thesis: A Critique of State 
Autonomy in Norway 1850-1970, (Bergen, October 1987). 
 Many people have inspired and assisted in the production of the 
book: Petter Bomann-Larsen, Torstein Dahle, Rolf Danielsen, Karl 
Davids, Jan Froestad, Odd Bjørn Fure, Carmenza Gallo, Alvaro 
Guzman, Kjell Havnevik, Torstein Hjellum, Helge Høibraaten, Jan 
Jacobsen, Alf Inge Jansen, Thor Øyvind Jensen, Ira Katznelson, 
Olav Korsnes, Ulf Lie, James March, Patricia Morgan, Hanne 
Müller, Kapote Mwakasungura, Audun Offerdal, Ole Johnny Olsen, 
David Olson, Jonas Pontusson, Giovanna Procacci, Paul Roness, 
Anurahda Seth, Sissel Steen, Øystein Tellef Hansen, Louise Tilly, 
Ulf Torgersen, Arne Tostensen, Marjolein t'Hart,  Erling Vårdal, 
Alan Wolfe and Ary Zolberg. 
 A special thanks to Professor Charles Tilly for critical support, 
from the first discussions of the problem in New York in the fall of 
1984, through the comments given in Cairanne in 1987 to the ideas, 
comments and criticisms received up to this day. They have been 
essential inputs in the ragged process of trying to get theory and 
materials to interact so that something "out there" might be slightly 
better understood. 
 The Department of Administration and Organization Theory at 
the University of Bergen, with Knut Dahl Jacobsen at its centre, has 
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been my primary place of work since 1970. It is a good arena for 
scientific study of state, administration and organizations, nationally 
and comparatively, not least because the department is open to 
theoretical discussion and experimentation. A thanks to my 
colleagues there. A special thanks to students taking part in the 
graduate seminar on "State formation and development 
administration", which has been a place of inspiration, learning and 
support. Thanks especially to Francis Appiah and Einar Braathen 
for cooperation since 1988. 
 This revision has been made easier through discussions with 
Giovanna Procacci (University of Milan), from the testing of some 
of the ideas with colleagues at the Institute for Technology and 
Society at Aalborg University, and with Josaphat Kanwanyi and 
Severine Rugumamu at the University of Dar es Salaam. Colleagues 
at Christian Michelsens Institute and at the Centre for Development 
Studies in Bergen have given a good deal of support. The 
presentation of some of the ideas on state and modernization for 
administrators and development workers at the School of the 
Norwegian Development Agency, NORAD, has been a test of their 
clarity and of their possible validity in other peripheral societies, 
both inside and outside Europe. I am thankful for invitations to 
Agder and Vestfold district colleges for the same reason. 
 Many have made the production easier: Gerd Andersen, Helge 
Arnesen, George Drennan, Anne Grantvedt, Erik Grung, Tom 
Johnsen, Gudrun Hopland, Aina Kristensen, Carolyn Moskowitz, 
Turid Nordhus, Anne Teigland.  
 In addition to the Center for Studies of Social Change at the New 
School in New York and the Department in Bergen, the following 
institutions have provided support, either financially or in other 
ways: The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the 
Humanities (NAVF), Meltzers Høyskolefond, the New School for 
Social Research, the University of Bergen, the Social Science 
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Faculty, Center for Social Science, SEFOS, the University Library 
and the Computer Centre. 
 A word of gratitude to Martin and Øyvind - and Haakon. There 
are, luckily, some people who support you no matter what you do - 
and no matter how difficult things are for them. Thanks for 
friendship, support and all kinds of good vibrations. 
 
 
Bergen, April 1994 
 
Thorvald Gran 





      THE STATE 
    PART  AS AGENT OF 
    A  MODERNIZATION 
 
 
      "One must start with error and convert it into truth. I.e. one must expose 
the sources of error, otherwise hearing the truth does not benefit us. It 
cannot penetrate if something else occupies its place. To convince 
someone of the truth, it is not enough to state the truth, rather one must 
find the way from error to truth." 
 
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, cited in Rod Aya (1979) 
 
 
     What role did the state have in the economic 
modernization of Norway, that is, in the transformation of the 
economy from subsistence agriculture to a growth-oriented 
industrial capitalism? To what degree and through which social and 
administrative mechanisms did the state have autonomy in the 
modernization process?  
 The question of the state as an autonomous organization in the 
political process1 and the empirical study of the state-economy 
relationship have been raised from the periphery of established 
political science with increasing force in the 1970's and 1980's 
(Birnbaum 1988). The question of the variation in state forms was 
addressed by Stein Rokkan (1975a) and Charles Tilly (1975a, b and 
                                           
     1By 'politics' and 'political process' I am thinking of activities oriented towards the 
building/reorganization of the basic institutions in a society (firms, households, parties, 




c, 1978a and 1990). But the dialogue has widened and absorbed 
contributions from classical Marxism (Karl Marx, Antonio 
Gramsci), from neo-Marxism of the continental (Claus Offe) and 
the Anglo-American (Perry Anderson) varieties, from 
behaviouralists with an increasing interest in institutional analysis 
(March and Olsen 1989) and from sociologists studying the role of 
the professions as mediators between state and society 
(Rueschemeyer 1983). The Stalinist tradition, which transformed 
Marx's dialectic and historical analysis into abstract dogmas, argued 
an instrumentalist theory of the state. The state was an instrument 
either for the bourgeoisie or for a ruling proletariat. The idea that 
the state could develop an organizational logic and a power position 
of its own was not considered. Democratic theory, combined with 
behaviouralism, has also assigned the state apparatus little interest 
and/or autonomy. The assumption has been that the state is an arena 
for political bargaining and compromises between representatives of 
most or even all sections of the population. 
 Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly suggested that state forms and 
state power are dependent on the type of economy. In economies 
with strong capitalists and much international trade the state would 
typically be weak and unbureaucratic. The capitalists would have 
control of the economy and taxes would be easily gathered at points 
of trade and transport. In economies with a large agricultural sector 
and with relatively weak capitalists in small urban centres the state 
would typically be strong and highly bureaucratized to be able to 
gather taxes from the many producers in agriculture. Dieter 
Senghaas (1985) has along the same lines suggested that 
democratization of states was dependent on the structure of land 
ownership. Where land was owned by many independent 
smallholders a strong farm movement would typically arise and 
demand a place, a representation in the state. Together with an 
emergent bourgeoisie, the market-oriented farm movement could 
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gain state power relative to feudal, aristocratic power, could 
democratize the state organization and make it an active 
entrepreneur in developing infrastructure for an industrial market 
economy. In areas where the land was owned by few and large 
landowners the farm movement would not arise and the (emergent) 
bourgeoisie would have difficulty gaining dominant power within 
the state.  
 The present study is limited to the Norwegian case. It will use 
materials from the history of the Norwegian state and the 
Norwegian economy to investigate the role of the state in the 
modernization process. It will only to a limited degree compare the 
Norwegian state with other states. However, it will study how the 
organization and the role of the state changed through three periods 
of modern Norwegian political history: (1) The period of the 
penetration of capitalism into the Norwegian agricultural economy 
(1850-1920), and the struggle against the power of the bureaucracy; 
(2) The period of capitalist consolidation in the interwar period, 
with a bourgeois multi-party state searching for efficient 
organizational forms in a new and complex situation with 
aggressive international capital2 on one side and an aggressive and 
growing labour movement on the other; and (3) the postwar welfare 
state period with a dominant Labour Party at the head of an 
increasingly corporatist type of state organization, with a labour 
movement losing its membership momentum and taking part in the 
western, US-dominated struggle against communism. It will thus 
                                           
     2
 Capital is a social relation where exploitation of wage labour occurs, where labour power is 
sold to an owner of means of production and where the labourer's labour time exceeds the 
labour time needed to produce the commodities he/she can buy with the wage and where the 
excess labour time (surplus value) is realized through the production owner's sale of products in 
markets. Capital can thus also be seen as materials (machines, buildings, raw materials, money 
etc.) that function within the capital social relationship. Capital can thirdly be used as denotation 
for the group or class of capital-owners and its material/organizational setting - as in "capital 
against labour" or "the capital - wage labour relationship".  
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compare state - economy and state - class - political movements in 
Norway over time. The study will also attempt to conceptualize the 
Norwegian economy as a "region" in a larger international and 
global system of capitalism, investigating the conditions for 
"autocentricity" (Senghaas 1985), the development of a locally 
controlled economy within a larger, dominant economic system. 
Thirdly the study will counterpoise over time study of state - 
economy relations with analysis of specific political conflicts. 
Lastly it will attempt to specify and criticize a Marxist interpretation 
of the role of the Norwegian state in the transformation process. 
 What role did the state have in the modernization of the 
Norwegian economy, in the formation of social classes, political 
movements and interest organizations, and in changing the relations 
between the actors? The development of the natural and social 
sciences has been important. New production technology drove a 
wedge into agriculture separating subsistence agriculture from new 
forms of farming, making production for markets increasingly 
common. New industrial technology made industrial investments 
possible at select (energy rich) places in the 1850's and were a basis 
for a gradual development of modern college education and 
research and the formation of modern professions. The social 
sciences were a basis for more systematic understanding of the 
national (and international) economy and for the conceptualization 
of industrial and state management.  
 The organization of the state was important. The parliamentary 
representative state invited the formation of political movements 
among subordinate groups and classes and introduced an arena for 
economic planning where the representatives for different classes 
and regions could present their demands and enter into alliances that 
served class interests. With increasing parliamentary control of the 
political profile of government in the latter quarter of the nineteenth 
century the dominant alliance in parliament got a form of macro-
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control over the public administration, directing it toward the 
formation of infrastructure for the modern industrial economy and 
opening up for professionalization of the bureaucracy. The political 
parties were important in this struggle for (and against) the 
reorganization of the state. Later the interest organizations 
penetrated into the public administration, representing a new 
mechanism for state - society interaction, changing the role of the 
political parties and the parliament, potentially introducing a new 
democratic dimension into the state, but also with the possibility of 
pacifying democratic political movements and strengthening an 
authoritarian alliance between a bureaucratic state and a bourgeois 
class of capital owners under pressure from a capitalist economy 
losing its ability to expand employment. Lastly the political regimes 
were important. The establishment of market and science oriented 
liberal regimes from the 1880's and onward ousted the conservative 
bureaucracy from top positions in the state and mediated the 
formation of the new unitary and professionalized state system with 
parliament at the apex of the power system. The bourgeois minority 
regimes of the interwar period mediated the struggle between the 
dominant bourgeoisie and the rising labour movement. With the 
reform strategy established in the labour movement the way was 
open for Labour Party governments from 1935. The Labour Party 
regime was the mediator between a crisis ridden capitalism and the 
working class, giving form to the welfare state strategy that 
managed to stabilize the economy by politicizing variable capital, 
by introducing state control and state management of the wage fund 
in society, drawing it out of the market and distributing it more 
equally between people in and outside the labour market (to people 
in education, to sick and injured people, to unemployed, to old 
people etc.).  
 By 1970 this modernization process was in a sense completed. 
The argument is thus that the market was the central arena for 
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transactions between the actors of the modern industrial capitalist 
economy, but that the market was dependent on an active and 
autonomous state organization to drive forward the necessary 
transformations: from subsistence to market agriculture, from a 
conservative status - ridden bureaucracy to an active public 
administration engaged in the building of infrastructures for the 
capitalist economy and for the establishment of a consolidated 
reformist labour movement, willing to participate in capital 
accumulation without gaining ownership of capital and in the 
parliamentary state system without using working class numerical 
dominance to legally eliminate the bourgeoisie as a class of owners 
of production and distribution capital. 
 
The language problem. 
There is, at least in the social sciences, no way past the language 
problem.  Whether we are doing research or presenting the results, 
we always apply a mode of discourse.3 It allows for discoveries, for 
better knowledge of identities and for cross cultural exchange. But it 
also limits what we can discover. The mode of scientific discourse 
is most often structured selectively, to focus certain relations and 
suppress others. Therefore we have the problem of transcending the 
limits of the established discourse, finding when that is necessary 
and how it can be done. 
 Different conceptions can inform how we approach our object of 
study. A hypothetical, deductive approach is valuable because (a) it 
specifies what we think we will find in the materials we are 
investigating; (b) it reduces more general concepts to measurable 
                                           
     3
 The writer Stein Mehren (1980) makes the same point: "Tidens fornuft er de tanker som 
tenker seg selv overalt, de ord som ordner våre erkjennelser og vår viten. Vi kommer ikke 
utenom den. Men denne fornuft er ensidig, den kan ikke avsløre noe uten å tilsløre noe annet. 
Overalt, rundt oss og i oss, er det dimensjoner som språket ikke entydig kan omfatte." Mehren 
1980:227-238, cited in Longum 1986:148. 
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phenomena and (c) thus makes intersubjective investigations 
possible. This method is valuable. But it has at least one drawback: 
the more we operationalize, the more embedded the investigation, 
most likely, become in the dominant discourse. 
 An alternative to the hypothetical deductive approach is the 
empirically inductive one, that is where we, without very specific 
hypotheses, approach an object, gather information on the basis of 
our interest (in certain types of questions, relations, institutions etc.) 
and gradually build a picture of the object, using it to formulate 
more specific ideas or questions about it, returning to the data again, 
gradually in a more deductive way. 
 A third, and even more complex approach to the scientific 
endeavour, is to start in an (assumed to be) alternative discourse to 
the one that is dominant in the analysis of the object we want to 
investigate, and attempt to find out what questions it would 
generate. (Note that even 'the phenomenon we are interested in' is 
itself a 'product' of a certain discourse). In such an approach even 
quite developed and broadly accepted theories about our object 
would become 'information to be processed', would become 
'materials'. The strength of such an approach is its critical potential, 
its potential of producing descriptions that in more than a marginal 
way transcend existing (hegemonic) descriptions of central 
phenomena in our societies. The weakness of it may be exactly that 
operationalization of concepts is more difficult (because the 
dominant discourse has not had the chance to develop concepts 
relevant to the object). The investigation can become abstract, 
theoretical, without 'proper' grounding in intersubjective, empirical 
facts etc. 
 The present study is, at least partly, embedded in a variant of 
Marx-inspired discourse on the state that developed in the 1970's. 
That was and is an oppositional, marginal discourse in European 
societies. Therefore it is necessary to spell out in some detail the 
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conceptual scheme of that discourse as I understand it. At least 
some elements of that language should be established, even before 
the problem is posed. Not that it is necessary to agree to the 
adequacy of that language to read the argument, but it is necessary 
to have some idea of the language, to be able to comprehend the 
problem posed. Therefore the introductory 'conceptual' chapters that 
attempt to mirror both the research done and the discourse adequate 
to it (Chapters 1-3). They delve into a specification of the process of 
state formation within a capitalist mode of production as a process 
of alienation of the state from society and the process of 
parliamentary state intervention as a bureaucratic form of power 
wielding (cf. Figure 1.2 and 1.3). They attempt to clarify at least 
aspects of the language used in formulating the problem, delineating 
relevant research materials and in presenting research results. My 
intention is to keep the concept formation process open for 
refutations and indications that other concepts and propositions may 
well be more to the point. 
 
The mode of presentation 
The presentation is developed along three paths: (1) A discussion of 
social science literature, both theoretical and empirical, of relevance 
for the understanding of the economic modernization process and 
state - society relations in that connection; (2) A study of primary 
data on the structural, over time (longitudinal) development of the 
economy and the state organization in Norway. An attempt is made 
to use data gathered within the macro-economic conceptual scheme 
of the national economy in an analysis of the distribution of power 
between groups, social classes and the state. In other words an 
attempt is made to develop a political economy empirically, to 
integrate analysis of different forms of the economy into political 
science; and (3) the intensive study of select political conflicts 
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(transverse study4) to develop some insights into the role of 
decision-making within the state organization, and in that way to 
introduce a test of the validity of statements on the role of the state 
drawn from the structural analysis. 
 The case studies were selected using three criteria: (1) that they 
were examples of state intervention into the economy (i.e. in 
agriculture, banking and industry); (2) that there was manifest 
political struggle over the form and the degree of state intervention 
and (3) that detailed materials on the decision-making processes 
were available. The three selected cases were all major conflictual 
questions at their time, but they are, of course, not in any sense 
statistically representative of how the state has related to labour 
and/or capital interests. 
 In Part A the problem and the main hypothesis is specified, 
together with a first delineation of the theoretical concepts. In Part B 
the formal structure of the state, as it appeared at the end of the 
modernization process (in 1970) is presented. The concept of the 
state is developed by locating the state within a theory of the 
modern capitalist economy and an attempt is made to describe the 
economic power of the state relative to the private sector. 
 In Part C I turn to the historical analysis of state formation and 
state interventions into society in the 19th century, looking at the 
state's relations to the peasantry, the formation of the new, modern 
bourgeoisie and the struggle between classes and movements over 
                                           
     4
 A transverse analysis, I suggest, is different from a synchronic analysis, which by definition 
does not "refer to historical antecedents" (Webster's New World Dictionary 1974:1443). The 
transverse analysis is both informed by and related to the historical analysis, but has the purpose 
of illuminating and modifying the 'long lines of development' exactly by giving the student a 
chance to investigate a more complex set of variables and their interrelationships. The opposite 
of a transverse analysis is a longitudinal analysis, that is, one that studies how a few variables 
affect a process over a shorter or longer period of time ('longitudinal': running or placed 




state power. The removal of the bureaucracy, as an elite and a 
political class, from the apex of the state organization in Norway is 
a central concern. As an example of this process Knut Dahl 
Jacobsen's study of the modernization of agriculture is revisited. 
The focus on the role of the state leads to a partial revision of the 
description given by Jacobsen (1964). 
 In Part D the analysis of state autonomy and the changing role of 
the state in the interwar period is presented. Materials on the 
changing structure of the economy are used to describe a new class 
structure. A dominant bourgeoisie is introduced to new forms of 
opposition both from international capital and from a strong, first 
split then consolidated labour movement. How this affected the 
structure and the role of the state is then addressed, suggesting a 
new form of state autonomy, called programme autonomy, where 
the state, through the mobilization of massive professional 
knowledge, becomes an independent actor within the economy. The 
role of the state is investigated more closely within agriculture and 
in the development of reformism as dominant ideology within the 
labour movement. A detailed study of the role of the state in the 
Trade Bank affair completes the study of state autonomy in the 
interwar period. 
 In Part E the role of the state in a consolidated capitalist economy 
and as a central actor within the social democratic regime is 
investigated. How the inherited state organization set limits on the 
definition of the social democratic project in Norway is looked into. 
The role of the professionals, a main theme through the whole 
study, is queried more closely, focussing on the formation of the 
professions between the pressure for scientific knowledge in 
different parts of the economy on the one hand and the demand for 
different types of knowledge within the public administration in its 
planning and implementing of sector specific policies on the other. 
Corporatism, the idea of letting functional groups and interest 
  
 11
organizations play a central role in state policy making is related to 
the increasing power of professionals, to the more limited role of 
the bourgeoisie (as Labour becomes government and as crisis 
tendencies develop in the economy) and as a conscious programme 
for state organization within social democracy. A study of the Kings 
Bay affair, where a state-owned mining company is hit by a number 
of fatal accidents, attempts to exemplify how the social democratic 
corporate type of regime could lead to a dramatic neglect of 
traditional labour movement demands for economic democracy.  
 The last theme in the study of state autonomy in the 
modernization process in Norway is the structure and the 
functioning of the welfare state. On the one hand the welfare state is 
the most important 'proof' of the thesis that the inherited state was 
not a crucial limitation on the implementation of working class 
interests with the Labour party in government. On the other hand it 
can be argued that the welfare state did not manage to counter or 
even neutralize the crisis tendencies in the economy, producing ever 
larger needs for exactly welfare state interventions. The Norwegian 
welfare programmes are set into a Nordic and European/OECD 
comparison. It is suggested that the welfare state budgets fruitfully 
can be seen as a politicization of the distribution of the wage fund, 
with the possibilities and the limitations that this concept suggests. 
 In Part F, the conclusion, I draw the lines together in an attempt 
to specify the role of the state in the modernization process, 
focussing the role played by the parliamentary organs of state, and 
the systematic limitation on those institutions set by a separate, 
bureaucratic administration with wide access to professional 
knowledge. In this basically (widely defined) infrastructural project, 
I suggest, the state was an autonomous policy-making and power-
wielding actor, an organization with elite- and class-forming ability, 
although, an organization (a complex set of institutions and 
organizations) systematically directed at securing bourgeois class 
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dominance in a complex web of technical demands, group and class 
conflicts and alliances and ideologically defined expectations, a 
state with a widening but limited repertoire of political and 
organizational responses to demands for democratization from 
labour and other oppositional movements.  
 In this complex relation between politics and administration we 
find both a modernization potential and an ability to limit the 
development of social movements beyond the modernization 
project. However, it is a specification of the modernizing role of the 
parliamentary state in Norway, that is, a state in the outskirts of 
Europe, a state long dominated by larger powers and a society with 
a large peasantry, a weak aristocracy and a weak bourgeoisie 
through most of the 19th century. Whether the theory developed 
here has relevance for other such states (and perhaps for peripheral 
states in so-called Third World regions today), requires somewhat 
more research in the days to come... 








      The problem of 
      state autonomy 
      in Norway 
 
 
      "An introductory discussion of concepts can hardly be dispensed with in 
spite of the fact that it is unavoidably abstract and hence gives the 
impression of remoteness from reality." 
 
 Max Weber (1968:3)  
 
      "Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of 
inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its 
different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only 
after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. 
If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally 
reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a 
priori construction."  
 
 Karl Marx (1970:19) 
 
     In the 1970's the Norwegian government 
commissioned a large social science study of "political power in 
Norway" (called the Norwegian Power Study (NPS) or, in 
Norwegian, "Maktutredningen"). By 1980 it had published its main 
findings (NPS 1982), suggesting (a) that the Norwegian state was to 
some degree defined and to a large degree hedged in by 
international economic and political processes; (b) that markets and 
bureaucracies had infiltrated and changed each other into negotiated 
markets and market-oriented bureaucracies; (c) that the state was a 
segmented system with power groups formed across formal 
institutional boundaries and with a plurality of values being peddled 
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and struggled over in the political arena; and (d) that the character 
of the Norwegian state (at the time of investigation) was determined 
by the large interest organizations. One task of the present study is 
to confront this description of the Norwegian state with findings 
from an historical analysis of the state-society relationship in 
Norway. My thesis is that the modern Norwegian state then appears 
as a surprisingly autonomous actor, with most of the empirical traits 
that the Power Study identified, but a state that rather should be 
seen as a conscious organizer of capitalism than as an open 
(democratic) arena for interest group competition and interest group 
compromises as the base for its policies. Contrary to interpretations 
of the Power Study, democracy in most of the radical meanings of 
that term (direct popular influence and control) has little relevance 
in describing state functioning, state autonomy and state power. The 
hypothesis is (a) that a Marxist approach can deepen the 
understanding of the modern state without contradicting major 
empirical descriptions given in the Power Study, interpreting them 
into a different, more encompassing system, contradicting the 
macro theory presented in the Power Study and (b) that a Marxist 
approach is as open to empirical verification and falsification of 
hypotheses as the "rational choice - pluralist system" approach 
adopted by the Power Study. 
 
 
THE STATE IN THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS. 
A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW 
 
State and classes in the nineteenth century 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Norway was an agri-
cultural society with a large peasantry, mostly unorganized 
politically and engaged in staving off Danish bureaucratic 
intervention. A new, but small bourgeoisie was emerging in urban 
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trade and rural, small-scale industry. An elitist and self-contained 
Danish-Norwegian bureaucracy controlled the state. A status-con-
scious bureaucracy, those 2000 families (Seip 1974), ruled the 
country - "in the name of the Danish king before 1814 and in the 
name of the Norwegian people after" (Steen 1957).  
 A broad and complex coalition of bourgeois industrialists, 
bankers and tradesmen, liberal intellectuals, and market-oriented 
farmers gradually took form around the project of national 
liberation, a coalition that gradually closed in on the Swedish/Nor-
wegian state with the purpose of ousting the bureaucratic elite or 
political class from the top positions in the state and establishing 
national independence (Seip 1945). That project succeeded in part 
in 1884, when the coalition managed, through the formal 
mechanism of a Court of Impeachment, to force the Swedish king to 
let members of government speak and defend policy in the Storting 
(The Norwegian parliament) and to make the choice of government 
dependent upon the majority there. From that time on it was the 
majority (or the largest section of the minority groups) in the 
Storting that decided on the political composition of the "King's" 
government.  
 The rise of the bourgeoisie, actively organizing capitalist forms 
of production and distribution, drew with it the formation of the 
working class (agricultural wage labour, wage labour in trade and in 
private service work, wage labour in industry, etc.), a class with 
contradictory interests to the bourgeoisie in the economy. The 
working class developed slowly in Norway (cf. Bull 1985 and 
Myhre 1977). Around 1850 workers, together with other class 
elements, penetrated for the first time in an organized way the 
formal borders of the existing state with economic and democratic 
demands, inspired by international socialist theory and the French 
revolutions, especially the February Revolution of 1848. The 
movement got its name from its leader, Marcus Thrane. The Thrane 
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movement managed to organize local associations across the 
country. But compared with the rising bourgeois coalition of the 
pre-1884 years, this labour-peasant movement was a dispersed, ad 
hoc social movement,5 without any firm collective identity, held 
together by the charisma of Marcus Thrane. When in 1851 Thrane 
managed to call a national congress in Christiania, the ruling 
bureaucratic elite and influential sections of the bourgeoisie got 
jittery. Rumours of "revolution and the use of weapons" gave the 
police reason to act. The congress was dispersed with force and the 
leaders sentenced to from four to eight years in jail. 
 With that powerful state action, the weak, first glimmers of a 
popular labour movement disintegrated. It was not until the turn of 
the century that the labour movement became a national, class-
conscious organization with a stable collective leadership.  
 
Indigenous economic development 
Between 1850 and 1890 an early and slow industrialization and an 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production had taken place. 
International capital had been important from the start. As Dieter 
Senghaas (1985) suggests, that influx of capital stimulated an 
indigenous economic transformation process. The national 
democratic movement gradually inundated the Storting. The 
majority there ousted the bureaucratic conservative elites from 
government position, and supported the demands of a national 
bourgeoisie for public infrastructure conducive to capitalist 
industrialization. The bourgeoisie, supported by a gradually more 
democratic and decentralized state apparatus, managed to link up 
with (English and French) capital and gradually gain control and 
independence in the economy through, among other mechanisms, 
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 See the winter 1985 issue of Social Research, with a number of articles on social 
movements, e.g. Tilly, Melucci and Touraine. For a discussion of the theories in relation to the 
early formation of the Norwegian labour movement, see Gran (1988). 
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the development of workshops for repair and development of 
technology in agriculture, forestry, fishing, shipping, textile 
production etc. The politically controlled and gradually 
professionalized state administration was important for creating the 
infrastructural conditions for autocentricity (common rules and 
standards for economic activity, state banks, roads, telegraph, 
controlled seaways, railway, medical administration etc.). 
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State, bourgeois interests and the labour movement 
The Labour Party was formed in 1887 and the Norwegian 
Federation of Trade Unions6 12 years later, in 1899. During the 
process of capitalist expansion and political organization around the 
turn of the century, the state increasingly became the political focus 
of the labour movement. The labour movement was from the 
beginning split on how to relate to the state. Could the labour 
movement cooperate with the radical bourgeois party Venstre, 
which had fought for national independence up to 1905, when 
Norway formally seceded from the union with Sweden? When that 
question was decided in the negative, the movement split on new 
questions: How should the conquering of state power take place? 
Should it be through a broad mobilization of the labour unions, 
using the general strike as a vehicle for transcending bourgeois state 
power, or was the revolutionary party the essential weapon? Or was 
reform the way, the long battle for political rights for the working 
classes within the existing state organization and using those rights 
for a gradual, legal conquest of majority positions in the Storting 
and government? Like the bourgeois coalition earlier, the labour 
movement was increasingly engaged in the question of state power, 
of how to organize the state.7 
 The battle within the labour movement was especially sharp 
between 1917 and 1923/24. It ended with a social democratic, legal 
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 Workers' National Trade Union, 'Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon' (AFL) to 1957. 
Thereafter, the National Union, Landsorganisasjonen (LO); i.e. a name that no longer mentions 
workers explicitly. 
     7
 See Bjørnhaug (1979) and Magdahl (1979) for a presentation of research on the labour 
movement and the explication of a thesis. Bjørnhaug argues against the view that the Labour 
Party first broke with a revolutionary strategy in the 1930's and turned to social democracy as 
we know it now as a parliamentary movement. Her view is that the party was on a reformist 
route after 1923 (when it broke with Comintern), that the syndicalist leadership also, in practice, 
supported reformism and that the party thus struggled against radical tendencies in the working 
class. Magdahl adds to that analysis that Labour Party verbal radicalism in the 1920's was 
motivated by a need to present itself as more radical than the Communist Party. 
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government takeover in 1935, after agreements were made on 
support to agriculture with the farmers' movement and on 
restrictions on the right to strike with the employers' federation 
(Bjørgum 1970, Seim 1972).  
 
The postwar welfare state 
From a confused beginning, the struggle against the Nazi invasion 
of Norway gradually created a broad national resistance movement 
that the labour movement was part of and in many ways affected 
by. Communists played a leading role in the development of 
militancy in the resistance movement. In 1945 the labour movement 
was still divided between revolutionary and reformist factions, 
between the Labour Party and the Communist Party. The labour 
movement as a whole had strong backing in the population. In the 
elections in 1945 the Labour Party got 41% of the votes and the 
Communist Party 11.9% (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 
Historisk Statistikk (HS), 1978:644). We can assume that this 
backing included a large and growing portion of the working class, 
relative to the prewar elections. The Labour Party and the 
Communists had a full majority in the Storting (87 of 150 seats) and 
the Labour Party under Einar Gerhardsen organized a new govern-
ment after feeble attempts at letting the bourgeois resistance leader-
ship form the new government. 
 In the first postwar period, reconstruction of the capitalist 
economy and international security issues were in the forefront of 
politics. The Labour government had no ambitions to restructure the 
economy on a socialist basis (given that by socialism we mean 
public ownership and democratic management of all major means 
of production). However, the party demanded state ownership of 
key industrial companies, especially those taken over by the 
Germans during the war and the banks. A corporatist type of state 
organization was to be developed, organs where the state, capital 
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and labour at all levels of the economy (firm, branch and state 
levels) would cooperate and plan the economic activity. The Labour 
Party, it has been said, let the bourgeoisie dominate the economy on 
the assumption that the labour movement could dominate the state 
(state + labour movement would mean political control of the 
private sector). NATO membership became a heated and divisive 
issue in the labour movement, an issue the NATO supporters won in 
1948. Since then the social democrats have been staunch supporters 
of Norwegian integration into the Western Alliance and into West 
European and American capitalism. Marshall Aid furthered that 
integration.  
 The social democratic leadership used harsh methods in 
suppressing opposition to this westward integration process. 
Especially after the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Commu-
nist Party was fiercely attacked and denunciated by the Labour 
Party leadership.  
 The idea of a planned economy also meant planned labour 
markets, or the idea of a welfare state that could manage markets 
and take care of those who were unsuccessful there. This 
interventionist state, with the ability to plan production and 
distribution and to regulate the labour market so that everyone 
achieved a reasonable wage and living standard, became the 
hallmark of the postwar social democratic labour movement. In 
Norway it seems true to say that, while the planned capitalist 
economy did not materialize to any substantial degree, the social 
democrats had success with labour market regulation and welfare 
state services8.  
 By the end of the 1970's this process of compromises resulted in 
a Labour Party that removed the goal of a socialist society from its 
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 Jonas Pontusson (1983) has shown that this was also the case for Sweden, and as such quite 
a different project from that of the socialists in France, who rather achieved the opposite: active 
planning of the economy, but less success in the labour and welfare markets. 
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programmes (Hjellum 1987b), even though the party quite openly 
admitted that capitalism was still the dominant economic system in 
the country. Their reasoning was that, with representatives of the 
working class in government, the situation was under at least 
popular, democratic, if not socialist control.9  
 
 
THE CASE STUDIES 
 
The modernization of the agricultural administration 
In 1900 the agricultural public administration was reorganized. An 
earlier independent Directorate of Agriculture was incorporated into 
a newly created Ministry of Agriculture. The earlier Director 
became one of many subordinates in the Ministry. At the same time 
a professional opposition in the Directorate rose to prominence in 
the Ministry. The opposition had long peddled an alternative model 
of the government's engagement in the development of agriculture. 
While the earlier model had focused on the dissemination of 
scientific knowledge about production methods, the new model, in 
addition, argued that the state should enter into more diversified 
support to farmers, support attuned to their varying needs in 
different parts of the country, with the purpose of making the farms 
economically viable in markets for agricultural products. The state 
should not passively wait for requests for assistance from farmers, 
but actively go to the farmers with assistance. The new model (the 
profit model) was directed at making all sections and units of 
agricultural production profitable in money terms. 
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 Walter Korpi (1983) has developed the thesis that by gaining positions in the existing state 
the Labour Party increases the power of the working class. 
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Support to the faltering Trade Bank 
In late May 1923 a group of bankers put their heads together to 
figure out how the faltering Trade Bank could be saved, or at least 
how the large capital deposits in that bank could be rescued before 
the bank collapsed. Their solution was highly statist. The state 
should provide the money needed. The bankers requested a meeting 
with the government. With the director of Norges Bank (the reserve 
bank) as mediator, the meeting with the government was arranged. 
In it the bankers presented their strategy. In addition to a specific 
amount of money, they suggested that the investment be made 
clandestinely: there should be no mention in the Storting. Mention 
there could arouse the labour movement and a general run on the 
banks. The bankers also demanded a public statement from the 
government, assuring the public in Norway and international 
finance capital that the banks were solvent and that, if problems 
should arise, the government would support banks "good for such 
support". Exactly that statement was issued. The Trade Bank was 
supported clandestinely and taken under public administration. The 
data show that during the administration the big investors in the 
bank got their contributions out, while the small, common savers 
lost most of their investments. Later the responsible Prime Minister 
was impeached, but through a very special judicial process he was 
finally acquitted. 
 
Public management of the Kings Bay Coal Mine 
In November 1962 there was an explosion in a state-owned coal 
mine on Svalbard; 22 miners were killed. The accident led to 
investigations of the government management of state enterprises, 
the management system the Labour government had been politically 
responsible for since 1935. The investigations disclosed a system 
focused on maximizing production, a system that had hardly 
touched upon questions of workers' safety in the years prior to the 
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accident, and a management system where the general assembly of 
the company in practice was one person, one centrally placed 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Industry, a bureaucrat who in addition 
was responsible for at least 10 other state-owned enterprises. When 
accused of irresponsible management, the Prime Minister, Einar 
Gerhardsen, defended the administration by referring to the law on 
share-holding companies, the law governing both publicly and 
privately owned firms in the country. It said that the central 
management had a limited responsibility.  
 
 
THE CONCEPTS OF STATE AND CLASS 
 
The state 
The state, seen as an organization controlling in an absolute sense 
the whole population within a specified territory, is in many ways 
the core institution of modern politics. States have become common 
political institutions globally. States embody the most diverse goals 
and ambitions (from the extremes of pure democracy to the 
extremes of elitism, dictatorship and racism, from ideas of a global 
community to the most petty of aggressive and intolerant 
nationalisms). And states have acted over a wide spectrum of 
policies, from genuine provisions of social welfare to poor people to 
the most gruesome acts of homicide. States appear as durable, 
unchangeable machines and as ephemeral creations, changing their 
character from one day to the next (e.g. the fascist takeover in 
Germany in 1933). States exist one day and disappear the next (e.g. 
the breakdown of the East German state). States have in this way 
become a central prize of organized politics. The acquisition of state 
power has become the ultimate goal of nearly all political activity, 
from the most conservative anti-state movements (like the Reagan 
movement in the USA or the right-wing Populist movement in 
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Norway), to the social democrats (who are explicitly pro-state) to 
the most extreme revolutionary movements, which on the one hand 
want to "explode" the old state, but most often (so far) with the 
ambition of immediately creating a new one. 
 How should we define a state? First I will consider a state an 
organization, that is, a specific group of people recruited to the state 
organization, an organization with an internal division of labour, an 
internal authority10 structure and directed at acting on some goal 
dimensions. Secondly a state has the ambition of absolute control 
within a territory. A state does not accept any higher decision-
making authority. If such an authority does exist it is because the 
sovereign state has allotted the organ such decision-making power. 
If people within a state have autonomy and freedom of action, it is 
because the state (usually after struggle) has allotted such freedoms 
to the people. Thirdly a state tries to monopolize the right to control 
and/or punish the people under its jurisdiction physically. And it 
demands to be in sole control of military units within the territory.  
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 We distinguish between authority and power. Power is the capacity to realize a project. 
Resources, including weapons of diverse kind, dependencies (where the powerful has something 
others need, want or are dependent upon) and ideological support, (where an actor has ideas that 
others feel attracted to and support) are all means of power. Authority is the assignment to 
somebody, an individual or a collectivity of some kind, of the right to make decisions and take 
on leadership. Authority can thus neutralize means of power or make those means superfluous 
for efficient realization of a project. 
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 States are often defined as legitimate organizations, that is, as 
organizations that are actively conceded the right to be alone in 
controlling and using military force. I agree with Charles Tilly that 
the legitimacy of state organizations should be seen as an empirical 
question (Tilly 1984b). States may or may not be legitimate in the 
whole population or in parts of the population under their 
jurisdiction.  
 What is it that makes the state organization so important? To 
approach that question we have to study several processes: the 
formation of states, how they relate to individuals, groups and social 
classes and other states, and how they function in those relations. 
Can it be that the state is not that important, that societies could well 
do without it (as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels discussed in some 
of their texts on the "withering" of the state)? Are there, in other 
words, other possible forms of political organization that could well 
keep societies going, perhaps even in a more peaceful way than 
hitherto (political organizations without imperial ambitions), with 
less internal strife, with less use of bureaucratic power and physical 
force and with less aggression towards neighbours? Can it be that, 
quite contrary to "common" knowledge, the dominance of state 
institutions is part and parcel of the development of the capitalist 
market economy, arising with capitalism and (in the future...) 
disappearing with it? Or is the state, as Stalin suggested, just an 
epiphenomenon of capitalism, a 'metal armour' that covers the body 
of a social class, the ruling bourgeoisie in capitalist society? Or is 
the state, as ideology in modern western welfare states would have 
it, a democratic institution, where everybody has some say and 
where state actions are compromises decided upon in duly elected 
parliaments? 
 State analysis has not been a very central part of western Anglo-
American political science. Behaviouralism directed attention 
towards actions, interactions and subjective, strategic aspects of 
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human life. Institutions, rules, cultures and collective expectations 
receded into near oblivion. Realism was in a sense part of the same 
movement. Rather than study the formal rules of the political game, 
it was deemed necessary to analyze the actual political and 
administrative actions of power groups, elites, political movements 
and professions (Slagstad 1987). Again the institutions, rules, 
cultures and collective expectations receded into the background. A 
third reason was that social scientists felt the pressure of the natural 
sciences, the demand that to say something depended on your 
measuring something. And to measure you had to limit your object. 
If it became too "large" or too "complex", measurement became 
difficult. So talking about states as organizations, as a unit, a 
macrosocial unit, was deemed frivolous and/or unscientific. 
 In European political science of the continental variety, the state 
had more legitimacy as an object of study. Legality was more 
institutionalized, the legal professions were stronger and the states 
themselves were more centralized. Rule systems and collective 
expectations were more conspicuous. Marxist analysis had a 
stronger footing, both in political movements and in academia. 
Marxists had for a long time seen states as organizations serving 
class interests, serving the bourgeoisie in the capitalist mode of 
production, serving "bureaucratic bourgeoisies" in socialist states, 
wielding its bureaucratic and physical might against people 
transgressing the ("bourgeois") law, against the working classes and 
against other states. This statist tradition in legal and political 
sciences on the continent was carried further after Hitler and the 
Second World War (SWW) by the Frankfurt School and the many 
strands of neo-Marxist state analysis. 
 But alas, with states proliferating around the globe, with 
enormous scope for variation, and with rather scant systematic 
research so far on the historical and political character of the 
modern state, that research has to be a piecemeal exercise.  
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 The project, then, is to contribute to the deciphering of the 
internal structure of the modern Norwegian state. Whose interests 
has it over time served? How were the structures formed, how did 
they function to order decision-making? What kind of state 
definition can we abstract from the historical materials? What kind 
of organization was it? To what degree can it be described as 
democratic? To what degree was it a class organization? To what 
degree was it an autonomous agent and actor in the modernization 
process? 
 This way of posing the problem is somewhat different from Stein 
Rokkan's and Charles Tilly's way. They are more interested in 
explaining variations in the forms of state, searching for reasons 
why certain societies had strong states and others weak states, why 
certain societies had a strong state early and others a strong state 
late, etc. The definition of the state, the kind of organization it was 
in the different societies, is less problematical in their queries. 
Charles Tilly, for example, assumes that states are organizations in 
the hands of their makers, serving the specific interests of the state 
makers. His research focus is the processes that generate different 
forms of state organizations: Under what conditions do capitalist 
entrepreneurs create states? When do military commanders create 
states? What are the conditions that generate large bureaucratic 
states or small state centres? etc. My approach is to focus more on 
developing a definition of state organizations over time, on the 
character of states as organizations. I find this focus important 
because there is reason to believe that states often appear in false 
garb, that popular ideas on states may be wrong and that our 
scientific concepts about the structure and character of states are 
poorly developed. 
 Working with the definition of states, their inner structure and 
function in society, is also important because it might be that 
societies can do without them. Much political science on states just 
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assumes that states are necessary for order and will exist as the 
ordering institution for ever. Research on the deciphering of the 
internal structure of states may prove that they were not as essential 
for the historical ordering of societies as we so readily assume and 
that state functions in the future might well be met by the civil 
society, because new political and administrative competences 
develop there. 
 
The concept of class 
The class concept has roots in political economy. It suggests that an 
economy places its agents in basically different roles, assigning 
contradictory interests to them, the producer in some way delivering 
economic values to a non-producer (owner) without economic 
compensation (= exploitation). A class is a category of people with 
a similar role in the economy and where that role is part of an 
exploitative system of classes. Social categories of people have 
common traits; for example, a certain type of education or a certain 
level of income. Being a class member means being part of an 
exploitative economic system. A class is defined or constituted by 
its contradictory relations to other classes, a relation that is rooted in 
structural differences, differences of positions and functions. Thus 
people who have wages and people who have profits and rents as 
their main income in the same society can most often fruitfully be 
considered classes of people, assuming that the surplus value behind 
the profits is produced mainly by wage workers. But people in state 
positions may constitute a class if those positions put them in an 
exploitative relation to for example subsistence farmers or to the 
group of private traders in the cities (e.g. because the state tries to 
run state trading organizations in the same fields as the private 
urban traders). Such a group may be termed a political class. An 
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elite, in contrast, is a term that defines an institutional leadership 
without taking a stand on that group's relation to class interests.11 
 Ideological differences can also give form to classes, for example 
when Islam unites people against Christians in the same society and 
those differences strengthen economic exploitation. Thus class is an 
analytical, not an empirical concept. A group of people that fulfils 
the class criterion can also act as an interest group. Class is a 
concept that identifies materialized, systematic, to some extent 
antagonistic contradictions between categories of people, contradic-
tions that generate struggle and that are rooted in the organization of 
the economy. 
 Classes (analytically again) exist in part objectively (materialized 
contradictions). Whether they exist subjectively is an empirical 
problem. That is, whether class members understand themselves as 
such is not crucial for the simple existence of class (the distinction 
between class an sich and class für sich). However, the subjective 
element is important for the development of class action and class 
struggle. We should therefore distinguish between class existence at 
(a) the objective, structural level, (b) the subjective, ideological 
level and (c) the organizational level (where class sympathizers 
band together in organizations to act on class and other interests).12 
 Class structures are rooted in economies. In Norway, 
modernization meant the introduction of the capitalist mode (wage 
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 The Oxford Dictionary:845 defines an elite as "the choice part or flower (of society, or of 
any body or class of persons"). See also the discussion of elites and elite theory in a 
development context in Gran et al. 1990:57-. 
     12
 If this is in conformity with Marx's understanding of class, as Bettelheim (1985) suggests, 
we can use the class concept without subscribing to Marx's specific theory of class struggle, 
which says (1) that capitalist society simplifies the class struggle and makes the wage-earners 
and the capitalists into two large and homogeneous classes with contradictory interests, (2) that 
the proletariat (wage-earners without subordinates) is increasingly strengthened objectively, 
subjectively (ideologically) and organizationally, (3) that the proletariat will for those reasons 
make a revolution and establish itself as the dominant, state-based class, until (4) the class 
system withers and the classless (and stateless) society emerges.  
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labour in basically industrial production) into an agricultural 
subsistence mode (with many small, independent landowners/ 
fishermen). A class is an actually or potentially exploitative group, 
that is, a group that can extract resources or compliance without 
compensation from other groups or classes in society. Classes exist 
by definition in a contradictory relationship. As long as the classes 
have their positions and their characteristics (for example as wage 
labourers and capital owners), the contradictory relationship 
between them will exist. 
 In capitalism the bourgeoisie is by definition the group that owns 
and controls the use of the dominant means of production. Its 
members are persons who fully live off that ownership and/or 
control and who are not economically exploited (who do not deliver 
labour free of charge to others).13 
 The working classes do not have that ownership or control. On 
the other hand, they have their wage income or their income in other 
forms from their own labour. The working classes have power in 
their large numbers and their specific, concrete forms of technical 
and cultural knowledge essential for the functioning of the 
production processes. These different economic contexts (or 
positions/places in the economy) imbue the classes with different 
interests, the bourgeoisie being a product of and dependent upon 
capital accumulation, the working classes upon work contracts with 
firms and an (assumed) interest in gaining control of its own 
working conditions and the means of production that they produce 
                                           
     13
 Tilly (1964) distinguishes between administrative, professional and commercial elements in 
'bourgeois' occupations. Those distinctions also seem fruitful for a study of the structure of the 
bourgeoisie in modern Norway. However, we might also distinguish a scientific segment 
(people in control of scientific institutions) and distinguish between public and private 
administrators. Thus the bourgeoisie is a complex of occupations and types of people. What 
makes the bourgeoisie one class is its dependence (in one way or another) on economic 
exploitation of other classes.  
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and use. Thus class power should be defined as a combination of 
specific positions and types of resources that give form to interests. 
If the working classes, through their political representatives, use 
their resources to strengthen the capitalist system, then they are not 
wielding their own fundamental class power, however much they 
are trying to gain in the short term. 
 With the advent of capitalism, the mode of politics (Mouzelis 
1986) changed. The state organization expanded and proliferated in 
new institutions, institutions that also emersed the state organization 
increasingly in economic processes and demanded expanded 
scientific and professional education. We might historically speak 
of a development from an elitist bureaucratic mode of politics, to a 
parliamentary-political party mode to a corporatist mode of politics. 
 As the economic so also the political "modes of production" can 
have class-forming capacities. Class traits can thus be sought in the 
character of institutions, the type of functions they have in the 
economy and in the management systems in both private and public 
sectors. Managers in private firms, while being wage-earners, can 
also live off profits and can be enmeshed in institutional demands 
and expectations that connect them closely to the interests of the 
capital owners. All these aspects of their existence influence their 
class-affiliation. State employees can in the same way be seen as 
having class traits or characteristics, depending on the type of 
institution they are employed in (the judiciary has a different 
function from the military, and welfare administrations have a 
different function relative to private firms and wage-earner 
organizations, etc.), on their placement in the wage hierarchy 
(working- or managerial- or top capitalist class payment levels), on 
their sex (indicating for example placement relative to the 
patriarchal type of culture and power), etc. Intellectuals, as 
Mannheim (1949) indicates, can have class characteristics, 
depending on the type of institution that employs/pays them. As 
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Regi Enerstvedt (1971) points out, people can be on the move 
within and between class categories. Students, unemployed people, 
people working mainly in the informal, non-wage, non-
commodified sector (for example family members working at 
home), pensioners, people on the move to new jobs, etc., will have 
ambiguous and/or changing class characteristics. 
 The structural class position will have effect dependent upon 
actual experiences of conflict, on subjective interpretation and 
understanding of class positions, class relations, etc. Thus the level 
and type of organization and struggle cannot be deduced simply 
from determinations of group/class positions. The subjective 
element is an autonomous element, more or less influenced by 
position and type of movement in that position, but dependent on a 
maze of other subjective historical, psychological and ideological 
factors. We can of course assign structural positions to anyone, 
whether they see those positions or not. But whether they have an 
effect is dependent on a demonstration of a change of behaviour 
and/or understanding that (with some likelihood) can be said to 
follow from the position. In this sense structural effects are and have 
to be mediated at the individual, subjective level (Ricoeur 1986).  
 We can thus assume that each of these complex, changing 
structural systems gave form to different group and class structures. 
It is in such a maze of group and class struggles that the problem of 
the role of the state is set. Class is basically a concept defining 
antagonistic relations to at least one other class. The autonomy and 
the power of the state organization in societies permeated or 
influenced by capitalist systems of production and distribution can 
(and should) be located in a class-group analysis of the type 
outlined above, with attention to both retrospective explanation of 
chosen actions and prospective analysis of the room or leeway for 
action and the action alternatives perceived by the actors. 
 





Democracy in class-divided societies 
Under certain conditions capitalism furthers the formation of a 
democratic, representative state (Moore 1966). Its democratic 
character is dependent upon popular participation in elections and 
the influence elected assemblies have on policy-making and 
recruitment of government personnel. Historically and across 
political systems, that has varied. That the state is representative 
alludes to the indirect character of popular influence. In direct 
democracies larger or smaller groups of the population rule directly, 
through meetings or other forms of direct decision-making.  
 Another type of democratic representative state is the parliamen-
tary state. This phrase has two interpretations: (1) a state where an 
elected assembly has supreme political authority - that type of state 
was introduced in Norway in 1814; (2) a state where parliament also 
has power over the composition of government - that system, 
parliamentarianism, was introduced in Norway in 1884. 
 If the democratic ideal is realized, then the state should not have 
any significant autonomy. The state can then be seen as an arena 
where all group/class interests are defined and common policy 
worked out. It should not be systematically biased against the 
interests of any part of the population and it should not serve values 
that are independent of specific interests in society. Therefore a 
critical test of the democratic theory is whether the representative 
state has autonomy. If it has autonomy in the sense that it serves its 
own interests and those are manifestly different from the interests of 
the major classes in society, the theory of a representative state is 
threatened. Also if the state systematically serves one class against 
the interest of others, the democratic theory is in question. 
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 Autonomy can generally be defined as independence or self-
government. Thus, we speak of an autonomous national state as one 
that is a sovereign member of the international community without 
any other state having the formal right to overrule it. National states 
are sovereign states.14 Within socialist theory sovereignty has been a 
basic right of nationalities, groups of people living within a specific 
territory with a specific culture, language, etc., a right of prominent 
importance because of the rampant subjugation of nationalities as 
capitalism expanded into its imperial and colonial forms.15 
                                           
     14
 See Merriam (1900) for an interesting presentation of how that concept was used after the 
French Revolution, when a host of theoreticians bent over backwards to find other sources of 
sovereignty than the 'the people'.  
     15
 See Lenin (1967:599-655) "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", where he also 
discusses Norway's secession from Sweden. 
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 In the present work the question of autonomy is raised in a 
different context. The focus is on the autonomy of the state 
apparatus and its diverse organizations. Both liberal theory about 
the representative state and Marxist theory on the class state have 
assumed that the state apparatus in such societies is without sig-
nificant autonomy. Liberal theory has assumed that the state is 
under the control of the people (at least a significant, "responsible" 
section of the people within the state's boundaries). One version of 
the Marxist theory has assumed that the state in capitalist society is 
both managed and controlled by the dominant class in the economy, 
the bourgeoisie (the state is an organization that rules over exploited 
classes with force if necessary, the state is the executive committee 
of the ruling class). That theory says that the state apparatus in 
capitalist society, which typically controls the military and the 
police, is used to subjugate, exploit and control the working classes 
and all working people. A socialist or revolutionary state is in the 
same theory (ideally) also an apparatus in control of violent means 
to suppress a class, but with the majoritarian proletariat16 (most 
often its representatives) in command. 
 Marxist theory put the state into the evolutionary perspective. 
Lenin, inspired by Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune, saw the 
possibility of a new type of state, a state gradually transformed from 
a specialized, violent/bureaucratic force for class rule to a 
democratic, popularly based system of administration of public 
communal affairs, stripped of its means of violence. How could that 
change come about? The theory was that the proletariat was often a 
majority and a class without any historically acquired rights over 
means of production, a class without an exploitative structural 
relation to other classes. Lenin put the theoretical point this way:  
                                           
     16
 Another term within Marxian theory for the working class. In ancient Rome, the proletariat 
was the lowest class of citizens; its members had no property or assured income and were a 
source of discontent and political instability. (Columbia Encyclopedia:2226). 
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 "The state is a special organization of force; it is the organization of violence for the 
suppression of some class. What class must the proletariat suppress? Naturally, the 
exploiting class only, i.e. the bourgeoisie. The toilers need the state only to overcome the 
resistance of the exploiters, and only the proletariat can direct this suppression and bring it to 
fulfillment, for the proletariat is the only class that is thoroughly revolutionary, the only class 
that can unite all the toilers and the exploited in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, in 
completely displacing it." (Lenin 1922:22) 
  
The withering of the state is related to the "total displacement of the 
bourgeoisie" and the fact that the proletariat does not have 
structurally defined exploitative interests as a class. The proletariat 
is the first class in history with the chance of avoiding private 
ownership of the means of production. It is interesting to note that 
there is no mention of the party in this paragraph (or in this work of 
Lenin's as a whole). It is the working class that shall "direct this 
oppression". History has proved that this aspect of class rather than 
party action has been the most difficult to implement in the 
"actually existing socialisms". 
 In this interpretation of the state, the centrality of bureaucracy in 
the democratic representative state is spelt out. The military/police 
apparatus, located centrally in the state institution, is the core of the 
state. In that apparatus there is no representation, no parliamentary 
organs, no electoral processes (except, perhaps, internal elections of 
spokespersons and the existence of trade unions). The rest of the 
state apparatus - the parliaments, the civil administration and the 
courts - in the Leninist conception is 'in the last instance' set to 
administer violent force against an unruly people and against 
revolutionary movements. 
 The possibility of this scenario is obvious. Many democratic 
states have laws that under extreme crisis conditions allow for a 
military command of the state. There are many examples of a 
democratic representative state in capitalist societies degenerating to 
military rule, suggesting that the representative system may be a 
 State autonomy  37 
 
relatively weak structure in the history of these societies. Capitalism 
and representative democracy are possible, but not necessary. 
Capitalism can thrive under authoritarian forms of state. 
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 Whether representative democracy or bureaucratic command is at 
the heart of the state system depends on the relation between the 
main classes. If that relation is openly antagonistic and exploitative 
we would expect the bureaucratic, violent form of state to be 
practised. If class relations are peaceful, the representative, 
democratic form of state is more likely. In a classless society we 
might expect representative forms of public administration to be 
prevalent. 
 Both these theories have been confronted with harsh scientific 
(and - of course - political) criticism. The democratic theory has 
been criticized internally by a number of studies showing that 
influence over state policy-making is skewed. The rich have more 
access than the poor, the organized have more access than the unor-
ganized, groups with professionals in their service have more access 
than groups without, etc. The Marxist theory has been criticized for 
not coming to grips with the autonomy of the state, the independent 
role of the state. Miliband (1973) suggested that the professional 
politicians and administrators in the state apparatus to a large degree 
acted independently in the political process, but that their back-
ground in bourgeois classes oriented their action models towards 
pro-capitalist policies (action models: that define the situation, the 
problems contained in that situation, participants in problem 
solving, and standards for reasonable solutions to the problems). 
Poulantzas (1970) developed a more structural critique, suggesting 
that the state had relative autonomy, but that its organization 
structure directed attention toward pro-capitalist policies. Habermas 
and the Frankfurt school developed the Gramscian idea of 
ideological hegemony, suggesting that the state in some sense was 
less important because the general (democratic) understanding of 
society was a common understanding.17 
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 Laclau and Mouffe (1985) relate this idea in an interesting way to the development of 
Stalinism and the all-powerful, bureaucratic and 'leading' political party. The Stalinist model 
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Elster on Marx 
Jon Elster (1985) suggests that autonomy is the central problem in 
Marxist state analysis: "The central question in Marxist theory of 
the state is whether it is autonomous with respect to class interests, 
or entirely reducible to them" (Elster 1985:402).  
 Is state autonomy a central problem in Marx's analysis? Hardly. 
What Marx is battling with as far as I can see - and which Elster 
demonstrates in his way - is how and to what degree the state serves 
the diverse interests of the economically dominant class and how 
the revolutionary class, the proletariat, should relate to the 
bourgeois state formation, and to a future socialist or proletarian 
state. Marx asks to what degree the state has capabilities the classes 
do not have, and he attempts to define the power of the state in 
different types of class relations and class struggles. If Marx does 
generalize, it seems to me, it is not in categorizing states as either 
autonomous or dependent, but about how the proletariat and its 
allies should act towards and in the state apparatus to implement 
their interests. Let me try to justify this statement by looking more 
closely at Marx's studies of the state in the class struggles of 
1848-1850 in France, and the Paris Commune in 1871.  
                                                                                                              
goes as follows. If the working class has adopted the bourgeois understanding of society, then a 
cadre party sharply separated from 'bourgeois society' is necessary. And, since the class doesn't 
have a correct paradigm any longer, the party has to develop the theory of socialism and 
revolution and teach the working classes. Discipline has to reign to prevent party members 
coming under bourgeois influence... But, as Laclau and Mouffe point out, if the working class 
has adopted the bourgeois ideology, what status does materialism have, the idea that the class is 
basically formed from its position in the economy and through the functioning of the class-
specific organizations?  
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 Elster's critique of Marx is scathing: "By and large, [his] 
influence has been harmful rather than benign. The theory is set out 
in a half-conspiratorial, half-functionalist language that invites lazy, 
frictionless thought" (Elster 1985:399). Marx "held a narrow, 
pre-strategic concept of power" (ibid:406). Is this critique 
reasonable? Elster's interpretation of Marx's analysis of the French 
state in The Eighteenth Brumaire can help us answer that question.  
 Elster attacks two points in Marx's text. First his suggestion of 
three stages in the development of the French state: during the 
absolute monarchy, the first revolution and under Napoleon the 
bureaucracy prepared class rule; under the Restoration, Louis 
Philipe and the parliamentary republic, the bureaucracy was an 
instrument of the ruling class, striving to develop its own power 
position; "Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to 
have made itself completely independent". And Marx adds, "As 
against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position 
so thoroughly that the chief of the Society of December 10 suffices 
for its head" (Elster 1985:416). Secondly Marx suggests that the 
bourgeoisie was forced to let Bonaparte come to power and that his 
regime served the bourgeoisie well.  
 What does Elster have to say about that analysis? His point is that 
Marx has weak support for his thesis that "the state is in the service 
of capitalism". "Marx never succeeded in proving that the state in a 
capitalist society must be a capitalist state." 
 Marx suggests that the autonomy of the Bonapartist state is "an 
appearance", not reality. Elster finds "the way in which [Marx] tries 
to anchor [the appearance] in the class structure ambiguous" 
(ibid:416). But is Marx's proof all that weak? 
 It seems to me that Elster underrates a specific type of material in 
Marx's studies and that he is emphatically mistaken in char-
acterizing Marx's analysis as "prestrategic". Elster underrates the 
information Marx mobilizes on how the French bureaucracy, 
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despite its size and parasitic character under Bonaparte, was set to 
support the financial aristocracy and capitalist industrialization. He 
also underrates, in my opinion, Marx's point that the bureaucracy 
was dependent upon capital accumulation in the private sector to 
pay the bureaucrats and keep the tax income expanding. Thus, for 
Marx the state was more than just a machine to suppress the 
working classes. It was an instrument that independently of the 
individual capital fractions, had to organize and suppress civil 
society on behalf of the ruling class. 
 The rising French bourgeoisie at the time was threatened by 
revolutionary rumblings from below. By electing Bonaparte it got a 
state management that seemed independent of that bourgeoisie, and 
could control the proletarian rumblings. At the same time the 
bureaucracy could, however haltingly, develop the conditions for 
capitalist industrialization. 
 Thus, it seems, Marx's analysis of the Bonapartist state works on 
two levels, both the structural level (the level of state structures and 
their relations to civil society) and the strategic decision-making 
level (how, within what forms of rationality, the state leadership 
developed policies and alliances to implement them). The 
Eighteenth Brumaire excels in interactionist and strategic/tactic 
descriptions of the political process, even if the degree of 
formalization of those strategic interactions could perhaps be 
developed further. Thus Marx's analysis indicates that the bourgeois 
character of the representative democratic state must be sought on 
different levels. It is not enough to show that the state is not 
managed by capitalists or capitalist factions to disprove the theory. 
The critical test is how the state relates to the subordinate classes 
and especially, under capitalism, to the demands for a new type of 
state set forth in the radical labour movement. 
 Marx's analysis suggests the combined use of two dichotomies in 
state analysis: the distinction between action and structure (how 
 Elster on Marx  42 
 
capitalist production defines roles and how incumbents define their 
roles) and the distinction between instrumental activities, oriented to 
changing the distribution and types of resources available in the 
economy, and expressive activities, oriented toward influencing 
popular thinking/world views/cultural norms.18 We might set these 
dichotomies against each other in Figure 1.1. 
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 This distinction between instrumental and expressive policy focus is the same as that 
developed by Edelman (1967).  

















For Marx the Paris Commune was the first manifestation of a socia-
list state, or what he called the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
proletariat. The Commune had some features that were different 
from the democratic, representative state: the working class was 
armed; the connection between church and state was severed; the 
parliamentary and administrative organs were united; 
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administrators, police officers and judges were elected and could be 
recalled by the electoral bodies at any time. 
 Again Marx's method is to investigate how a changed power rela-
tionship between bourgeoisie and proletariat, this time especially in 
the Paris region, influenced the organization of the state. Marx asks: 
were the state forms adequate to the short and long term interests of 
the (briefly) ruling proletariat? He searched for the new 
organizational forms in the class struggle, that is, those forms that 
most efficiently served the rising proletariat and the working people. 
 As has been pointed out by others,19 Elster suggests that strategic 
analysis and game theory can increase our understanding of the 
political process and make studies of simultaneous interactions 
between more than two actors manageable. But his general critique 
of Marx's state theories is an unwarranted way of "clearing the 
ground" for interactionist, individualized, strategic analysis. The 
selectivity of structures is important in organizational societies, not 
as an alternative approach to action analysis and calculations of 
strategic and tactical alternatives. Marx, in his analysis of the 
French state in the 1850's, argues that the exploitative character of 
the state, managed through bureaucratic means, permeates the diffe-
rent organs of the representative democratic state and conditions 
leadership strategies there.  
 
 
THE PROBLEM: AN AUTONOMOUS STATE 
IN A CLASS DIVIDED SOCIETY? 
 
My contribution to the debate will attempt to focus on the autonomy 
of the state in the interaction between the main social classes and 
groups. I will look at the state as an apparatus, as a structure or a 
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 See the "Elster-debate" in Theory and Society, 1982. 
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system of formal organizations, the state as an elite, as the top 
management of that apparatus, and as a bureaucracy, a complex 
social category of employed people working in state organizations 
and institutions. 
 The study of state autonomy will cover two aspects: (1) delineate 
the processes that gave form to the state, how actors in society 
transferred specific projects to the state and influenced the 
organization of the state; (2) describe the ability and capacity of the 
state to intervene independently into the relations between the social 
classes, groups and categories of people in society and the 
mechanisms through which the state wielded its autonomy. In each 
main period these two processes will be looked into. The analysis in 
each part of the work will move between a structural (mode of 
production) level, an organizational level (where classes and groups 
create organizations), and a decision-making level (where 
individuals and groups make policy and use organizations to 
implement policies). 
 The mode of analysis, the heuristic20 model in the present study 
can thus be presented in a diagram, of the assumed inner dynamic of 
the state - class relations in Norway with a dominant capitalist mode 
of production (established from the 1920's) (Figure 1.2). The thesis 
is that there exists an exploitative relation between labour and 
capital, between the working class and the bourgeoisie that the state 
is set to regulate and reproduce with some degree and type of 
autonomy. In the state formation process the state is 'lifted out' of 
society with some type and degree of alienation from both the main 
classes. On the other hand the state continuously acts, attempting to 
intervene into the class relations so that the state defined projects 
are implemented. In this intervention process the bureaucratic form 
of organization is often present, perhaps dominant. In the 
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 "The ideas of reason are heuristic, not ostensive; they enable us to ask a question, not to 
give the answer" (E.Caird, cited in the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971:H,259). 
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Norwegian case the working class movement, in its struggles with 
the bourgeoisie and with the state chose a strategy of reformism, 
which left the basic social relations in the economy untouched and 
which opened for an entry of the labour movement leaderships into 
the existing state organization. The study attempts to describe how 
this strategy affected the state organization and the autonomy of the 
state. 

















This arrangement of variables needs to be specified in more detail: 
the class structure is more complex, with the introduction of middle 
layers and the petty bourgeoisie. The main classes change their 
composition and boundaries over time; there are movements 
between them and within each of them, creating schisms, 
contradictions and layers of class members with marked differences 
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in income, positions of authority, etc. It is necessary to introduce 
intervening variables in the model. Organizations and associations 
are formed within and between the class formations. Professions 
develop as the scientific enterprise expands and the state takes on 
professional tasks, in infrastructure, in social and economic 
services. The complexity of relations that arises when intervening 





















The question of state autonomy is therefore a question of (a) the 
configuration of social classes and groups, the relations between 
them, their interests, strengths and capacities to influence the state, 
(b) who the state is dependent upon, how dependent it is on inputs 
from specific actors in society, and (c) who the state is not 
dependent upon, and therefore freer to influence and control from 
the outside. The problems I want to address concern both 
description of the state, its autonomy in the class/group system, and 
explanation of its role. The problem is the autonomy of the state 
organization in the modernization process.   
 Charles Tilly suggests that if the state is subservient to capitalist 
interests, that subservience is an outcome of a struggle between 
state makers/power holders and capitalists: "It would, of course, be 
perfectly compatible with this summary [of state making] to 
discover that in the process states became subservient to capitalist 
interests: everything depends on the terms of accord between 
capitalists and statemakers." (Tilly 1985b:4). In the present study I 
suggest that the constitutional organization of the state also matters. 
It can structure decision-making so that it favours some interests 
more than others, a selectivity that functions without any specific 
accord, except perhaps an acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
existing state. 
 Within the "conceptual terrain" (Althusser and Balibar 1970) of 
class-state relations explicated here, the main questions in the study 
are these: 
 
 1. What role did the state have in the transformation of the 
Norwegian economy from subsistence agriculture to modern 
industrial capitalism? 
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 2. How can we explain the main changes in the state 
organization through three phases of Norwegian political history, 
the struggle for national autonomy (1814-1905), the period of 
bourgeois parliamentarianism (1884-1940) and of social 
democracy (1935-1970)? 
 3. In what meaning and to what degree was the state apparatus, 
headed by governments, with its formal organizations and 
institutions, its administrative and professional personnel and its 
budgets, an autonomous and powerful organization in society? 
 
Given that the power and/or autonomy of the state has increased, 
how can that be explained? Three theories can be suggested. I will 
call them the breakdown theory, the democratization theory and the 
extreme state autonomy theory.  
(1) The breakdown theory suggests that the autonomy and the 
power of the state should be seen as functional responses to break-
down tendencies in capitalism (inflation, poverty, unemployment, 
war etc.), which are related to difficulties in accumulating capital 
and keeping rates of profit high enough to spur new investments in 
labour-absorbing production.  
(2) The democratization theory suggests that state autonomy is a 
function of a democratization of the state, of a stronger and more 
equal representation of all classes in parliaments, making the state 
an arena for representation and assigning the state the role of a 
relatively independent arbiter.  
(3) The extreme autonomy theory suggests that the state at some 
time in its development became an autonomous class formation, 
that is, a group of people located in an economic system, in a state 
mode of production - cf. Johnston (1984), Djilas (1957), with its 
own 'statist' class interests, contradictory to other classes.  
 State autonomy relative to a class or group of people can be more 
or less inclusive. If we define human activities as falling into three 
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main fields, economy, politics and culture, then the state can have 
autonomy within one or more of these areas. We can also 
distinguish types of state autonomy, defining instrumental 
autonomy as independence in the development and choice of means 
for implementing a given goal or programme, programme 
autonomy as independence in the development of state policy, and 
class autonomy as a state with a position independent and external 
to one or more social classes, a state with autonomy relative to the 
basic interests of one or more social classes. A state has class 
autonomy when it can act systematically against the basic interests 
of a social class. A state can have class autonomy relative to all 
classes. The state then acts as a class on its own (a statist class, a 
state where rulers and state employees have developed their own 
class interests). A state in a two class system (classes A and B) can 
lack class autonomy in relation to class A (i.e. the state is organized 
within the logic and basic interests of class A), and have class 
autonomy relative to class B, that is, be able to control and intervene 
into class B independently on the basis of its own logic or the logic 
and the historical interests of class A. Thus for example a bourgeois 
state, structured so that it serves the bourgeoisie, may or may not 
have class autonomy relative to the working class, that is ability to 
independently, with its own programmes, intervene into the 
working class on behalf of the bourgeois project.  
 Let me categorize these dimensions - fields of activity and types 
of autonomy - in a diagram, and fill in the areas in the diagram with 
suggested examples (see Figure 1.4). 
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Instrumental autonomy in the economy is thought of as independent 
state intervention in the regulation and adjustment of economic 
activities within policies defined by external, non-statist actors, for 
example a state fund for regional investment support when large 
companies try to decentralize their activities or a state fund for 
capital support to faltering private banks. At the level of politics, 
instrumental autonomy can be activities directed at securing the 
existing legal order; for example, state organs working to improve 
tax collection from capital owners. At the ideological level, 
instrumental autonomy could be state-developed text books that 
describe the dominant mode of production in abstract, ahistorical 
terms. 
 The concept of programme autonomy alludes to a policy-making 
state, one that has an independent concept of the whole society or 
the sector in which it is working, a concept that serves to guide 
changes and modifications of existing systems. A state that 
develops programmes for sectoral or regional development, 
programmes that are not adopted from or defined by non-state 
movements, classes or organizations, has programme autonomy. A 
state that takes on the development of infrastructures and has the 
initiative in that process has programme autonomy. A state that 
independently works out plans for conciliation of conflicts between 
classes and political movements has programme autonomy. 
 By a state with class autonomy I mean a state that has power to 
act effectively and independently in contradiction to the basic 
interests of an existing class. Given the assumption of bourgeois 
dominance of the capitalist economy, there are three possible 
examples of states with class autonomy: 
 

















Limiting cases (Figure 1.6) are (D) weak, autonomous states, 
independent but without interventionist power in either of the main 
classes; (E) dependent states, arena for class relations, class 
struggles; (F) socialist state with class autonomy and (G) socialist 

















      Organization analysis: 
      Action in institutions 
      and exchange in markets 
 
 
      "...political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or 
instead of, by calculated self-interest; politics is organized around the con-
struction and interpretation of meaning as well as, or instead of, the 
making of choices; routines, rules, and forms evolve through history-
dependent processes that do not reliably and quickly reach unique 
equilibria: the institutions of politics are not simple echoes of social 
forces; and the polity is something different from, or more than, an arena 
for competition among rival interests." 
 
 March and Olsen (1989:159) 
 
 
     Social science is at best a dialogue, searching for 
truthful interpretations of our relations with the natural environment 
and each other. It is therefore critical, trying continuously to identify 
limitations in established knowledge, find better, more relevant 
methods and develop new insights and deeper understanding. All 
absolutes and all forms of dominance in the scientific enterprise are 
a threat. They restrict the arena of open dialogue. Politicizing, trying 
to convince others of the correctness of a preconceived view, is 
foreign to the ideal of scientific enquiry (Arendt 1990). The 
scientific dialogue requires an interest in clarifying the positions of 
the others in the dialogue. But that interest itself requires a position 
on the question under investigation. Scientific enquiry and politi-
cal/ideological arguing are therefore in a dependent and 
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contradictory relation to each other. But the two concepts delineate 
a methodological paradigm for the process of social science 
enquiry. My aim is not to define state autonomy in a simple 
formula. It is rather to investigate the autonomy of the modern 
Norwegian state organization in different economic, political and 
ideological processes and from a set of relatively concrete 
descriptions to attempt to abstract a definition of state autonomy as 
it developed over time. Thus I want to analyze how select state 
policies were given form in an institutional and class context; how 
the organizational structures of the state were selective relative to 
class/group interests; and how they affected/conditioned action 
models of the decision-makers.  
 In the NPS, how did Gudmund Hernes define the analytical 
approach to the study of political power in Norway?21 Different 
analytical strategies were applied in different parts of the NPS, but a 
central choice was Hernes' rational actors in exchange approach. 
That is an approach that considers change a result basically of 
willed actions. In that approach individuals, interest organizations 
and the state were considered sufficient specifications of the 
concept of actors. Social classes as bases for action were not looked 
for and therefore, of course, not found. 
 Gudmund Hernes spelt out the rational actor model in 
commendable detail. Can it help us conceptualize the relation 
between the economy and the state in the modern Norwegian 
society? Hernes and the Power Project should be honoured for 
introducing the state as a problem and independent variable in 
Norwegian mainstream social science.22 The government-initiated 
                                           
     21
 For a presentation of the project and how it was organized, see NPS (1982), Hernes (1975) 
and Gran (1983a). 
     22
 There are several reasons why the state as an institution has been off the social science 
agenda for a large part of the postwar period. Professor Øyvind Østerud (Slagstad 1978) points 
to behaviouralism. Political science has focused on decision-making and actions in the system, 
not the role of the political system in society. The (classical) liberals (Aubert, Christie, Jacobsen 
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NPS became rather heavily involved in the study of state organi-
zation. At one stage it co-opted problem definitions that Marxist-
oriented researchers were working on (Hernes 1975). Hernes 
formulated a paradigm that attempted to fuse the behavioural and 
the strategic action approach - the Millian, Coleman approach of 
"political money"23 - with the study of the selectivity of institutional 
structures. Hernes also introduced the concept of "powerlessness" 
(avmakt). A thesis was that a study of power had to account for the 
existence of groups without power. A power study had to 
investigate how established institutions systematically excluded 
interests and specific problems from the political agenda. 
 However, now that the NPS is completed, it is obvious that 
Hernes' programmatic interest in powerlessness did not lead to any 
substantial empirical study of that phenomenon. No attempt was 
made to identify excluded and oppressed groups. There is hardly 
any discussion of powerlessness as a concept in the publications 
after 1975. The empirical problem addressed was the distribution of 
                                                                                                              
and others) have been more interested in the processes of incorporation of social interests into 
the state rather than the state as such, the state as independent variable. Political scientists have 
long felt that the concepts of state and state power were too "big", too complex to be of much 
value in analytical studies (March 1966). Norwegian political scientists made valuable studies 
of decision-making within policy areas, ministries and other specific units or organs of the state 
(Jacobsen 1964 and Vold 1968 on agricultural and fisheries administration, Hallenstvedt 1968 
on administration of foreign affairs, Sjaastad 1969 on military administration, Jansen 1971 on 
industrial administration, Hallenstvedt and Hoven 1974 on committees and commissions in state 
administration, etc.) In Marxist-oriented social science in the late 1960's, the study of the state 
was in a way too small a problem, too empirical. The "rediscovery of Marx" was on the agenda. 
Theoretical problems of political economy, imperialism and critique of "bourgeois science" 
engaged the Marxists (Linne Eriksen 1968, Enerstvedt 1971, Skarstein 1973, Seierstad 1980). 
The anthropologist Ottar Brox entered early into the empirical field with his study of state 
planning for Northern Norway (Brox 1966), followed by Torstein Hjellum with his study of the 
Bergen bourgeoisie (Hjellum 1971). In the field of scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962), works of 
Skjervheim (1968), Kalleberg (1971) and Østerberg (1975) were important. 
     23
 See Coleman (1986), Chapter 7 Political Money and Tilly (1978b) for a presentation of the 
Millian concept of strategic action. 
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influence in the political system, and how that distribution was at 
odds with the constitutional definitions of democracy. In contrast to 
the Marxist class-based description of the Norwegian society, the 
NPS reproduced a picture of a pluralist system of interest groups 
represented more or less proportionally in a segmented state. 24 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PURSUIT 
OF INTERESTS, AND THE STATE AS MEDIATOR 
 
The concept of strategic pursuit of interests is based on the Millian 
idea of strategic action in a complex grid of actors. Hernes relates 
interests to control and values to resources, discussing how actors 
can maximize interests in given actor-resource contexts. Those 
without substantial power have four strategies they can follow. 
They can choose the normative strategy, which says 
interest-oriented action is acceptable as long as it does not affect 
others with the same interests negatively. They can choose a 
strategy of solidarity: I help you if you help me and we agree on the 
goal. They can choose an incentive strategy, that is, giving special 
favours to passive elements in the interest coalition. Lastly they can 
choose a strategy of exchanging assistance for control: I will give 
you some of the things I control if you will join my coalition. The 
central analytic concept here is exchange. It is Hernes' contention 
that all coalition-building requires exchanges of some sort, and that 
these exchanges basically hinge on trust or confidence.  
 As I have suggested elsewhere (Gran 1983a), it might be that 
both the exchange system and the actual distributions of 
resources/goods within it are dependent upon the social character of 
the production system, the basic system of ownership of the means 
                                           
     24
 See the final report of the NPS, (NPS 1982), Lægreid and Olsen (1978) and Hernes (1978). 
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of production. At least it is necessary to check that out, i.e. to 
attempt to clarify the relations between the economic system 
(production and distribution) and the workings of the political 
system to test if coalition-building and organizing hinges on 
exchange.25 If we consider the capitalist firm as a coalition of 
different groups and actors there is, according to Marx's theory of 
production, no exchange between labour and capital on the surplus 
value produced. Labour produces all the values, the capitalist 
owners appropriate them all, distributing a part (variable capital) to 
labour. 
 Hernes accepts the need for relating the economic and the 
political systems. In Hernes (1982) he argued how sociology needs 
to apply economic concepts and models. But empirically he focuses 
on the processes of exchange, i.e. processes that imply the existence 
of powerful actors in markets.26 
 A basic market principle is the exchange of equals. As Hernes 
notes, most parties to market agreements will benefit from evading 
that principle, i.e. putting less into the exchange than agreed upon. 
At this point the state enters the analysis. The state is an institution 
for guaranteeing equal market exchanges. It is for this purpose that 
the state has special access to physical force. By alone controlling 
force the state can demand compliance with agreements and thus 
increase the trust in agreements. 
 
 "The problem in this system of exchange is that it is tempting to break agreements... In all 
societies this problem is solved through a judiciary system that in the last resort can use 
physical force against those who do not abide by agreements made. The rationale for 
creating a specific institution with legitimate right to use physical force is to create trust in 
                                           
     25
 I use the concept 'political system' in the broader sense as the state and the organiza-
tions/institutions and processes directly influencing the state. 
     26
 This focus on markets in the economy can be seen in Max Weber's seminal ideas about 
class being formed through asymmetrical distributions of "life chances" in markets. 
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the population that agreements will be held." (Hernes 1975:179, my translation from 
Norwegian) 
 
Here the central function of the state, the monopoly of violence, is 
seen in terms of exchange. Violence is so to speak the oil needed to 
make markets work. The statement also indicates why the state has 
to have a certain autonomy from the contending parties. If the state 
was identical with one of them (or with the interests of a specific 
sector of the economy) it could not legitimately aspire to guarantee 
all parties to all agreements. 
 But this definition of the state contains problems. It does not 
touch upon how and why equal exchanges in the market may 
disguise unequal exchanges and direct use of power in non-market 
arenas (inside the walls of privately and publicly owned companies, 
in families, schools, etc.), a problem Marx used much of his time to 
prove was the case in capitalist societies. That is, even if the 
exchange between capital and labour in the market is between 
equals and equivalent values are exchanged there, that does not 
exclude unequal exchange and exploitation in production. Labour 
power may be bought at its exchange value, but will be employed 
beyond the production of its own value equivalent in the production 
process. If that is the case the market agreements on wages and 
working hours is coterminous with exploitation of labour in 
production. If the wage equals only part of the value the worker 
produces, then using the state to force the workers to work full time 
means forcing them to produce values free of charge for the 
capitalists. 
 How will the exchange approach interpret the state rules and 
regulations? It studies movements within the established exchange 
system (to which degree the agreements are fulfilled), but has 
difficulty grasping the social relations of production and the 
functioning of the markets. As Marx puts it in Grundrisse: a focus 
on exchange is superficial. The problem is the production of the 
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resources that go into the exchange. The processes that keep the 
exchange going and the character of the exchange system cannot be 
grasped within the ambit of markets. Charles Tilly argues the same 
way in his critique of the Millian strategic action approach: 
 
 "The Millian emphasis on the rational pursuit of interest is a welcome antidote to notions of 
crowd action as impulsive and irrational. Yet so far the followers of Mill have not given us 
much insight into the way those interests arise and change. They have not said much about 
the way people define, articulate, and organize their interests." (Tilly 1978b:37) 
 
The chosen approach or paradigm has effects on theory. We can 
posit a logical parallel between a focus on exchange and a pluralist, 
democratic understanding of the state. As money and commodities 
are exchanged in the market, so votes and decisions are exchanged 
in an elected parliament. The Marxist class theory transcends the 
exchange ambit. As production is exploitative, so the state can be 
organized to serve exploiters and suppress the interests of the 
exploited classes. However, capitalist exploitation, if it exists, is 
indirect, mediated by the material output of the production process, 
surplus value realized by the capitalist through the sale of the 
products. Feudal exploitation was direct: two days work directly for 
the landowner. Capitalist exploitation is mediated and seemingly 
non-existent in the wage/work time contract. Thus the Marxist class 
theory of the state in capitalist society is dependent upon the 
validity of hypotheses of exploitation in capitalist production. And, 
as I have discussed earlier, the exploitation theory is dependent on a 
complex process of transformation of values, which makes 
empirical testing much more difficult than testing hypotheses of 
equal exchange on markets.27 
                                           
     27
 Intuitively the exploitation theory is easy to grasp if we look historically at the accumulation 
of riches in means of production in the hands of select capitalists and none in the hands of 
workers in the capitalists' companies. Usually the one accumulates the riches, the other 
accumulates nothing, or hardly anything, that can be used to employ others. 
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 The methodological point, then, must be to study the state 
relative to both systems, both production and exchange/distribution 
systems.28 The NPS and Gudmund Hernes did not say a word about 
the social structure of capitalist production units in Norway, and 
thus nothing about the power base of capitalists in the ownership of 
the industrial means of production.29 
 
 
A SKETCH OF THE ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
 
I will develop the analysis within a class theoretical perspective: 
how class interests are formed in the broader social relations of the 
economy and conceptions of society and self at the cultural level, 
how class interests take form and manifest themselves in 
organizations, relative to other interests, and how and to what 
degree the organizations generate and reproduce action models that 
guide decision-making. Rational action, the specification of means 
to reach goals and defend values, is developed in a grid of social 
relations and general conceptions of society, opportunities and con-
straints set by them. For that reason we might expect, as Tilly sug-
gests (Tilly 1984b, 1986), that rational action historically and 
typically clusters around a limited set of action repertoires. The 
freedom of the individual is circumscribed in some way, to a certain 
                                           
     28
 Nicos Mouzelis (1975) makes the point that the autonomy of one unit (a group of people) 
should be studied in its 'organizational context as a whole' and not only through data about how 
individuals perceive that context. "The degree of group autonomy is an empirical question, and 
in order to identify this degree we have to place it in its organizational context. It is not enough 
to learn about this context by simply examining how the individual perceives it. We have to 
focus our attention on it as a whole" (ibid:114). 
     29
 At one point Hernes points to the government mandate of the NPS project which explicitly 
says that the project should not enter into the study of power relations within firms, beyond what 
is necessary for understanding power structures in society. That may of course be a reason for 
not raising the problem of power within firms. 
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degree by the institutional and societal setting and the individuals' 
interpretations of the setting. The acting individual and the state as 
an acting organization affect the institutional and cultural grids. It is 
in the variations of this complex interaction between structure and 
action that we want to define the role of the state in the 
modernization process.  
 I will thus see organizations in a sociological perspective, as 
expressions for collective interests and as instruments for 
implementing the interests in complex, often conflict-ridden and 
hostile environments. This concept of organization can be 
explicated in a modified version of Harrison White's concept of 
organizations as social categories and networks (See Tilly 
1978b:62). Introducing the power concept, defined as formal 
organization, as a third dimension gives the following figure (Figure 
2.1). Some examples of organizations in different locations in the 























In this way we can conceive of both different types of organizations 
and the possible developments within organizations: A category of 
people is an organization in the sense that their equal living/working 
conditions is an organizational dimension (at this level often not 
conceived as organization). The more unitary the category the 
stronger it is. The more networking, actual communication there is 
among members of a category or a formal organization, the stronger 
the organization is. The more formalization of a specific 
organization representing the category and/or the network, the more 
powerful the organization as a whole (usually) is. A crowd can 
increase its power, for example if there is an accident and someone 
in it take leadership to help in the accident. Here the crowd would 
be moving inward along the power axis. West coast peasants can 
create regional cooperative dairies as a product of more networking 
and more consciousness on the advantages of cooperation, thus 
moving along the network and power axis. The peasants (and the 
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leaders of the dairies) may create an interest organization to peddle 
their interests at the national level, thus increasing their power and 
thus moving along the power axis. 
 I will attempt to develop a critique of the Marxist functional 
model of the state-society relation. That model suggests that the 
state develops from and intervenes in capitalist society because 
capitalism as a system of production and the bourgeoisie as a class 
cannot do without it. Capitalism introduces class cleavages that only 
a state can contain. A state typically organizes the infrastructures 
(financial, technical and social) that capitalist production and 
distribution are dependent upon. The Marxist functional 
understanding of the state in capitalist societies assumes that the 
state exists to take care of the interests of the exploiting class in 
politics, both reproducing and controlling contradictions that might 
threaten the production system. In this way the functional 
explanation of an institution says that it exists because of its 
consequences (Stinchcombe 1968). The consequence is under 
pressure (homeostatic variable: capitalist exploitation; pressure: 
from the labour movement). The state supports the homeostatic 
variable to counteract the pressure on it.30 This may well be the 
case. But to demonstrate functionality of the state it is not enough to 
show that capitalism and a state organization exist at the same time. 
We have to document mediating mechanisms between the capitalist 
production system and the pro-capitalist role of the state. We have 
to include an analysis of how the state relates to other modes of 
production, making the state a more complex organization than one 
serving only the exploiters of the dominant mode. Intermediary 
organizations may intervene in state policy-makings modifying the 
relation to the dominant exploiters. We have to test that, without the 
                                           
     30
 Non-Marxist functionalism suggests that the division of labour (differentiation) in society 
generates conflicts and caveats in the social system that a state has to bridge through processes 
of integration (Badie and Birnbaum 1983). 
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state, capitalism and/or the bourgeoisie would collapse or not 
develop in the first place. For, if capitalism can do without the type 
of state that exists, the thesis that the state serves the capitalist 
exploiting class loses its force. Here comparative studies are 
needed.  
 Thirdly I will apply a dialectic mode of analysis defining social 
relations as both unity and contradiction. Like a teacher-student 
relation, which is externally unitary, both dependent on each other 
for their individual existence and development, and internally 
contradictory. If the internal relation becomes unitary, then the 
relation dissolves; both become students or both become teachers or 
something else. Or, if the contradiction expands, the relation may 
break down for that reason. This mode of conceiving relations can 
be applied generally to social relations. It contains a concept of 
movement, of change of relations, through the development of its 
contradictions and it implies that new relations may be understood 
as consequences of breakdowns of old ones, thus that materials for 
understanding new relations can be found in existing social, 
organizational and class relations. 
 The time-period chosen for the present study excludes the study 
of the early emergence of capitalism in Norway. One case makes it 
difficult to test the null-hypothesis that autocentric capitalism would 
have developed and thrived in Norway under a different form of 
state and without an independent state. That kind of test requires 
comparison. Capitalism in one place may well thrive on resources 
and political institutions elsewhere.  
  Using class struggle as an organizing and heuristic concept 
puts the focus on structural contradictions between classes and on 
class as a basis for the identification of interests and action. The 
concept also implies a developmental theory - that classes are 
formed within the economy and the political system, dependent 
upon types of technology and institutional structures, that classes 
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develop political organizations to implement their interests, against 
the interests of other classes. Class struggle is thus a concept in an 
analytical system. A whole class seldom acts. Most often it is 
individuals and groups/organizations within classes that act. Action 
depends on subjectively guided decision-making, where individuals 
and groups work out actions, in those class/group grids that impinge 
upon them and that they see and understand.  
 
 
THREE LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION 
 
The state will be considered at three levels of abstraction: 
 (1) The state seen as one organization, distinct from society, as it 
functions in society, in the political, economic and ideological 
struggles between social classes, groups and movements;  
 (2) The relations between the main institutions within the state, 
that is, between the parliament, the representative, public discourse 
arena of the state; the administrative arena, with its complex 
divisions of administrative labour; and the judiciary, the formal 
conflict-resolving arena of the state; and  
 (3) The role of the bureaucracy and the division of administrative 
labour within it, the principally closed, hierarchical corporation of 
the state. 
 The analysis will span the period from mid-nineteenth century to 
approximately 1970, encompassing the rise of social democracy, its 
entry into and role in government, and what might seem to be a first 
indication of its demise, when it lost out to a bourgeois coalition 
government after the defeat in the Common Market referendum in 
1972. 
  A first indication of findings (hypotheses) within the three levels 
of the state organization (institutional arena) and the three modes of 
analysis (analytic dimension) is presented in Figure 2.2.  
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 Figure 2.2 Central hypotheses on state-class relations 
 








(1) The thesis emerging from this study is that the modern 
Norwegian state has had autonomy through the whole modern 
period. It has played an independent role, one that can only partly be 
explained by pressures and interventions from class/group actors 
outside the state. The state was an autonomous actor in the relations 
between the social classes. The representative state had a pull-effect 
on the formation of social, political and professional movements. 
The Storting was an arena where initially weak sections of the 
population, through the election of their leaders, could gain voice in 
national politics. The Storting was an arena for the forging of 
alliances, where representatives of the new industrial bourgeoisie 
could forge an alliance with the market-oriented part of the peasant-
farmer movement and thus gain enough political weight to oust the 
conservative bureaucracy from the apex of the state. The Storting, 
through control of the political composition of the government, 
made possible normative guidance of the public administration, 
demanding a professionalization of the administration and 
engagement in the planning and management of the new 
infrastructure for the modern industrial growth economy, including 
the modernization of agricultural production. In this sense the state 
had autonomous influence in the economy, on the formation of the 
new social classes (the bourgeoisie and the working class) and on 
the structure of the political process (the formation of parties and 
later the integration of interest organizations into the public 
management process). But the state, seen as a whole, was mainly 
engaged in organizing and developing capitalism relative to other 
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modes of production. In this sense the state was a bourgeois state. 
The state was, in other words, not normally guided and controlled 
by capitalists, as a certain strand of Marxist theory has suggested. 
 (2) State autonomy varied with the political/ideological situation. 
In times of sharp conflict, capitalists increased their direct control 
and guidance of state policy. 
 (3) The state influenced the development of reformism within the 
labour movement. The mechanisms of power wielding introduced 
state-defined interests into the labour movement. The mechanisms 
of bureaucracy in the state and labour movement had the effect of 
neutralizing radical leaders and setting the political agenda of the 
state as the agenda for the movement (Solvang 1974). The 
Norwegian state in the studied period never became mainly 
representative for the working class (an organization representing 
the deep, long-term interests of the working class, the wage-earners 
with middle and lower wages and no subordinates). The labour 
movement did manage to persuade the state to engage in 
redistributive policies in favour of the working classes, but state 
power has in the whole period been with the bourgeois class, the 
private owners of capital and its top directors and managers. 
 (4) The autonomy of the state developed through the bureaucratic 
form of administration, professionalization of the public 
administration, and  cooperation between economic interest 
organizations and the state.  
 (5) The contents and the scope of state autonomy have changed 
over time. I suggest that it has developed from instrumental to pro-
gramme autonomy, that is, from an autonomy mainly used to work 
out ways of implementing and defending a given, law-defined 
policy (the tax-collecting and watchman state) to an autonomy also 
in the area of policy-making, that is, a professionalized state with 
active support from the scientific community, developing political 
programmes and with power to implement the programmes. The 
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state increasingly influenced the structure of civil society and 
penetrated ever more deeply into the life and work conditions of 
individuals. I suggest that the late nineteenth century, with the first 
entries of the new specialized professionals into the state 
administration, and the 1930's, with the entry of the labour 
movement into government position, date two phases in this 
change. The first phase meant state programming of the legal and 
technical infrastructure (rail, canals, telegraph, etc.) for the new 
market economy. The second phase meant efficient state 
intervention into the financial and social infrastructure as well 
(Keynesianism and welfare). 
 The study starts with a description of the modern state in the 
Norwegian economy as it presented itself in official statistics and 
organizational descriptions in the mid 1970's (Chapter 4). By 
starting with the modern structure of the state, it is possible to 
search historically for the origins of the modern forms. By going 
back to the origins of the modern state and looking forward at the 
changing structure of the state, it is possible to clarify the 
perspectives applied by contemporary decision-makers. The 
analysis in parts B to E investigates (1) movements in the economy; 
(2) the reorganizations of the state institutions and (3) collective and 
individual decision-making in specific political conflicts (the case 
studies). 




      The alienation 
      of politics 
      from society 
      and the power 






THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION 
 
The capitalist mode of production is a social system which sets the 
private accumulation of capital as the central organizing principle in 
the economy. Capitalism pushes each individual capital toward 
investment of profits or to what is the same, its own expansion. 
Markets put many capitals, many producers and consumers in a 
non-discursive relation to each other, their transactions mainly 
mediated through the price mechanism. Capitalism is therefore 
synonymous with competition between firms and between labourers 
for jobs. 
 Capitalism contains a class contradiction between labour and 
capital. That means that labour (working classes) and capital 
(capital owners) are dependent upon each other for their simple 
existence and that capital produced by the producers in common 
(the total worker) is accumulated and controlled by a bourgeoisie. 
Like any social system, capitalism functions through a material, 
physical structure.31 Feudalism built on and was limited to the 
                                           
     31
 Heilbroner (1985:36-37) states this precisely: "Capital is therefore not a material thing but a 
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utilization of land. Machine technology opened for capitalism. Both 
the feudal and the capitalist mode of production can be seen as class 
systems related to specific means of production, basically a three-
sided relationship between producer, non-producer and means of 




                                                                                                              
process that uses material things as moments in its continuously dynamic existence. It is 
moreover a social process not a physical one. Capital can and indeed must assume physical 
form but its meaning can only be grasped if we perceive these material objects as embodying 
and symbolizing an expanding totality". Max Weber defined capitalism differently, as a system 
that motivated capital owners to invest rather than to consume their incomes. "take his [Weber's] 
definition of capitalism which is supposed to be ... a "neutral" ideal type. He defines capitalism 
as "culture": "in which the governing principle is the investment of private capital" (Meszaros 
1972:39). This is certainly an important difference from the feudal/agricultural mode of 
production, but it is a very different concept from that of accumulation. With accumulation as 
the core, the motivating force is to expand capital. The concept of an investment motive leaves 
open what that investment will or should serve. Marxist political economy suggests that it is this 
expansion of capital that is specifically capitalist and that it is of prime importance to understand 
theoretically: when capital expands, what is the source of the expansion, and, given that the 
source is to be found in society, in a collectivity larger than the individual, how can the 
expansion end up in the form of increased private capital, and often public poverty?  
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The producer of the commodity is the person who participates in 
giving the material product its form, all who contribute, directly and 
indirectly to the physical qualities of the product. The non-producer 
is the external owner/manager of the production process, which by 
definition is not part of the total worker. The non-producer can be 
necessary in organizing the accumulation process in its financial 
and organizational aspects. In principle that function can be carried 
out by an owner who also participates in production. The third 
element in the relationship is the means of production, the physical 
materials, tools and infrastructure (again widely defined) that are 
necessary for production (up to the point of consumption). 
 The modes of production are dependent on the quality of each of 
the three elements and how they are related and interact. Capital is 
objects or things (everything from money to machines and land) 
that function within a capitalist social relation, that is, are used by 
labourers to augment capital. Modes of production can be classified 
along several dimensions. One dimension is whether they produce a 
surplus over and above what is immediately consumed. Without a 
surplus-producing economy, there is little possibility of sustaining a 
state, at least in the form of a separate organization of full-time state 
employees. On the other hand, when an economy has the capacity 
to produce a surplus, the question arises how that surplus is distri-
buted and used. There is power in the control of the surplus. The 
movement from an economy of consumption to an economy 
producing a surplus beyond the subsistence of its producers, can 
basically be defined as the modernization problem. 
 A second dimension is the type of technology in the production 
process. Here we can distinguish direct gathering of products, 
agricultural production of food products, handicraft production of 
non-food products, manufacture (where handicraft at local level is 
organized at regional or national level), industrial production, 
where handicraft tools essentially are driven by an external machine 
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force (steam, electricity, gas, etc.), and automated industrial 
production, where the feeding and control of the machines is taken 
over by machines (first stage numerical control, second stage digital 
control, etc.) The technology will set limits on human interaction 
and cooperation and thus limit the types of organization that are 
possible (Scott 1981). 
 A third dimension is the character of the producer-non-producer 
relation. Here the form and amount of remuneration is important. 
The producer can in principle only get a share of what he or she 
produces, as any economy contains more people than the actually 
active producers. This share can be regulated by basic needs and 
traditionally established rules of distribution. In a surplus economy, 
where the producers produce in excess of immediate demands, the 
possibility of unproductive social classes arises, classes that live off 
others and who do not in any way participate in the material pro-
duction process.32 
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 Two meanings of the term 'productive' will be applied in the present analysis. One is 
productive labour in the sense of taking part in producing goods and services that are in 
demand. The other meaning is productive labour in the sense of contributing to the fund of 
surplus value. Productive workers in this sense are workers who embody labour in products that 
are sold by the capitalist, so that the embodied labour is transformed to money capital over and 
above the capitalist's costs of production. Here we can distinguish between productive labour for 
individual capitals and productive labour for capital as a whole in an economy (total capital), on 
the assumption that labour which is productive for an individual capitalist need not be 
productive for the collective of capitalists. Profits gained by one may be transferred from an 
other. Productivity can be evaluated at the use- and exchange-value levels. Productive labour at 
the use-value level is labour expended on products/services that are in demand. At the 
exchange-value level, productive labour can be defined as labour that is expended on 
products/services that enter into exchange (markets). Products can there be exchanged for their 
use value in consumption (product against product, with or without money as medium); or they 
can be exchanged for their use value in production (as materials/machines for investment). 
Production can be either capitalist or non-capitalist, the difference being whether the production 
process engages foreign labour under an owner of the means of production or not. Productive 
labour in the first instance is then materialized in products that serve the producer's 
consumption. Productive labour in the capitalist production system is materialized in 
products/services that serve the extraction of surplus labour from the wage labourers working in 
the capitalist firm. Thus, productive labour in this sense is labour exchanged against capital, that 
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 The modes of transferring surplus to non-producers vary. The 
surplus can be transferred in the form of direct labour for the owner 
of capital (two of seven week days are work for the estate owner). It 
can be transferred in the form of products. It can be transferred as 
labour time materialized in products or used in different types of 
services, labour time that the non-producers transform back to 
money form through the sale of the products/services. 
 To clarify the concept of a class exploitative economy, what 
would a classless economy (communal/socialist economy) look 
like? A classless economy need not be one where everyone 
contributes to the fund of material products. A modern economy 
without classes would be one with divisions between producers and 
non-producers (managers), but where both the distribution of 
products and services and distribution of investments were 
democratically controlled where in other words private capital did 
not exist. A classless society is more likely when a population 
understands/experiences that there is an abundance of products (no 
poverty, i.e. ideals or norms that limit material ambitions, etc.). A 
classless economy would by definition be one without economic 
exploitation as defined above. We might in such a system expect a 
democratic policy mechanism for deciding on distribution. We 
would expect the use and/or consumption of goods and services to 
be equitably distributed and that investments were planned at the 
firm and societal level. 
                                                                                                              
is, in the form of means of production or money engaged to extract surplus labour. Unproduc-
tive labour is labour exchanged against consumption funds, with no or negative effects on total 
capital. The problem of the distribution of productive and unproductive labour in a capitalist 
economy and how that distribution affects the expansion-crisis cycle in capitalist economies is 
intriguing, but beyond what can be investigated systematically here (Is for example structural 
unemployment in capitalist economies an expression for a systematic increase in unproductive 
employment of labour, e.g. labour used to administer increasingly difficult and complex 
relations between production and distribution?) I will discuss how the two types of labour 
utilization affect the division of labour between the state and the economy. 
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 In a class system we should be able to show that the surplus is 
systematically used by the dominant class (classes). Thus if the 
dominant or near-dominant mode of production establishes 
economic classes in society, then the previous discussion suggests 
that a bourgeoisie would be in need of an extra-economic power, 
either a sort of political and/or an ideological power, i.e. a power 
that secures the delivery of surplus products and/or values to the 
bourgeoisie and the state. If that extra-economic power did not 
exist, the existence of an exploitative bourgeois class could be 
threatened by the materially productive classes, when and if they 
recognize their exploitation and conceive of organizational 
alternatives to it. The more obvious economic expropriation is, the 
stronger either the state and/or the ideological production of 
submission will be.  
 In addition, in an economy without classes the extraction of 
surplus from the producers would ideally have to be openly ac-
knowledged and agreed upon. In a class society we would expect 
the exploitation to be a central point of political, ideological and 
theoretical strife, the ruling and dominant classes wanting to cover 
up the extraction, or bluntly denying that it takes place. 
 
 
THE STATE ALIENATED FROM SOCIETY 
 
How can we then conceptualize the relation between state and 
capitalist society? I will suggest, to begin with, that we distinguish 
two types of relations. The democratic relationship is the idea of the 
participatory state, where those ruled actually take part in 
organizing the state and in formulating and executing its policies. 
The participation can be either indirect, through representatives, or 
direct, in the form of decision-making and/or controlling meetings 
of all ruled by a specific organ. We can also imagine different com-
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binations of direct and indirect participation. The alienated 
relationship implies the idea that something valuable and 
meaningful is torn away but returns as a foreign object with a 
foreign meaning. Applied to the state-society relation, an alienated 
state would be an organization that took on tasks defined in civil 
society, but as the tasks were organized into the state the definition 
of them changed and the implementation was foreign to those who 
had set or defined the task in the first place. The alienated state 
absorbs projects or unresolved conflicts from society, transforms 
them into state-defined problems and implements solutions foreign 
to those people who had the problem or project in the first place.33 
 Marx suggested that alienation in capitalist society was 
widespread. Political alienation was related to economic alienation. 
On the basis of private ownership of the means of production and 
the distinction between the labour market where labour power was 
bought and production where labour was performed under capitalist 
management and control, the surplus value in the products produced 
was transferred, through the sale of the products to the capitalist and 
used by him to expand production of surplus value. The 
consequence was that the whole production system - the machines, 
the products produced and the management - was alienated from the 
workers. They produced all the (new) material products but owned 
none of them and had no say in the management and planning of 
their own workplace. Only after the worker had received a money 
                                           
     33
 As is well described by Mandel (1971), Marx moved from an anthropological to an 
economic definition of economic alienation; from an idea of man alienated from "himself" to a 
focus on how the workers were alienated from the means of production and from the mass of 
products that they collectively produced. Marx developed the concept of political alienation, 
that is, how the state was alienated from the interests of the subordinated social classes and from 
the interests of the society as a whole. Istvan Meszaros (1970) gives a broad presentation of 
Marx's theory of alienation. Richard Lindley (1986) has written about the concept as it has been 
developed and used within both Marxist and liberal/individualistic philosophical traditions.  
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wage and bought the products (often from a new capitalist) were 
they his.34 
 This economic alienation generated an alienated state, a state that 
had sovereign authority within a specific territory giving the state 
the right to suppress any attempt to create a new and alternative 
state within that territory, with a monopolization of the right of 
violent repression guaranteeing the continued functioning of an 
alienated economy.35 As Mandel says, the alienated, exploitative 
economy "produces political alienation, with the rise of the state and 
the phenomena of violence and oppression that characterize the 
relations between men" (Mandel 1971:181).36 
 In the economic field the relation between use values and 
exchange values can be seen in terms of alienation. Exchange 
values can be seen as alienated, abstracted forms of concrete use 
values. The argument would go like this. In a capitalist economy the 
abstract form of value is the goal of the production process: 
Considerations of exchange value dominate the management of use 
values. Thus capitalism is a two-tier system of values, one system 
producing, distributing and consuming the products proper as use 
                                           
     34
 Mandel (1971: Chapter 10) presents the debate on Marx's concept of alienation that went on 
mainly in Eastern Europe and West Germany, with contributions from Emil Bottigelli, Jurgen 
Habermas, Pierre Naville, Roger Garaudy, Henrich Popitz, Erich Fromm, Jean Hyppolite, 
Siegfred Landshut and Gustav Mayer. 
     35
 A system that also alienates capitalists: most of them are alienated from the actual use of the 
means of production, their actions are guided by abstract value- and profit-maximizing terms, 
and they exist in an antagonistic relation to the wage workers. 
     36
 The Norwegian sociologist Nils Christie has noted that same alienated relationship between 
state and society, within the field of legal conflict resolution. His point in the comparative study 
of the judicial systems in Norway and Tanzania (Christie 1977) is that the courts in the 
Norwegian state "steal" the conflicts from civil society, from the locality where they exist, and 
transform the conflicts so that those involved in them become secondary actors, relative to the 
prosecutors and, generally, the lawyers, who are specialists, not in the dynamics of conflict 
resolution within specific local communities, but within the logics of state laws. See also 
Ericsson (1982) for a discussion of Christie's and other authors' analyses of systems for conflict 
resolution. 
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values, with their varying ability to meet human needs; the other 
system being a dynamic, imperfect copy or reflection of the first, a 
system of money related to prices used to guide economic activities 
and express and measure the degree of success of those activities 
(profits). The money system is abstracted and alienated from the 
system of use values. On the one hand money has no use value 
itself. It is a document or symbol that the producing and consuming 
individual has no intrinsic interest in. The primary interest in money 
comes from the owners of the means of production, who need a 
mechanism to appropriate the whole value of production, giving 
capital owners control over the following distribution of the 
production result between wage payments and investments. 
 The money form of the economy makes an alien ownership of the 
whole production result possible. In this sense money has use value. 
In a secondary, deductive way, money is also important for the 
workers. Without it they cannot buy the products on sale in the 
market, products that appear there as use values owned by others, 
by capital. The use values created by the collectivity of workers thus 
return to them in alienated form, as commodities for sale. Condens-
ing the inducements to work into the wage, limiting the interest of 
the worker to the amount of the wage, reproduces the alienation of 
workers from the means of production and secures capital 
dominance in the whole production and distribution process. 
 The alternative of giving the workers part of the substantive 
production as pay, would - of course - require a number of 
mechanisms that would threaten the workings of an exploitative 
economy. Let me speculate a moment. Getting say, 30% of 
production as pay would require that the workers could sell their 
part so as to redistribute it. They would need organizations or firms 
that could sell their commodities. It would require planning, so as to 
make equitable distribution possible. That would require some kind 
of workers' participation in management. That again would most 
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likely raise the question of why the collectivity of workers (who 
actually produce all the products) could not take part in the 
management of the whole economy.  
 The money form of pay breaks any such functional connections 
between the collectivity of workers, the firm and the management of 
the economy as a whole. The intricate workings of the two-tier 
system make it possible to let the working class have part of the 
production result without having any part of the ownership of either 
the means of production or the result of production. The 
bureaucratic form of administration, I suggest, can be said to have 
the same kind of abstractedness. As money is designated to 
represent and measure the exchange value of any commodity, so the 
bureaucracy is formally designed to serve, as rationally and 
precisely as possible, any political project or goal. State bureaucracy 
is sharply severed from society by a number of buffers. 
 Alan Wolfe defines the concept of political alienation in the 
following terms:  
 
 "in capitalist society politics is replaced by alienated politics, which can be defined as the 
process through which people in similar positions are separated from each other, forced to 
compete instead of to cooperate... Hence political institutions in capitalist society can be 
defined as those institutions responsible for absorbing the common power that people 
possess as members of a dominated but majoritarian social class and for using that power to 
rule them, that is, to exercise political power (their own political power) over them for 
purposes alienated from those people themselves." (Wolfe 1974:148). 
 
As the state in capitalist society absorbs problems and projects from 
society, transforms them into a public responsibility and organizes 
public administration to manage them, the possibility arises that the 
problem then exists within a different, a new interest context, a 
state-defined context. In theory (as a utopia) we can think of a 
non-alienated state, a state that manages problems efficiently in the 
interests of a client group - or a state that is genuinely under the 
control and in the service of a use-value, planned economy. In that 
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case we might, as Marx suggested, expect the state to become 
another kind of organization - an organization for administration 
rather than one characterized by coercion.37 
 Wolfe's concept of political alienation suggests that the state in 
capitalist society is alienated from the working class, that the state 
absorbs both working-class problems and working class representa-
tives, but then in "solving the problems" changes the problem 
definitions and develops solutions that may be in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie and/or the dominant political coalition in the state. But 
because of the separation of state and society, we have to be 
prepared for the opposite possibility, that the government can 
develop policies that the dominant class does not support.38 
 The concept of political alienation suggests a doubly alienated 
state: a state alienated from the working classes, but a state alienated 
from bourgeois interests as well, a state that does not succeed in 
realizing the bourgeois project, attempting i.e. to expand capitalism 
but in practice (as with the programme of economic growth and 
market freedom) "victimizing" just those interests. 
 The concept political alienation can be related to Max Weber's 
concept of "closure" - the idea that social groups of all kinds try to 
establish an exclusive internal communication and authority 
structure. "Weber conceived closure as the monopolization by 
members of an interest group of social and economic opportunities 
by closing off those opportunities to outsiders." (Murphy 1983). By 
                                           
     37
 Max Weber saw monopolization of coercion as an essential aspect of the modern state: 
"The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character 
of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation" (Weber 1968:56). 
     38
 In his book on American politics (Wolfe 1981), this seems to be one of his points. Both 
Democrats and Republicans accept the basic policy of "business freedom and military strength". 
But, in Wolfe's opinion, that public program, rather than serving the bourgeois class in the 
United States, will "victimize" it. "Instead of an expansive future" that program will "chain it to 
a restrictive past" (Wolfe 1981:9).  
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such closure the ability to understand demands outside the group 
also diminishes. The possibility of alienation increases.39 
 I suggested that the bureaucratic form of administration relates to 
policy-making as the exchange form of the economy relates to the 
production and distribution of use values. Is the bureaucratic form 
of organization systematically an alienated form seen from the point 
of view of the wage working classes in capitalist society? Is the 
bureaucratic form of administration one among several possible 
forms of state administration in capitalist societies or a form 
systematically related to that mode of production?  
 
 
                                           
     39
 Jens Arup Seip (1980) uses the concept "transformation" (of interests) to characterize the 
functioning of political parties. Parties in parliamentary systems, he assumes, have to absorb and 
represent many interests. How does that 'absorption' work? In political science the concept of 
'aggregation of interests' has been coined. Seip would rather use the concept "transformation". 
Interests are absorbed and transformed in the party before they are expressed in the policy-
making process. Usually, he says, the parties absorb 'more' interests than are expressed in the 
political struggle: "Man taler i politisk vitenskap om at det skjer en aggregering av interesser. 
Jeg vil heller tale om partiet som transformator. Interesser og ønsker hos velgerne føres over på 
et midlere plan og omdannes før de når opp dit hvor avgjørelser treffes. Et parti er ikke bare 
kanal for velgerinteresser, men nettopp en transformator hvor strømmen, kraften, fra forskjellige 
velgergrupper blir justert, spenning senket, strømmen blokkert om nødvendig, eller økt til det 
høyest mulige. Et politisk parti er et apparat hvor inntaket av interesser normalt er større enn 
utspillet" (Seip 1980:29).  
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THE BUREAUCRATIC MODE OF POLITICS 
 
Bureaucracy, seen as the power or rule of offices, is an 
organizational form characterized by a hierarchy of subordinates 
and superiors, where those above have formal control and manage-
ment of those below, where those below are without formal author-
ity over those above and where recruitment to decision-making 
positions is ideally on merit and knowledge (Weber 1968, Fivelsdal 
1971). Bureaucracy implies appointment. It is distinct from 
organizations where members are elected to their positions. 
Employment is usually a full-time, waged job for life. 
Bureaucracies work on specifically defined problems, keep each of 
them in dossiers and communicate on them in writing. They 
therefore have an advanced ability to remember and reproduce 
details of decision-making. 
 
A form of hierarchy 
Bureaucratic organizations are, typically, subordinate to a collegial 
or representative body that intermittently specifies goals and 
policies the bureaucracy should implement. Bureaucracies are 
rule-oriented, that is, they intercept and handle problems which 
have been defined in the rule set, subject the accepted problems to 
standard operating procedures in the hierarchy, and consider a 
problem solved when a decision on it has been made according to 
the defined procedures (Eckhoff and Jacobsen 1960). Whether the 
intention of the rule-makers is reached is formally not a matter for 
the bureaucratic organization. Bureaucracies are therefore a haven 
for lawyers, for specialists in interpreting formal parliamentary 
decisions, classifying problems in relation to the intentions and the 
existing rule sets and operating procedures and finding solutions to 
conflicts over intention and rule interpretation. 
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 Bureaucracies have a peculiar double character. On the one hand 
they are instruments for autonomous professional and powerful 
intervention in society. On the other hand they are meant to be loyal 
servants of political authority located outside the bureaucratic 
confines. Bureaucracies have power form (hierarchy and appoint-
ment) and professional contents (substantive decision-making). We 
might expect that the power form is dominant in class divided 
societies and that in classless societies, bureaucracies would 
disappear as power instruments but retain their professional 
contents. By combining both the power form and the professional 
knowledge, bureaucracies can gain dominance over policy-making 
in parliamentary organs. 
 However, rules are not enough. Bureaucracies need substantive 
knowledge to be able to understand goals and classify problems 
relative to the existing standard operating procedures. Thus 
bureaucracies contain forms of knowledge that potentially transcend 
the rule-orientation indicated in the definition given here. They 
often have a potential ability to evaluate whether the chosen means 
will serve the goals. Thus bureaucracies contain tensions between 
loyalty to rules and knowledge of realities, tensions that can exist in 
individual bureaucrats, between different departments in the 
bureaucracy and between different groups of professionals.40 
 Hierarchy and systematic division of labour give bureaucracies 
the power to implement complex programmes on a large scale. 
Bureaucratic coordination and hierarchical control of 
implementation do for the state what Marx indicated cooperation 
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 These tensions and contradictions within bureaucratic organizations may play a role in 
processes of change. Oppositional forces in society may well have a foothold within bureau-
cratic organizations, forces that can play a role in processes of political change and state 
reorganizations. I will later investigate Knut Dahl Jacobsen's work on such tensions and 
contradictions within the agricultural administration in Norway in the last part of the nineteenth 
century. The existence of such tensions and contradictions should, perhaps, have informed the 
revolutionary Marxist thinking on the state as well...  
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did for labour: "When the labourer co-operates systematically with 
others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the 
capabilities of his species" (Marx 1970:329). Bureaucracy, through 
cooperation within the bureaucratic organization, develops to an 
extreme the ability to manage and manipulate large societies and 
organizations from above, from the apex, from the point of a central 
will. The professional reference to scientific knowledge can strip it 
of any political or value content. 
 Hierarchical administration and bureaucracy, then, are not 
synonymous. Bureaucracy is definitely a hierarchy. But the opposite 
is not necessarily true. Hierarchical administration has, as Braudel 
(1985) suggested, a much longer history than bureaucracy. Typical 
of bureaucracy is the professional corps of administrators, paid 
money wages and without any ownership of the "means of 
administration" in the organization. Bureaucracy in this sense can 
be seen as inherent in or at least coterminous with capitalism. As 
money mediates economic transactions in capitalist society, 
bureaucracy mediates power relations.41 
 
Bureaucracy and markets 
What are some of the conditions that favour the development of 
bureaucratic organization? Max Weber demonstrated how 
bureaucracy develops with the spread of capitalism.42 The 
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 However, bureaucracy is not solely to be found in modern capitalist societies. Weber (1968) 
mentions the following historical examples: (a) Egypt, during the period of the New Kingdom, 
although with strong patrimonial elements, (b) the later Roman Principate, and especially the 
Diocletian monarchy and the Byzantine polity which developed out of it - and contained strong 
feudal and patrimonial admixtures, (c) the Roman Catholic Church, increasingly so since the 
end of the thirteenth century and (d) China, from the time of Shi Hwangti until the present, but 
with strong patrimonial and prebendal (where the state supports private persons) elements. 
     42
 "Bureaucracy, thus understood, is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical commun-
ities only in the modern state, and in the private economy only in the most advanced institutions 
of capitalism. Permanent agencies, with fixed jurisdiction, are not the historical rule, but rather 
the exception" (Weber 1968:956). 
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bureaucratic administration is superbly effective in creating 
common rules and formally equal distributions of resources within 
large economies and nation states. Bureaucracy contradicts 
democracy to the degree that it acquires independent political 
power. As Weber put it: "Democracy as such is opposed to the 
"rule" of bureaucracy, in spite of and perhaps because of its un-
avoidable, yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization" (Weber 
1968:991). As the bureaucratic administration expands it becomes 
increasingly difficult for parliaments to manage, and especially 
change, the policies pursued by the bureaucracy. Parliaments may 
make new decisions, but their ability to change the old established 
programmes may be weak. 
 Bureaucracy can be seen as a form of organization, as discussed 
above, as a special instrument of power, power wielded through 
administrative offices, or the concept can designate a social group, 
a group of bureaucrats, of people who have bureaucratic positions in 
private and/or public organizations. 
 Characteristic of bureaucratic organization is that it is a 
specialized management system, under the control of a "leader" (a 
capitalist or a legislature), with appointed personnel. But 
bureaucrats are without ownership of the means of administration 
and are set to manage a "society" or a "subsociety" (a company, an 
association, etc.) on behalf of the leadership/ownership. Bureaucra-
cies are separated from the societies they are designed to rule and 
manage. Public bureaucracies are themselves part of a hierarchical 
relationship between rulers and ruled. They contain professional 
skills acquired in society, concentrated in the administration and 
used to manage that same society from above. In capitalism, I have 
suggested, bureaucracies "grow out of society" and return to it in the 
form of powerful, alienated management.43 
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 Rosa Luxemburg saw the same mechanism at work in the social democratic party, but 
indicated that within the movement democracy and individual freedom were conditions that 
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 Bureaucracies thus absorb resources from the productive sphere, 
both for management purposes and for purposes of their own 
remuneration; get their goals (ideally) from above, from a political 
(in some sense elected) leadership; and manage some larger group 
of people according to specific standard operating procedures, with 
the purpose of reaching the "politically" defined goals.  
 Thus there are at least three contradictions in bureaucracy: (1) 
The contradiction between democracy (defined both as 
representative democracy and more radically as self-administration) 
and the power of professionals, (2) between wielding power and 
giving technical advice to politicians and clients, and (3) between 
the organization's separation from the larger social system and the 
need for intervening efficiently in it. How and to what degree 
bureaucratic power develops in Norwegian society, is separated 
from it, becomes in some sense autonomous and returns to society 
in the form of an externalized, powerful management, is a central 
problem in the following analysis.  
 
Class and bureaucracy 
If we introduce the idea of class contradictions into the workings of 
the society - the idea that large groups of people, because of 
manifestly different positions in the economy, have antagonistic 
interests - the questions related to the functioning of bureaucracy 
can be expanded: 
 (1) Where is the bureaucracy located in the systems of class 
contradictions? Is the bureaucracy value neutral? Does it have the 
                                                                                                              
could counter the bureaucratic alienation process. "The only way to rebirth [of the progressive 
movement] is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy, and 
public opinion....Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, 
without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere 
semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element" (1971:71). 
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capacity to serve any class interest that has managed to attain state 
power?  
 (2) Can it be influenced, changed or reorganized so that it serves 
subordinate class interests or is bureaucracy as we have defined it 
systematically related to capitalism and bourgeois rule?  
 (3) Does bureaucracy have its own logic that cannot be reduced 
to or deduced from any of the main class interests in society? Or, as 
Weber puts it: "How far are these administrative structures in their 
developmental chances subject to economic, political or any other 
external determinants, or to an "autonomous" logic inherent in their 
technical structure?" (Weber 1968:1002). 
 (4) What happens when bureaucracies recruit bureaucrats from 
other than the ruling classes and their allies? Does the long drawn 
out recruitment process eliminate the effects of class, so that 
bureaucrats are apolitical, technical specialists when they (finally) 
reach the point of employment, or are they actively socialized into 
the norm system of the ruling class? Or do they under specific 
conditions activate their original class identifications and create 
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 Effects that in the literature on bureaucracy may be identified as of dysfunctional. See for 
example Blau and Scott (1963).  
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A CRITIQUE OF MAX WEBER'S 
THEORY OF MODERN STATE BUREAUCRACY 
 
Weber is often interpreted as a student of the internal structure of 
bureaucracy with a scant understanding of the relations between 
bureaucracy and capitalist society.45 This reading of Weber is, I 
think, faulty. Weber saw both the functionality and dysfunctionality 
of bureaucracy relative to bourgeois economic interests and several 
of the dynamic relations between bureaucracy and class.  
 Although Weber saw his project as one of rejecting the basic 
tenets of Marxism, he held several Marxist positions.46 He saw the 
theory of social classes as fruitful in analysing capitalist society, not 
least because denying class contradicted a common self-under-
standing among workers. But class analysis was for Weber 
subordinate to the study of rationalization. Weber's theory of 
bureaucracy was at the same level of generality as the Marxian 
theory of class and class conflict. Weber considered the theory of 
bureaucracy a stronger one for understanding capitalism: "Roughly, 
for Weber, bureaucracy plays the part that the class struggle played 
for Marx and competition for Sombart" (Parsons 1957:509). 
Accepting the existence of social classes and class struggle was for 
Weber a necessary condition for limiting and legalizing the class 
struggle. "Class conflict", he told the Protestant Social Congress 
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 Weber's concept of bureaucracy defined as a "closed" system, closed to environment, 
without interaction with the environment, cf. Scott (1981). 
     46
 Roth and Schluchter 1979. Talcott Parsons already made the same point in 1937: "Weber on 
the other hand, was a thinker steeped both in the idealistic tradition of thought and in the 
particular empirical problems of Marx and Sombart" (Parsons 1937:499). One of Weber's points 
was that Marx indulged in one-factor explanations. That focus produced a wrong understanding 
of the historical role of the bourgeoisie. In my opinion this is a quite misplaced understanding of 
historical materialism, which operates both with the analysis of separate factors and their 
empirical relationships and, more importantly, with several levels of analysis, where, at the 
basic economic level, Marx assigns a clear predominance to class relations and class struggles 
in explaining politics and state.  
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amid protests, "was an integral part of the present social order. It 
was time the church recognized this, and in recognizing it, thereby 
legalizing it" (Beetham 1974:58). 
 In Weber's view, capitalism would gradually spread and make all 
members of society more equal, more capitalists in the markets and 
smaller income differentials between capitalists and workers. 
Bureaucracy was a system of administration inherent in capitalism. 
Its effect was to further social levelling and to liberate and increase 
the life chances of ever more individuals and groups in that society. 
Weber had an optimistic view of bureaucracy as an administrative 
mechanism for social and economic advancement: "The 
development of bureaucracy greatly favours the levelling of social 
classes and this can be shown historically to be the normal 
tendency" (Weber 1947:340). Weber spoke of "passive demo-
cratization": it serves a levelling of socioeconomic conditions, but it 
does not significantly increase political mobilization or activation of 
ordinary people, or the subjects of the state. Weber saw a contra-
diction between the expansion of bureaucracy and "active" 
democratization. However, Weber did not seem to worry about that 
contradiction. His assumption was that, if bureaucracy helps capita-
lism expand, that system, in the long run, will create the maximum 
of economic advance and individual freedom. That theory is 
consistent with Weber's concept of history as a rationalization 
process, with capitalism and bureaucracy as the `highest` and most 
rational forms of production and administration, in both the private 
and the public sector. 
 Weber postulated that bureaucracy had a conservative effect on 
ideology. Bureaucratic rule is commonly conceived of as un-
changeable and dominating. Both bureaucrats and subjects come 
under the spell of bureaucracy. Even when bureaucracies break 
down, ideas of alternative ways of organizing do not arise in a 
thoroughly bureaucratized society. The "accustomed way" of doing 
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things reigns supreme. "Every reorganization of defeated or 
scattered army units, as well as every restoration of an admini-
strative order destroyed by revolts, panics, or other catastrophes, is 
effected by an appeal to this conditioned orientation [to bureau-
cratically established rules and ways of doing things]" (Weber 
1968:988). 
 This ideological effect and permeation/ideological 
homogenization of a population is, if it works, an efficient 
stabilizing mechanism in a class-divided society. Bureaucracy was, 
for this reason, resistant to revolutionary attacks. Bureaucracy 
works like a machine, and its structure controls its own personnel as 
strictly as it controls its subject population. The bureaucrat is 
"chained to his activity in his entire economic and ideological 
existence". It is "practically indestructible" (ibid:987). The only 
flaw in this harmoniously functioning, highly rational and powerful 
system, according to Weber, is the plight of the bureaucrats 
themselves. They are not free. Rather they are reduced to "cogs in 
the wheel", to persons interested only in "the perpetuation of the 
apparatus and the persistence of its rationally organized 
domination" (ibid:988). 
 Historically, capitalism has been able to resist revolutionary 
change to a large degree. Even in the Soviet Union that argument 
can be defended. The revolution of 1917 did not abolish capitalism. 
It has there only taken a much more statist form (Nicolaus 1975). In 
Eastern Europe; and in many parts of the Third World, where 
attempts have been made to transcend capitalism into some kind of 
socialism, there is reason to investigate Weber's thesis. Can the 
bureaucratic forms of state, also in the socalled socialist states, 
thwart attempts at transcending capitalism and perhaps rather favour 
a regeneration of more feudal forms of economy and domination?47 
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 One interesting attempt at a comparison of Weber's and Lenin's analysis of bureaucracies is 
Wright (1979). He suggests that Lenin was one-sidedly interested in how to win over the tsarist 
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 There is a distressing finality in Weber's description of the 
rationality of capitalism and bureaucratic state administration. In a 
way it is an end station in Weber's conception of history. But cannot 
the internal contradictions in both capitalism and bureaucracy 
indicate that there is a way out, that alternatives in some sense exist, 
that both systems have oppositional and transcending forces within 
them?  
 Such alternatives, even if they exist, did not catch Weber's eye. 
His perspective was the increase or decrease of rationality, with 
capitalism supported by bureaucratic administration as the highest 
form of societal organization. Socialism, as an elimination of 
private ownership of means of production and an integration 
between politics and administration, was for Weber a degeneration, 
a reduction of rationality. He saw the possibility of bureaucracy 
degenerating, beginning to serve its own interests to the detriment 
of the expansion of market freedom and capitalism. The Prussian 
state was such an example. There feudal lords had control of the 
public administration. The Soviet state after 1917 was another 
example, where the bureaucrats controlled both the state and 
society. 
 Why degeneration? Weber saw it as a consequence of public 
ownership of the means of production. Bureaucrats were conserva-
tive, only interested in defending and expanding their economic 
rewards and the power of their offices. Public ownership of the 
means of production gave the bureaucrats power to implement those 
interests. The capitalist on the other hand, confronted with 
competition in markets, was systematically induced to take risks 
and search for technical and social innovations, moving 
continuously into new and more profitable ventures and developing 
                                                                                                              
state. The problems of transcending bureaucracy in everyday administration came as a surprise 
to Lenin. Wright suggests that a closer reading of Weber could have helped at least to remove 
the surprise...  
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more ingenious and labour-saving forms of technology. Weber 
drew the conclusion that socialism was the rule of bureaucrats, a 
regression from the freedom of capitalism. Capitalism generated 
freedom and economic growth; socialism generated state control 
and economic stagnation. 
 Analytically it seems necessary to transcend Weber's "in-
crease/decrease of rationality". We should rather search for laws of 
movement, laws effecting a change from one system to another, 
from one logic to another. We should search dialectically, that is, 
trying to identify the contradictions in existing systems, attempting 
to identify potentially new forms in that which is suppressed in the 
existing systems.48 
 Do we have reasons to believe that the parliamentary organs of 
state in the modern capitalist societies will increasingly be 
dominated by bureaucracies? I have mentioned the distance 
between people and parliaments, the indirect character of the 
popular influence in the parliamentary type of state. I have 
mentioned the combination of hierarchy and knowledge in the 
bureaucracies, and the difficulty that parliamentary organs, 
constructed on popular but highly indirect elections, have in 
keeping the initiative and defining realistic projects for admini-
strative implementation. Equally important is the economic aliena-
tion inherent in capitalist production. Ordinary people have the vote, 
but they do not have any ownership of the means of production. 
Private ownership of means of production eliminates a basis for 
authoritative and knowledgeable participation in the parliamentary 
forms of government. 
 This asymmetry of all power in parliaments and no power in the 
economy reproduces the powerlessness of ordinary people, 
especially when the economy becomes a more integrated system 
                                           
     48
 Fredrik Barth and Ottar Brox call this kind of process 'generative processes', that is, 
processes that generate new forms of social existence. See Barth (1966) and Brox (1972, 1989). 
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and increasingly dependent on international economic processes and 
institutions. Local and national parliaments lose power. The large 
capitalists, in control of multinational corporations, gain monopoly-
type economic control. The power of parliamentary organs is 
strictly limited to national boundaries. The international parlia-
mentary organs work at an even greater distance from localities and 
cannot make authoritative decisions within the multinational 
economies.  
 The capitalist control of the means of production allots 
knowledge and policy-making potential to the bureaucracies within 
the larger firms. The state bureaucracies will, at least in most 
economic questions, be dependent upon actions, interests and 
knowledge defined within the private sector bureaucracies. As 
Weber saw, the bureaucratic form of organization was generated 
and developed primarily within the private sector, within the realm 
of the large capitalist firms. The private sector "taught" the public 
sector how to organize itself as bureaucracy. This permeation of the 
state sector by private organizational forms allots privilege of 
influence to the larger firms. They are acquainted with the inner 
workings of bureaucracy, they know how to communicate with 
public bureaucracies and they will be the best served in situations 
where there are many claimants to public services. 





      THE STATE 
    PART  IN THE 






    My intention in this part of the work is to define the 
Norwegian state in the capitalist economy. I will describe the 
structure of the state as it was organized around 1970 (organs, 
personnel and finances). Then I will search for the origins of the 
structure of the modern state in relations within the capitalist 
economic system. How does the capitalist economy in its relations 
to pre-capitalist modes of production, both pressure for and delimit 
the process of state formation? Are there aspects of the capitalist 
economy that support the thesis of an alienated state and a state that 
appears, at least to sections of the population, as a foreign, 
oppressive/exploitative power? Lastly I use materials from the 
social-economic study of the national and state economies to 
question the distribution of power between the public and private 
sectors, between the state and the capital-owning bourgeoisie. In 
Part B I thus investigate to what degree the state can and should be 
seen as a dependent variable, an organization formed and controlled 
from the outside.49 
                                           
     49
  Karl O. Moene and Tone Ognedal (1990) argue that different forms of public ownership of 
firms (direct workers' ownership, municipal and state ownership) might make a more balanced 
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development of a market economy possible, without the present uncontrolled restructuring of 
the economy, with less internal conflict over management and investment decisions, and with 
less secrecy concerning technological innovations. 
  








      The formal structure 
      of the Norwegian state (1970) 
 
 
      "Apparatus is the term used to describe the mechanisms or instruments 
through which state functions are executed. Our argument is that all 
previous theories of the state have neglected to trace through the form - 
function - apparatus structure and as a result have missed vital clues as to 
the state's agenda, power and bureaucratic design." 
 
 Clark and Dear (1984:viii) 
 
 
A FORMAL DEFINITION OF STATE APPARATUS 
 
By state apparatus I mean those legally defined organizations that 
wield state authority, that is, organizations whose goals and modes 
of action are defined within the law-making process, and that can 
mobilize state force, bureaucratic, judicial and physical force to 
implement their decisions. This definition accords with the 
constitutional conception that state power flows from the 
Constitution, and downward into those institutions and organiza-
tions that explicitly are endowed with state authority (Andenæs 
1962, Eckhoff 1982). In this sense the state authority can be 
manipulated and distributed by political leadership; it can be 
concentrated in fewer organs and at higher levels in the hierarchy; it 
can be decentralized, moved out, so to speak, to new and more 
regionally dispersed organizations and - if wanted - to lower levels 
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in the hierarchy. Private organizations and persons can also be 
endowed with state power. 
 Concentration of authority will often take place in conflict 
situations and diffusion will be the trend in more peaceful periods, 
when ideological and other conflicts are less developed or notice-
able (Eisenstadt 1958 and Jacobsen 1964). A ruling class and/or 
party would be expected to diffuse or decentralize authority when 
its values are dominant in society, and concentrate authority in the 
state when oppositional or alternative values gain support. 
 The state apparatus in Norway (1970) has the following structure: 
formally a monarchy, state authority is wielded by three organs of 
state, the parliament, the Storting, the administration50 and the 
judiciary. I will here present an overview of the structure of the state 
and search for the political values and group and class preferences 
that are built into these institutions, and how and to what degree 






The Storting is divided into two "houses" the Odelsting and the 
Lagting, for law-making,51 but otherwise operates as one unit. The 
Storting should be seen as a unicameral system. There is no 
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 The 'administration' here refers to the whole public administration. I will use the term 
'government' most often for the collegium of ministers at the top level of the state. I will use the 
term 'public administration' or 'state administration' for the whole administrative system, at all 
three levels, national, provincial and municipal. I will use the term 'central administration' for 
administration directly subordinate to the ministries, at all three levels. At the local level I 
distinguish between central and municipal administration. The central administration has 
regional and local offices. The municipalities have their own municipal administrations. 
     51
 A proposed law is first sent to the Odelsting, then to the Lagting. If the Lagting rejects the 
suggestion twice, then the Storting meets and decides on the proposal by a two-thirds majority. 
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difference in the way members are recruited to the two houses. In 
1970 there were 150 members of the Storting, distributed between 
the political party lists taking part in parliamentary elections 
according to a modified Lague method of distribution.52 The 
Storting elects six presidents, two for each of the houses and two for 
the plenary Storting, and a number of committees. The committee 
structure resembles the structure of the ministries.53 The committees 
prepare decisions for the Storting within their field of work. They 
have no formal role in relation to 'their' ministry, but informally 
there is policy-making influence going from committee to ministry 
(Olsen 1983). The committees have increasingly invited interest 
organizations to their meetings to present viewpoints and evidence 
on policy questions. The Federation of Norwegian Industries (NIF), 
for example, in the 1970's had meetings with members of the 
Committee for Industry each week. The committees are important 
decision-making units. "The large majority of representatives [in the 
Storting] spend most of their time in their committees" (Olsen 
1983:61). Recruitment to the Storting depends upon nominations in 
state-approved political parties54 and national elections every four 
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 This method implies that the votes for a party are first divided by 1.4 for determining who 
gets the first mandate. Then the party votes are divided by 3, 5, 7, etc. The method favours the 
largest parties, but not to the same extent as the earlier applied d'Hondt's method of distribution 
(Andren 1963:132). 
     53
 There are some exceptions. The Ministry of Trade did not have a trade committee in the 
Storting. Its matters were taken care of in several committees, but mainly in the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs. The functional division of labour between the Trade Ministry and the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry has for a long time been unclear (see Debes 1978). There are also two 
committees for foreign affairs, the main committee and an expanded committee where the 
Storting presidency and the head of the Military committee meet. In 1948 the expanded 
committee was dismantled in favour of a special committee, with only four members from the 
expanded committee. The intention was to exclude members of the Communist Party. In 1949 
the Communist Party lost its representation in the Storting. The Storting then reestablished the 
earlier two committees for foreign/military/constitutional affairs. 
     54
 A new party wanting to participate in elections has to have 3000 supporting signatures to be 
accepted. 
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years. All positions in the Storting are contested each time. The 
voters are presented with a choice between lists of party candidates. 
This makes the vote a vote for parties and their programmes rather 
than a vote for persons. The political parties thus play an important 
role in selecting members of the Storting. The political parties are, 
however, considered as private organizations in constitutional law. 
They have no formal role within the Constitution as it is written, 
even if they are the central mechanism channelling nominees from 
their civil positions in society into parliamentary positions. The 
party organizations therefore play an important role in determining 
which sections of the population are to be represented in the 
Storting, and in selecting people within these sections (Valen and 
Katz 1964). The indirect character of the parliamentary democracy 
means that candidates for positions of power and authority in the 
state have to pass several 'gates'. Prewitt suggests generally seven 
such gates for upcoming candidates: From the population to becom-
ing a voter, from voter to party member, from party member to 
party leadership, from the party to be nominated as candidate, from 
there to be elected and then to actually become a member of 
parliament and the last gate (in a parliamentary system), from 
parliament to becoming a member of government (Prewitt 1969). 
 Studies of the parliamentary channel show that the activity in it is 
oriented toward producing rational, coherent plans and policy 
decisions - much less towards influencing the organization of the 
political and administrative process (Jacobsen 1964, Jansen 1971, 
Olsen 1983).55 
                                           
     55
 We can speculate on the effects of a state system in which law-making and administrative 
implementation are more closely related than in the present Norwegian state, where elected 
parliamentary organs have more direct control of the public administration. On the one hand a 
higher degree of election of officials, as in the US government system, seems to make admini-
strative actions more open to public scrutiny. On the other hand such elections can threaten 
professionality. Engels points to how election of government officials, as done in the Paris 
Commune, might be an important element in a working-class state: "In the first place, it filled 
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 The development of the party structure between 1882 and 1973 
can be depicted in the following manner (Figure 4.1). A left-right 
analogy is used but the placement of the parties in relation to each 
other may well vary, depending on which political 
dimensions/policies are focused on. To the right of the diagram are 




                                                                                                              
all posts - administrative, judicial and educational - by election on the basis of universal suffrage 
of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors" (Marx, Engels 
1990:190, written by Engels for the new edition of Marx's text Der Burgerkrieg in Frankreich, 
Berlin, 1891). Such elections and a radical right of recall would, no doubt, increase the power of 
elected assemblies. 
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THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
The central administration is organized mainly in ministries and 
directorates, the latter formally intended to be responsible for a 
specific management area (railway, post, procurement and sales of 
medicines, etc.). However, the distinction between ministries and 
directorates is unclear in practice, and the position of the 
directorates relative to the ministerial hierarchies vary. Some direc-
torates are independent organizations with a clear policy-making 
role (like NORAD, the international aid directorate, and the Health 
Directorate), while others are more like departments within 
ministries, tightly controlled and without much policy-making 
autonomy.  
 The central administration in Norway is less clearly divided 
between political secretariats and technical administrations than is 
the case in Sweden. There the directorates have strong and very 
distinct technical roles. The ministries are more directly political 
councils for the government (Andren 1963). 
 Some ministries and directorates have a subordinate system of 
regional (fylke) and municipal units, and several kinds of public 
production and service institutions at the bottom of the pyramid. If 
we distinguish between income-generating and non-income-
generating public institutions, defining income-generating 
institutions as those that sell products and/or services to the public, 
we can depict the hierarchy in the administration and the number of 
persons employed at each level in Figure 4.2. 
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The size of the public service institutions within the income- and 
non-income-generating categories at the bottom of the administra-
tive government hierarchy is given in Figure 4.3. It spells out in 
somewhat more detail which institutions they are and how large 
they were in 1973. 
 



















I will in Chapter 6 on the economic power of the state and in 
Chapter 18 on the management of Kings Bay Coal Mines, analyze 
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the economic function and management orientation of these insti-
tutions relative to the interest in capital accumulation in the private 
sector. 
 How were state employees in 1973 distributed over the sectors of 
state activity and between the sexes? A parliamentary report 
(St.meld. no. 90, 1977-78) answers this question. About 30% of all 
were women. Women were heavily represented in banking, in 
communications, health, education and cultural work.  
 
 
Table 4.1 State employees by sector and sex, 1973 
 
          Total      Women 



















































Totals 121413 99.8 35102 28.9 
COMMISSIONS AND BOARDS 
UNDER THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
Since 1814 the central administration has had commissions and 
boards that look into specific questions or are responsible for 
managing some part of the public sector. They have several 
functions: they increase the number of people engaged in govern-
ment decision-making; they increase the amount and kind of 
professional knowledge directly available for government decision-
making; and - at least potentially - they return knowledge about 
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government decision-making to society, both through the decisions 
made by the government, and through the commission members 
working in their regular jobs with added knowledge of the workings 
of government. 
 In the 70-year period from 1814 to 1884 some 580 commissions 
and boards were established. After the Second World War the total 
number of commissions increased from 503 in 1951 to a maximum 
of 1141 in 1976 (Lægreid and Roness 1983:191). 
 In 1980 there were 5500 people engaged in about 1000 commiss-
ions and boards. In 1983 there were 3148 positions in the ministries 
(Lægreid and Roness 1983:72). Thus the government recruits a 
large number of people into government through the commissions 
system. The group of commissioners was nearly double the size of 
the permanent personnel in the ministries in 1980. They emulate the 
class profile of the administration in general, that is, urban, 
upper/middle-class males predominate.56 
 What kind of problems do they attend to? Lægreid and Roness 
(1983) found that most of them worked with administrative 
problems of a national character (64%), about one-third of them 
attended to problems at the municipal/regional level (29%) and 8% 
were engaged in international affairs. The commissions and boards 
were distributed among the ministries as shown in Figure 4.4, with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs having the smallest number (14) and 
the Ministry of Education/Church having the largest number (112). 
The mean among the 16 ministries was 42 commissions and boards. 
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 In 1981 66% were from the Oslo/Eastern Norway region where 48% of the total population 
then lived; 7% of the members belonged to the occupational categories "farmer, fisherman, 
worker and lower administrator"; about 25% of the members were women. In addition we note 
that 64% of the members were public employees (22% in the central administration, 9% in 
municipal positions and 33% in other parts of the state apparatus) (St.meld nr. 7A, 1981-1982). 



















The commissions and boards represent a layer of professionals, 
organization leaders and politicians, not regularly employed in the 
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state (but well paid for their services), supplementing and 
strengthening the power of the government, working within the 
confines of the public administration. 
 
 
INCOME-GENERATING AND TAX- 
CONSUMING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
We can crudely distinguish the ministries related to production 
sectors of the economy (production of priced goods and services) 
from the ministries engaged in labour-related public services, like 
education, culture and social welfare (non-income, or not individu-
ally priced services). As of November 1979 there were six 
ministries in the first category (Agriculture, Fisheries, Industry, Oil 
and Energy, Transport and Trade) and five in the public services 
category (Local Government, Environmental Affairs, Social Affairs, 
Church and Education, and Consumer Affairs). If we add the 
ministries engaged in the administration of the state itself (Finance, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice) to the public service 
ministries, we have six in the first category and nine in the second. 
 We can distribute the state budget and the national budget 
between these two   categories, income-generating commodity 
production and non-income-generating distribution of public goods. 
This division produces the following result: the six ministries within 
income-generating production administered about 25% of the state 
budget, while the corresponding sectors of the national economy 
produced 80% of the gross domestic product (as measured in the 
economic terms employed by the Bureau of Statistics); the ten 
service and general administration ministries took the rest of the 
state budget, that is, 75.6%, while the corresponding sectors of the 
economy (mainly the welfare services and general administration, 
like police, military, judicial system, education, research, cultural 
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production, etc.), contributed 18.1% of the gross domestic product 
(Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2 Production patterns in state and society. Non-
commodified service and commodity production in 













































Totals 24.4  79.6 












































Totals 75.6  18.1 
Grand total 100.0  97.7** 
 
 
* Established 1982 by a separation from the Ministry for Church and Education 
** Less than 100 because of net imports in the balance of trade 
Sources: Lægreid and Roness (1982: 4.39); Statistisk Årbok 1982, table 102. 
 
 
 Productivity  78 
 
If the distinctions are valid, this demonstrates how the state is 
heavily oriented towards services. While nearly 80% of the 
domestic product emanates from commodity production, the state 
allots only 25% of its resources to that commodity production. The 
major part of its budget is used for the administration of non-priced 
public services. Why are these services provided through the state? 
Why are they not taken care of by private entrepreneurs and 
companies? At least two possibilities exist: (1) political movements 
have succeeded in organizing this service production through the 
state, making it a public responsibility and thus financing the 
services at least partly through tax revenues; (2) the production of 
these services are of no interest to private capital. Profitability is 
either low or spread out over a long investment period, so that 
yearly profits are low. Given that the services are important for the 
reproduction of labour power, public financing may be an 




THE SIZE OF THE STATE 
 
The total number of public employees in both central and 
regional/local administration, their distribution between the 
different categories of activities (general administration, services 
and commodity production) in 1970 is shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Public employees, 1970 
 
























































Sources: CBS, SØS 3, and Census Data 1960 and 1970.  
 
This table presents a picture of the personnel structure in the Nor-
wegian state. In 1970 the state employed about one-fifth of the total 
labour force in the country. Half of the public employees worked in 
the welfare service sector, about equally distributed between health 
and social services and education. In commodity production post 
and telecommunications employed about as many as public trans-
port/energy production, if we exempt the railways. The railways 
employed close to 6% of all state employees. General administra-
tion took about a quarter of public employees. Thus the personnel 
structure supports the welfare state thesis: the majority of 
employees were engaged in welfare services in 1970. We will return 
to these data and supplement them with analyses of the historical 
development of the personnel structure and its distribution between 
sectors of state activity. 
 Size of state  80 
 
 Approximately half of all public employees worked at the 
municipal and provincial levels of government. Table 4.4 depicts 
the type of work the municipal employees were engaged in and the 
number of persons in each department. I have included data 
specifically on the municipality of Oslo because of its size. I have 
inserted an overview. We see that the mass of welfare services to 
the population is delivered through the municipal level of 
government. 
 
Table 4.4 Public employees in local government, 1973 
 


































































































All part-time: 55330 37.1    
TOTAL 149060 100.0 30700 100.0  
 
Source: NOU (1974-60:130) 
 
 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
 
The Supreme Court (Høyesterett) has through its own decision-
making established the Court's right to test the legality and consti-
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tutionality of laws made in the Storting and administrative decisions 
made in government (Andenæs 1962:249-265). The Constitution 
does not define that right. However, the Storting can regulate the 
rules of the Court through its law-making. Compared with the USA, 
the Supreme Court in Norway has seldom made use of its right to 
test laws and seldom contested the judicial understanding prevalent 
in the Storting.  
 
The court system 
Constitutionally the Supreme Court is an independent institution, 
not subordinated to the Storting or the government. Its members are 
appointed by the government and the Storting has some influence 
on the Court's organization through its approval of Supreme Court 
budgets and posts. But neither the Storting nor the government can 
overrule the Supreme Court's decisions on law interpretation and 
justice (Andenæs 1962:154 and Eckhoff 1982). 
 There are three levels in the Norwegian court system. Below the 
Supreme Court there are regional courts (Lagmannsrett). The coun-
try is divided into five Lagrett districts, using the names of the 
assemblies from the early middle ages: Eidsivating (Oslo), Agder 
(Skien), Gulating (Bergen), Frostating (Trondheim) and Hålogaland 
(Tromsø). Beneath them there is a complex system of urban and 
rural courts, a system for working out compromises before entering 
the formal court system (forliksråd) and special courts 
(vergemålsrett, (child rights), jordskifterett, (land ownership), 
fiskeridomstoler, (fishing rights), konsulrett, (adjudication of 
Norwegians in foreign countries), etc.). The courts had 1097 
permanent posts in 1973 (NOU 1974-60:126). 
 The legal system in Norway is structured on the idea that 
accumulation of capital through employment of foreign labour is a 
private right. This is most clearly expressed in paragraph 105 of the 
Constitution, which states that persons who have to secede any form 
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of property to the state, whether that is means of production, land or 
means of consumption, shall have full economic compensation 
(Andenæs 1962, Fleischer 1968). This principle permeates the legal 
structure of the country, and is a principle that a socialist state (of 
some kind) probably would modify. 
 
The state prosecuting apparatus/the police 
The state prosecuting apparatus is divided into a civilian and a 
military branch. The civilian system is under the Ministry of Justice, 
headed by a State Prosecutor, with subordinates at the region-
al/provincial level. The military system is also subordinated to the 
Ministry of Justice, headed by a General Prosecutor 
(Generaladvokat) with War Prosecutors as subordinates in each of 
the main five military regions of the country, the Eastern, Southern, 
and Western regions, Trøndelag and Northern Norway. The 
prosecuting system is administratively independent of the Ministry 
of Justice. Only the government can give instructions to the 
prosecutors (NOU 1981-35:63). 
 In Norway the police are organized as part of the prosecuting 
apparatus. The state prosecutors are superordinate the police chiefs. 
However, the police are also managed and controlled by the 
Ministry of Justice. This puts the police under a double leadership, 
an arrangement that may cause conflict (politically motivated 
leadership from the Ministry of Justice, legal/judicial leadership 
from the prosecuting authorities).57 The police apparatus is divided 
in two, between 50 police stations, mostly in urban areas, and some 
400 rural police offices (lensmenn).58 The trend in this system since 
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 The government document NOU 1981:35:63 on the role of the police, mentions that 
suggestions have been put forward to severe the organizational connection between prosecutors 
and police, and thus create a system parallel "to most other countries that we with some reason 
can compare to Norway". 
     58
 The rural police have a number of civilian duties in addition to police functions 
(bidragsfogd, stevnevitne, namsmann, oppgaver for skifteretten, den lokale domstol) and as 
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about 1950 has been a relative reduction in the number of rural 
policing officials and an integration of police offices into larger 
regional units (regionalization was formally decided upon in 1976). 
There have also been some attempts at establishing local police 
centres within a police station district, especially in densely 
populated, suburban areas. The police had about 7700 posts in 1980, 




                                                                                                              
such are subordinate to a number of different state authorities. Ten local police districts have 
been stripped of all police functions. Concerning district police offices: five of them have 
regional police functions (East, South, West, Trøndelag and Northern Norway regions); five of 
them have regional functions within surveillance and security; two of them are rescue 
commands; the other district offices are local rescue commands. 
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The jails 
The jails are the last and most crudely suppressive institutions of the 
civilian judicial system. There exist national and regional jails. 
There are three national jails: Bredtvedt (Grorud, outside Oslo), 
Ullersmo (Kløfta, also outside Oslo) and Ila. Norway is divided into 
four jail districts, East, West, South and North. Within each district 
there are two kinds of jails, district jails and supplementary jails (see 
Table 4.5). 
 





























































Source: State Calendar (1980) 
 
 
THE MILITARY ARM OF THE STATE 
 
Where in the administrative structure should we locate the military - 
as a part of the judicial system, as part of the government/central 
administration, or as a separate fourth state institution? Both 
because it is managed by one ministry, the Ministry of Defence 
(earlier there were separate ministries for the army and the navy), 
and because the military, whether it acts internationally or against 
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its own countrymen, essentially acts outside the rules of the judicial 
system (though it of course has no right to act outside the constitu-
tional rules), it is perhaps most reasonable to view it as an element 
of the government/central administration. The degree of autonomy 
the military has in government is an empirical problem, dependent 
on political conditions between Norway and the outside world, and 
between the military and the political leadership in the country. The 
military system has a centralized leadership (Forsvarets 
Overkommando), with administrative units for personnel, intelli-
gence, security, operations, logistics and planning. There are 
subordinate regional commands for Southern and Northern Norway. 
Under the central leadership there are leaderships/commands for the 
four main elements: the army, the navy, the air force and local de-
fence. So we see a kind of military grid or matrix organization, with 
one axis divided functionally, one divided regionally and a third 
axis divided between the main types of military forces. 
 The Norwegian military is integrated into the NATO command, 
both the NATO civilian system and the military command. NATO 
takes command of the Norwegian forces if and when Norway is at 
war, and can act within the Norwegian territory in the case of a 
government-defined internal crisis.59 
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 Kleven (1976-1977:258-260) writes about this law, Beredskapsloven of 15 December 1950, 
which legalizes a bypassing of constitutional authorities. The government can generally delegate 
public authority: "Myndighet etter loven kan delegeres til andre i den utstrekning det anses 
nødvendig for at lovens formål kan oppnås". The military can take full command of the police 
during war: "På krigsskueplassen kan de militære myndigheter overta den øverste ledelse av 
politiet ... Kongen kan bestemme at alt politi, enkelte politikorps eller politiet i visse distrikter 
skal innlemmes i de militære styrker." The law can also be activated in situations of internal 
conflict: "Rikets selvstendighet eller sikkerhet kan nemlig bli truet av andre grunner enn krig, 
truende krigsfare eller fiendtlighet mellom fremmede stater. Under en situasjon med sterk 
utenrikspolitisk spenning vil således indre uroligheter kunne bety en overhengende fare for 
rikets sikkerhet, selv om det i øyeblikket ikke kan påvises at det foreligger krigsfare for Norge." 
The military can more generally take command of the state: "I den utstrekning det anses 
nødvendig for å fremme og trygge militære tiltak kan de militære myndigheter overta ledelsen 
også av andre sivile forvaltningsgrener". 
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 In 1980 the Norwegian military organization had 9000 civilian 
and 15 000 regular, full-time military posts. There was a standing 
army of about 35 000 officers and soldiers, mainly located in 
Northern Norway. About 80 000 Norwegians participate in military 
practice operations each year. The maximum army that can be 
mobilized is about 400 000, among them 100 000 officers. In 1980 
the Norwegian military consumed about 9% of the national budget. 
All physically and psychologically fit men are called up for one 
year of obligatory military service. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE FIVE CHANNELS OF 
STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION 
 
From this description of the formal structure of the Norwegian state, 
we can define five channels of interaction between the state and the 
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society: a parliamentary (1), a bureaucratic (2), a judicial (3), a 
corporative (4), and a military (5) channel. The first three are 
systems for decision-making, with only the parliamentary channel 
having a specific ambition of being representative of the population. 
The other two channels are systems for solving societal conflicts 
using legally based, indirect dialogue or force. These internal 
divisions of political and administrative labour regulate access to 
public policy-making and are important for contents, selectivity and 
power of state intervention into society (who gets what, when and 
how?). I turn now to an analysis of the value content of this state 
structure, looking into the base-superstructure idea in Marxist 
theory, the role of wars in state formation and how political and 
economic alienation may be related. 








      State formation 
      and the role of the superstructure 
 
 
      "It is only this autonomization of the political, as opposed to the dictates 
of the economic base, that permits [the political] to play this role of 
recomposition and reunification against infrastructural tendencies which, 
if abandoned to themselves, can only lead to fragmentation." 
 
 Laclau and Mouffe (1985:31) 
 
 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BASE AND SUPERSTRUC-
TURE 
 
Marxist social theory assumes that the state-society relationship in a 
class society is hierarchical, that it takes the form of a base-super-
structure relationship, with the economic system as the base and the 
state with its institutions, personnel, ideology and legal framework 
as superstructure. Marx's assumption, as I interpret it, is that in 
capitalist (and most earlier) societies the base determines a number 
of structures and types of actions and ideas in the superstructure. 
The scope for autonomy and power of the superstructure is in 
principle always present but its extent and the degree to which it is 
used by actors to give form to society vary. As societies grow richer 
we might expect the scope for superstructural (political-cultural) 
influence to increase with a parallel increase in the importance of 
the cultural-ideological struggle for conservation or change of soci-
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ety. Rich classless societies might well make the distinction 
redundant, in the sense that all the social dynamics of the economies 
are under subjective, individual and popular democratic control. 
 
The state has a separate, distinct type of authority 
The state has a kind of authority that the organizations and 
institutions in the private sector lack. That is, modern states can act 
on behalf of the whole society in a way that private institutions 
cannot. The state has a type of sovereignty that it does not share 
with any other institution or organization in society. The state is the 
only organization that can ultimately act on behalf of everybody. In 
this sense it has a monopoly - not, I think, a monopoly to use force, 
even legitimately. Many can use force in society - but monopoly of 
the use of force on behalf of the common will. 
 This sovereign authority should then be a fruitful criterion for 
delimiting the state apparatus: the state is all those institutions and 
organizations that wield the sovereign authority. Public 
administrative law assumes exactly that. State authority is an 
attribute that is assigned to institutions. State authority in Norway 
emanates from the Constitutional Assembly of 1814, and from the 
Storting in its right to make and revise constitutional laws. This 
state authority is assigned downwards in the institutional structure, 
as Figure 5.1 depicts. 
 




















The content of the sovereign authority 
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What social forces determine the content and distribution of this 
sovereign authority into and within the state? What processes 
produce the concentration of state authority in the Storting in the 
first place, furnishing it, so to speak, with something to distribute at 
all? Eckhoff (1982) does not address that question. The question 
analyzed there is how state authority is organized, and how it 
functions. 
 In constitutional law, however, there are attempts at explaining 
the concentration of power in the state and the division of political 
labour between state and society. In Andenæs (1962), a standard 
textbook on constitutional law, it is assumed that it is the will of the 
people that is behind the concentration of sovereign authority in the 
state. Sociologically this is a simplistic statement, but it is none the 
less important, because it is widely embraced in official and in 
elementary descriptions of the political system in Norway. Andenæs 
(1962:15) puts it this way: 
 
 "The people is a concept delineating a group of people that through a common language, a 
common territory and common traditions has been unified... The state is the organization 
this people creates, with a king, a government and a parliament as the peak authority, with 
an army of public officials and with the multitudes of people as its common members." 
 
Why does the people create a state? Because a state is "a condition 
for development and common welfare in society" (ibid:16). Accord-
ing to Andenæs, the characteristic of the state is not its legally 
defined monopoly of force. It is its policy-making sovereignty.  
 
 "From a judicial point of view, the difference between state and non-state, is that the state is 
independent (selvstyrende). That means the state makes its own laws, without reference to 
any higher authority or other society. This defines the difference relative to private or-
ganizations and to municipal authority." (ibid.:17)60 
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 Eckhoff (1982:10) also notes the dependent character of the municipal administration, 
stating that even if it is common to speak of municipal independence in the Norwegian state 
system, the municipalities should be understood as an integrated and dependent part of the state.  
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So we have two extremes. One is that state authority emanates from 
a dominant social class (given that such class concepts have empiri-
cally meaningful reference in the society we are studying), with the 
state as an organizer of the socio-economic system that sustains the 
dominant class. The other is that it emanates from the people as a 
whole. (a) To what degree can a Marxist-oriented class theory of 
state authority be defended in modern Norwegian state history, i.e. 
has the state been an independent agent of modernization, changing 
the economy to capitalism dominated by and giving freedom to a 
nationally based bourgeoisie? (b) To what degree has the state 
become an independent source of state authority, that is, an 
organization with enough independent power within the modern 
dominant capitalist mode of production to set its own imprint on the 






Vilhelm Aubert and Knut Dahl Jacobsen consider the existence of 
the state as a natural or at least unproblematical fact. They have 
done pioneering research into who manages to gain position and 
influence in the state. Their questions were: how does the actual 
distribution of influence in the state compare with the democratic 
ideals of the state as representative of all groups and classes? And to 
what degree does the democratic ideal of parliament as the real law-
maker and distributor of collective goods hold true? In particular, 
what is the role of the bureaucracy and the professions in the 
bureaucracies? Are they the neutral implementers the ideal supposes 
or are they better considered as political actors, taking part in 
policy-making? 
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 While sociologists were interested in the problem of how poorly 
represented groups could increase their representation and influence 
in the state, the Norwegian Power Study moved the focus one step 
forward. The question became not primarily how to improve 
representation of poorly represented groups, but how and, to what 
degree, strong, well-represented interest groups would come into 
conflict with the general interest, the general will of the people, as it 
was expressed by majorities in the Storting?61 The study reformulat-
ed the problem of constitutional law: how to organize the state so 
that it can represent and implement the common will of the people? 
Here Gudmund Hernes (1975:179), as mentioned earlier, 
formulated the age-old liberal hypothesis: the state must control the 
use of violence; with that monopoly the state can instil confidence 
in the population that rules and contracts will be respected. 
 The state is a guarantee for compliance to its own rules and 
regulations. In this sense those abiding to the rules can have 
confidence that the state, generally will support them. But it seems 
more likely to find the reason for the monopolization of physical 
force in the state's relation to its internal and external contenders 
who might have the ambition of establishing new sets of rules and 
regulations in the country. Thus, at the historical level, the state's 
monopolization of physical force in Norway is related to projects 
like establishing capitalism in a massive agricultural subsistence 
economy and (later) containing the contradictions within capitalism, 
between capital and labour, between the state and the unemployed, 
between the state and capitalists who do not abide by established 
rules, etc. 
                                           
     61
 See Gudmund Hernes (1975 and 1978) on how the state regulates market transactions in the 
interests of all and relative to competing large companies with 'political' power in markets. 
Francis Sejersted (1984:19), takes the same position, lamenting the segmented state and the lack 
of "overall coordination": "Power has been distributed so widely that we have moved into the 
segmented state. The overall coordination of state activity has been lost on the way." 
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 All these answers have one trait in common: the state exists to 
contain, bridge or mitigate conflicts. If the state did not exist, the 
assumption is that the society might disintegrate. The answers differ 
on the structure of the Norwegian society and on how representative 
the state is relative to the differing interests and values in society. 
Few studies have questioned whether a modern Norway could 
continue without a state (in the essential meaning of the term, as an 
organization wielding physical power alone on behalf of the 
population). There is reason to ask that question, as the distinction 
between state and society becomes blurred, as the international 
economy limits the power of the national state and as the 
surrendering of state sovereignty and power to international 
organizations becomes a realistic option. 
 
 
STATE AND WAR MAKING 
 
The idea of a genuinely democratic state is an old idea, but within 
most societies throughout European history democracy has been 
defined as democracy for the "independents", that is, for those 
members of society who were already active within the dominant 
mode of production and had an interest in its continuation. In 
Norway the Constitution of 1814 gave voting rights to owners of 
some kind of capital, and it was only in 1912 that those rights were 
extended to the whole adult population. Capital accumulation is 
coterminous with competition between firms struggling to defend 
their privileges and technological advantages and with the labour-
capital conflict. The system is conflictual, the dominant actors in it 
are aggressive and expansionary concerning territory. Charles Tilly, 
looking historically at "state-making", finds that state-builders in 
Europe often acted within a context of war: 
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 "A portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears 
a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social 
contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to 
willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a 
certain kind of government." (Tilly 1985b:169).  
 
In Tilly's studies of politics, individuals and relations between them 
and institutions are more prominent dimensions than social classes 
striving in some way to articulate and implement their interests.62 
The concept of state-makers does not in any way indicate that social 
classes might have been a root cause of the formation of state or-
ganizations. But the statement does indicate that democratic, 
peaceful representation of the population has not been the hallmark 
of European state formation. The coerciveness of states does tend 
toward the Marxist interpretation: the modern European states were 
typically violent, bureaucratically organized machines, fighting for 
dominance over territories.63 
 The Tillian statement cited evades defining the "state-makers". 
Who were they? Did they represent class interests of some kind? 
Did the kind of state system that arose in Europe relate to the kinds 
of social classes that were on the ascendant from the fifteenth to 
sixteenth centuries, that were becoming the dominant social for-
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 Tilly (1978b) has much praise for Marx's analysis of the nineteenth-century European 
societies, where class analysis is a prominent element, and for the Marxian focus on conflict and 
change. 
     63
 In Tilly (1986), the class character of the state is more visible, for example where the 
intendants' zeal to defend the royal government in practice supported the development of 
commercial and agricultural capitalism, and gradually gave the capitalist classes leverage over 
the state: "In their zeal to maintain the crown's sources of credit and to generate new taxable 
income, furthermore, intendants were hesitantly promoting commercial and agricultural 
capitalism. Purchases of office, loans of money, bids to farm taxes, attempts to create new 
industries, efforts to increase grain exports all looked desirable, since they seemed to solve the 
monarchy's pressing domestic problems. Those very activities, however, placed restraints on 
government... Those activities also caused the hardships about which ordinary people became 
angry" (Tilly 1986:244).  
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mations in the capitalist economies of Europe? Or were the state-
makers special elites, quite separate from the economic system, that 
fought for their own interests? 
 Tilly makes the point that the state was a political organization 
for protecting specific interests against others, and that states widely 
used suppression in the process. In this perspective much of the data 
on Norwegian state-making falls into place. We can, again 
assuming the fruitfulness of a class perspective, interpret the state in 
the following way. The state apparatus was a prized object of the 
struggle between the social classes. In the eighteenth century an 
early Norwegian bourgeoisie, allied with nationalist movements 
among the peasantry, fought the Danish aristocracy, gradually 
articulating an interest in a separate, independent Norwegian state. 
The contending classes, through their representatives, sought 
control of the state. In a sense, 1814 was the first chance of 
establishing a bourgeois parliamentarian state, a state that let capital 
owners actively choose state personnel, a state that could control the 
monarch through a law-making parliament, and a state that could 
effectively implement a policy of market formation and infra-
structural development advantageous for expanding capitalism.  
 The year 1884 can be interpreted as a battle for a continued 
development of the bourgeois state. The bureaucratic elite that 
monopolized the top positions of the state was ousted, even if 
important parts of it had served capitalist expansion well. In 
retrospect, in the 1880's the rising bourgeoisie and its allies were 
strong enough to take direct control of the top positions in the state 
and expand the democratic form by augmenting the political power 
of the parliament. The democratic expansion was essential for 
building viable coalitions with capital-supportive class elements and 
for legitimizing the often quite brutal expansion of the capitalist 
mode of production into Norwegian subsistence agriculture, forestry 
and fishing. 
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 Only a few years later, in 1905, full national independence was 
attained. The broad national coalition managed to eliminate the 
Swedish king and aristocracy from the Norwegian political system. 
The bourgeois revolution, creating a nationally independent state 
structure responsive to all political movements and professionally 
organized to develop infrastructure for capitalist expansion, was 
completed. 
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POLITICAL ALIENATION ROOTED IN ECONOMIC 
ALIENATION? 
 
Stein Rokkan recognized how the bureaucracy was a foreign, 
alienated body relative to the peasants. Under the heading "A 
fundamental theme in Norwegian politics: opposition to central 
authority" he says:  
 
 "[The peasants'] motives were simple and eminently practical: they had come to see the 
administrative apparatus of the new nation-state as a threat to the traditional ways of life of 
the rural communities; they wanted to keep this apparatus in check and they wanted to shift 
the burden of taxation from the subsistence economy of the countryside to the money 
economy of the cities and the trading centres. They came to realize that this cause could be 
advanced at two levels, in the Storting, through their efforts to keep central expenditures at a 
minimum and to curtail the rights and privileges of government officials; in each local 
community, through direct control of the field administrators." (Rokkan 1967:371). 
 
This idea of alienation is absent in Hernes' and Andenæs' reflections 
on the Norwegian state. They both focus on how the state is 
established (formally) to serve all. I have suggested that this is a 
superficial characteristic of the parliamentary state as long as the 
main means of production are in the hands of a (numerically) small 
section of the population and as long as parliamentary organs are 
without real directing and controlling power over the bureaucracy. 
But the superficial outer form of the state (representative of all) can 
function to maintain the legitimacy of private ownership of the 
means of production in the economy. (Since the state is democratic 
and the means of production are in private ownership, and the state 
can regulate ownership, then private ownership is subordinate to the 
will of the people).64 
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 Elster (1982) suggests that functional logic is a lazy logic. Functional theory is not 
inherently lazy, even if it is easy to state that A has a function for B when both A and B exist. 
The problem, as G.A. Cohen (1982:486) rightly puts it, is to demonstrate that A has a function 
for B and how that function is mediated, through what feedback mechanisms and social 
relations the function manifests itself. Cohen defines functional theory in this way: "e occurred 
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 The alienation of the state relative to the primary producers, the 
peasants and the working classes can have part of its source in the 
capitalist economy. In that economy the abstract (surplus value) 
aspects of the work process are in focus. For the capitalists the 
abstract aspect of labour, that it, independent of form, produces 
surplus value is the most important aspect. Abstract labour is the 
logical basis of surplus value and profits. What is actually produced 
is subordinate. It is the amount of abstract labour that can be 
extracted as profits that is at the root of capitalist economic 
decision-making and planning. 
 It is possible to distinguish between division of labour in society, 
between types of production (farming, handicraft, industry etc.) and 
division of labour within the firm, between the different steps in the 
production process and functions related to it (sales, accounting, 
personnel administration etc.). Durkheim (1964) related the 
divisions of labour to developments of two types of solidarity, 
organic and mechanic solidarity. Organic solidarity develops 
between people with different economic and social functions. They 
do different things and thus become interdependent. Mechanic 
solidarity on the other hand was that which developed between 
people who do the same work operation or have the same 
knowledge. Mechanic solidarity could be a basis for organized 
collective action, but did not give form to society, did not generate 
interdependence. These divisions of labour and types of solidarity 
can be systematically related to the Marxist distinction between 
concrete and abstract labour, as in Figure 5.2. 
                                                                                                              
because it would cause f, ... e occurred because the situation was such that an event type E 
would cause an event of type F." I note that the causal relationship is open in the sense that the 
possibility of non-functionality exists (did e cause f?) and that Cohen talks of types of 
phenomena and not about specific phenomena (type E, type F.) A functional model assumes 
that there is a common logic regulating the relations between several variables through feedback 
mechanisms. The critical search for functional explanations should continue, in addition to 
studying the interrelations between selected variables.  




This model suggests that the dualism capitalism creates in the work 
process, between concrete and abstract labour, may generate a dual-
ism in society between the economic sector, where capital is in 
control and the political system where the struggle especially for 
democracy can go on independently of the power relations in the 
economy. The model suggests that there might be a relation be-
tween the capitalist duality in the economy between concrete and 
abstract labour and the duality in society between the society and 
the state. The state is "separated out" from society and given an 
abstract form (democracy, bureaucracy) that can in principle contain 
and serve everybody and returns to society as a powerful actor 
systematically and concretely defending the capitalist mode of 
production from both earlier and possible future forms of 
production. 
 The more specific analogy to abstract labour in the state is the 
professional, value-neutral, politically neutral, but powerful bu-
reaucracy. Because there is nothing democratic about the extraction 
of surplus value from the primary producers and because the 
primary producers are a large majority the state under these 
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conditions will often be a separate, alienated and powerful 
institution. A sharp separation between the bureaucracy and the 
parliament is likely. The one speaks on behalf of the people, the 
other plans and implements modified but class-specific policies. 
The state will monopolize force. If the weaponry was distributed in 
the population and the working classes became convinced of their 
exploitation, then the exploiters could be forced to relinquish their 
privileges. 
 This complex relation between labour, capital and the state in the 









 Figure 5.3 The work - abstract labour - state relationship 
 


















The starting point here is Marx's idea that work has two analytically 
distinguishable aspects. It is first the expenditure of human energy 
in production. This use of human energy in work, the use of 
"muscle, nerve and brain energy", is basically the same across all 
kinds of work. But work is always concrete, that is, it is production 
of something specific, a use value. In this aspect work is different, 
requires different forms of education, different skills, different tools, 
etc. The idea is that because capitalist production gives priority to 
the abstract aspect of labour and to the maximization of surplus 
labour, over and above the labour necessary for the reproduction of 
the labourer, the capitalist class needs an extra-economic power, a 
state, to guarantee the reproduction of the capital-wage labour re-
lationship, a relationship that is exploitative, and a relationship that 
in a democratic setting most likely would be transcended by wage 
labour demanding that the exploitation be terminated. 
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 This, I suggest, could also be one of the reasons for the marked 
institutional separation of the administration from parliament. By 
separating them so sharply - as is the case in Norway - it is difficult 
for parliament to direct and control routine, everyday adminis-
tration; it is difficult for parliament to take the initiative in law-
making and budgetary processes; and it is relatively easy for strong 




POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE BASE-SUPERSTRUCTURE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
That the parliamentary state with its bureaucratic administration 
favours the reproduction of an existing capitalist economy does not 
necessarily mean that the state is an "instrument in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie". It might be such a state. There is reason to believe that 
no other major class within capitalism could make that state such an 
instrument for itself. There is more reason to believe that the state 
will have autonomy within the broad limits of reproducing capi-
talism. The capital-owning classes are themselves fragmented, in 
need of an organizing mechanism. The economic infrastructure is 
constantly changing. An institution that can independently plan and 
organize the production of infrastructure can gain support from indi-
vidual capital owners. The structure of the classes and the relations 
between them are constantly changing. Arranging compromises 
between them is a project that requires an overview that persons, 
groups and organizations embedded within a class would have diffi-
culty discerning. National companies are increasingly engaged in 
economies in other countries. A state can both further and ease 
international interactions. Rather than the Marxist (Stalinist) instru-
ment- theory of the state, a theory of an autonomous state with the 
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ability to organize the capitalist system at both the economic and the 
political/cultural level, and thus a state which is representative, 
would seem generally more functional for an economically 
dominant bourgeois class. Given that this is a reasonable 
assumption, the problem is the content of the autonomy and the 
limits of it: Does capitalism have stages when it can do without a 
strong state? Is the development from the parliamentary state with 
the Storting in command to a parliamentary state with the 
corporatist-bureaucratic administration in practical control of 
policy-making an expression of a capitalist economy losing its own 
expansionary dynamic? When do the problems and contradictions 
in capitalism outstrip what the parliamentary-representative-
bureaucratic state can contain and deal with? 
 What happens to the base-superstructure relationship when the 
state becomes a producer of commodities and services and 
increasingly an owner of means of production? In a small, 
capitalist/imperialist type of economy like the Norwegian one, does 
that lead to democratization of the state and more effectual popular 
participation in politics, or does it mean a more brutal, more exploit-
ative state-capitalist type of economy and a state with less demo-
cracy and less popular participation?  
















     What economic power does the Norwegian state have 
relative to the bourgeoisie in the private sector and relative to the 
working class? How have economic resources been distributed 
between the private and public sector in Norway over time? In this 
chapter the data in the national accounts are used to answer those 
questions. An attempt is made to abstract statements about power 
from the data on the size and composition of production, consump-
tion and investments in the Norwegian economy. First I attempt to 
get an overview of the distribution of economic resources. Then I 
look at the changing pattern of state expenditures, abstracting from 
those materials statements on the economic power of the state. I 
also use the changing pattern of expenditures as basis for some 
reflections on government strategy relative to bourgeois and 
working class economic interests. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES RELATIVE 
TO THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) 
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What has been the size of government expenditures over time and 
how do they compare with the size of the economy as a whole, 
measured by GDP?  
 Looking at the overall development of central government 
expenditures from 1900 to 1969 (Figure 6.1a), we see that they 
increased at a new and higher rate from about 1939. Although there 
was some slowing down in the early 1950's, around the Korean war 
and the slight economic depression just before, the increase in the 
1950's was exponential. The diagram depicts how increases in 
government expenditures are related to wars. After the First World 
War the level of expenditure fell. After the Second World War there 
was only a brief downturn around 1945 and then a continuous 
increase. 
 If we draw the same diagram on a logarithmic scale, we get a 
clearer picture of the details in the periods before and after the First 
World War. In Figure 6.1(b) we see the downturn in the 1920's and 




























































With the Labour government of 1935, the picture changed. One 
interpretation could be that by 1935 the "storm" was over: the 
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Labour Party was out of the Comintern, the communists had left the 
Labour Party and created their own party, the Norwegian 
Communist Party. The political arena was clear for engaging social 
democracy in state management and for an expansionary state, with 
capacity to regulate breakdown tendencies in the capitalist 
economy. 
 The increase of expenditures during the first social democratic 
period, 1935 to the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, was 
moderate compared with what happened under German occupation 
1942-1944, which represents the really big jump forward. 
 How large are the state expenditures relative to gross domestic 
product, GDP? The dramatic increase shown in Figure 6.1(a) 
decreases when data on GDP are introduced. Figure 6.1(c) shows 
the relationship on a logarithmic scale for the whole period, 1900 to 
1969. What we see is a subordinate state. GDP expanded abruptly 
with 1914 and the First World War, and took a sharp downturn in 
1920. It was only in 1917 that an increase in state expenditures was 
registered in these data, and the increase was moderate relative to 
the size of the economy (GDP). Then the state reduced 
expenditures. When Berge Furre (1971) says that the crisis of the 
1920's wasn't especially serious for the majority of the bourgeoisie, 
these data confirm that statement. Then, in the same way, in the 
economic upturn towards the Second World War, the upturn in state 
expenditures was again moderate. A parallel development of 
government expenditures relative to GDP took place in the postwar 
period. 
 The general picture that emerges from these data is of an 
expanding state, but a state subordinate to the private sector in terms 
of control of economic resources. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES RELATIVE 
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TO OTHER COMPONENTS OF GDP 
 
Public consumption comprises goods and services used by the 
central and local government, including the social security admini-
stration, for current administrative purposes. It does not include 
consumption of goods and services by government enterprises. The 
category includes both civilian and military costs for personnel and 
infrastructural investments (CBS 1978:90). The marked area in 
Figure 6.2 gives an historical overview of public consumption as 






















Figure 6.2 measures public consumption relative to gross 
investment, private consumption and export surplus. The diagram 
demonstrates the stable structure of the economy from 1865 to 
1905, with private consumption accounting for the main part, 80% 
of the GDP. But from 1905 the Norwegian economy was increas-
ingly an investment economy. Investments took larger parts of 
GDP, indicating increased economic power to the owners/managers 
of the modern means of production. In the 1960's private consump-
tion was down to the 50% level. 
 The diagram demonstrates how Norway was a net exporter for 
the first time in 1915, mainly because of its international shipping 
services, which brought large amounts of finance capital to leading 
sections of the bourgeoisie. 
 The diagram also demonstrates how public consumption 
gradually increased relative to other components of GDP, with 
some brief periods of relative reduction (in 1875, in 1915 compared 
with 1905, and in 1955 compared with 1946). However, even in 
1969, public consumption had not passed the 20% mark. 
 Lastly the diagram demonstrates how the sum of public 
consumption and investments - the economic power base of the 
bourgeoisie and the state, relative to the working class - has 
increased dramatically, from a meagre 15% in 1865 to 50% in 1969. 
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 Can data on public consumption and gross investments give a 
more detailed picture of public and private economic strength? 
 
 
CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN 
ELEMENTS OF THE DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
 
Within the domestic product, as it is defined in the national 
accounts, I will consider wages an indicator of working-class 
strength, taxes an indicator of state strength, and net investments 
and income on investments a crude indicator of bourgeois economic 
strength. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 show a dramatic shift in positions 
from 1900 to 1969. I have called the shift "from a consumption to 
an investment economy". 
 













































































































Source: CBS (1978), Table 51. 
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In Norway around the turn of the century wages (broadly defined) 
represented 80% of the gross domestic product. The wage element 
declined continuously to 1965, when it was a little above the 50% 
mark. The state, as shown by the public consumption indicator, str-
engthened its relative position evenly from 6.4% in 1900 to 14% 
of GDP in 1969. Capital accumulation, measured in net 
investments, leaped forward around the First World War, returning 
to a low of 11,5% in the 1930's, thereafter increasing to a new high 
in 1955 (17,4%) with a declining tendency to 1969. Net 
investments were up to 1965 larger than resources expended on 
public consumption, the difference being especially large in 1920 
(9.9%) and 1955 (7.2%). In 1969 the relation changed, with public 
consumption somewhat larger (2.5%). 
 We can visualize these movements in two figures, 6.3(a) 
depicting the sum of public consumption and gross investments 
relative to private consumption, and 6.3(b), a cumulative 
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These data tell us that from 1939 there was an increase in 
economic strength for both the state and the bourgeoisie in the 
private sector. Who led the way? A picture of relative economic 
strength from 1900 to 1969 is shown in Table 6.2. The state 
declined in strength up to 1920, lingered at the 25% mark in the 
1930's, was at a low point in 1950, but expanded from then on. 
 






































































































Source: CBS (1978), Table 51. 
 
Some public investments are included in gross investments. If 
anything, these numbers underrate the strength of the state. The 
movement over time of the relative strength of the state can be 
shown more clearly in Figure 6.4. 
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In 1980 the GDP was NOK 283 bill. (Statistisk Årbok 1982:75). 
State income that year was NOK 150 bill. Although this figure is 
not directly comparable to public consumption in Table 6.2, it 
indicates that in 1980 the state captured around 50% of GDP. 
 This demonstrates that after the Second World War the state 
increased the amount of resources either created within its bounds 
or channelled through it. The state is intertwined with the capitalist 
economy in many different ways, through production and distri-
bution functions and through control of finances and the redistri-




CHANGING MAGNITUDES IN THE MAIN 
CATEGORIES OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
 
What does the increase in economic resources mean for the 
political character of the state, its power and its interests, as an 
actor attempting some kind of overall planning? What we can say 
on the basis of these data is that the Norwegian state gradually has 
grown stronger, and that in crisis situations it is possible for the 
state to expand its power substantially. But, what interests 
motivate state intervention in the economy? One step towards 
understanding that can be gained through a more detailed study of 
how the state used its revenues. 
 In the following figures, government income is split into four 
component parts: two that represent redistributions, that is, 
"transfers to households" and "subsidies to firms/sectors of the 
economy"; the third category, "public consumption" represents 
money that the government spends on production and services; the 
fourth, "government capital formation", is additions to government 
physical capital. The four forms of activity and their scope imply 
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power. However, the capital formation category is of special 
interest. Capital is a stable power base, and it is directly related to 
the bourgeois interest in accumulating capital, that is, using surplus 
value to increase the total reservoir of the means of production - 
the basis for employing wage labour. 
 Figures 6.5 (a), (b) and (c), present the relationship between the 













































































The data indicate three stages in the development of the state 
economy. In the first stage, up to 1900, the state was a consuming 
state. The redistributions and state capital accumulations were at a 
minimal level, not moving above the NOK 10 mill. mark.  
 In Figure 6.5(b), 1900 to 1939, we see how the First World War 
gave the state budgets a jolt upward, an effect that subsided, but 
only slowly. The state budgets never returned to the old prewar 
level. In addition to consumption, subsidies increased during the 
First World War. The state extracted more money from society and 
became involved in the private economy. The other forms of state 
activity started taking on substantial size, but only slowly, relative 
to public consumption - with an increasing pace from 1935. Thus 
in this period we can call the state a transitional state.65  
                                           
     65
 One element behind the transition of the state organization was the emergence of the 
Keynesian deficit spending strategy championed by, among others, Professor Ragnar Frisch. 
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 In the third postwar period, the managerial state unfolds. All 
four categories of activity have substantial size and seem to 
increase together. State accumulation of capital is substantial, with 
a marked increase in the time of Marshall Aid. And the sum of 
redirecting activities, subsidies and transfers to households, 
exceeds public consumption (NOK 12 bill. as against NOK 11 bill. 
in 1969). 
 The relative size of the four components of the government 






















This shows how public consumption dominated the other elements 
of the state budget up to about 1900. In 1900 public consumption 
took nearly 90% of the government budget. But then the differenti-
ation process set in. Again in the 1920-1925 crisis, the relative size 
of general administration increased to the detriment of the other 
elements. A turn towards a differentiated use of the government 
budgets was taken in the late 1920's, the period called the transi-
tional state, when the forces for the expansion of a politically 
conscious state (the Keynesians) and the forces for limitation and 
reduction of the state,66 struggled for hegemony. With the end of 
the Second World War, and the arrival of a social democratic 
majority government, the managerial state was established and the 
whole policy repertoire was in use. Subsidies, capital formation 
and especially transfers to households became major parts of state 
economic activity. 
 Does this last phase represent a statist economy, giving the 
social democrats major economic leverage in the total economy 
through the state, and making it possible efficiently to change the 
social system, even the class system through state policy making? 
Is in other words the managerial state a new type of state with 
autonomy relative to the capitalist mode of production and the 
                                           
     66
 Parts of the farm and liberal intellectual movement of the time. The so-called "axe 
committee" was set down by the government to reduce the size of the state (see Tønnesson 
1979). 
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private sector bourgeoisie? The data so far show a change of 
economic strategy, but hardly support a theory that there has been 
a major change in the balance of economic power between the 
state and the private sector. Can the distribution of public and 





The national statistics are not especially good on the 'reservoir' of 
public capital. However, given the limitations, what resources, in 
the form of real and finance capital67 did the state have in the 
postwar period?  
 The registered amount of real capital increased in the economy 
as a whole. From a total capital stock in current prices in 1939 of 
NOK 24 billion, it rose in 1945 to 40 billion, in 1957 to 132 billion 
and in 1965 to 213 billion (Formuesfordelingskomiteen 1968:61, 
Table 1).  
 Table 6.3 shows how this capital stock was distributed between 
the public and the private sector and between real capital assets 
and finance capital in 1945 and 1965. The distribution 
demonstrates a significant structural change. 
                                           
     67
 Real capital is capital which is invested in material structures, like buildings, roads, 
transport equipment, machines, etc. Finance capital is capital in money form. 




Table 6.3 Capital in public and private sectors, 1945 and 1965 
(%) 
 
































Source: Formuesfordelingskomiteen (1968:61), Table 1. 
 
The state increased its control of real capital from 24% to 30% 
between 1945 and 1965 and at the same time reduced the public 
financial debt to the private sector from -22% to -1%. Both 
dimensions indicate a strengthening of the state. However, the 
private sector was strong in real capital assets, showing a slight 
increase from 73% to 74% of the total, although by 1965 the state 
had paid back most of its loans from the private sector. These data 
indicate an economically stronger state up to 1965, that is, during 
the main period of social democratic rule. However, in 1965 the 
state was still in a subordinate position relative to the capital fund 
in the private sector. 
 Taking the statistics on fixed capital in all sectors of the 
economy, it is difficult to separate public from private. But we can 
get an indication of the public sector position when we select those 
sectors that clearly are state controlled (the publicly controlled 
infrastructural sectors) and compare them with the rest, even if 
state capital is present in many of the categories that do not 
distinguish public and private (Table 6.4). 
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Total fixed real capital 
 




































































 = NOK mill. 
Source: CBS (1978), Table 62. 
 
Using this restricted definition of public capital, the state increased 
its control over fixed capital from about one-fifth to one-third over 
the 70-year period.  
 What freedom does the state have in utilizing its capital 
resources? To what degree are they utilized as capital, that is, as 
means to extract and accumulate surplus value? Or can the state 
use other criteria in its capital management, considerations of 
public need, public good, equitable distribution of production 
results, etc.? 
 I shall return to this question of management criteria, but to the 
degree that fixed capital makes wage employment possible and 
production that can be sold through the market at prices above 
production costs, we are talking of capital accumulation in the 
classic Marxist sense of the term. The problem is to what degree 
state production is sold through the market. Earlier we assumed 
that some 46 800 state employees were engaged in such 
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production (electricity, post, telecommunications and railway 
services - Figure 4.3). Compared with the private sector economy, 





Even if the state had control of one-third of all fixed capital (most 
likely more than that), two-thirds was still in "private" hands (both 
persons, families and institutions). The idea that the state had 
become economically dominant or that it functioned outside the 
capitalist economy on its own economic base by 1970 does not 
seem plausible, given the concepts, ideas and data presented here. 
It seems reasonable to say that the modern Norwegian state has (a) 
functioned within the economic logic of the modern capital-
ist/imperialist economy, (b) had its economic resources mainly in 
the field of infrastructures and (c) been subordinate in economic 
power to the private sector, where the bourgeoisie has had 
dominant and decisive power in its control/ownership of the means 
of production. To the degree that the working class has had control 
of capital it has not been through the firms but indirectly through 
policy-making in the Storting. The state increased its position 
relative to the private sector during the regime of social 
democracy. From this analysis there is little reason to talk of a 
statist economy or a statist mode of production developing within 
the capitalist economy, giving a state-based social class a new type 
of economic interest, different from that of the private sector 
bourgeoisie. 
      
 
 
      THE STATE 
      AS INNOVATOR: 
      FROM 
    PART  INSTRUMENTAL 
    C  TO PROGRAMME AUTONOMY 
 
 
      "Who commanded the Norwegian state between 1814 and 1884? Was it 
Odysseus [sailing for his utopia undisturbed by present dangers, demands 
and rewards] or was it Prometheus [free to steer his ship from harbour to 
harbour]?" 
 
 Sørensen 1988:11; my translation/additions 
 
 
     We have in the previous part of this work discussed 
what capitalism as a social system of production is, how that system 
seems to be dependent upon the ability to materialize labour in 
commodities, to avoid expansion of unproductive services and upon 
the existence of an extra-economic power in a state. As material 
production is increasingly automated, that is, as productivity 
increases, the limits on capitalist expansion (globally) seem to 
become tighter (structural unemployment). As societies get richer in 
material products and more complex in their divisions of labour, the 
demand for services both to capital and to labour seems to expand. 
As economies get larger, the demand for more service work in 
arranging the exchange process increases. As the limits on 
accumulation get tighter, there is an expanding demand for more 
scientific and administrative work directed at increasing produc-
tivity and finding new arenas for productive investment. As 
demands on labour increases more services are required for its 
reproduction. 
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 Now I turn to the historical analysis. What role did the state play 
in arranging the early penetration of capitalism into the Norwegian 
society in the nineteenth century? To answer this question I will, 
referring to the heuristic model (Figure 1.2), first study capital as 
the independent variable. How did it penetrate the Norwegian 
agricultural economy? How did the capitalist system affect the 
formation of classes and groups in the early period? And how did 
capitalist entrepreneurs relate to and demand action from the state? 
Having answered these questions I turn the spotlight round. How 
and to what degree did the state elites, through parliament and the 
government bureaucracy, act autonomously in relation to differing 
economic class interests in the early period? To what degree was 
this autonomy important for the modernization process, for the 
penetration of capital into the Norwegian economy? 
 According to the analysis in Part B, as long as capitalism expands 
the scope of material/industrial production, there is reason to believe 
that the capitalist economic system will thrive. The state will benefit 
from the expansion: tax incomes and jobs will increase and there 
will be room for wage increases and welfare. 
 With the expansion of capitalism we would expect the rural, 
subsistence mode (the household economy) in agriculture to be 
under attack. Urban capitalism demands a production surplus from 
agriculture. Landowning peasants might organize opposition to the 
urban onslaught, as happened in Norway (Koht 1975). We would 
expect that an expansion of capitalism would increase the size, and 
perhaps the homogeneity, of the working class (at least in the early 
phases of capitalist expansion; see Bettelheim 1985:15-). The new 
working class will, in the expansive phase of capitalism, experience 
both warm and cold winds. The warm wind is the absolute increase 
in the number of jobs in capitalist industry, absorbing larger parts of 
the workforce. Wages will vary, but will become relatively high in 
those sectors with the highest profits. The cold wind will be the 
harsh working conditions and the low wages in the less profitable 
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parts of the system. Capitalism in this early, expansive stage lacks a 
regulatory state, one that can administer the wage fund politically.68 
 I will investigate how capitalism affected Norwegian state 
formation. Dieter Senghaas (1985) has suggested that the structure 
of land ownership is an important variable for explaining the 
development of a liberal, democratic political movement in 
European societies, one that could actively define and implement 
the conditions for an autocentric capitalism. Without a break-up of 
the large, feudal or semi-feudal estates into smaller plots worked by 
independent peasants, such a farm movement would typically not 
emerge. When created, that movement played an important role, 
together with sections of the bourgeoisie (industrialists, traders, 
administrators, etc.), in establishing a parliamentary democratic 
form of government and a dominant regime of a farmer-industrialist 
alliance oriented toward modernization. I will reflect on the 
relevance of that theory in the Norwegian case (see Mjøset 1983 
and Gran 1989). 
 I will investigate materials on land ownership from the end of the 
seventeenth century when Norway and Norwegian peasants and 
farmers69 became directly subordinated to Danish state rule. Then I 
query to what degree the state had an autonomous role in changing 
the economic system. I will investigate the role of the state in this 
contradictory process in the nineteenth century and attempt to 
define the kind and extent of state autonomy up to 1905, when 
Norway seceded from formal subordination to the Swedish 
monarchy. My suggestion is that the state played an independent 
                                           
     68
 Keynesianism and the development of the welfare state are, I suggest, an expression of such 
maturity, of a political control of the size and distribution of the wage fund in society. 
     69
 I will use the term 'peasant' to imply an agriculturalist who works a piece of land (owned or 
rented) without any foreign labour (labour of other than family members) and who produces 
directly the livelihood of his own household with market exchanges as supplement. A 'farmer' is 
an agriculturalist who owns or rents land, or works for wages for an owner on land that 
produces mainly for markets. Empirically, of course, the distinction is located on a continuum. 
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role in the modernization process. Its parliamentary form, its 
professional bureaucracy subordinated a democratically controlled 
government, was decisive for success. The bourgeoisie could not 
have managed without that state. The state in the early period was 
small and seemed to have autonomy mainly in the field of working 
out means to implement policies defined by bureaucratic/political 
elites (instrumental autonomy), while later, toward the end of the 
century, the state developed a higher-level autonomy, programme 
autonomy or the ability to develop policy independently, for 
modernization and infrastructural works, based in its own 
professional competence and policy-making systems. 








      The early formation 






     How did the bourgeoisie as a dominant class in a 
modern economy take form in Norway? With Dieter Senghaas 
(1985) we can suggest that land-owning peasants play a central role 
in the modernization process. The industrial bourgeoisie cannot 
make it alone. Only in alliance with a strong farm/peasant 
movement is the bourgeoisie strong enough to oust feudal or 
bureaucratic power from the centre of the state. A state structure 
that invites representation of political movements seems to be 
important for the rise of politically ambitious farmer/peasant 
movements. The independent ownership of small plots of land that 
can be tilled by the peasant is a crucial element in the political 
mobilization of the peasants toward collective action for their own 
economic interests. How did land ownership develop in Norway 
from 1661, when the Norwegian territory and the Norwegian and 
Lapp nations were subordinated to direct Danish rule, to 1814, 
when the first liberal democratic form of state was organized in the 
country on a semi-independent basis?70 
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 There has been a debate on the character of agricultural production in Norway in the 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND, 1661 TO 1850 
 
The distribution of land in Norway in 1661, at the inception of 
Danish autocratic rule in the country, has been studied in some 
detail by Holmsen and Bjørvik (1955). Holmsen found that during 
the Middle Ages only about a quarter of the arable land was owned 
by the peasants. The rest was divided between the church (40%) and 
the king and the aristocracy (35%) (Holmsen 1961). Toward 1661 
there was a gradual change in the distribution, favouring farmers 
and large private land owners and reducing the land holdings of the 
church. In 1661, according to the land tax registers, peasants owned 
about 40% of the land, but only half of this was in the hands of 
independent peasants. The other 20% was rented from landed 
aristocracy. The king had around 30% of the arable land in the 
territory in 1661. 
 This ownership structure made peasants dependent upon absentee 
landlords. But how dependent? That question concerns the type and 
                                                                                                              
nineteenth century in Historisk Tidsskrift (HT). Øyvind Østerud wrote in 1975 about the radical 
change in agriculture, which most students agree took place in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Østerud's argument is that agriculture all over Norway was a special, non-capitalist 
mode of production, characterized by an interest in maximizing the farm household's fund of 
consumption goods. There was no dramatic change from a subsistence to a money economy in 
Norwegian agriculture. Market transactions had been important for agricultural households far 
back in Norwegian history. In the latter part of the nineteenth century market transactions 
generally became more important, but agriculture did not become a sector in the economy 
characterized by capital accumulation. However, the development of capitalism forced most 
parts of the agricultural community to adjust to market demands to fulfil their primary need of 
consumption goods. Kjell Haarstad (1983) disagreed with Østerud (1976). Haarstad does not 
see agriculture in Norway as a special mode of production. Rather the dualism between the 
accumulation of money capital, through market transactions, and the maximization of 
consumption in the household "went right through the agricultural community itself" (p.117). 
Both interests in subsistence and market transactions motivated the farmers. What drove 
agriculture towards modernization in the form of greater use of technology and increased output 
per man-year was "pressure from the outside", the demand for labour that developed in the 
industrial and the tertiary sectors of the economy, which drew labour from agriculture and 
forced the farmers/peasants to modernize their production techniques. 
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the extent of economic exploitation of the dependent tillers. The 
topography made coordination of production and exploitation 
difficult. The aristocracy and the church in Norway was relatively 
weak compared with Denmark. There seems to be agreement that 
small landholders had a marked economic autonomy, and that the 
tendency in the whole period was dissolution of estates and in-
creasing independence of small landholders.  
 There were regional differences in 1661. As we move from the 
far north of the country, southwestward and then east, the land is 
increasingly in the hands of independent peasants. Taking data on 
the two extremes, Nordland in the north and Bratsberg/Tønsberg in 
the southeast, we find the distribution of land in 1661 shown in 
Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Land ownership, 1661. Regional differences 
 




Peasants on rented land** 
 
Land under peasant control 
 
Land owned by aristocracy 
Land owned by the Danish king 
Church land 
 



































 = Bratsberg, Brunla and Tønsberg 
**
= Land rented to peasants by urban bourgeois owners. 
 
Source: Holmsen and Bjørvik (1955:88 and 444). 
 
 
Through the eighteenth century, lands owned by the aristocracy, the 
king and the church were gradually sold to urban capitalists. At the 
same time, an increasing number of renters of farm land achieved 
independent status on that land. But, as Holmsen and Bjørvik show, 
ownership of land by urban capitalists was still, in 1820, a major 
social element in the Norwegian countryside.71 The strength of 
                                           
     71
 On the basis of Koht's materials (Koht 1975), Almås describes this development as follows: 
"The number of independent small landholders increased fourfold in one century. The increase 
developed in two waves: from 1660 the state most often sold whole estates to urban capitalists 
and rural/urban nobility. ... some of this land was gradually transferred to independent 
landholders. After about 1720 it was farms within royal estates that were sold to farmers. 
Through these transfers, the peasant farmers strengthened their position as a social class. But as 
some peasants became farmers, other peasants became crofters [tenant farmers with life tenure]" 
(Almås in Koht 1975:ix). According to data presented by Koht, there were 10 000 crofters in 
1660 and 49 000 in 1825. There were 40 000 dependent peasants in 1660 and 31 000 in 1825, 
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independent farmers increased as we move from the north to the 
southeastern part of the country. Capitalist ownership of land was 
distributed regionally as shown in Table 7.2. 
                                                                                                              
while the number of peasant farmers was 14 000 and 59 000 respectively. Thus, as Almås also 
points out there was differentiation: on the one hand more peasant farmers, on the other, more 
crofters. Agriculture became class differentiated. The peasant farmers became a petty 
bourgeoisie, located between the urban rural bourgeoisie on the one hand and crofters/land- and 
household labourers on the other. 




Table 7.2 Urban landowners, 1820. Regional distribution of urban 
capitalists' ownership of land 
 








90% 60% 40% 30% 10% 
 
 
Source: Holmsen and Bjørvik (1955:88 and 444). 
 
 
These regional differences indicate that urban and aristocratic 
control of agriculture varied between the north, the west coast and 
the southern part of the country. Urban control over land was 
stronger in the northern part of the country. In the southern regions 
the differentiation between farmers and peasants, and the power of 
the market-oriented (and larger) farmers was stronger. Thus capital 
accumulation has had a function in agriculture in all parts of the 
country but through different social structures. In the north and 
west, capital accumulation was administered from the towns, while 
in the southeast urban capital cooperated directly with large 
independent farmers. 
 Holmsen and Bjørvik point to the main tendency towards 
independent peasant ownership: 
 
 "That is an old trait [that 10% of the land was private and public estates]: The valleys in the 
south and all of Agder were dominated by independent small peasants all through the middle 
ages. There was no nobility. The old state and church did not manage to establish estates. 
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Otherwise the statistics demonstrate the relative movement from tenant to independent 
farming in different parts of the country. That was the main change in the history of land 
ownership in Norway through both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, apart from the 
development of crofting." (Holmsen and Bjørvik 1955:83) 
 
Generally the rural conditions for creating a liberal democratic 
movement in the Senghaasian sense seem to have developed 
positively from 1661 onwards. 
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MANUFACTURE AND INDUSTRY 
 
In 1801 Norway had a population of about 880 000 people. 
Approximately 9% or 80 000 lived in towns. From 1661 to 1800 the 
relative number of townspeople was constant (7% in 1661, 9% 
1801, Bergsgård 1964:240). Looking at the occupational structure 
in 1801, Bergsgård found 80% in agriculture, 6% in industrial 
activity (mining and handicraft/manufacture), 5% in sea transport 
and fishing, 2% in trade and commerce and 3% in private service 
work. Thus in 1801 there was some manufacture and industry in the 
country, but more in the form of isolated firms in an agricultural 
landscape, rather than any kind of network.72 Information about 
                                           
     72
 An interesting indication that this early form of the modern class structure (capitalists, 
working class and a petty bourgeoisie) was on the rise is given in the historical studies of the 
barony in Larvik (on the east coast of Norway, about 200 km south of Oslo) (Vestfold 
Historielag 1980). Although the area is atypical in the sense that it probably already at that time 
ranked among the richest farm land in the country, the studies describe industrial-type activities 
in the barony in sawmilling, mining and metal working. The companies were formally in public 
ownership, but administered by the baron (the Danish baron Gyldenløve) who was responsible 
for the Norwegian colony (stattholder) between 1664 and 1699, and later by members of the 
family Daneskjold. They employed wage labour (how many workers is not specified) and 
organized the work of most of the farmers in the district. The farmers delivered timber to the 
sawmill as part of the rent they had to pay for using the land. 
 The barony also controlled trade in Larvik town. This infuriated the bourgeoisie there, who 
wanted to free trade from Danish state regulation. Its battle was unsuccessful up to about 1750. 
But then the bourgeoisie increasingly managed to cooperate with the barony administration, 
which became sympathetic to the bourgeois cause (the bureaucrats were themselves traders). 
Gradually, towards 1800, the bourgeoisie in the towns increased their economic power. Within 
the feudal mode of production of the barony (estate owner controlling and exploiting dependent 
land and workshop labour) there developed a semi-public industrial structure that the 
bourgeoisie gradually, from their independent position in the towns, took over. 
 The barony developed a meticulous and strong administration for the economic activities, a 
semi-public administration, closely monitoring economic activity, from delivery of timber from 
the farmers, via the production process itself, to the sale of products in Norway and in other 
countries. It seems that, at least in the Larvik district, a modern administration was developed in 
the barony, an administration for production proper, for exploitation/taxation and for public 
control of the population. The bourgeoisie in Larvik did not have to start from scratch when 
they entered into larger-scale industrial activities and public administration. 
 One reason why the barony gradually had to give in to the bourgeois takeover was that the 
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manufacture and industry in 1829 has been drawn from the province 
managers' (amtmann) reports (Lieberman 1970). Table 7.3 shows 
the distribution of types and numbers of companies in the country, 
with the sawmill as the dominant form of activity, mills that as often 
were owned by farmers as by urban capitalists. 
 
Table 7.3 Industry in Norway, 1829 
 


































Source: Lieberman (1970:87). 
 
Thus it seems that, at the turn of the century, the occupational 
structure contained several modes of production, household, use 
value focused modes in small-scale agriculture, semi-feudal 
aristocratic modes and capitalist production. The semi-feudal mode 
was probably dominant, with peasants renting land, delivering taxes 
in kind and in money, with many independent peasants and with the 
new urban capitalism on the rise. A new bourgeois class was taking 
form, a class engaged in trade and farming, but with some few in 
industry. It was an internationally composed bourgeoisie already 
                                                                                                              
barony administration did not manage to keep public and private interests apart. With the baron 
himself in Denmark, the inspectors at the barony increasingly worked for their own private 
interests. Inefficiency and public discontent increased. In 1805 the barony was heavily in the red 
and it was sold to the Danish king.  
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then, with Danish and German members (Kleven 176-1977 and 
Koht 1975). 
 Per Maurseth (1981), among others, has argued that the Dan-
ish/Norwegian bureaucracy, with some allies, was the ruling class in 
Norway after independence from Denmark in 1814 (see Gran and 
Hjellum 1982, and Fure 1984b for a discussion of that thesis). There 
is little doubt that the bureaucrats dominated the state, that they as a 
corporate group had control of the state. However, that alone does 
not make them an independent class. The powerholders' relations to 
society are important. To be a political class the powerholders 
should have their own economic base and it should put them in an 
exploitative relation to other classes. The problem with the bureau-
crats at this time was that they had very little or at best very indirect 
control of means of production (land, trading houses, industrial 
firms, boats, sawmills, etc.). As Hjellum and Gran argued, the 
bureaucracy was not a separate class in the economy. However, it 
could be termed a political class, a category of people  in state 
positions, with an economic base in select industry and trade, with 
contradictory interest to other classes in the economy. An elite is a 
group that has special traits that others do not have (high education, 
high position, high income etc.) and that is based in an institution. 
An indication of the bureaucrats' lack of 'economic class status' was 
their split into (at least) two ideological camps, one peddling 
liberalization and the development of a market economy 
(modernization), the other identified with the traditional paternalis-
tic values of the agricultural society (large-scale, self-sufficient 
farming, family, church and patriarchy). 
 
 
FARMING, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND  
CLASS FORMATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
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The peasantry in Norway had a large degree of economic 
independence. We can call that form of agriculture a petty bour-
geois mode of production: the producer owns the land and the 
means of production, produces a large part of the family's food, but 
also some amount for exchange (exchange in money or in kind), but 
does not employ foreign wage labour. If others work on the farm 
they are most often family members. Capital accumulation is 
difficult because of the limited size of the production unit. 
Therefore maximizing household necessities is a dominant motive.  
 This mode expanded in several ways from the 1830's. 
Independent, relatively small, self-owned plots of land became 
more common. If 57% of all tillers were owners of land in 1801 
then 81% were owners of land in 1855 (Bergh 1983b:36). Most 
important, the size of the absolute surplus in agriculture started to 
increase faster than the growth of the population. The ability of the 
countryside to feed itself and a growing town population increased. 
At the same time the relative number of farmers declined from 83% 
in 1801 to 43% in 1900. Over the length of the century there was a 
general downward trend (Table 7.4), a trend, however, that is 
uneven if we look at the changes per year. The mean data reveal 
sharp reductions in 1865-75 and in the last decade of the century 
(Table 7.5). 
 










 733 000 
 1 115 000 
 1 052 600 
 975 000 
 972 000 
 Total 
 population 
 883 000 
 1 701 000 
 1 818 900 
 2 004 100 
 2 239 000 








Source: Jacobsen (1964:139) and CBS (1978), Table 6. 
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Table 7.5 Decline of agriculture, 1801-1900. Mean reduction of 


















Sources: Bergsgård (1964:48), Jacobsen (1964:13), CBS (1968:36-37). 
 
The flight from agriculture was especially strong in the crisis period 
of the 1870's and during the economic expansion and rapid indus-
trialization in the 1890's: Both crisis and expansion in the economy 
seemed to hurt the small farmers and peasants. 
 In the middle of the century there was a spurt of modernization. 
New textile mills were established on the east and west coast, 
developed by entrepreneurs (e.g. Peter Jebsen in Arne Fabrikker) 
with knowledge of the new English technology, with capital support 
from the outside (Jebsen from bankers in Schleswig Holstein) and 
with access to nearly free energy from the rivers.73 Metal workshops 
(Aker and Myren) were started in the Christiania (Oslo) area. The 
first private and public national banks were created around mid-
century.74 
 The table on the occupational structure in the Appendix allows us 
to identify some of the details of the class formation process in the 
nineteenth century. In addition to data on the main occupations, the 
table includes data on the "active" and "inactive" in the economy 
and on the number of women in paid work. 
                                           
     73
 The farmers along the Blindheim river in Bergen sold access to the river for an amount of 
money equal to the pay of one school teacher for one year (Grieg 1946). 
     74
 Creditbanken with French capital in 1856 (see Seip 1968), Bergen Privatbank in 1855 and 
Christiania Bank og Kredittkasse in 1856. The first national public bank, Norges Bank, was 
created in 1816. The second one, catering for a specific sector of the economy, was 
Hypotekbanken, established in 1851, to lend to farmers against security in land holdings (see 
Keilhau 1938, vol. 9). 
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 The decline in agriculture was large both in absolute numbers and 
relatively. Both 'push' and 'pull' factors were at work. Better 
productivity caused by new production methods and technology 
forced people off the land; emigration to the United States was a 
consequence of that push, but also itself a pull factor, stimulating 
entrepreneurial farmers to search for better conditions. Increased 
market demand for food in the cities stimulated the modernization 
process in agriculture, as did better access to loans. 
 Industry increased its relative position, having 11.2% of all 
employed in 1875 and 16.4% in 1900. As defined in the Appendix, 
industry includes work in industry proper and in infrastructural 
works (roads, telecommunications, railway, etc.). Industry was the 
central investment area of the new bourgeoisie, the sector which 
gave the new class leverage over agriculture and over the old 
bureaucratic elite. Industry was the driving force of the 
modernization process. It was characterized by the new machinery, 
making establishment in energy-rich places relatively easy. The 
plants could be expanded (and reduced) as markets for labour and 
products changed. The new technology made it possible for the 
owners to structure the industrial plants so that they maximized the 
extraction of surplus value from labour. It made a new form of 
social control of the labour force possible - by specializing the 
workers, by interspersing machinery between workers, through 
variations in pay and through social isolation (manipulating a 
machine rather than cooperating with other workers). Foremen were 
introduced, making detailed on-the-floor management and control 
possible. That the new society was on the rise can been seen, for 
example, in shipping. The number of ships was constant at around 
8000 between 1876 and 1908, but the number of larger ships 
increased (1000-2000 tons from 43 to 369, 2000-4000 tons, from 0 
to 82 ships in the same period). In agriculture new knowledge and 
new techniques increased productivity somewhat in the late 
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nineteenth century: milk per cow per year in 1865, 1000 kg., in 
1905, 1500 kg. 
 In the period 1850 - 1900 a state management for infrastructure 
took form. Slowly the conditions for the new industrial society were 
built. By 1905 Norway had 2500 km. of railways (1500 km. in 
1885, 270 km. in 1865, HS 1978:427). But the number of pupils in 
public schools did, for example, not increase relative to the 
population before around the turn of the century (13% in 1840, 13% 
in 1885, 16% in 1905).  
 
 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND 
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN TØNSBERG 
 
How did the economic structure in a select city change in the 
nineteenth century? From a presentation of firms located in 
Tønsberg (Syrrist 1913) I have registered type of firm and year of 























The industrialization process started slowly in the 1850's, with a 
marked boost around the turn of the century. However, industrial 
undertakings can be identified also before the 1850's. Ropemakers 
had been in Tønsberg since 1796 and a producer of ship and church 
clocks had been in business since the early 1840's. In the 1850's two 
private banks were established (Tønsberg Sparebank, 1846, and 
Sem Sparebank, 1855), a brewery, two metal workshops and some 
new stores (a grocery, a bakery and a photo shop). Then the 
modernization process subsided with relatively few new establish-
ments up to 1880, a bank, a newspaper, Tønsbergs Blad, and a 
steam ship company. Then there was a literal explosion of new 
establishments at the turn of the century: oil refinery, gas company, 
machine works, paper mill, margarine and textile companies and a 
ship yard. A number of whaling companies and several more 
specialized shops were established. The population in Tønsberg in 
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1814 was 1800 persons. It increased to 5300 in 1880 and to 10 000 
in 1910. That is an increase between 1880 and 1910 of 88.7%. The 
total population in Norway in the period 1875-1910 increased from 
1.8 million to 2.4 million or 32.4% (CBS 1978:33). Between 1840 
and 1880 Svend Foyn's Company was active off the coast in 
northern Norway, shooting seals. In the 1880's Wilhelm 
Wilhelmsen brought a new fleet of steamships to the city. The 
public budget in Tønsberg in 1910 amounted to about NOK 450 
000: About 30% of it went to schools (there was an elementary 
school, a high-school and schools for seamanship, technical training 
and trade); 16% was used for poor relief; about the same percentage 
was used for sanitation, fire prevention and the like; and 16% used 
to pay interest on the public debt. 
 The new firms increased the power of the industrial bourgeoisie 
relative to the local bureaucratic elite. It created more differentiation 
in the bourgeoisie, separating groups connected with specific 
sectors - the large farmers, the new metal and textile industrialists, 
the shipowners, and the bankers. 
 The names of board members of the banks in Tønsberg indicate 
that each bank represented a section of the bourgeoisie in the town, 
but that each bank also brought together capitalists from different 
types of firms. The banks were, in other words, both coordinators 
between individual capitals and institutions representing sections of 




THE CLASS STRUCTURE 1850 
 
How large was the working class around 1850 and what internal 
structure did it have? Bergh (1983b) says the industrial working 
class in 1850 numbered 12 000, growing to 17 000 by 1860, 5000 
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of them working in the (mainly rural) sawmills. By 1870 the 
number of workers had risen to 48 000. The number of seamen had 
in about the same period risen from 19 000 to 60 000 (Lieberman 
1970:119). Arbeidernes Leksikon (AL) calculated the working class 
in the towns in 1850 to be about 35 000 and the semi-proletariat in 
the countryside to be 250 000 (Arbeidernes Leksikon 1932-
1936:1087).75 
 The historian Sverre Steen (1957) helps us construct a picture of 
the class structure around 1850. He figured that 17% of the 
population belonged to what he called "the money society". In a 
population of 1.4 million, that makes, 240 000 in the money society. 
If we estimate family size as 5, that means about 50 000 income 
earners. The bureaucratic elite was in all about 2000. Steen says that 
in 1850 "there were probably more bureaucrats than major private 
capitalists". Let me assume that the number of private capitalists 
was 1500. Now, if the working class in the towns was 35 000,76 and 
we add Steen's data on the petty bourgeoisie, this gives us a "still 
picture" of the class structure around 1850 (Table 7.6). 
 




The bureaucratic elite 
Major private capitalists 
Owners of large farms 

















The petty bourgeoisie 
 
a) in the countryside 
  Small-scale farmers 
b) in towns 
  Public employees 
  Traders 
  Small-scale industrialists 
  Handicraftsmen 
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 Around textile mills like Arne in Bergen, the working class grew rapidly. The mill started 
production in 1846; by 1855 there were 400 workers in it. 
     76
 Steen (1957:259) seems to agree with that. 









Dependent subsistence farmers and 









The industrialization process was slow up to the turn of the century. 
Bergh (1983b) suggests that it was the wood and pulp industry that 
came to be the leading sector in the industrialization process 
towards the end of the century. That sector was affected directly by 
international demand for its products and felt the competition from 
the Swedish wood industry, eliciting an interest in technological 
development. The metal workshops learned gradually to repair 
imported technology and were slowly able to begin responding to 
the industry's demand for better machines and tools. Bergh's point is 
that the initial modernization impact (capital and market expansion) 
came from abroad, from the inflow of foreign capital, foreign 
technology and personnel.77 His second point was that the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie, the owners and managers of the Norwegian 
firms, were slow in acquiring independence in company manage-
ment, in industrial development planning, in establishing technical 
education, research and development work. 
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 Even the workers who built the first railway in Norway came from England.  






Industrialization took a first step in the 1850's, with a concurrent 
strengthening of private institutions for capital administration. But 
up to the turn of the century industrialization and agricultural 
modernization developed slowly, and it seems that the bourgeoisie 
in the country was weak and passive relative to finance capital from 
abroad. The industrialization process created the working class, a 
class that entered the political arena briefly in the Thrane 
movement, but that only in the 1870's and 1880's acted class-
consciously at the national level. After the turn of the century, the 
working class increased rapidly. But, as we shall see in more detail 
later, it encountered an aggressive and strong bourgeois class and a 
state that, as the economic crisis after the First World War set in, 
attempted to suppress many of its economic and political demands 
in the interwar period. 
 Politically the nineteenth century was dominated by the 
bureaucracy, a corporate group and a political class with 
contradictory interests to the bourgeoisie and the farmers/peasants 
on the organization of the state. Parts of the bureaucracy was from 
the 1840's engaged in the early innovative project of clearing the 
way for capitalism in Norway (liberalism, creation of markets and 
infrastructures; see Seip 1974 and Sørensen 1989). It does not seem 
reasonable to consider the bureaucracy a class in the economy in 
this early phase of Norwegian modernization. The bureaucracy was 
split between traditional and modernizing ideologies. As far as I can 
see, it did not consider itself an independent agent of stability or 
change, but saw itself in relation to classes and ideologies in 
society. 
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 The development of the modes of production and the class 
structures that emerged within and between those modes indicate 
that Senghaas's thesis gains support in the Norwegian case. The 
feudal and ecclesiastic estates were just about eliminated by 1840. 
The urban capitalists had some power in the rural areas through 
ownership of land, sawmills and boats, but independent peasants, 
with their own land, were a social class, a petty bourgeoisie. 
Peasants in different forms of dependency relations were members 
of what we might call a rural semi-proletariat. That the peasants 
would play an autonomous role both in relation to the reorganiz-
ation/democratization of the state and in relation to the working 
class and its organizations seems, on this basis, quite likely. 








      Class pressures on the 






     There are several factors that can explain the political 
dominance of the bureaucracy in Norway in the nineteenth century. 
Danish administrators had several hundred years to entrench 
themselves in the country. From November 1814 Norway was 
formally ruled by the Swedish king, adding Swedish bureaucratic 
traditions to the Danish. A small and weak bourgeoisie,78 combined 
with a mass of small farmers spread out in more or less isolated 
plots of land along the coast, gave the ruling bureaucracy a great 
deal of power and autonomy.  
 How was the state organized after formal political independence 
was achieved from Denmark and the new union with Sweden was 
established in 1814,79 and how did the organization change and 
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 Arbeidernes Leksikon (The Workers' Encyclopedia) points to how the economic crises and 
the isolation from both Denmark and England in the first decades after 1814, and the fact that 
these crises "nearly eliminated the old commercial aristocracy" (AL no date:867), put the 
bureaucracy in a leading ideological and political/administrative role. However, AL puts the 
strategic leadership of the national liberation movement from about the turn of the century to 
1815 clearly in the hands of the bourgeoisie in the private sector. 
     79
 Prince Carl Johan (Bernadotte) of Sweden became king of Norway/Sweden in 1818. 
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THE PARLIAMENTARY FORM 
OF STATE - A PRODUCT OF PEASANT DEMANDS? 
 
The Norwegian bourgeois/bureaucratic liberation movement esta-
blished the parliamentary democratic form of state in 1814, that is, a 
state apparatus with a parliament, (the Storting) as the apex of the 
law-making and budgetary process, and with elections as the 
recruitment mechanism to the Storting. The executive branch was 
the prerogative of the king, implying a recruitment process to 
government administration characterized by appointment on merits. 
The government had a section in Christiania with the king's 
representative, a stattholder, as its head and a prime minister as 
head of the Norwegian section of government in Stockholm.80 
Nearly all owners of real capital, however small their plot of land or 
house in the towns, received the vote.81 The dual structure with the 
parliament separate from the public administration is typical of the 
modern parliamentary state: on the one hand common elections to 
parliamentary organs; on the other, administrative appointment to 
positions in the executive branch. 
 To what degree can the radical democratic and parliamentary 
form of the new Norwegian state be attributed to the wishes and 
influence of independent peasants and farmers, working mainly on 
their own small plots of land? This is a central question in 
Norwegian historiography. It is clear that the radical democratic 
character of the 1814 Constitution was influenced by parallel 
                                           
     80
 The nobleman Essen was appointed the first stattholder. The rich Norwegian capitalist 
Peder Anker was chosen as prime minister in Stockholm (Bergsgård 1964:46). 
     81
 There were suggestions in 1814 that everybody except workers, both industrial and 
agricultural labour and servants of all kinds, should have the vote. But on 4 May, when the 
Constitutional Assembly started discussing the constitution, the right to vote was limited to the 
bureaucracy (people in official state/government positions), peasants and farmers who had 
either owned or rented land for at least five years and everybody who had official citizen rights 
in towns or owned a house of a value of at least 300 riksdaler (Jensen 1963:21). 
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developments in other countries, in France, in the United States and 
in England. It was the Norwegian bourgeoisie that organized and 
fought out the liberation process in 1814 and had the initiative and 
the ideas for organizing a new state.82 But the bourgeoisie was split. 
One part of it wanted to develop relations with Sweden, and was not 
at all against a union with that country. Other sections of the 
bourgeoisie, and especially the bureaucracy, had an inclination to 
continue cooperation with Denmark. 
 Intellectuals played a role in the formation of the new state. They 
represented different tendencies, formulating the interests of 
different movements in the process. Nicolai Wergeland (Henrik 
Wergeland's father), Christian Falsen and J.G. Adler played 
important roles in the making of the Constitution. Were the interests 
of the peasantry important in the political/ideological struggle over 
constitutional arrangements in 1814? The constitutional suggestions 
can be related to the political struggle. A parliament was a way of 
mobilizing national participation in the state formation process. It 
was an instrument that could defend national interests against 
foreign royal power. A strong executive could be a way of 
preparing for a resumption of Danish power after the Swedish threat 
was over, because the bureaucracy was previously overwhelmingly 
Danish. A weak executive could be a method of limiting the power 
of the Swedish king, giving more leeway to Norwegian political 
                                           
     82
 AL puts it this way: "From the end of 1807, it is possible to see how developments in most 
parts of Norwegian society demanded the formation of a separate, Norwegian state. Both in the 
preparation and in the final decision-making, it was the new bourgeoisie that decided on 
strategies, even if it had to tolerate defeat occasionally." (AL, no date:863; my translation from 
Norwegian). Jens Arup Seip points to the urban base of the national, independent state 
movement. "In contrast to the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (småfolk) in the towns, the 
peasants were unenthusiastic." Many of them said they were not worried by subordination to the 
Swedish king. Seip also points to the unorganized character of the Norwegian national 
movement. The movement was based on a liberal ideology (private entrepreneurial freedom in 
the economy). The movement was unorganized except for the organs of state that could support 
it in some way (Seip 1974:54). 
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elites in parliament. But the parliamentary form of state could also 
be seen as a form of political organization adjusted to, or adequate 
to, the interests of the independent peasantry, making it possible for 
them to organize and voice their interests relative to other classes 
and movements. 
 Yngvar Nielsen, in his work on 1814 (Nielsen 1904), points to 
how the interests of the peasantry were highlighted by intellectuals 
in the constitutional process. Christian Falsen's motivation, Nielsen 
suggests, was that the interests of the independent peasants should 
permeate all aspects of the new Constitution:"Falsen came to 
Eidsvold with the idea that Odelsretten [the first right of oldest son 
to take over the family farm] should permeate the whole Constitu-
tion." (Nielsen 1904:189).83 The parliamentary state was seen as a 
key institution for the modernization project, for liberating the 
power of accumulation of the new bourgeoisie. In the politically 
active Norwegian elites at the time, most were in agreement that 
independence meant the formation of some kind of parliamentary 
government. There was conflict over how representative and 
democratic it should be. Some argued for aristocratic prerogatives 
in an 'upper chamber'. Many felt that ownership of some kind of 
capital was a necessary condition for having the right to vote. On 
the first question a unicameral system was chosen, however, with 
the Storting divided in two (Odelsting and Lagting) for specific 
                                           
     83
 Nielsen suggests that the idea of individual freedom from state intervention or state 
intrusion into 'private affairs' had its basis in the life conditions of the independent peasantry at 
the time. That emanated in suggestions of a sharp distinction between parliament and 
government/monarch, with parliament as a buffer against bureaucratic authority. The 
independent peasantry was seen as the "base of the Norwegian society": "Grundloven var ogsaa 
et Barn av sin Tid, naar den optrak et skarpt Dele mellom den udøvende og den lovgivende 
Magt. Fra en almindelig forekommende Teori om, at Borgerrettighederne nærmest eller 
udelukkende tilkom Samfundets jordeiende Klasser, tog Grundlovens Forfattere nogle af sine 
vigtigste Bestemmelser... Odelsbonden var bleven forherliget af Lærde og af Digtere, og der 
herskede en almindelig Tro paa, at han skulde være Bæreren af det nye norske Samfund." 
(Nielsen 1904:188-189). 
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purposes. But all representatives were elected on the same basis. On 
the question of capital and voting rights, the solution was to require 
exactly such a combination, but with relatively low requirements of 
capital ownership. For the bourgeoisie the parliamentary form of 
government would serve to weaken and limit the power of the 
monarchs and the aristocratic/feudal and economically static 
interests that rallied behind them, in both Denmark and Sweden. 
The voting rules excluded 'the enemy', the 'mob', the wage labourers 
and poor peasants, and mobilized the established peasants and 
farmers, the intellectuals, the state employees, technicians, officers, 
etc., i.e. the economically active groups within a capital accumula-
tion nexus. 
 If this is correct, then Senghaas's theory of a foreign impetus to 
modernization is weakened. The small Norwegian bourgeoisie was 
an important autonomous organizer. However, the new bourgeoisie 
was in need of allies against the old monarchies and their aristo-
cratic and bureaucratic supporters. In Norway those allies were 
present, precisely in the large group of relatively independent 
peasants and farmers. 
 Gradually the voting rules were made more inclusive. The 
Storting held its meetings more often and its power in relation to the 
bureaucracy, but also in society as a whole, increased. Once the new 
bourgeoisie realised that its activity also meant the development of a 
working class, increasingly demanding citizen rights, the 
bourgeoisie became more restrictive about the democratization of 
parliaments. Thus the independent peasant/farmer population and 
the ever broader farm movement gradually increased their roles in 
the democratization process. Here Senghaas points to a central 
variable: the land reforms and ownership structures in agriculture 
created the economic basis for an active and politically independent 
farm movement, supporting parliamentary democracy because they 
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wanted to and needed to defend their specific petty bourgeois 
economic interests politically. 
 As long as the working class was unorganized, as long as it had 
not begun to penetrate into the parliamentary system, and as long as 
the market-oriented farmers were dominant in the farm movement, 
the parliamentary form of government was quite acceptable to the 
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was dependent upon the development 
of free markets, that is, regulated economic systems where everyone 
with money was free to buy what was offered for sale. The 
parliamentary form of government was, in a sense, a parallel 
structure to the market in the political arena: everyone could 
participate; it was the ability to accumulate votes (in the political 
market) that gave power in parliament. The parliamentary form of 
government could 'prove' or at least testify to the idea that the 
bourgeoisie was serious about both economic and political freedom, 
not just for itself. But would a growing labour movement make the 
bourgeoisie reconsider its support to parliamentary democracy? 
How would the governments and leaders of state institutions react 
to demands for working class participation? 
 
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, 1814 -1860 
 
Hierarchy, classical administrative divisions and royal appointment 
In 1814, after the new Constitution was approved, the Danish 
prince, Christian Fredrik, was appointed head of state. By March 
1814 the prince had appointed a governing council (regjeringsråd) 
with seven members. The executive was organized into five 
ministries: Finance, Interior, Justice, Trade, and Industry. The last 
ministry was to deal with "Publicly owned manufacture and 
industry, publicly owned forests and mines" (Steffens 1914:8). The 
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educational and ecclesiastical system was administered by a royal 
commission that reported directly to the prince. The coastal seaways 
were administered by a separate marine administration. There was 
also a separate commission (Overprovideringskommisjonen) for the 
management of imports of grain to districts suffering from 
insufficient food production. Each ministry was headed by one of 
the members of the governing council and had an internal structure 
of offices with a bureau chief (byråsjef) and subordinates 
(betjente).84 
 After the union with Sweden in 1814, the system was somewhat 
changed. Educational and church matters were organized in a 
separate ministry. A new Ministry of Police was established with 
responsibility for law and order, but also responsible for the postal 
system, the administration of roads and the medical system 
(Steffens ibid.:22). The administration of the armed forces was 
transferred to a ministry (the sixth), which also took over admini-
stration of the seaways. 
 The early state organization was small and hierarchical, with a 
limited administrative division of labour (divided into relatively few 
ministries). The administrative division of labour in the ministries in 
1819, 1831 and 1844 is shown in Table 8.1. 
                                           
     84
 By July 1814 there were 83 persons in the executive branch of government. As Maurseth 
(1979) has described it, the largest ministry was "the first" ministry, responsible for taxation and 
public finances (16 members). There were 5 ministries and 5 commissions in all. There were 4 
main levels in the administrative hierarchy (top administrators, bureau chiefs, secretaries and 
under-secretaries (kopister)). Of the 83, 16 were members of commissions without 
administrative positions. The rest were distributed in the following way: 8 at the top level, 15 
bureau chiefs, 12 secretaries and 30 kopister (Maurseth 1979:54). 
 The executive  129 
 
Table 8.1 The Norwegian Government, 1819, 1831 and 1844. 
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    created 23 March 1822 (Steffens 1914:163) 
    Source: Maurseth (1979:158-159). 
 
We observe the dominant position of the Finance and after 1822, 
the Audit ministries engaged in the acquisition, use and control of 
public finances. We see how Justice and Education/Church were 
strengthened. This could indicate that the state increasingly moved 
into areas requiring professional knowledge and that the state 
increased its control capacity: Justice dealt with the police; Church 
and Education dealt with ideology and knowledge. From the early 
1840's the liberal farm movement gained momentum, threatening 
the political power of the bureaucracy. From this time on the 
demands for state involvement in development of infrastructure 
increased. 
 In the 1850's the state moved more actively into infrastructure. 
This can be read from the reorganizations of the ministries in 1845. 
The changes focused on a new Ministry of the Interior. A large 
number of infrastructural activities were put into it: responsibility 
for public support to private industry and trade, for fisheries, 
forestry and mining, for marine transport, for control of the 
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distribution of medicine, for the postal system, for roads, canals and 
public buildings, for fire protection and standards for weights and 
measures. This long list, combined with the limited number of 
employees, 19 in 1845 including 13 in lower office positions, tells 
us two things. First, with such limited manpower the government's 
actual responsibility and range of activity in these infrastructural 
areas was limited. Secondly, although ideas of liberalism were 
strong at the time, the list demonstrates that this did not mean that 
government was to be kept out of the economy. 
 The military apparatus, "the last instance" of state authority, was 
a matter of conflict at the Constitutional Assembly at Eidsvold in 
1814. The principle of compulsory conscription of all men above a 
certain age had widespread support, a principle with roots in the 
French revolution. Compulsory service was demanded as a 
democratic principle of equal burdens and as a guarantee against 
counter-revolution (NOU 1979:51). Opposition to the principle was 
voiced.85 Some felt that the bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie should 
be exempted from service because their function in the economy 
had "public value". The principle of compulsory service was 
approved unanimously in 1814, probably because there was 
agreement that the specific rules for conscription should be worked 
out later. The laws of 1815 and 1816 put the main burden on the 
farmers and peasants and both contained rules making it possible to 
have deputies serve in return for substantial payments86 
(stillingsrett). Around mid-century the stillingsrett was modified. In 
1854 only conscription to the 'line'87 could be avoided by paying for 
a deputy. The new law included urban dwellers under the general 
                                           
     85
 Paragraph 109 in the Constitution says (a) that service is compulsory and (b) that specific 
regulations are given in the form of law. 
     86
 A "usual price" at that time was 80 to 100 speciedaler. 100 speciedaler was in the range of 
a wage for a teacher for one year. 
     87
 The 15 youngest age groups, serving in the front lines. 
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principle of compulsory conscription. Stillingsrett was abolished in 
1876. From then on participation was related to physical and 
psychological requirements and to the number of conscientious 
objectors. Around 1900 it was decided that people in the latter 
category were to serve in non-combative units. 
 The Constitution established the radical principle of compulsory 
conscription. A sociological study of the soldier population over 
time might show that it was skewed to the advantage of the rich and 
the owners of means of production. We have reason to believe that 
compulsory service developed ideas among the soldiers that 
Norway was a socially homogeneous society and that the state was 
a democratic state. In Norway the bourgeoisie rose in the economy 
without serious competition or opposition from a landed aristocracy. 
Thus, there was no power centre in the economy that could take 
advantage of a broad recruitment of soldiers to develop a separate 
force against bourgeois political interests. Compulsory conscription 





EMANATING FROM THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 
 
Up to 1845 central government bureaucrats had mainly a legal or 
military background. In 1845 two priests and a teacher were 
employed in the Ministry of Church and Education; one doctor was 
employed in the Ministry of the Interior and one technician entered 
the Highway Office in the same Ministry. This was a small 
beginning of professional diversification in the state. In the 1850's 
there was an expansion of technically specialized units. The railway 
and the telegraph administrations were organized separately. A 
separate postal administration was set up in 1857, with its own 
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managing director. In 1855 the telegraph got its managing director, 
as did the railways in 1865. 
 In the 1850's a number of public studies of the living conditions 
of the "lower classes" were carried out. Public money was invested 
into "peoples libraries", and into "working-class choirs". There were 
plans for starting a public school of agriculture (agerdyrk-
ningsseminar) (Steffens 1914:66).  
 Educational policy changed in the 1850's, from a policy assuming 
that schooling was a private matter to the idea that school finances 
and school organization were a public responsibility (Høigård and 
Ruge 1963). Education was increasingly seen as part of the strategy 
for economic modernization. The liberal democratic movement was 
on the rise. It was assumed that education would strengthen that 
movement: knowledge develops understanding of the in-
terdependencies between individuals and groups, and through that a 
positive view of cooperation and organization. For the bureaucracy 
and its allies, public education could be supported because it could 
generate an understanding of how the individual's well-being was 
dependent upon a well-functioning state. Education could in that 
way be an antidote to the radicalism of the Thrane movement and 
the anti-bureaucratic tendencies in the liberal democratic farm 
movement. There was agreement that education should be a public 
responsibility. Already in the 1850's there were ideas on the social 
responsibilities of the state, ideas that went beyond the control of 
poor and destitute - a state with responsibility for the well-being of 
its citizens, and especially for their ability to fill specific roles in the 
economy. 
 The professionalization of the public administration continued in 
the 1870's. An Office of Forestry was established in 1874, for the 
medical services in 1875. In 1875 a public archives administration 
was created. In 1876 the beginnings of the Central Bureau of 
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Statistics (CBS, Statistisk Sentralbyrå) was organized in the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
 The 1880's was a period of fewer reorganizations. With the major 
political conflict at that time, (the fall of the bureaucratic regime in 
1884) the Storting decided that it wanted control over the 
appointment of the government. The Conservative and the Liberal 
political parties (Høyre and Venstre) were created and quickly 
entered the political front stage. Ideas on administrative reorganiza-
tion receded into the background of the political process. In 1885 a 
Ministry of Public Works was separated off from the Ministry of the 
Interior. In 1900, five years before secession from Sweden, several 
special sector ministries were established. A Ministry of Agriculture 
was created and the old Directorate for Agriculture was integrated 
into the ministry (see Jacobsen 1964 and Chapter 9 in the present 
work). In 1902 the Ministry of the Interior had two departments, 
one for foreign affairs, trade and shipping (an expansion of the 
Office for Consulates) and one for industry and social welfare. In 
1905 these two departments became the core of two new ministries, 
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Ministry of Social Welfare, In-
dustry, Trade and Fisheries. This last ministry was renamed the 
Ministry of Social Affairs in 1913. What we see behind the 
changing names and organizational structures of ministries is a 
continuity of functions and a change in the relative importance of 
different functions.88 The pattern is fairly clear. In the first period of 
semi-independence the state was engaged in bringing in taxes and 
safeguarding law and order (instrumental autonomy). The economic 
activities of the state were related to specific public 'industries' and 
                                           
     88
 The changes made in the formal organization seem primarily to be a consequence of 
increasing workload within the administration and only secondly a real change of priority. 
However, the differentiation and specialization process was real, creating administrative units 
directed at ever more specific (economic) functions and creating an ever larger number of 
offices and institutions at each hierarchical level of the administration. 
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shipping activities, but several infrastructural activities were present 
in early form,89 however, without separate organizations at the 
directorate or ministerial level. 
                                           
     89
 In the Interior Office and in small infrastructural offices within other ministries. The 
highways administration was for example located in the Ministry of Justice, probably because 
the main problem was to get the farmers/peasants to do their required road work. The state was 
a controlling, not a producing state, with instrumental autonomy. 
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The state into infrastructure 
The second period, focused on the organizing of the Ministry of the 
Interior, is characterized by upkeep of the old, classic functions of 
state (extraction of taxes, administering justice, ideology, physical 
force, and relations with other states) and an expansion of state 
administration into infrastructural activities. The Ministry of the In-
terior was in the 1840's a source for the proliferation of such 
infrastructural administration, which gradually created new 
administrative units for specific functions. With the Ministry of the 
Interior, professionalization of the executive branch of government 
accelerated,90 a process that was influenced by the demands for 
more specialized personnel in government.91 The Ministry of the 
Interior developed an administrative structure for the future 
management of foreign affairs. Thus the executive branch of the 
new state in 1814 had many of the later functions present in its 
structure, but the main function in the first period was law and order 
combined with an ability to administer crises (the grain crises and 
the state financial crisis). Then the infrastructural administration 
was separated out, with a concurrent professionalization and 
internal specialization without, however, the old law and order 
function being in any way superseded. 
                                           
     90
 Focused specially in Edgeir Benum's contribution to the history of the Norwegian central 
government administration (Benum 1979). 
     91
 Even if it is true that the professional groups, as they develop in size within the state 
apparatus, generate state autonomy, in the sense that the state increasingly has the ability, 
independently of interest groups or social classes in society, to develop public programmes and 
organizations to implement them, it is also important to keep in mind that the state, through its 
responsibility for financing and organizing scientific activities, had influence on the formation 
of the professions. Professions may be as much a response to politically (and socially) defined 
demands for specific 'policies' as autonomous actors within the state generating 'new' policies 
and organizations for their implementation. 
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 In the nineteenth century the state was a small organization. 
Table 8.1 depicted the size in the first period. In the 40 years from 
1842 to 1882 the total administrative staff doubled to 355. The 
number was 575 in 1914, an increase of 220 in 32 years. But if we 
had data on the number of employees in the technical administra-
tions (workers on the public roads, in the lighthouses along the 
coast, in the harbours and canals, on the railways, etc.) the number 
would be substantially larger. But a small state organization does 
not necessarily mean a weak state. The strength of the state is 
dependent upon the number of people and the amount of resources 
it can mobilize in the face of interests that conflict with it. It might 
seem that the nineteenth century state was strong in that sense. Its 
mobilization potential was large because the state was engaged in 
the struggle for national independence from Sweden, a struggle 
powered by the farm movement, and by sections of the rising 
bourgeoisie; the state had direct control over and support from the 
church, an institution with strong ideological influence in most parts 
of Norway, an institution that played a central role in the 
development of the educational programmes both in public and 
private schools; and lastly the state needed scientific knowledge and 
(gradually) new forms of professional competence. In that way the 
state mobilized the support of the intellectual community.  
 If this is a reasonable description of the power of the state in this 
period, it indicates that a new labour movement, and especially one 
that expressed an interest in transcending the capitalist mode of 
production and the bourgeois democratic form of state, would have 
to start from an isolated and marginal position in the Norwegian 
political, scientific and ideological communities. The organization 
of the central administration in the nineteenth century was a closed 
process, mainly a result of interactions between the bureaucracy, the 
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Swedish government and political elites representing capital 
ownership and the church.92 
 
Management principles 
These materials indicate that the state had some functions in the 
economy even in 1814, and that they expanded from the 1850's, 
especially in the area of technical and economic infrastructure. Was 
the state, in its management of these economic activities, 
subordinated to the profit principle in the same manner as firms and 
entrepreneurs in the private sector? Let me argue that the state has a 
freedom that private sector lacks. 
 (1) While the profit motive is mandatory in private market-
related activity, it is not so in public economic management. There 
the profit motive is a political decision. The railways, the roads 
(with tollstations), the canals, the harbours, the mines, etc. can be 
run with a profit. But it is equally plausible to make them 
non-profit, or even tax supported. The state has an economic 
freedom, an autonomy, that private entrepreneurs do not have. 
 (2) Remuneration to employees and workers is for the same 
reason under different kinds of restraints in the state and in the 
private sector. The pay to public employees comes from the public 
fund of tax money. The employer in a state office is thus, at least 
potentially, more of a politician than a capitalist in his relation to 
public employees. When considering remuneration, the state 
                                           
     92
 Seip discusses the reorganizations of the state around mid-century and points to how the 
ruling bureaucratic elite manoeuvred to increase its independence both from the Swedish 
monarch and from the Storting. The Storting wanted information and influence on the 
appointment of government members. Seip says that the government wanted it otherwise: 
"Regjeringen selv kom imidlertid til å foretrekke en annen løsning. Det var en løsning med front 
både mot en selvrådig konge og mot et kontrollerende storting. Den ble utformet og begrunnet i 
en betenkning fra 1843. Dette dokument ble grunnleggende for senere praksis og statsrettsteori. 
Her ble det hevdet at det konstitusjonelt riktige var at kongen rådførte seg konfidensielt med 
regjeringen. Siden det hele foregikk konfidensielt, ville ingen protokoll bli oppsatt, intet skriftlig 
råd foreligge som stortinget kunne kreve å få seg forelagt" (Seip, 1974:81).  
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management must consider tax burdens, comparable pay levels in 
the private sector, etc. But if the state wanted to increase wages 
substantially, to improve the attraction of public employment or 
increase demand for consumption products, then the state has the 
possibility of increasing wages in a way that individual capitalists in 
the private sector do not have. 
 
The strength of a functional explanation 
State administration of infrastructural activity can be seen in a 
capital-functional perspective. Capitalist expansion in banking, in 
industry and in market-oriented farming demanded a technical 
infrastructure that the state could organize efficiently without 
basically supporting any special section of the bourgeoisie against 
others. Rather, by having the state take responsibility, public money 
would be available for infrastructural investments. Capitalist 
industry demanded large national (and international) markets, 
regulated by common laws that could be applied and defended in all 
parts of the country. The state was a potentially efficient creator and 
regulator of such laws. Finance capital needed access to 
international money markets. The state could increase the prestige 
and weight of Norwegian capital in such negotiations. In this 
perspective the state was not a foreign/alienated institution for the 
bourgeoisie. Rather it was an institution actively organizing the 
common conditions of bourgeois expansion. 
 Urban industrial capitalism demanded an agricultural sector with 
the ability to 'liberate' labour power for employment in the towns 
and to deliver a surplus of food. The transformation of peasants to 
farmers and increasing agricultural productivity can thus be seen as 
an integral part of the expansion of urban capitalism. But, the 
"functions of capital" have to be translated or transformed into 
public administration, into public programmes and organization 
able to implement the programmes.  






What was the project of the bureaucracy, what power did it have 
and why was it ousted from the top positions of state? 
 
Contradictions within the bureaucracy 
Seip has demonstrated that the bureaucratic elite was divided. One 
section - the smallest part around the middle of the century - 
identified with the norms of the old, rural society, with the authority 
of the large land owners and the church. Their regulating idea was 
to conserve existing authority structures, patriarchy and submission 
to the church. The other section was oriented towards 
modernization, wanting to eliminate economic privileges and create 
conditions for 'free' competition. But the bureaucracy did not just 
mirror ideas prevalent in society. As Seip says, the bureaucrats were 
dependent upon social and ideological movements in society. Even 
if it was obvious up to 1884, that the bureaucracy fought for its own 
specific interests - defending its positions, its power and revenues - 
Seip's description indicates that the bureaucrats were 
representatives of class interests other than their own. To speak of 
them as a dominant economic class would be wrong, primarily 
because they did not have a separate base in the economy. They 
were for that reason an elite influenced by sections of other classes, 
of the landed aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie. But the 
bureaucracy may be designated a political class when it was in 
control of the state, furthering its own interests and where it exploits 
other classes through the state (Gran and Hjellum 1982). 
 Seip defines the bureaucrats as one of three social formations in 
Norway at the time, the other two being the bourgeoisie (mainly in 
the towns) and the farmers (without, as far as I can see, 
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distinguishing between classes in agriculture). As Fure points out 
(Fure 1984b), Seip defines the bureaucrats differently in different 
contexts. But in my opinion, Seip's description of the bureaucrats 
demonstrates that they were dependent upon support from other 
classes, from other parts of the population, for their existence as a 
politically dominant group or class. "In the long run the bureaucrats' 
position as a political elite depended upon trust in other social 
groups, that is, support in public opinion and in elections" (Seip 
1974:68). The position of the bourgeoisie, and the working class for 
that matter, is not dependent on such support. 
 The power of the bureaucratic elite was partly built on the 
clamour for national independence, since the bureaucracy could 
conveniently represent the national interest as a whole. But it was 
also dependent upon specific economic classes, and that state 
policies served those class interests. The bureaucrats had a choice, 
according to Seip: to build coalitions either with the rich farmers or 
with the bourgeoisie in the towns. The first partner was a poor 
choice, a weak partner. The future was with the bourgeoisie. And 
that, in hindsight, proved to be the case. The section of the 
bureaucratic elite that aligned itself with the interests of the 
bourgeoisie was successful in politics up to the 1870's. But then the 
liberal democratic movement and the bourgeoisie ousted the 
bureaucracy and reorganized the state. 
 
The strategy of the modernization-oriented part of the bureaucratic 
elite 
What did the modernization-oriented part of the bureaucratic elite 
struggle for and how did it struggle? It attempted to implement a 
free market, eliminating privileges to persons and townships. This 
was a project closely related to the advancement of capitalist 
industrialization. But then, would not the elimination of privileges 
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and a reduction of the scope of public rules and regulations at the 
same time weaken the basis for bureaucrat power? (Seip 1974:129). 
 Seip shows how eliminating privileges and other restrictions on 
market activity was parallelled by the active production of new 
regulations - rules that positively, in terms of the capitalist 
economy, regulated market transactions, creating and securing equal 
conditions for competition. "An economic system in expansion 
needs the intervention of the state" (Seip 1974:136). We can add: 
even if that system is capitalism packed in an ideology of laissez-
faire. Markets are artifacts. They are created. 
 Seip demonstrates that under bureaucratic leadership the state 
concentrated real capital through its infrastructural policies. State 
taxation and the use of taxes to build roads and railway, and the 
creation of state banks (Hypotekbanken) increased state capital.93 
 In 1884 the bureaucratic elite was ousted from its dominant 
political position. It was left with a role in the public administration. 
The bourgeois political parties overwhelmed the state with their 
authority. Again I think Seip gives the correct definition of the new 
state. The representative, parliamentary state, where the Storting 
controls the appointment of the government, and where the political 
parties are contenders for political power, was the state of the 
bourgeoisie (his concept in Norwegian: det næringsdrivende 
borgerskapets stat). 
 Who were the members of the bourgeoisie? It was at least the 
industrial/ trade/finance owners of capital in the towns and the large 
farmers (especially on the east coast) who could employ foreign 
labour power and accumulate capital. As the preceding analysis has 
shown, the base for this bourgeoisie expanded from the 1850's and 
especially from the 1880's.  
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 He demonstrates elegantly how the municipality of Bergenhus paid 126 000 riksdaler to the 
state road budget and got 22 000 back to build roads. 




CLASSES IN RURAL NORWAY? 
 
There was a large semi-proletariat of wage/subsistence workers or 
peasants, often seasonally employed, employed in farming proper 
and in all kinds of housework. Secondly there were many 
independent small-scale peasant farmers, attached in part to the 
market economy (see Jacobsen 1964, Haarstad 1983 and Østerud 
1975 and 1976). There was a bourgeoisie within the farm 
community, with different problems and opportunities from the 
urban bourgeoisie, but basically with the same class interest in 
developing the capitalist market system and in accumulating capital. 
 What was the relative position of peasant and farmer interests in 
the liberal democratic movement? The movement had a basic anti-
bureaucratic stance and struggled for local democracy (partly 
fulfilled in 1837 when parliamentary organs were created at the 
municipal level), positions supported by the whole movement. 
 The movement's demand for more local democracy was 
ambiguous. It could increase local power, but it could also serve to 
strengthen state control over the municipalities. The strong 
nationalist element in the movement could be seen as conservatively 
anti-capitalist, as one of its motives was to conserve the petty, 
subsistence form of Norwegian farming and handicrafts (the 
household economy) and keep other states and international capital 
at a distance. But, in the last part of the nineteenth century, national 
independence was also favoured by sections of the urban 
bourgeoisie, who saw independence strengthening its position as an 
independent (autocentric) capitalist class, both nationally and 
internationally.  
 The political party Venstre was a political leadership of the 
liberal democratic movement. The policies of that party have been 
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interpreted as a pro-modernization strategy. Capitalists, both large 
capitalists and those of smaller, petty bourgeois calibre, were active 
members of the party. It was the radicals from the urban areas, 
arguing for liberalization and individual freedom in the economy, 
who were to play the decisive role in Venstre. Nerbøvik puts it this 
way: "With the knowledge we have today we have to conclude that 
it was the modernization element, rather than the defense of the old 
order, and thus the alliance with the old "farmer associations" 
(bondevennforeninger), that is, characteristic of the Liberal party in 
the 1880's" Nerbøvik (1973:70). 
 
 
THE STATE AND THE EARLY FORMATION OF THE 
WORKING CLASS 
 
The role of the cyclical movement in the economy 
An important condition for the class struggle is the cyclical 
movement of the economy. In the capitalist mode of production this 
movement is driven by the negative pressure on the rate of profit, a 
pressure driven by the capitalists' strategies for maximizing profits, 
a pressure caused by the need for ever larger investments in the 
means of production that at the same time reduce the amount of 
"living labour" in the production process. Therefore the amount of 
surplus value relative to the amount of investment falls. This in turn 
spurs all kinds of additional activity by the capitalists to keep the 
rate of profit up, again increasing the downward pressure on the rate 
of profit in the system as a whole - a spiral that, law-like, in 
contradiction to the intentions of the individual capitalists and the 
state, emanates in economic crisis and depression, with large 
quantities of goods in the warehouses without buyers and large 
numbers of workers/wage labourers in the labour markets without 
work. 
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 In the depression phase of the cycle, the means of production are 
destroyed and/or their value is reduced, so that a new balance of 
surplus value and investment in the means of production is created. 
In that way a positive rate of profit is created. And so on - 
indefinitely - as long as the asymmetrical and contradictory class 
relation between the working class and bourgeoisie in the economy 
exists. 
 If we first look at data on the Norwegian economy as a whole, the 
cyclical movement can be recorded in the movement of the absolute 
size of the GDP (in NOK), and on the percent growth of GDP per 























Given that GDP per person is an expression of the general move-
ment in the economy, these data indicate periods of economic 
growth in the late 1860's and early 1870's, in the first part of the 
1890's, in the period up to and during the First World War, in the 
late 1920's and then again before the start of the Second World War. 
The first period after the war was also a growth period. Downturns 
were experienced in the 1880's, in the first years after the turn of the 
century, in the 1920's, the first half of the 1930's and during the 
Second World War.  
 The cyclical movement can be registered on many levels. At the 
firm level we can observe it when we take a long time perspective. 
Figure 8.2 shows the volume of wool production over time at the 
Arne textile mill outside Bergen (Gran and Jensen 1978). There was 
a marked downward turn in the 1880's and the 1910's. Then, 
through the 1920's and 1930's production at Arne reached a high 
point just before the Second World War. There is reason to doubt 
that this cycle represented changes in the real social needs for the 
products from the textile mill. The cycle expressed the effects of 
changes in demand, as they were expressed in money terms. If this 
is correct, we would expect the movement in production at Arne to 
be related to the general cyclical movement in the economy as a 
whole, with downturns at Arne when the economy is in the crisis 
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phase of the cycle, reducing employment and wages, reducing the 























Comparing figures 8.2 and 8.1 we see, as might be expected when 
we compare national data with one specific firm, that the fit is not 
quite perfect. But the relationship is there. In 1887 the economy and 
Arne had a downturn. Between 1900 and 1905 Arne was expanding 
with a downturn in per capita GDP in the economy. The 1921 crisis 
hit both the economy and Arne. But then in the 1920's and 1930's 
the economy had a recession that Arne avoided. 
 The cyclical movement affects the class struggle. In the upturn 
the bourgeoisie will demand labour power and increase wages to 
attract workers; in the downturn there will be layoffs, cuts in wages, 
etc. The working class will be more aggressive in the downturn, 
when the employers will have the least incentive to meet their 
demands (they are laying off workers and reducing production 
anyway). Thus we might expect the state to be more actively 
repressive against the working classes in the downturn, because 
those periods create a general scepticism about the dominant mode 
of production. However, when the employers win the battles in the 
economic sector, we might, according to the same logic, expect the 
state to be more lenient because of the concomitant spread of 
defeatism in the working class. 
 The working class  148 
 
 Whether English workers tend to strike in the upturn or downturn 
phase of the cycle is discussed in Seth (1984). She presents the 
theories about cycles and strike propensity developed by Smelser 
(1962) and Tilly (1978b). Even if downturns hit the working class 
hard, and make it more aggressive, whether that aggressiveness will 
result in political action or in political defeatism is unclear. The 
economic downturn in the 1920's definitely led to a mobilization of 
the labour movement. However, when the strikes were defeated by 
the employers, the tendency was for workers to leave the unions. 
Deterioration of economic conditions spurred mobilization and 
radicalization, at least among the mass of workers. Defeat in the 
political arena, however, did not spur more radical and more active 
organization. 
 
The organization of the working class 
What pattern can we see in the development of working-class 
organizations? How did class identity develop? Under what 
conditions did the class become aware of itself, that is, see itself as 
an independent group both in relation to the paternalism of the state 
and relative to the individualist, liberal conceptions of society 
peddled by Venstre? 
 As I have shown, the working class was in an early phase of its 
formation in the 19th century. Its struggles can be divided into three 
phases. The first phase was in the 1840's when some workers joined 
the Thrane movement and threw their lot in with handicraftsmen in 
the towns, with farmers and intellectuals in that movement. Seip 
suggests that the three main groups or "formations" in Norway in 
the nineteenth century had more the character of corporations than 
of classes, because they represented separate cultures and had few 
interactions (Seip 1974:63). His description of the Thrane 
movement indicates that (a) the working-class movement emanated 
from handicraftsmen and intellectuals in the towns and (b) its 
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members were mainly rural wage labourers and tenant farmers. He 
suggests that it was a complex of several movements, "It was at the 
same time a movement of peasants, of handicraftsmen, of tenant 
farmers (husmenn) and a labour movement" (Seip 1974:192, Bull 
1985). Marcus Thrane articulated a utopian anarchic concept of a 
new socialist society inspired by Saint Simon and Fourier. On a 
more practical level the movement petitioned the government and 
the king for democratic rights and economic assistance. The 
working-class element in the movement was largely recruited from 
the countryside, where the living conditions were poor but on the 
upturn in the 1840's. There were more rural wage/subsistence 
workers than urban workers. The working class was becoming a 
category of people with some degree of internal networking but 
with little coherent conception of its own existence. The Thrane 
movement was a first form, a first possibility of formal organization 
(cf. Figure 2.1). 
 It disturbed the bourgeoisie and the authorities. The movement 
was violently attacked by the police when it held a national 
congress in Christiania. The leaders of the movement were 
sentenced to years in jail. The second phase of the working-class 
struggle started early in the 1870's, again inspired by developments 
in France. There were nation-wide strikes in 1872. 
 Some details of the early organization of workers can be 
discerned at the Arne textile mill. It was located in a rural area, by 
the Blindheim river. It had a large number of female workers. In 
1872 the workers asked for a reduction in their work hours. At that 
time they were obliged to work a total of 13 hours with a 2 hour 
break in the middle of the day. They asked the owner, Peter Jebsen, 
for a reduction to 11 hours. The workers met in a house near the 
church, but were thrown out as both house and church were 
company property. Jebsen turned down the request. Then, as the 
workers continued their strike, Jebsen changed tactics and accepted 
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a reduction - given it was implemented after existing orders were 
delivered. Months passed. The workers heard nothing and went on 
strike again. At their second attempt their work hours were reduced 
to 11. The struggle did not lead to a permanent trade union. The 
First World War passed before a union was established, organized 
in the national Textile Workers' Federation. A number of actions to 
improve working conditions were taken in the 1920's, but defeat 
was the order of the day. 
 The owner, Peter Jebsen, had close to total power in the mill 
community. He owned most of the buildings (houses, shops, church 
and school). Jebsen and the clergyman were on the school board 
and on the board of the cooperative store. The system can perhaps 
be termed a feudal paternalism, perhaps not uncommon in isolated, 
rural areas in Norway with new industrial establishments. 
 The evidence from Arne tells of workers' organizations built from 
above. The initiative came from the outside, from organizers who 
travelled from one workplace to the next. Workers joined the unions 
at Arne, it seems, mainly for economic reasons. Few joined for 
ideological reasons. In 1909 a union leader was sacked after having 
organized a strike. The sources do not tell of any mobilization 
against the ousting of the union leader. When the union lost a wage 
struggle, many members left the organization.94 
 Locally the "union federations" (samorganisasjoner) played a 
role. They organized all the trade unions in a town or region. They 
integrated worker demands and politics between unions in different 
branches of production, but they were inefficient when it came to 
specific struggles between a capital owner and workers in one 
sector or in one branch (Bull 1985). The local federations often had 
difficulty in taking the lead in specific struggles because they 
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 Edvard Bull has data on membership in Kristiania Arbeidersamfunn. They show that 
conflict leads to a mobilization of new members, but defeat meant a return to lower, "more 
normal" membership levels (Bull 1985:361). 
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represented very different and often conflicting interests between 
workers from different companies. Therefore national organizations 
within industries were on the rise. The first one in Norway was the 
National Federation of Typographers (1885). By 1898 there were 11 
such federations (Bull 1985:443), all of them small in the beginning 
and concentrated in Christiania and other big cities. Thus, by 1900 
we can say that leading sections of the working class were 
conscious of their common economic interests and had the capacity 
to organize on a national level - a process that was dependent upon 
and conditioned by the uneven advancement of capitalist 
industrialization. 
 The third phase was the organization of a separate, class-based 
political party. In the 1880's many politically aware workers were 
members of Venstre. However, the need for a separate, class-
specific political organization was being voiced by activists all over 
the country. The Labour Party was created in 1887 at a congress in 
Arendal. 
 All these data taken together show that the working class was 
gradually organized without any support from the state apparatus, 
but surely inspired by the representative character of the Storting 
and, as we shall see, with the state most often on the alert, ready to 
suppress any such organization at the first opportunity. The working 
class gradually developed an understanding of itself as a separate 
movement, one that had different interests from the liberal, 
farm/petty bourgeois movement and certain interests in the broader 
movement for national independence (better chances for the 
liberation of labour from aristocracy and patriarchy in a bourgeois 
national state). First in 1903 did the labour movement achieve 
representation in the Storting, when two socialists were elected 
from northern Norway. 
 The working class struggled first in the individual firms against 
capitalist owners, defending worker interests and taking the first 
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steps towards building class organizations there. That struggle 
matured gradually and led to the formation of samorganisasjoner, 
and later to national industry-specific federations. It was in the 
1880's and 1890's that these industry-specific federations managed 
to achieve a national level of organization. In this sense the working 
class was the essential labour power of the modernization process, 
but at the same time continuously attempting to build organizations 
that could defend workers' interests against pressures for more 
loyalty to and attacks on pay, worktime etc. from the owners of 
capital and their organizations. The workers' organizations 
expressed more or less clearly, more or less forcefully, a dual 
perspective: defence of interests within capitalist labour relations 
and attempts at defining and giving form to a society beyond 




THE POLITICAL PARTY VENSTRE AND STATE 
REFORMS AFTER 1884 
 
After getting into power in 1884, Venstre, with Johan Sverdrup as 
leader and prime minister (from 1884 to 1889. See Nerbøvik (1973) 
and Seip (1981)), introduced a number of reforms in the govern-
ment system: (a) the parliamentary system for the selection of 
government members; (b) a new and more democratic jury system; 
(c) a new education law, making access to schools easier for 
members of the lower classes; and (d) formal equalization of the 
two Norwegian languages. The reforms had a profile oriented 
towards the interests of lower classes, but can also be seen in an in-
tegrative perspective: (i) making parliament responsible for the 
political composition of government at the same time made the 
opposition in parliament responsible for the chosen government; (ii) 
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allowing for popular representation in the judicial system could also 
increase the legitimacy of the bureaucracy; (iii) unifying the school 
system and broadening recruitment could weaken conceptions of a 
class society and make workers' adaptation to the industrialization 
process easier; and (iv) giving public legitimacy to New Norwegian, 
that is, to a norm for writing developed on the basis of the oral 
traditions particularly in the rural areas of the country, could in the 
same way strengthen a less class- and culture-specific 
understanding of the state among common people. Not that these 
policies were implemented with consciousness of such effects, but 
that they to some extent could function that way. 
 The Liberal Party split in two just after 1884, the two parts taking 
the names the Moderates and the Pure Left. The Moderates merged 
with the Conservative Party.95 The Pure Left cooperated 
increasingly with the labour movement. But not all elements of the 
labour movement were happy with that involvement. In 1892 the 
conflict sharpened in Christiania. Two suggestions were put forward 
in samorganisasjonen for the arrangements for Independence Day 
(17 May). One was to support the demonstration organized by 
Venstre. The other was to organize a separate workers' 
demonstration. The unions which supported an arrangement with 
Venstre created a federation, Norsk Fagforbund in 1893. As the 
organizational process advanced, inspired by the new Labour Party, 
Norsk Fagforbund became increasingly isolated in the working 
class, and as Bull says: "It disappeared without leaving any trace at 
all" (Bull 1985:442). The older workers' societies gradually joined 
with the Labour Party.  
 These data suggest that the main political thrust of both Venstre 
and the farmers' movement as a whole was the demand for demo-
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 A detailed description of this process is given in Nerbøvik 1973:107-.  He mentions a third 
faction in Venstre, 'the nomads', attempting to keep Venstre united. He also mentions the 
discussion among the historians about the Moderates' amalgamation into the Right Party. 
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cratization of the state (parliamentarism and local democracy) and 
modernization of the economy, i.e. advancing the capitalist market 
economy. 
 Venstre was supportive of the development of capitalism, but was 
also part of the opposition against the ruling bureaucratic elite. The 
party absorbed most of the early underdog, lower-class, working-
class opposition to both bureaucracy and expanding capitalism. It 
represented the liberal intellectuals and the broad demands for 
Norwegian national independence.96 But the party was at the same 
time a bourgeois party, one that saw the future in capitalist terms, 
that is, a production system with private owners of the means of 
production, employing wage labour and 'freely' accumulating 
capital through a market economy. It was pitted against the radical 
ideas of a socialist economy and a state in the explicit service of the 
working class, as propagated by the radical sections of the newly 
formed Labour Party. 
 The reorganization of the state in 1884 created a stronger state 
with a more unified command (the Storting got control over the 
composition of government) and with an administrative structure at 
the local, municipal level acquiescent to central government policy. 
It was a state with increasing autonomy relative to the bourgeoisie, 
with the beginnings of a professional administration oriented 
towards building infrastructures and the creation of 'free' markets. 
But it was a state that, more systematically than the bureaucratic 
state earlier, was organized to develop capitalism. In this sense the 
new, more autonomous state increased the state power of the 
bourgeoisie (the state acted independently as an essential agent of 
modernization). With the creation of specific working-class 
organizations, and thus the clarification of Venstre as a bourgeois 
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 As the Workers Encyclopedia (AL:1115) puts it: "Venstre expressed the interests of all the 
different democratic forces in the country, the interests of most of the working population at the 
time." 
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party, the state could also respond much more directly to labour 
movement actions and initiatives. 
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STATE SUPPRESSION OF WORKING-CLASS MILITANCY 
 
The democratization of the state and its involvement in 
infrastructural activities through public investments and 
professional management, did not rule out the suppression of illegal 
political activity by the state. Seip (1974) mentions in some detail 
the secret security and spy system that the Swedish king organized 
inside the Norwegian government in the first years after 1814, in 
order to be able to follow the real movements of opposition and 
supportive elements in Norway and safeguard his position and 
Swedish interests. The liberal state was not unfamiliar with the use 
of direct bureaucratic and violent force against political opposition 
movements. Some examples: 
 (1) It is well documented (Ousland and Skar 1949, Bull 1985) 
that the suppression of the Thrane movement by the police was 
initiated on a false rumour. The police in Kongsberg got the idea 
that the activists in the movement were planning to take weapons 
from the munitions warehouse at Kongsberg Munitions Company, 
and go clandestinely to Christiania and there physically harass the 
meetings of the Storting. Thrane's project was to "tear down the 
central jail in Christiania and free the inmates" (Ousland and Skar 
1949:29). A police report on this "plan" was sent to the Ministry of 
Justice and triggered police action against the leaders of the 
movement. The police transferred weapons from the munitions 
store at Kongsberg to a secret hiding place. Some weapons were 
destroyed by pouring cement into them. On the basis of the rumour, 
the police arrested the Thrane leadership. Marcus Thrane and other 
leaders were jailed. An order went out to register all members of 
Thrane's local organizations (arbeiderforeninger) throughout the 
country (probably around 20 000 members at the peak of the 
movement in 1850). About 200 leaders were jailed. It took the 
judiciary four years to work through the indictments against them.  
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 The families of the arrested leaders were mostly in dire economic 
straits because their breadwinners were in jail. Some of the families 
petitioned the Storting for support from the public poor relief funds. 
The Storting turned the petitions down. 
 Thrane and his next-in-command got four years. The rest were 
jailed for shorter periods.97 All the Thrane movement petitions, 
mainly concerned with citizen rights, were defeated in the Storting. 
With the leadership eliminated, the movement disintegrated. What 
kind of political conclusions the many members drew from the 
movement's activity and the state's reaction to it, we do not know. 
Nor do we know to what degree the movement existed as a social 
movement, without formal organization, in the years up to the 
emergence of the independent labour movement in the 1870's.98 
 (2) In 1872/73, as mentioned earlier, there was nationwide 
worker militancy. In Christiania, a Danish socialist, Marius Jantzen 
attempted to reorganize the 'Workers Society' (the ar-
beidersamfunn), independently of Venstre. He mobilized a few 
workers, but met with harsh reactions. The conservative newspaper 
Vikingen asked him to leave the country and, if he did not, 
suggested that the police should "give him a helping hand" 
(Ousland 1974:42). Suddenly he lost his job. But he continued to 
call meetings. The police were always on his heels, intervening so 
that no one was willing to let him rent meeting halls when he 
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 "The final verdict in the Supreme Court fell on 25. June 1855. Of the 123 persons indicted, 
6 were set free. Thrane and the editor of the paper Arbeiderforeningens Blad, Abildgaard, were 
sentenced to four years. Thrane was in jail for seven years in all, as the three years in jail before 
the verdict fell were not deducted. Most of those convicted had participated in 
"Hattemakerkrigen", a struggle waged at Hønefoss to liberate the indicted Halsten Knudsen. He 
was sentenced to nine years in jail. A number of leaders were convicted in provincial towns, in 
Romedal and Levanger, making the total number convicted 200 (Bull 1985:234). 
     98
 Seip's thesis on this point is 'total dissolution': "Those workers who had listened to his 
[Thrane's] rebellious agitation and his admonitions about solidarity and autonomy, about the 
right to work and to vote had [after the movement had been crushed] slipped into the "grand 
consensus" between the social classes, isolated and subdued." (Seip 1974:206). 
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attempted to arrange political gatherings. There was, as far as we 
can see now, nothing unlawful in his activity. 
 (3) As was typical internationally, the printers were in the 
forefront of creating workers' organizations. In Christiania in 1889 
the printers went on strike for higher wages. Mobilizing 
strikebreakers was used as a counter-strategy by the owners of the 
publishing houses. One owner, Mr Steen, contacted the presidency 
in the Storting and requested that it move the printing of public 
documents (Stortingstidende) to a printer in Denmark. This 
suggestion was adopted by the presidency of the Storting, and later 
accepted by a majority in the Storting. A meeting of workers in 
Oslo, meeting in Oslo Arbeidersamfund 29 March 1889, protested 
against this support of the employers by the national assembly. "We 
have never felt the lack of working-class representatives so strongly 
as when the Storting accepted the decisions of the Presidents, 
decisions explicitly taken to support the [media] owners against the 
workers" (Ousland, 1974:160). The printing was started in 
Copenhagen - but not for long. The Danish printers were soon 
informed about the nature of their work for the Norwegian national 
assembly. Their demand: either the printing of the Stortingstidende 
was stopped or they would go on strike - in support of their Nor-
wegian colleagues. The Labour Party called for a meeting on 31 
March at the open area at Tulinløkka in Christiania. When more 
than 1000 people showed up the police tried to disperse the 
demonstration. Then one of the workers' spokesmen, Carl Jeppesen 
mounted a staircase and proclaimed: 
 
 "Workers, the police have today harassed us and blocked our access to a public space where 
we want to discuss important matters. Let us continue as we started and go peacefully home. 
Let the police stand for brute force in our society" (Ousland 1949:162). 
 
Ousland has found traces of a larger police and military system that 
was on stand-by, ready to act in this conflict in Christiania. The 
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King's Guard and the military training school for the cavalry had 
been mobilized and ammunition distributed to the soldiers. Ousland 
suggests that the preparations in 1889 were forebodings and a 
'practice' for the more massive military and police interventions 
against the working class and the labour movement in the 1920's.  
 What we see in these materials is a state apparatus directed at the 
control of political activities. It is an administration at best working 
at the limit between indirect democracy and more direct 
authoritarian forms of the state, itself in danger of acting illegally 
because it can act on assumptions of unlawful actions that have not 
been committed. This type of clandestine, oppressive administration 
indicates the existence of what I will call the two faces of 
parliamentary-based indirect democracy: one face is formally open 
to the public, engaged in implementing positively defined laws, 
programmes, etc. decided upon in parliaments; the other face is 
clandestine and secretive, engaged in identifying potentially 
'dangerous' or 'illegal' political activity.  
 Seip (1974) indicates that espionage among Norwegian citizens 
was already common in the 1830's and 1840's. In 1851, when the 
Thrane movement was at its height, he suggests that the bureaucrat-
ic elite "prepared to defend itself with physical force... Students 
were trained in using weapons against "internal enemies". On 24 
February 1851 ... the Norwegian government had 1000 soldiers 
ready for action in Christiania... The Thrane movement was right 
from its inception under state control through an organized 
espionage system" (Seip 1974:174-175). 
 The secret services seek autonomy within the state, and in 
addition attempt to hide or cover up their own activity. Thus the 
secret services may not only have autonomy relative to the Storting, 
but may also be autonomous relative to the government and to other 
parts of the administration. The secret services may be viewed as a 
second-level administration within the public administration, both 
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formally and in practice autonomous of the regular decision-making 
routines in the administration. If such autonomy exists, who is in 
political control of the second-level system? 
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION 
 
The state was substantially reorganized between 1814 and 1905. In 
1814, in the "political space" created by the settlements of the 
Napoleonic wars, a Norwegian/Danish liberation movement esta-
blished a nationally independent parliamentary type of state. But 
independence was brief. By the end of 1814 the Swedish monarch 
and ruling class had control of government formation in Norway. 
The government was divided between a Norwegian and a Swedish 
section. This system did not, it seems, seriously reduce the internal 
political power of the bureaucratic elite and the Storting in Norway. 
In the 1880's the new bourgeoisie and an active liberal farmer's and 
urban intellectual movement removed the bureaucratic elite from its 
leadership position in the Norwegian state. With Venstre in the 
forefront, a parliamentary form of government was created. After 
this change of regime Venstre, and later Høyre, had control over the 
public administration, implementing a technical/administrative and 
legal infrastructure in support of capitalist market expansion and 
industrialization. In 1905 the Swedish authority was eliminated 
from the Norwegian state. Both the military and the foreign service 
were subordinated Norwegian state authority. The Norwegian state 
could move autonomously into international relations. 
 This development which took approximately 100 years, can be 
defined a bourgeois revolution in Norway, a process that at the 
same time meant the formation of a working class, a class that in the 
nineteenth century gradually developed an identity and class 
organizations. The newness of the working class and the fervour of 
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its leaders gave state actions against that class a rather jittery charac-
ter. Reaction to working-class organizations and political activity 
was violent at times. The state developed secret services for 
continuous surveillance of radical political activity. 
 The state in this period was explicitly self-assertive on its own 
bourgeois character. There was no doubt in ruling circles around 
mid-century that the task of the state was to eliminate economic 
privileges, open for markets and market competition and the 
development of capitalist activity within those markets, supported 
by international capital when possible. In the latter half of the 
century the infrastructural development programme was added to 
the project and meant exploiting scientific knowledge in the public 
sector. 
 This did not mean, however, that the state was without autonomy 
relative to the bourgeois class. The law-making process in 
parliament had a logic of its own, where external interests and 
demands were registered and processed, with an outcome in the 
form of laws, regulations and budgets valid in the whole territory, 
laws that therefore contained (a) a general national policy and (b) 
compromises between and exclusion of some specific interest and 
demands. The public administration developed its autonomy more 
on a professional/scientific basis, suggesting means for 
implementing (often unclear) goals defined by parliament and the 
government.  
 This autonomy was a product of several factors. One was the 
weakness of the bourgeoisie. Another was its newness; it was a 
class that was being formed only gradually in the nineteenth 
century. For this reason the bourgeoisie lacked class organizations 
before the 1880's that could take part in the struggle between the 
political parties and over positions and influence in the state 
administration. Thirdly the bureaucrats had built an administration 
well adjusted to wielding bureaucratic power. That administration 
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(as organization) did not disappear with the removal of the 
bureaucratic regime. Lastly, the infrastructural projects were new 
and were developed within a basically agricultural economy, so that 
the professionals who did get involved in the state, had plenty of 
scope to define more exactly what the projects should be. The 
professionals enabled the gradual development of programme 
autonomy in the state, which gave the state the capacity for 
independent policy-making. 
 Typical of state activity was its interventions in the "space" 
between the classes, between the economic systems, or the modes 
of production struggling for expansion or against oblivion. In 1814 
the state intervened between the Norwegian bourgeoisie and the 
competing monarchic regimes struggling to subdue the country. In 
the 1850's the state intervened in the conflicts between the peasants, 
the bourgeoisie and the Thrane movement, always on behalf of 
"society", not as an explicit instrument of any special interest in 
society. In the 1880's and 1890's the state intervened in the struggle 
between the rising bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite, and it 
intervened increasingly in the economy, between the capitalist firms 
and the consumers, creating an infrastructure for capitalist 
production and distribution. Precisely in these ambiguous, proble-
matic spaces between different, contradictory modes of production, 
between contradictory social classes and their organizations, the 
state has room for autonomous action.








      State autonomy in agriculture: 
      The role of the new professionals 
 
 
      "if the social sciences teach us anything, it is that the development of 
theory of various kinds is not simply the product of acts of will, but it is 
the slow outcome of many efforts to describe, explain, and account for 
specific social phenomena." 
 
 Martin Trow (cited in Jacobsen 1964:i) 
 
 
     What role do the professions and professionals in top 
positions in the bureaucracy have in the state apparatus? What 
autonomy do they have, to what degree do they enhance the 
autonomy of the state in the political process and how can we go 
about analyzing the role of professions and professional leaders in 
the state? 
 Knut Dahl Jacobsen (1964) gathered detailed materials on the 
political role of an increasingly professionalized agricultural 
administration in the modernization of Norwegian agriculture. He 
was interested in how the administration participated in formulating 
and implementing agricultural policy in Norway in the last part of 
the nineteenth century.  
 Jacobsen introduced a novel, specifically organizational approach 
to the study of administration. He combined analytical elements 
from political science and administrative law, from Norwegian 
historiography, from sociology and organization theory. The study 
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inspired a debate across disciplinary boundaries on the interpreta-
tion of the role of the agricultural administration and the state more 
generally in changing the mode of production and the living 
conditions of the rural population in Norway in the late nineteenth 
century.99 
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 Two 'opponents' commented on Jacobsen's doctoral thesis. They were the sociologist 
Vilhelm Aubert (1965) and the historian Jens Arup Seip (1965). 
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FROM DISSEMINATION OF 
KNOWLEDGE TO THE GENERATION OF PROFITS 
 
The administration as a political actor 
Knut Dahl Jacobsen was among the pioneers of postwar social 
science in Norway (Bleiklie et al. 1985). His focus is on the political 
role of the state administration and the processes that changed that 
role over time. His thesis is that the government bureaucracy, 
intended (by some) to be a neutral, efficient and state-loyal 
implementer of democratically defined goals and public 
programmes, is actually a central and autonomous political actor. 
He sees this autonomy as a function of two mechanisms. The first is 
the mechanism of constitutionality, where the specific roles of the 
state and each main part of it are defined in a constitution. The 
definition of the macro-structure of society and the organization of 
the state in the constitution cannot easily be infringed. The second 
mechanism is professionalization of the bureaucracy. The 
professions develop specific action models on the basis of, among 
other things, investigations within the scientific disciplines. The 
professional action models affect the content of public policy and 
the choice of means for implementing it. Before the legal and 
technical professions entered government, the state relied on 
common, popular concepts of change. Lacking the modern, 
scientifically based professions, the state was limited to extracting 
taxes, paying its own employees and ensuring, more or less 
violently, that law and order was respected. A state with the ability 
to intervene constructively in the economy and participate in 
redistributing public resources between groups was dependent on an 
ability to formulate policies, find economic and organizational 
means to implement the policies, and ability, legitimacy and power 
to change social relations. The professions and the sciences on 
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which they were based brought that kind of knowledge into the 
state. 
 But professional autonomy in the state implies dependency. The 
professions needed support. If no one considered the knowledge 
useful, the influence of the professions would dwindle or never 
develop. Professionals in the state are dependent upon having 
means/end knowledge, but also on someone in society considering 
the ends interesting and the means a good way of reaching them. 
 As professions develop and establish themselves in (public) 
positions, a change of relations between professions and clients can 
develop. If the professions were originally dependent upon popular 
support in attaining power positions, once they have become 
established, earlier autonomous supporters may become dependent 
clients. In that situation the internal dynamics of the profession may 
change. From being engaged in changing reality in the service of 
some value, the professions may well become primarily engaged in 
prolonging their position of influence, especially as society is 
transformed and new groups or social classes make new demands 
on the state.100 Perhaps the most surprising thesis Jacobsen puts 
forward is that the professions hold the key to client group access to 
state resources and support. 
 
 "Quite decisive for the welfare of a client group is the outlook of "its" profession, whether it 
explicitly is interested in the welfare of the group or whether it is more oriented to the 
survival of its own administrative unit and "public welfare in general". If a client group is 
not related to a profession, or if that profession is not client oriented, then policies based in 
other sectors, other group interests will be forced on the group and its interests will have 
difficulty permeating into public politics. In one sentence: the rule of experts is only a 
danger for a client group that is not represented by experts." (Jacobsen 1965:160) 
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 See Terrence Johnston and Rueschemeyer in Dingwall and Lewis (1983) for developments 
of aspects of this theme. 
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This is a radical thesis. On the one hand it questions the theory of 
parliamentary democracy, that interests are primarily dependent on 
being represented in parliament. On the other hand it highlights the 
elitist character of the state: the state is an arena for professionally 
based activity. Lay persons will have difficulties, will meet 
knowledge and especially language barriers in attempting to 
influence state policy. Groups without elites (read: professionals in 
the bureaucracy) taking care of, representing and formulating their 
interests will not advance very far in the hierarchy of programme 
priorities established in the state, even if they are well represented in 
parliament. But can this radical theory of the autonomy and the 
power of the professions stand critical testing? How does Jacobsen 
analytically and empirically argue his theory of professional auto-
nomy? 
 
The analytical strategy: 
bridging the gap between psychological and political variables 
The analytical strategy is primarily informed by the sociological 
concept of roles. Jacobsen suggests that we look at organizations as 
relatively stable distributions of roles in which individuals and 
groups go about making (and receiving) decisions. Sociological role 
theory suggests that positions in organizations contain expectations 
as to what the incumbent should do. Role theory suggests that 
individuals have action models that define the situation, the 
problems contained in that situation, participants in problem 
solving, and standards for reasonable solutions to the problems. In 
organizations, expectations, embedded in decision-rules and 
organization structures (hierarchies and offices), meet action 
models. Some kind of adjustment takes place, but the contradictions 
between the structures and the action models can also generate 
innovation and change. 
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 Organization structure is seen as the distribution of various 
attributes of power and dependencies between roles in the 
organization, initiative, information, influence, obligations, 
acceptance, legitimacy, who decisions affect, and responsibility 
(Jacobsen 1964:5). Jacobsen assumes that these distributions are 
influenced by the professionals and that the professions have dis-
tinctly different action models. March, Simon and Guetzkow 
(1958:174) suggested that understanding routine decision-making 
and innovation required two quite different theories. The theory of 
the relative value of known alternatives can help us understand 
routine decision-making. Innovation in organizations, on the other 
hand, requires an understanding of how people and groups focus 
their attention and how and under what conditions that focus 
changes from the existing programmes to searching for new ones: 
"a theory of choice without a theory of search is inadequate". March 
and Simon developed a number of social psychological hypotheses 
about when dissatisfaction with existing programmes would 
generate a search for new ones and where such a search would take 
place. Dahl Jacobsen moved the focus of that research from the 
psychological mechanisms of individuals and their interplay with 
organizational factors to the power and influence of professions. He 
not only developed the idea of action models to pinpoint the 
strategic thinking of professionals; he also introduced an 
"ecological" perspective to the study of group action, that is, 
investigating how professions came to identify with social groups 
and movements in society and how they related differently to 
political authorities. 
 Jacobsen's study is concerned with the modernization of agri-
culture in the last part of the century. He studied the autonomy of 
the agricultural administration in policy-making, from the early 
period when the Ministry of the Interior had its agricultural 
consultant (from 1854), through the expansion of the consultant's 
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role, to the creation of a Director of Agriculture in 1877 and to the 
final incorporation of the Agricultural Directorate into the new 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1900. What role did the professionalized 
administration have relative to small and large farmers and relative 
to the rising bourgeoisie in the urban areas? 
 Jacobsen's thesis is that the professional bureaucrats had an 
autonomous role in the political process, in specifying the 
programme for agricultural modernization and the means for 
implementing it. The administration was not a machine, imple-
menting a well-defined parliamentary programme. Rather, the ad-
ministration was a politically independent actor, developing its role 
through knowledge-based action models. There were disagreements 
and conflicting views within the agricultural profession over models 
of development within agriculture and how development should be 
implemented. The professions had complex and dynamic relations 
with the Storting, with social class interests and with specific client 
groups. 
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The role of the agricultural profession 
and Jonas Smitt in the modernization process 
The process Jacobsen describes is one of administrative change. 
From an early policy of modernization, developed in the 1860's and 
1870's, which focused on developing scientific methods of agri-
cultural production, the policy changed to a more complex 
programme, including financial assistance to farmers and an 
extension service actively disseminating information about better 
production techniques. 
 The old programme focused on scientific experimentation and 
accumulation of technical knowledge. Jonas Smitt, the director of 
the Directorate of Agriculture, the perpetrator of this programme, 
left it to the farmers to acquire the knowledge in practice. The 
responsibility of the agricultural administration was to organize 
scientific experiments in agricultural production techniques, and to 
make the results available for farmers who were interested in it. The 
active dissemination of knowledge would contradict the principles 
of a neutral administration. The obligation of the administration, in 
Smitt's view, was to be equally available for all. Neutrality meant 
providing information to whoever asked for it. Thus Smitt's model 
of the administration was that it should be passive in relation to the 
farm community, but active in developing theory and knowledge. 
This administrative action model Jacobsen named the "insight 
model". The outcome of that policy was an agricultural extension 
service that mainly served the large farms that had capital and time 
to implement the new production techniques. 
 A new action model gradually emerged within the agricultural 
administration, developed by a new generation of agronomists. 
Their education had a more practical slant and their understanding 
of modernization and the role of the state was more interventionist 
than Smitt's. Their knowledge of the practical problems in the 
different regions of the country was wider, their identification with 
 Politics of administration  155 
 
the farm communities stronger. At first they represented an oppo-
sition within the administration, activists or agitators as Jacobsen 
calls them. Gradually their influence increased as their more down-
to-earth programme of agricultural development gained support in 
the political arena. They believed in an active state, that approached 
the farm communities with suggestions, ideas and resources for 
developmental activities. Jacobsen called this model the "profit 
model" because it focused on creating conditions for profitable 
production in the different regions of the country. The profit model 
engaged the state in modernization of all sections of Norwegian 
agriculture. 
 The change from the insight model to the profit model was 
manifest in the agricultural administration by the end of the century. 
How was the change implemented? Can the change be explained 
solely in terms of the support for the models within the admini-
stration? Jacobsen develops an intriguing description of the change 
process, a description that puts the relations between the state and 
society in focus. He demonstrates that the change was not a result of 
open discussion and policy decisions within the public 
administration. The struggle within the administration called to 
mind more a war of positions than a rational dialogue among collea-
gues. The politics of administrative change had parallels to the 
politics of government composition in the larger political arena. 
Regime changes, it can be said, are dependent upon power, not 
arguments. According to Jacobsen, while the insight model mainly 
served the interests of the large capitalist farmers in the rich 
Eastern/Southern regions of the country, the profit model served all 
and particularly the subsistence farmers/peasants along the coast, 
especially in the West and North. 
 The internal conflict over action models mirrored changes in the 
political strengths of different classes and groups in society. In 
Jacobsen's interpretation it was the democratization process, driven 
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forward by the broad liberal alliance, that was the basis for the 
strength of the profit model within the agricultural administration. 
That process influenced and changed the structure of the 
agricultural school system, away from an abstract, scientific 
education towards a more practically oriented study, engaged in 
improving farming techniques and socioeconomic conditions from 
one region to the next. 
 However, the change of action model was also related to a set of 
organizational variables. The change was dependent on a 
reorganization of the formal structure of the state. That 
reorganization had several dimensions. One was the change of 
governmental form, the change from the king's control of 
government to the parliamentary system, where parliament 
controlled the composition of government. The bureaucratic elite 
gave way to the rule of the bourgeois/liberal/farm coalition. This 
change was a decisive condition for the elimination of the insight 
model from the agricultural administration.  
 The change was implemented through a reorganization of the 
administration. The Venstre government initiated what Jacobsen 
(inspired by Eisenstadt) calls a concentration process. Political 
power, from being located in the bureaucracy, was moved into the 
Storting. From 1884 the Storting increasingly controlled the 
appointment of government. But Venstre also concentrated power in 
the top levels of the administration. Through the creation of a new 
Ministry of Agriculture the autonomy of the Directorate was 
limited. By setting up a new Ministry and incorporating the Directo-
rate in the Ministry, the government had a powerful instrument to 
implement the new policy. Through this concentration process the 
old insight model was scrapped and the new, progressive profit 
model and the professionals subscribing to it were given access to 
administrative power.101 
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 Dag Solumsmoen (1980) argues that taking political control of the Director of Agriculture 
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THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROFIT 
MODEL AND THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE 
 
Jacobsen's interpretation of the change from insight to profit as the 
guiding principle, and the parallel change from the parliamentary 
state with a separate and independent government controlled by the 
monarch to the same form of state with a government appointed by 
the Storting, is definitely one of democratization. Through the 
application of the profit model, more farmers got the benefit of 
government activity. Through the Storting-controlled parliamentary 
state, broader sections of the population, including the small 
farmers, were drawn into the political system. His thesis is that 
Norwegian politics moved from a focus on elitist, centrally located 
interests to a broader representation of the social classes in society.  
 
 "On several points the [political] system became open to influence from without - the courts 
through the jury institution, the government through the duty of the government members to 
meet and assume responsibility in the Storting, the Storting by a broadened obligation 
between voters and representatives. The broadening of this obligation can be considered a 
link in the change from local representation to class representation ... The class element also 
laid the foundation for more permanent group formations in the Storting ... the new 
measures [in the profit model] ... were intended to take care both of the farmers in contrast to 
other social groups and of the lower strata of the farming community, the hired workers who 
were on the point of being enfranchised." (Jacobsen, 1965:86-87) 
 
The message is clear: from local to class representation, and 
representation of all major classes in the new Storting; from 
                                                                                                              
by incorporating him into the new Ministry was an untypical organizational innovation around 
the turn of the century. Most directors kept their independent positions and some directors were 
even moved out of their ministry (e.g. the Director of medical supplies). However, the 
incorporation strategy became common in the interwar period, when a number of infrastructural 
directorates were incorporated into ministries (Rail, Telegraph, Navigation, Sea Transport, Post 
and Roads). The argument then, according to Solumsmoen, was to reduce redundant decision-
making (Solumsmoen 1980:67). 
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selective support for large farmers to support for all farmers, and 
even support for hired workers in agriculture. Is this a reasonable 
interpretation of the profit model in practice? 
 The answer to that question is important for the interpretation of 
the autonomy of the state in this period of Norwegian history. A 
more powerful and interventionist state is not in question.; but 
intervention organized on what class basis and in the interest of 
what classes and groups? 
 Several scholars have taken part in that debate. Professor Jens 
Arup Seip is one of them. He disagrees with Jacobsen on two 
points. First, Seip is sceptical of the democracy thesis. The profit 
model was not a model in favour of the small farmers. Rather, it 
was a concept of an active, interventionist state within the ruling 
class itself, that is, within the aforementioned alliance of class 
forces that ejected the bureaucratic elite from government. As Seip 
puts it, Jacobsen's two models were two action models competing 
for hegemony within the conservative class, "two models within 
Norwegian conservative politics at the time". They represented the 
thinking of two sections of the ruling class, one laissez-faire, the 
other interventionist, interested in engaging the state in the ex-
pansion of the infrastructural conditions for capitalism. It had little 
to do with the influx of working-class and small subsistence farmer 
interests into the state. 
 Seip is also critical of the "from local community to class 
representation" thesis. Seip argues that the bureaucratic elite had for 
a long time itself represented class interests in Norwegian politics. 
The bureaucratic elite was dependent upon support, as mentioned 
earlier. While the main section of it had been modernization 
oriented from the early part of the century, another section had its 
loyalties in traditional patriarchy and large-scale aristocratic 
farming. The new element in the politics of the 1880's was, 
according to Seip, precisely the mobilization of local interests into 
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the national political system, their organization into the state 
(parliamentary forms at the municipal level, legally introduced 
through formannskapslovene).  
 The bureaucratic elite, in addition to its split over identities, also 
presented itself as a defender of society as a whole. In Seip's 
formulation: "The bureaucratic elite comprised the attitude both of 
state authority and of the individual citizen" (Seip 1965:215). In that 
way it attempted to please all parties. That was a viable strategy as 
long as all other parties could not enter the political arena. It became 
an ambiguous strategy when each party wanted a voice. The 
strategy was gradually identified as a cover up for the specific 
interests of the bureaucratic elite itself. 
 The profit model was "an element in the conservative [bourgeois] 
movement". There was a widening of popular participation in the 
state in the 1880's, but it was a participation controlled and 
organized within a capitalist/industrial modernization model.102 The 
profit model functioned to integrate agriculture into the market 
economy and thus into the circuit of capital accumulation. Through 
more efficient production techniques, prices of agricultural products 
would be reduced, reducing the working class pressure on wages in 
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 I think Rokkan rightly saw that popular participation was quite easily incorporated into the 
state system, once the state (bureaucratic) structure and the basic power relations between the 
state and the social classes was determined. Earlier demands for participation were met with 
state opposition and even state violence when those demands were based on cultural and 
economic interests that had not been (a) either organized away or (b) incorporated 
administratively. As Rokkan puts it: "The Protestant centres of the far North [in Europe] could 
pass quickly from state-building (Phase I) to nation-building (Phase II) and could develop 
unified cultures well before the era of mass politics (Phase III and IV) ... The essential message 
... seems to be this: you can expect a smooth transition to the mass politics of Phases III and IV - 
either when the territory is sufficiently remote from the exit promptings of the trade belt to have 
allowed the early growth of distinctive legal, religious, and linguistic standards (the English, 
Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic cases) or within the central belt [of independent city trade 
centres], whenever the cities have been able to establish strong enough consociational ties to 
thwart the development of a centralizing state apparatus (the Dutch and Swiss cases)" (Rokkan 
1975a:581 and 591). 
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the urban areas. The need for labour per unit of land or per unit of 
produce would decrease, "liberating" farm labour for employment 
in industry and trade. 
 Several empirical factors in agriculture support this interpre-
tation. The market economy expanded around the turn of the 
century. Many small tenant farms and small self-owned farms were 
lost as independent units; the number of people in farming was 
reduced, as depicted earlier, and a large number of people from 
rural areas emigrated to the USA because of better opportunities 
there or lack of sufficient employment in the expanding industry in 
Norway.103 Bergh is of the same opinion: 
 
 "The special focus given to agriculture in this period of Norwegian history can give the 
impression that public policy had the intention of helping peasants on their own premises, in 
essence defending their mode of production. But that was not the case. It is beyond doubt 
that the primary purpose of state engagement in agriculture was to integrate the whole sector 
into the market system." (Bergh 1983:52) 
 
Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that (a) popular participation 
in the state increased; (b) local interests, through the enhanced role 
of the Storting and the local parliamentary organs, got a larger say 
in the political decision-making process; (c) contrary to Jacobsen, 
the struggle over action models within the agricultural admini-
stration was a struggle between the bureaucratic elite's 
static/conservative view of the state and the rising bourgeoisie's 
more dynamic interest in expanding industrial capitalism and 
engaging the state actively in the creation of the necessary condi-
tions for that expansion; (d) the struggle between action models also 
expressed a conflict within the bourgeois movement over how 
active the state should be; but (e) the agricultural administration, 
                                           
     103
 Between 1865 and 1900 the farm population fell by 24%. Between 1875 and 1890 227 000 
Norwegians emigrated to the USA, of these 160 000 came directly from the rural areas (CBS 
1978 and Lieberman 1970). 
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whether under the insight model or the profit model, was oriented 
towards the expansion and modernization of capitalism - the models 
represented different strategies towards that goal. 
 
 
IS STATE AUTONOMY DEPENDENT UPON 
PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL? 
 
Ulf Torgersen (1961) has investigated the relations between the 
university, the professions educated there and the state in 
nineteenth-century Norway. His study results in a theory that 
somewhat modifies Jacobsen's thesis that the influx of professionals 
increased state autonomy. Torgersen's thesis is that before 
breakdown of the bureaucratic regime in 1884, the university and 
the state were increasingly held apart. The professors who had 
become bureaucrats were forced back into the university, while the 
"pure" political organizations, the political parties, were being 
organized. The state should be a specifically political organization. 
Science in the state created ambiguity. 
 At the same time a process of specialization and bureaucrati-
zation was going on inside the university. The academic disciplines 
were split into more specialized subjects, each organized in separate 
departments. The scientific role was gradually changed from one of 
"overview and understanding" to "specialized (technical) 
knowledge and research".  
 The crisis of 1884 transformed the state. New power relations 
between classes filtered into the state. Through a concentration of 
power in the Storting, the elimination of the bureaucratic elite from 
government power and the reorganization of the administration, the 
new liberal/democratic coalition had done its job. Power could then 
be disseminated again, to the administration and to municipal 
organs. With the change of regime and the reorganization of the 
 The role of professionals  162 
 
state apparatus, the academics could be drawn back into state 
activity, but now in a new role, not as autonomous administrative 
leaders but as specialized counsellors to the politicians.  
 This set of changes in the state, in the universities and in the 
relations between the two institutions can be internally related. As 
long as the bureaucrats had political command and the state mainly 
gathered taxes and kept the peace, the state did not need specialized 
professional knowledge. That need arose with the burgeoning 
capitalist economy. To meet that need the Storting was strengthened 
to be able to oust the bureaucrats from political leadership and  
develop policies for the building of new infrastructure. Implement-
ing that kind of intervention into the economy required more state at 
the local level and local mobilization. That project required a more 
professional political role, politicians who not only directly 
represented their constituencies, but who had a vision about the 
future (capitalist) society and the ability to specify that vision in 
concrete development programmes. The specialization in the 
university system in the form of more natural and technical sciences 
and a proliferation of faculties and departments can be seen as an 
adjustment to this new task: the education of professionals for 
positions in a more specialized state administration. 
 The bureaucratic elite had to concentrate political power in the 
state as a defence against the attacks of the industrial 
bourgeoisie/farm coalition. In that process the publicly employed 
professors were not efficient. They were loyal first to the scientific 
enterprise, and only secondly to politics. Therefore they had to go. 
The rising bourgeoisie was interested in a new type of academic, a 
more practical, technical type of academic - in addition to the 
humanists, the military officers and the legal and religious 
generalists. The state-conscious bourgeoisie wanted politicians in 
government with knowledge of infrastructural conditions for 
modernization, politicians who could run the state on its behalf. 
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 In this sense science appears in both these stages of Norwegian 
political history (before and after 1884) as subordinated to politics. 
Seen this way, the theory that class politics was in command in both 
periods is strengthened. Before 1884 bourgeois interests were 
promoted in politics by parts of the bureaucratic elite. After 1884 
bourgeois interests were more directly taken care of by the new 
political parties through the Storting, which was in command of the 
political composition of government. After 1884 professionals were 
drawn into the administration, after a specialization and 
socialization process had been inaugurated in the universities. The 
professionals certainly had their autonomy, but autonomy within 
organizational structures that were adjusted to the new economic 
demands on the state.104 
 Torgersen demonstrates how the bureaucratic elite gradually lost 
its value-neutral image as it was increasingly forced to defend its 
power, and how the new social movement, focused on capitalism, 
industry and independence, was related to the specialization of 
science and its renewed mobilization in politics after 1884. That 
development of the scientific enterprise supports the hypothesis that 
the bourgeoisie and not the broad coalition of farmers, peasants and 
intellectuals was in the forefront of the political process. 
 The small peasants in the farm movement were quite uninterested 
in or even hostile to "science". Their interest lay in increasing the 
value of practical farm work - in practice, in state policy, in 
education and science. In that sense the "profit model" may well 
have had appeal, as Jacobsen indicates. That model meant at least 
an administration interested in the specific problems experienced by 
agriculture in the different parts of the country. But my argument 
concerns the profit orientation of the agricultural administration. 
Was that orientation in the interests of the peasants and small 
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 See Benum (1979) on the integration of professionals into the state in the nineteenth 
century. 
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farmers in the rural areas of Western and Northern Norway? I doubt 
it. I have more sympathy with Østerud when he suggests that these 
farmers (perhaps all farmers in Norway?) were primarily interested 
in raising the consumption standard in their own households. 
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THE VALUE OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF STATE AUTONOMY 
 
Jacobsen's theory of the political role and autonomy of the ad-
ministration combined elements from organization theory, 
sociology and historiography and contained a concept of levels of 
analysis that made it possible to identify processes both generating 
and limiting subjective choices and decisions in the administra-
tion.105 When distinctions between the economic structure of 
society, the organizational systems and subjectively determined ac-
tions are not made, or when the specific movements and processes 
within each level are overlooked, studies easily degenerate into 
factor analysis, or the quantitative relations between an unending 
number of variables without an eye to the processes (systems) 
connecting variables within and between the different levels of 
analysis.106 
 Jacobsen noted that Jonas Smitt, as a professional within the 
ruling bureaucratic elite in the 1870's and 1880's, typically 
identified with society as a whole and a politically neutral 
administration. The state should not favour any specific group. The 
professionals in opposition to Smitt identified with specific class 
interests, and felt that the administration should actively and 
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 See also Stein Rokkan's (1975a) distinctions between levels of analysis in his grand design 
for comparative studies of nationbuilding. Rokkan and Dahl Jacobsen cooperated and pioneered 
at about the same time the establishment of the political sciences in Bergen in the late 1960's. 
     106
 The NPS can be criticized for not distinguishing between levels of analysis. Quite 
typically, as a consequence of the lack of this intellectual tool, the Power Study describes a state 
structure, a complex state organization, without investigating empirically what it does and how 
its more concrete actions and policies are generated. The state has innumerable organs, units, 
commissions, levels, professions and complex relations with organizations, firms, communities, 
markets, etc. outside the state. But why those structures exist, which classes in society gain 
power through them and how and to what degree the structures determine policies, we are 
hardly told (see Hernes 1975, Lægreid and Olsen 1978, Olsen 1978, Østerberg 1979 and 
Andenæs 1981). 
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concretely serve those interests. A neutral administration was a 
cover-up for the defence of established interests. 
 The oppositional professionals integrated science and politics: 
science should be motivated by a specific liberation or development 
model. The opposition wanted an active administration, a battling 
administration, one that sought contact with its clients and fought 
for their interests. The rulers wanted a passive and neutral 
administration. In this way the professionals were seen as political 
actors mediating between interests in society and government 
policies and integrating political-scientific programmes and forms 
of administrative organization. 
 Jacobsen studied the changing role of the agricultural admini-
stration in the Norwegian state in the nineteenth century, developing 
a theory of the processes behind the change of attention focus and 
action models in the agricultural administration. The professions 
emerge as change agents. He described how they carried new action 
models into the administrative system and how they organized it to 
implement the new values. When new social movements arose in 
society, those movements that managed to educate professionals 
had an instrument for entering the public arena and mobilizing state 
resources for their cause.  
 Jacobsen described how a change of political regime opened the 
administration to the new professionals.107 The new regime and its 
concentration of political power in the Storting, through the 
mechanism of parliamentarism and by forcing autonomous admini-
strative units (like the Agricultural Directorate) into the politically 
controlled ministries, seem to have been a necessary condition for 
the change of action models and agricultural policy in the 
administration.  
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 See Tilly's description (1978b:384) of the two-tier and four-tier action models, called 'the 
moral economy' and 'possessive individualism' respectively, confronting each other in the 
politics of eighteenth-century England. 
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 As I see it, Jacobsen places his theory of professions as 
independent actors and agents for administrative change in a 
dialectic base-superstructure paradigm. His theory can be depicted 
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THE UNDERLYING PARADIGM: CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 
 
What in this potent analytical scheme led Jacobsen to what I have 
argued to be a somewhat exaggerated evaluation of the democratic 
character of the political-administrative changes towards the end of 
the century? That may be an effect of Jacobsen's own paradigm, the 
basic concepts he employs in studying Norwegian politics.  
 First Jacobsen (like Rokkan) did not develop a concept of the 
process of capital accumulation. Capitalism was expanding and 
penetrating into agriculture, but in Jacobsen's scheme that meant 
basically pressure for new technology, increased productivity and a 
market/money orientation of production. What social relations 
capitalism established between worker and capitalist, between urban 
capital, farmer and farm workers, between the social classes in 
capitalist society, was not conceptualized. 
 Secondly, politics was defined abstractly as attempts at changing 
the world in a direction normatively defined by a change agent. As 
Jacobsen says: "Politics ... can be regarded as an activity aimed at 
defining problems, getting the problems accepted as definite, and 
possibly creating an administrative organization in order to get the 
problems solved" (Jacobsen 1965:63). Politics is defined (1) as a 
subjective process, where conceptions of a preferred future guide 
present actions, and (2) as a struggle for representation in the state. 
This definition sidesteps the question of actors in politics. Are they 
only individuals or can groups and classes be seen as actors? 
 Within a marxist paradigm, politics generally in capitalist society 
might be defined as the struggle between social classes over state 
power. With that definition, subjective interpretations of interests 
should be sought for in decision-making within economic positions 
and relative to established cultural codes, world views, etc. 
Subjectively defined interests could then be related to more 
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structurally defined expectations and language structures. The 
political aspect of the struggle could be defined as the struggle (a) 
over the organization of the state, and (b) over the content of state 
policy. With these definitions the result of the investigation might 
well be, as suggested earlier, that the democratization of the state in 
the 1880's and 1890's, which is undeniable, was a democratization 
within the structures and limitations set by the rising capitalist mode 
of production and the dominant class interests within it. When the 
class theory of politics is missing, and when politics is defined more 
abstractly as a relation between will and organization, a 
specification of the limitations of the democratic reorganization of 
the state at that time can hardly be conceptualized. 
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FROM INSTRUMENTAL TO PROGRAMME AUTONOMY 
 
Jacobsen's studies show that the state and state bureaucrats had a 
large degree of instrumental autonomy in the first two-thirds of the 
century. But it was a limited autonomy, an autonomy that developed 
within a capitalist modernization paradigm, a paradigm that the 
bureaucrats acquired through their contact with European economic 
and political ideology and through their alliance with the rising 
industrial bourgeoisie in the towns. The old regime, after 
eliminating the privilege system in the markets, focused on bureau-
cratic values (safe positions, good pay, stable relations with clients, 
with the political authorities and with other administrative units). 
With the industrial bourgeoisie on the rise, the state took on 
programme autonomy. The new professionals developed, quite 
independently, detailed programmes for profitable agriculture in the 
different regions of the country. 
 At the same time, however, the government and the public ad-
ministration were subordinated to the Storting and the dominant 
political party there. The formation of the political parties can be 
seen as expressions of the increased importance of social classes in 
society. Venstre organized the broad coalition of liberal 
intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and the farm movement. The 
bourgeoisie proper and parts of the bureaucratic elite organized in 
the Right Party (Høyre) and the working class in the Labour Party 
some years later. In Venstre there was a political leadership capable 
of uniting a broad bourgeois class coalition, fighting for national 
liberation, the dethronement of the (Swedish and Norwegian) 
bureaucracy, and the gradual development of conditions for 
expanded capital accumulation in the economy. It was a political 
coalition that, through the state apparatus, could both mobilize and 
control the publicly employed professionals. It was a coalition that 
could not hold together as the Right Party confronted more directly 
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the labour movement's party and trade federations. Venstre then 
became increasingly a political party between the Right and the 
Labour Party.  
 
 
INCREASING STATE AUTONOMY: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALIZATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
 
Jacobsen's research demonstrated how, through which mechanisms 
and relations bureaucrats participated in politics, in institution 
building and class formation and highlighted the role of the 
professions in state decision-making and in the development of state 
autonomy. He introduced the ecological approach (organization/ 
environment relationship) and demonstrated the scientific value of 
interdisciplinary analysis. But his lack of a theory of the social 
relations in the emerging capitalism makes his analysis ambiguous, 
in my opinion, with respect to the class content of the 
modernization programme in agriculture and to the class character 
of the democratization process. 
 With the political turmoil of the Napoleonic wars and the radical 
political ideas of the revolution, the bourgeoisie and the nationally 
conscious bureaucratic elite in Norway was offered an important 
opportunity for organizing an independent state in the country. The 
bourgeoisie lacked the capacity to dislodge the bureaucratic elite 
from the heights of the state organization in the first decades after 
1814.  
 From the materials I have investigated, I suggest that the 
capitalist mode of production was the most dynamic economic force 
in the country already in 1814, even if farming, in a combination of 
market and subsistence modes, was the most common form of 
production. My thesis is that, up to 1884, the bourgeoisie delivered 
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the decisive value premises to state policy-making, premises that 
were processed independently by the bureaucracy, with a 
breakdown of the bureaucratic/bourgeois alliance in the years 
before 1884 but with a renewal of it on the basis of a new definition 
of the role and place of the professional bureaucracy after 1884. 
 With the economic and technological innovations around mid-
century, the relations between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie 
gradually changed. The bureaucracy hardened and put all the more 
energy into defending its own limited power interests, while the 
economic power of the urban bourgeoisie and the political and 
ideological power of the liberal farm movement increased. The 
power of the state was at the same time restricted. It was wielded by 
the bureaucratic elite up to the 1880s, when the political coalition of 
bourgeoisie, liberal intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie in both towns 
and rural areas became strong enough to dislodge the bureaucrats 
from the ruling positions in the state, establish the Storting as the 
leading organ and reduce the bureaucratic elite to a place in the 
administrative apparatus (Seip 1945).  
 The state organization up to 1850 was small and sharply hier-
archical, with limited political division of labour (divided into only 
a few ministries). The state was mainly an instrument for control 
and taxation. But even in 1818 the infrastructural administration 
was present, in its earliest forms, interspersed as separate, small 
offices in the classic ministries. Then in the 1840's, with new 
economic expansion, these infrastructural functions became more 
important, and they were separated out from their old locations and 
organized into the Ministry of the Interior. This change indicated 
new demands on the state: (1) that it eliminate barriers (like trade 
and production privileges to specific persons, families or towns) and 
introduce the principle of laissez-faire into the legal code, and, (2) 
that it initiate an active management of infrastructural activities - 
canal building, regulating sea traffic in difficult waters, building a 
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railways, land telegraphs, and furthering more efficient forms of 
production in agriculture. These two functions were in part 
contradictory, one requiring that the state stay out of production and 
distribution and the other that the state be involved in the production 
of infrastructure. The solution was a stronger state because both 
policy areas required positive state activity. 
 The new laissez-faire/infrastructural policies brought the state 
into contact with larger groups and sections of the Norwegian 
population. This expansion of state activity could be misunderstood 
in two directions.  
 (1) It could be seen as a general democratization resulting from 
anti-bureaucratic and pro-democratic demands. The expansion of 
the state in the municipalities, which was a democratization, could 
be seen as only that. But it also made possible a more detailed in-
tervention by the centre in the widely different localities in the 
country, a closer surveillance of wants and sentiments there and a 
state-guided mobilization of economic activity in the service of a 
foreign agent, the rising, urban, industrial bourgeoisie.  
 (2) The reorganization of the state could be misunderstood as a 
change from a bureaucratically self-interested state to a class state. 
It is at least possible that no such change occurred in mid-century 
Norway. What happened was rather that the leading class, the 
bourgeoisie, developed from being a class based in trade and 
farming, subordinate to the rule of the bureaucracy, to a class where 
the industrial and export-oriented section gradually gained enough 
strength to enter the political arena. With the bureaucrats in power, 
the new class's arena was the Storting. The class then became strong 
enough - in alliance with other oppositional elements - to oust the 
bureaucratic elite from top positions, and put a new leadership, 
educated in the bourgeois political parties, at the head of the state.  
 Parliamentarism was a state form which put the bureaucratic elite 
more clearly under the control of the government and the political 
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parties. Modern infrastructure boosted both the development and the 
power of the professions. The profit model in agriculture, 
administered by a directorate controlled by the Department of 
Agriculture, exemplifies, I suggest, exactly this new political 
system. The profit model was directed at integrating most farms into 
the market and making production more efficient in money terms. 
The state took on the problems of agriculture, but in an alienated 
form - focusing on profit maximization, when most small farmers 
and peasants were worrying about how to keep the household 
economy from collapsing. The consequences of state success in 
agriculture were therefore: (1) many small farmers had to give up; 
(2) more and cheaper food from the farms was delivered to the 
urban areas; and (3) farm labour was "liberated" for work in urban 
industry. 
 The model required a new type of bureaucrat, a professional with 
substantive knowledge of agriculture, with the ability to understand 
and specify problems as they existed in the different districts of the 
country and the ability to define public interventions that could 
solve or alleviate the problems. But the new professionals 
(agronomists) functioned within an action model influenced by the 
idea/demand for a market economy in agriculture. This thesis 
suggests a more limited professional autonomy than Jacobsen 
describes (see Jacobsen 1964:196) and an autonomy used to 
advance the capitalization of agriculture, with a very limited loyalty 
to small, household-oriented farming in Norway (Otnes 1973, 
Chapter 12). 
 The development of capitalism gradually formed the industrially 
based working class, a class recruited largely from the countryside 
through the gradual elimination of tenant farming, through the 
introduction of better technology which reduced the need for 
manpower in agriculture, but also through urban changes, develop-
ment of handicrafts with apprentices who were prevented from 
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becoming masters. Parts of the working class, together with small 
farmers and handicraftsmen, had, under Thrane's charismatic 
leadership, already in the 1850's shown a capacity for an underclass 
mobilization.  
 Let me now turn to state-class relations in the twentieth century, 
the era of the working class and social democracy. Given the 
increasing political strength and influence of the labour movement, 
did the state retain its class character untainted or did the labour 
movement influence the state and gradually reorganize it in such a 
way that interpreting the state apparatus as an autonomous 
organization oriented towards realizing and defending the bourgeois 
project of an autocentric capitalism became imprecise or even false? 
      
 
 
      THE STATE 
      INTO THE 
      ECONOMIC ARENA: 
    PART  THE UNFOLDING OF 






    How and to what degree did state policies in the interwar 
period affect the class structure? In particular, how did the state and 
its policies affect the formation of a reformist labour movement, one 
that accepted to struggle for working class interests with the 
bourgeoisie in command of capital and within the existing state 
structure? 
 In Part C we have seen how the bureaucratic elite was ousted 
from political leadership. The administration was reorganized and 
expanded to develop infrastructure favourable to privately 
organized industrial production. There was a shift in the internal 
power structure of the state. The bureaucratic political class, 
dominant in the administration, the government and the (newly 
formed) parliament, was historically set to administer 
feudal/aristocratic interests. The state had its role in tax collection, 
in education and religious services and in some infrastructure and 
military affairs. The aristocratic concept of society was static. But 
through the pressure of international developments, toward 
enlightenment, liberalism and capitalism, parts of the bureaucratic 
elite, together with the rising Norwegian and Danish bourgeoisie, 
demanded change. 
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 The change process that ensued was complex. On the one hand 
the progressive part of the bureaucracy supported liberal ideology 
and capitalist organization of the economy. On the other hand the 
bureaucratic elite was not willing to let go of its political power 
positions. It was this contradiction that reached breaking point in the 
1880's, and a common interpretation is that the bourgeoisie won that 
battle.108 But not in the sense that a bourgeois elite moved into the 
state and took over the role of the bureaucratic elite. Rather, the 
state was reorganized into its modern parliamentary form, and two 
political parties that represented different social coalitions started 
struggling for majority in the Storting and for government control. 
 The distribution of power in the state changed. After 1884 it was 
the Storting that both formally and in practice was the power centre. 
Parliament (i.e. the Høyre and Venstre parties within it) demanded a 
new and direct loyalty from the government. The government in its 
turn demanded a new and more direct loyalty from the 
administration, at least in periods of tense ideological and political 
struggle. This loyalty was enforced in different ways. One way was 
to eliminate the autonomy of the professional directorates, as 
happened with the Agricultural Directorate under Jonas Smitt. 
Another was to specialize the more technical administrations. The 
division of labour between parliament and administration became 
clearer. Specialization increased attention to sub-goals in the state 
programmes. Thus policy-making was left to higher levels of the 
state organization. 
 A central role of the state in the nineteenth century was to 
develop the wide-ranging legal and technical infrastructure 
necessary for capitalism to expand. But when we look back at that 
process it was the politicians and bureaucrats and not the private 
                                           
     108
 "The multi-party state was organized constitutionally much like other West-European 
states; it was also in Norway dominated by "bourgeois" elements; agrarian interests were 
secondary; both interests were pressured from the left by an organized working class" (Seip 
1974:11; my translation). 
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owners of capital who were the organizers. The capitalists proper in 
Norway played a subordinate role in the political and administrative 
arena. In the political coalition that managed to eliminate the 
bureaucracy from government there were people with a basis in 
capitalist trade and industry, but the state played an autonomous 
role in developing and implementing the infrastructural 
programmes. The bourgeoisie as a class of private capitalists was 
rather weak and on the defensive in this period of Norwegian 
history.109 
 With the turn of the century, modern industry took form in 
Norway, especially in connection with the hydroelectric power 
plants. How did the industrialization process affect the class 
structure? How did changes in that structure affect the organization 
of the state? Were the industrial entrepreneurs active in state policy 
making? 
 Having investigated those questions, I turn to the relationship 
between the state and the labour movement. What role did the state 
play in the interwar years in the formation of the working class and 
its organizations? How was the state organization affected by the 
new and dynamic industrial bourgeoisie, struggling against a large 
and quite homogenous working class, and what power and 
autonomy did the state have in that relationship? A study of the 
Trade Bank affair in the early 1920's makes a more detailed, 
transverse, study of that question possible. 
                                           
     109
 An exception may be Peder Jebsen, who was active in organizing the construction of the 
railway from Bergen to Voss, the 'forerunner' of the rail connection between Bergen and Oslo. 
That Peder Jebsen needed more efficient transport to get materials and products to and from his 
textile companies on the west coast just emphasizes that the private sector needs state 
intervention and support. That a private capitalist was especially active on the west coast may 
also say something about the reach of the classical bureaucratic state which was concentrated in 
the south-eastern region of the country. Øystein Sørensen (1988) demonstrates how the state, 
through the elite bureaucrat Schweigaard, was active in organizing the first railway line in the 
south-eastern part of the country. 
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CHANGES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
There is something enticing about data on the distribution of people, 
of workers, administrators, and capital owners in society. They are, 
at least formally, very accurate. How many are getting paid for 
work in banks, in industry, in farming, etc.? Antonio Gramsci 
(1967) suggests that at this level of description we can go about our 
work with the exactness of the natural sciences. The structures 
disclosed are stable, at least over the short term. However, even 
these classifications are problematical: how many actually gain their 
living from farm work in Norway's small-scale, peasant farming; 
where is the dividing line between agriculture, industry, transport 
and trade? Still, let me turn to the data on the development of the 
economic structures in Norway between 1900 and 1950, the distri-
bution of both people and capital. I will use them to indicate 
changes in the class structure and in the power relations between 
classes and the state. 
 The data in the Appendix do not distinguish between owners of 
capital and wage labourers, or between different kinds of owners 
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(for example whether they employ foreign labour or not) or between 
wage labourers according to size of wage. Neither do they 
distinguish clearly between the public and the private economy. The 
table does distinguish crudely between material production and 
services. The table has a separate category called "economically 
inactive". The Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has put housewives, 
children working at home and recipients of public and private 
support in that category. The concept "inactive" is used to indicate 
that these people do not receive regular wages and/or they get 
remuneration without working. People in all these categories may 
work, may produce material goods or services that have use value. 
But that is, for the CBS, beside the point. Most of these people do 
not contribute to the fund of surplus value; they drain surpluses 
from it. 
 I have included data on women in paid work ("active" women), 
so that we can see their position in the economy and in the class 
structure. Since women generally are subordinates in 
socioeconomic systems, from the family, through the labour 
markets and into the capitalist firms and public institutions, there is 
reason to assume that their voice in political and ideological 
organizations will be different from that of men from the same 
socioeconomic positions. 
 I will in the following also scrutinize some data on international 
capital in the Norwegian economy and data on the distribution of 
real capital between the state and the private sector. 
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The primary sector: downward trend. Expansion in periods of 
unemployment 
The numbers show that agriculture was on the decline, relatively, 
from 1900 to 1950. However, the speed of the decline varied. From 
1910 to 1930 the reduction was about 3%. That is a small reduction 
compared with the downward trend in the last part of the nineteenth 
century. In absolute numbers, the exodus from the primary sector 
halted in the first part of the twentieth century and was reversed. 
The number of farmers in Norway increased between 1910 and 
1930, which it did not do in any other decade between 1870 and 
1970 (CBS 1968, Table 17). The number of farms rose from 259 
000 in 1917 to 327 000 in 1939, an increase of 26%. This increased 
the social base and the political importance of the farm movement, a 
fact the Labour Party was well aware of in the 1930's. But statistics 
on farm size also suggest support for a theory of class distinctions in 
rural Norway in this period (Table 10.1). 
 
 




Very large farms over 1000 mål* 
Large farms 200-1000 mål 
Middle sized farms 20-200 mål 





















 1 mål = 0.247 acres 
Source: CBS (1968), Table 74. 
 
The number of small farms increased most, increasing the size of 
the peasantry as a class of rural workers, producing mainly for 
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subsistence but with market transactions as a means of rationalizing 
work and increasing the consumption fund110. Large parts of this 
peasantry were economically no better off than the urban industrial 
workers. They toiled as much or more and at no time had 
subordinates (except, as suggested, women; but that was a common 
trait with males in the industrial working class). The difference was 
that the peasants did not experience the large workplaces where tens 
and hundreds of workers cooperated under some kind of capital 
command and the relatively direct capital-labour relationship in 
industry. The peasants' confrontation with capital was more in the 
form of banks requiring interest and instalments on loans. The 
industrial workers had the representatives of capital present all the 
time. The numbers also indicate that the petty bourgeoisie in the 
rural areas increased in this period, as did the rural bourgeoisie 
proper on the large farms. 
 But then, from 1930, through the war and to 1950 the speed of 
the relative decline increased, reducing the number employed in 
agriculture from 15% to 10% of all aged 15 years and over. We 
notice that forestry and fishing managed to uphold their relative 
position in employment up to 1930. By 1950, however, the relative 
decline in fisheries had set in. One reason why forestry and fisheries 
did not follow the rate of decline in agriculture may be that both 
these sectors were more integrated into industry than small-scale 




                                           
     110
 Whether the increase in the number of small farms in the interwar period was a conse-
quence of explicit policies and state interventions or a consequence of the economic crisis that 
hit wage-earners in industry, making employment in agriculture a tempting alternative, is, hard 
to say. But more on that later. 
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The figures for industrial employment are somewhat surprising. 
They demonstrate that industry in Norway right up to 1930 did not 
in any marked way increase its relative position. From 1900 to 1910 
there is a decline in the percentage. It increased through the First 
World War and reached 17.2% in 1920. Then there was the decline 
in the 1920's, bringing the percentage back to the level of 1910. But 
the Second World War changed the picture. By 1950 20.4% of all 
employed were in industry. Considering the difficulties encountered 
in securing food supplies during the war and the tendency to return 
to agriculture, this rise in industry is significant. The data indicate 
that industry became the major sector of employment in Norway as 
a consequence of the preparations for war, the entry of the social 
democrats into government and German-supported industrialization 
during the war. Industrialization developed rapidly during the First 
and Second World Wars, with a certain, but actually not very large, 
decline in the 1920's (CBS, SØS No.3:40).  
 On the basis of historical statistics, I have constructed a diagram 
of the changes over time in the numbers of workers in industry 
(bottom curve in Figure 10.1; the top curve shows people receiving 
some kind of support as their main source of livelihood). 
 
 



















The diagram demonstrates that industrialization, as measured by 
employment in that sector, increased evenly from 1875 to 1900. At 
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the turn of the century the increase flattened out, only to move 
upwards again in the decade of the First World War. Then came the 
crisis of the 1920's with a new flattening of the numbers employed, 
followed by active industrialization from 1930 up to the outbreak of 
the Second World War. The diagram gives us a glimpse into the 
postwar period. There was, as could be expected, an increase in 
industrial employment after the war. But by 1950 industrialization 
had reached its peak. There was a moderate increase in the 1960's. 
 Around the turn of the century industry was established in places 
with waterfalls and hydroelectric power. Failing farmers and 
semi-proletarians from the countryside moved to these places in 
large numbers.111 On the one hand, as we shall see, industrialization 
was pushed by the influx of international capital and organizational 
know-how in the early part of the century, with a slow and halting 
nationalization of control of the new enterprises (slow development 
of autocentricity). On the other hand the industrialization process 
around 1900 rapidly formed an urban working class in Norway,112 a 
class that soon produced a conglomeration of movements, both 
                                           
     111
 However, as Ramsøy shows, the increase in the industrial working class was probably 
already at this time largely recruited from within the working class itself. Persons "freed" from 
work in the countryside, especially from work/ownership of middle-sized or larger farms, often 
went directly into service work in the urban/industrial areas. It was the sons of peasants and 
rural workers who moved to urban industry when work possibilities disappeared in the 
countryside. "Most of the new recruits to urban industry came from the industrial working class 
itself" (Ramsøy 1977:159). 
     112
 How rapidly was it formed? To what degree were rural workers working class members 
before (the late Norwegian) industrialization? Was a working class to some degree already 
formed and ready to move in to the new industries, formed through the development of 
manufacture and petty industrialization in the countryside? Work on this general question of 
class formation has been done by Tilly (1983) and Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm (1981), 
who speak of proto-industrialization, industrial developments and the formation of a proletariat 
in the countryside. William Lafferty (1971) has looked at the early formation of the working 
class in Norway. 
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economic and political organizations, some with a radical 
ideological profile.113 
 
Transport and communications 
The relative size of employment in the transport sector follows the 
modernization profile identified earlier. Water transport experienced 
a relative decline compared with land transport. However, there is 
an indication that water transport held its position during the war 
period (1930 to 1950 in the Appendix). The transport sector as a 
whole had a small but continuous increase from 1910 to 1950. 
Work in trade is comparable to work in transport. Both are 
concerned with bringing the produced goods to their physical point 
of consumption. Employment in trade increased more than in 
transport up to 1930.  
 The increase in services is one indication of a more economically 
integrated society. More work goes into moving goods and money 
between people, moving people between different locations and 
caring directly for individuals. However, more material exchanges 
and movements within a society do not necessarily say anything 
about the extent of subjectively meaningful communication 
between people. An economically more integrated society can have 
widely varying degrees of meaningful communication. This 
distinction is important in state analysis, because the possibilities for 
democracy are influenced by both dimensions, both the technical 
possibility of communication (material integration) and the amount 
and character of meaningful, expressive communication (social 
integration). We shall later (Chapter 15) see that, while technical 
integration increased in the period from 1945, one expression of the 
degree of meaningful communication in the working class, namely 
                                           
     113
 There is a wide debate in Norway on the extent of radicalization and the reasons for it. See 
Bull Sr (1922), Lafferty (1971), Bjørgum 1977 and Bjørnhaug (1979). 
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the prevalence labour movement organizations, experienced a 
decline. 
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The tertiary service sector 
In 1950, not unexpectedly, the relative position of trade and banking 
was about the same as in 1930. Government services held stable 
position (at 0.8% of all persons over 15 years) between 1900 and 
1930. With Labour Party takeover in 1935, with preparations for the 
war and the war itself, government services doubled their relative 
position between 1930 and 1950 (from 0.8% to 1.6%). 
 Personal services had a downward trend in the period, but just 
after the wars that category fell sharply (6.4% in 1920 and 3.6% in 
1950). Community services (public services) experienced a steady 
increase throughout the whole period. The tendency, in other words, 
was for service labour to move from the private to the public labour 
market. 
 All together the tertiary sector increased from 14.1% in 1900 to 
16.8% in 1930. The war years had the same effect: reduction of 
services. The Bureau of Statistics calls all categories "economically 
active" (1-15). I have suggested that within this group a substantial 
number of persons are unproductive in terms of capital. The rest, the 
productively employed, decreased. The trend is sharply downwards 
- from 47% in 1900 to 44% in 1910 and from 44% again in 1920 to 
41% in 1930. If my assumptions are correct, this development saps 
the power base of the bourgeoisie. The unproductive have to be 
provided with money for consumption. Money has to be transferred 
to them, not because they add anything to the capital fund through 
their labour, but because the upkeep of the social system of 
capitalism needs service labour (banking, trade, government) and 
not furnishing unproductive categories with consumption funds can 
kindle social and political unrest. So, even with progressive 
industrialization, the reduction of productive labour in the primary 
sector and the increase of unproductive service labour, led to a 
change in the balance between capital productive and capital 
unproductive work. (Here I believe there is an intake to the 
understanding of the structural unemployment in capitalist econo-
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mies). Capital productive labourers become a smaller part of the 
population. 
 However, such a deterioration of surplus-producing capacity will 
also affect the power of the state. The state is dependent upon the 
size of the surplus produced in the economy (Offe 1975). 
Government taxes are dependent upon the size of the surplus: with 
the surplus fund increasing, it is easier to increase taxes; with the 
surplus fund diminishing (whether GDP is decreasing or 
increasing), there will be pressure on the state to reduce public 
expenditure. If the amount of capital productive labour is decreasing 
relative to unproductive labour and the number of 'inactive' in need 
of public support is increasing, that generates a structural crisis for 
state financing. In such a situation the state will be under constant 
pressure to reduce expenditure, a pressure that will exist over and 
above whether the cycle of capitalism is falling or rising.114 
 
The economically inactive 
The percentage of housewives among the adult population was 
quite constant in the period up to 1930, at 23%. Again, not 
surprisingly, it rose through the war: in 1950 it was 27%. The 
relative number of children working at home increased from the 
turn of the century, with a slight reduction in 1920 and a major 
reduction after the Second World War. As we would expect with 
expanding capitalism, more people joined the ranks of those living 
directly off gains from finance capital. Recipients of assistance, 
however, did not show any clear tendency in this long period, 
vacillating up and down around the 5% mark. 
                                           
     114
 The fact that from the end of the l970's the size of the working class in industrial 
production went into an absolute (not just a relative) decline, may have precipitated such a 
structural crisis in the Norwegian economy (a crisis that may have started in the international 
economy earlier, cf. Mandel 1972). 
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 The data in the Appendix demonstrate, surprisingly, that women 
became a continuously smaller part of those in paid employment, 
from 30.5% in 1900 to 27% in 1930 and 24% just after the war in 
1950. This can again indicate a crisis tendency, that is, when 
employment possibilities in surplus-producing work become 
increasingly difficult, the first to be ejected from wage labour are 
women. Another possibility is that the reduction of wage labour in 
agriculture hits women harder than men.115 
 Lastly the data demonstrate how those in paid work became a 
continuously smaller part of the adult population. In 1900 the 
"gainfully" employed were 61% of all adults; in 1950 they were 
56%. Again this indicates a crisis tendency, in the sense that the 
number of people in surplus-generating work decreased in the 
economy as a whole (more youth in education, more old people 
receiving pensions), thus limiting the source of surplus value for the 
bourgeoisie while the demand for consumption funds increased. 
 Thus the number of persons over 15 years of age who were 
supported increased more or less constantly from 1875. There was a 
decline in the expansive 1890's. In the crisis years of the 1920's it 
increased more rapidly than earlier. In the years of stagnation in the 
1950's it increased dramatically. But the expansion of higher 
education absorbed a large part of these "unemployed" young 
people.  
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 If we look at the absolute numbers this is confirmed. Between 1890 and 1950 there was an 
absolute reduction in men in paid work in agriculture of about 6 000 (from 230 000 to 224 000). 
The reduction of positions for women in paid work in agriculture was during the same period 59 
000 (from 85 000 to 26 000). 
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THE PENETRATION OF IMPERIALIST 
CAPITAL INTO THE NORWEGIAN ECONOMY 
 
Imperialist capital is finance capital in search of profitable 
investments outside its country of origin. We have already 
identified such capital in Norway in the 1840's and 1850's, when 
Peder Jebsen was assisted by German capital (and English tech-
nology) in establishing a textile mill (Arne Fabrikker) and when 
Norwegian bankers in Christiania were assisted by French capital in 
establishing Den Norske Creditbank. The penetration of imperialist 
capital intensified around the turn of the century and was probably a 
dominant element behind the rapid industrialization at that time. 
That capital integrated the Norwegian economy into an 
expansionary global process. England accelerated imperialist 
expansion as the industrial revolution gave it a leading role in the 
national and global development of capitalism, a process that, 
through colonialism, meant a relation of dependency for a host of 
third world countries. In the post Second World War period the 
process of imperialist expansion was driven forward with new 
energy by the United States and by the statist/militaristic 
imperialism of the Soviet Union. The integration of the Norwegian 
economy into that global system, the stages in the development of 
that integration and how it has limited the independence of the 
Norwegian state, have not been very well clarified. The penetration 
of imperialist capital meant that a wide range of organizations and 
institutions in Norway were, in different ways, connected to 
international systems.116 Capital needs representation. Invested 
capital needs representatives on company and bank boards. Imperial 
capital needs - to some degree - state approval and state support. 
                                           
     116
 The penetration was especially rapid and dynamic around the turn of the century and after 
the Second World War, when, among other things, the Marshall Aid program boosted the 
modern economy. 
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Imperial capital attracts technology from the world market, makes it 
necessary and possible for national firms to enter actively into 
international markets and (gradually in Norway) makes it necessary 
to educate nationals in the language of the new technology. 
 In 1909, 85% of the shares in the newly established chemical 
industry were in foreign hands, 80% in mining. In state-run energy 
production, 47% of the capital invested was in the form of inter-
national loans. In the forestry industry 44% of the invested capital 
was foreign investments. As Figure 10.2 demonstrates, this position 
of international capital was reduced somewhat during both the First 
and Second World Wars, but with new and increased penetration in 
the interwar years and from 1962 onwards. 
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After the First World War foreign investment was on the 
increase.117 After the Second World War it was at the level of 
12-14% up to 1962 and then increased again, reaching 22% in 1968. 
It is likely that foreign capital increases the economic power of 
those parts of the Norwegian bourgeoisie that are directly connected 
to the investing parties. It is also likely that, other things being 
equal, foreign investments in Norway reduce the political freedom 
of the Norwegian state, at least in the sense that private capital 
becomes a more powerful element in the economy, an element 
which is increasingly difficult to regulate.118 
 How did foreign capital function in the accumulation process? 
Did it just draw surplus from indigenous labour and export it 
without developmental "spillover" for national capital in Norway? 
One hypothesis put forward by Dieter Senghaas (1985), says that 
foreign capital in Norway was an impetus or at least an opportunity 
for a national capital formation process, an assimilation of resources 
in Norway (financial, material and technological resources) that 
made the development of a more autonomous bourgeoisie in 
Norway possible119. Senghaas's view is that the Norwegian 
bourgeoisie managed to take advantage of the influx of international 
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 Berge Furre (1971:138) has listed some of the main international companies that entered 
during the 1920's: 1923 - Aloca; 1927 - IG Farben, Kreuger, National Lead; 1928 - Meltion 
Corporation, Tenet Son and Co., Union Carbide, LM Ericsson; 1929 - Falconbridge. 
     118
 That such investments may increase state autonomy through a general strengthening of the 
economy, by increasing the basis for higher tax incomes to the state, etc. should also be 
considered in a thorough analysis of the role of imperialist capital. 
     119
 What he calls from dependent/peripheral status to "autocentric development". Bergh 
(1983:162) follows Senghaas's lead: "German, French and Swiss turbine companies, Voith, 
Escher Wyss, Piccard Pictet, cooperated with Norwegian metal companies, which as a 
consequence created their own construction departments. Swedish, German, and Swiss 
producers of electrical materials, ASEA, Brown Bowery, AEG Siemens and Telefunken, put 
capital into Norwegian companies like Per Kure and NEBB ... English, French and Canadian 
electric metallurgical companies went into steel, nickel and aluminium production in Norway, 
introducing new technology into the Norwegian economy."  
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capital, generating a nationally controlled industry and an 
educational and scientific system that gradually could stand on its 
own feet. 
 As I have demonstrated earlier, one of the conditions for this 
autocentric development was the development of a parliamentary 
political system that liberated and strengthened the bourgeoisie, 
making it possible for that class gradually to gain control of the 
spillover from imperialist capital in Norway.120 Development of that 
political system was dependent on the existence of an ownership 
structure in agriculture that could sustain a social movement with 
democratic/representative demands against the old, conservative 
bureaucracy. The farm movement was in this sense a spearhead for 
the political development of the industrial bourgeoisie.  
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 Senghaas develops this hypothesis through a comparison with the effects English capital 
had in the Iberian peninsula. There a national, independent bourgeoisie did not develop. English 
imperial capital did not disturb the power of the feudal, aristocratic classes. 
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FIRMS GAIN MARKET POWER 
 
This development created firms in Norway large enough to gain 
what one public commission defined as power over the market 
(Formuesfordelingskomiteen 1968). Some firms reached a size in 
the relevant markets through capital accumulation in each firm 
which made it possible for them to control prices. Another effect 
was that the total number of firms in a sector decreased - what we 
might call centralization of capital (merging of independent firms). 
The first of these processes, market power, is hard to pin down in 
facts or statistics. The other is somewhat easier. The development in 
the banking sector can illustrate the centralization process (see 
Figure 10.3) 
 


















We notice the culmination in 1918. The processes of concentration 
and centralization reached a new stage at that time. From an ex-
panding banking sector, in the sense of increasing numbers of 
autonomous units, the number of banks decreased. However, even if 
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the centralization process slows down, the concentration of capital 
may well continue. That is demonstrated by the fact that by 1938 
the three largest banks had NOK 873 mill. of bank capital or 48% of 
all bank capital in the private sector (Formuesfordelingskomiteen 
1968:217). 
 Centralization takes many organizational forms.  
(1) Firms can agree on prices. This is a weak and often quite 
unstable form, price agreements are abandoned when it is to the 
advantage of one of the parties.  
(2) Cartels are created. That is, firms agree to divide the market 
between them (for example geographically, as the breweries in 
Norway did in the 1960's and 1970's.  
(3) Companies may cooperate in purchasing raw materials, 
machines, etc., and/or organize marketing of products; this is called 
syndication.  
(4) They may enter into trusts, that is, one company owns others, 
but profits are generated and used within the individual firms.121  
(5) Companies may lastly create corporations. This is the most 
advanced form of centralization, where companies are integrated 
into one administrative economic system, with division of labour 
horizontally (between different markets and/or different functions) 
and vertically (between different steps in the production process). 
 Furre (1971) presents data indicating that already in 1923 there 
were 517 trust agreements (in a population of 9900 firms), 93 
cartels and 92 price agreements. The material gathered by Furre 
demonstrates an important tendency: in the capitalist economy firms 
tend to organize within markets, put more popularly, to "gang up" 
against consumer, working-class and state interests.122 
                                           
     121
 In Norway in the 1970's both Akergruppen (shipbuilding) and Joh. Johanson (food pro-
duction and distribution) had the character of trusts. 
     122
 The NPS demonstrates how this tendency continued in the 1970's. I will return to these 
data when discussing postwar state-class relations. 




THE CAPITAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE STATE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
Capitalism is a social system of production and distribution oriented 
systematically towards capital accumulation. How successful was 
the accumulation in different sectors of the economy in the interwar 
years? One indication is real capital in private and public sectors 
registered in the national accounts. 
 
Sectoral expansion 
These data describe changes in the economic structure in Norway 
and indicate the economic strength of the public and private sectors. 
In Figure 10.4 we can see the value of real capital over sectors and 
over three points in time: 1899, 1939 and 1969. The values are 





















We see that in the private sector real capital is concentrated in agri-
culture, industry and transport. The dramatic change has been the 
decline of agricultural capital and the increase of industrial capital. 
In the public sector, public consumption capital dominates. The 
relative size of that sector increased after 1939. The data 
demonstrate the history of electrical energy, which hardly registered 
in 1899, but was in second place in 1939 and 1969, increasing as 
rapidly as consumption capital from 1939 to 1969. Otherwise there 
were modest changes in the relative distribution of real capital in the 
public sector. 
 
Relative strength of the private and public sectors 
What was the relative strength - in terms of capital - of the private 
and the public sectors? Table 10.2 shows the changing distribution 
("miscellaneous" contains both private and public capital). 
 
Table 10.2 Real capital in private and public sectors, 1899-
1969 
    (%, current prices) 




























Source: CBS (1978), Table 62. 
 
The change was as we might have expected. Although the state 
strengthened its position, the private sector controlled nearly 70% of 
all real capital in 1939 and 61% in 1969. Public capital is mainly 
capital invested in infrastructure, long-term technical investments 
with a limited function as installations absorbing labour after they 
have been constructed, and to a small degree capital that produces 
products sold piecemeal in the market. Figure 10.5 demonstrates the 
preponderance of private capital accumulation. 
 



















Figure 10.5 indicates some striking changes: 
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(1) From a low position in 1905 the private sector accumulated 
large values (mainly finance capital) through the war period, with 
an increase from NOK 100 mill. to NOK 350 mill. The state 
improved its position up to the war, but the increase was reduced 
through the war years. This difference in capital strength in 1915 
was stable between the two sectors up to 1946.  
(2) Even if the state had relatively moderate increases in its capital, 
the increases were of the same magnitude from year to year. This 
can be related to the infrastructural character of state investments. 
But it also indicates that the state had a more stable economic basis. 
The infighting among the bourgeoisie in the private sector and the 
vagaries of the market mechanism are, perhaps, not so marked in 
the public sector economy.  
(3) The diagram demonstrates that even in the crisis years of 
1920-1935 the value of private capital increases held steady at the 
NOK 300 mill. level, with some variation up and down.123  
(4) From 1935 capital increases accelerated for both sectors. But 
again the private sector led the way, moving up to NOK 750 mill. in 
the ten-year period, while the public sector moved up to the NOK 
300 mill. mark.  
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 This point is also made by Berge Furre (1971) in his overview of Norwegian history in this 
period.  
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Figure 10.6 presents data on the changes in foreign debt over the 
same period. They demonstrate how foreign capital was brought to 
the country in the first expansionary years of industrialization, how 
the First World War put Norway in a creditor position - however 
briefly with a huge debt accumulating in the early 1920's. The 
diagram shows how the expansionary postwar period was connected 
to loans abroad, with 1950 as an exception because of the Marshall 
Aid. 
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The distribution of capital over sectors 
How did the relative positions of the subsectors change between 
1899, 1939 and 1969 in percentages (based in current prices)? If we 
compare the relative size of all the subsectors, the results are 
presented at the three points in time in Table 10.3. 
 
Table 10.3 Real capital, sectoral distribution and comparison, 
1899, 1939 and 1969. Percentages and ranking. 
 Percentages Ranking 




































































































   
 
 
Most of the real capital was invested in dwellings. Agricultural 
capital was reduced from second to seventh position. Industrial 
capital increased to third position in 1939 and was at that position 
also in 1969. The public consumption capital moved up to second 
place in 1939 and stayed there. Capital in railways decreased to 
eighth position in 1939. Capital in electric energy increased 
substantially from eleventh to fourth position. The same five sectors 
were in the top five in 1899 and 1939. Among those five there was 
 Private and public capital  196 
 
only one state sector (public consumption capital). By 1969 public 
supply of electrical energy had entered the top five and agriculture 
had fallen out. 
 
Growth rates for real capital in the economy as a whole 
Taking yearly means, the Central Bureau of Statistics computed 
data on the rate of change in real capital between 1865 and 1960. 
Taking the total amount of real fixed capital and real capital per 
person employed in wage labour in some selected years (highs and 
lows) and drawing a line diagram gives us a picture of how growth 
of real capital varied.  
 Figure 10.7 depicts a surprising stability of growth. Not at any 
point do the curves touch the zero growth axis. We note how the 
prewar periods are periods of growth, and 1935-1939 more so than 
1905-1916. The rates had a downturn in the 1920's, but was not 
below the 1% mark in the period (as the data are registered here. 
More detail may change that). It seems that the most serious 
downturn was not in the early 1920's but in the early 1930's. Capital 
accumulation, rather than any absolute capital reduction, has been 
the tendency in the Norwegian economy in the whole period, 
including the periods of most intensive political conflicts.  
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STATE ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENCE 
 
As has been said, it was the German occupants who taught both the 
bourgeoisie and the leading social democrats in Norway how to use 
the state (Aukrust and Bjerve 1945). The data in Figure 10.8 
demonstrate how public employment rose actively in periods before 






















Figure 10.8 depicts the systematic movement from stagnation to 
increase in the two periods, 1900-1920 and 1930-1946. The same is 
brought out in the data on government personnel in Norway 
between 1875 and 1970 in Flora et.al. (1983:228). He distinguishes 
between personnel in general administration and total government 
personnel. Taking general government personnel as a percentage of 
the total reveals an interesting pattern: 1875:32, 1890:26, 1900:22, 
1910:19, 1920:22, 1930:22, 1946:33, 1950:28, 1960:31, 1970:28. 
Up to 1910 the expansion of the state was heavily biased to 
specialized personnel, the percentage of general personnel sinking 
from 32% to 19%. In the interwar years the percentage of general 
personnel was stable, at 22% at the two points of measurement. In 
the postwar period the percentage was also stable, but at 30%. 
General administration had become a heavier task. This can support 
the thesis proposed earlier, that the state had increasingly to 
intervene in the economic and social system in an attempt to keep 
them running smoothly. I will return to more data on public 
employment in the post second world war period. In the diagram we 
notice the relative stagnation up to 1950.  
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Figure 10.9 demonstrates the development of the employment in the 
three main state sectors: administration and defence; services; and 
public commodity production. Personnel in service work and in 
administrative employment have a stable increase over time, but it 
is a moderate increase compared with commodity production. 
Public commodity production seems more volatile, perhaps more 
dependent upon market forces, moving dramatically upward before 
the wars and also more markedly downward in the 1920's. 
Administration and defence move together like services.124  
 Lastly in Table 10.4 the relative size of the sectoral employment 
in the state 1900-1950 is depicted. The stable relations between the 
main sectors is striking. Commodity production accounted for some 
50% of employment in the state throughout the period. 
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 Around 1900 defence had as many public employees as the administration proper - around 
6500 people. Then the number of defence personnel was reduced. In 1930 the number was at its 
lowest point, with 3250 persons employed. Administration proper expanded, with 17 000 
employed in 1930. We can imagine how much more important the military officers were around 
1900 within the public sector than in 1930, when non-military administrative personnel in the 
state outstripped the military employment by five times. 
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Table 10.4 Public employees, 1900-1950 
 




II Public services 
 






































































Source: CBS, SØS no. 3, Table 56, Oslo 1955. 
 
 
CHANGING CLASS POSITIONS AND POWER 
 
Let me suggest how the aforementioned changes in the occupational 
structure, the influx of imperialist capital into the Norwegian 
economy and the distribution of fixed real capital between the 
public and private sectors affected the class structure and the 
strength of the state. 
 The industrialization process in the interwar years was not one of 
decline, but one of relative stagnation and especially reorganization. 
The size of the industrial working class declined relative to the 
whole working population between 1920 and 1930, but its relative 
position increased again from 1930 up to the Second World War. In 
the 1930's a new economic growth occurred, but this time a growth 
in production managed by a national bourgeoisie and stimulated by 
the influx of international capital and know-how. It was a pro-
duction that also catered to demands in the home market. New 
industries were established outside the big, export-oriented 
industrial centres (Bergh 1983:167). 
 The bourgeoisie expanded its own power. It was increasingly 
integrated into the imperialist economy, both reducing and 
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increasing its autonomy in Norway, increasing in terms of access to 
more economic, financial and organizational resources; reducing in 
that international market relations increasingly determined what the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie could do. The division of labour between 
the state and the private sector held the state to its infrastructural 
activities, engaged in developing the material systems necessary for 
private, market-oriented business, systems that require large, unitary 
investments that give small profits in the short run (Cogoy 1974). 
The accumulation of capital developed more rapidly in the private 
sector. The state was clearly the smaller partner in terms of control 
over capital.  
 However, the capitalist mode of production was under pressure 
from increasing service demands and a shrinking source of surplus 
value in the working population. Stagnation of industrial 
employment, the increase in service work (both privately and 
publicly) and an increase in the numbers of adults outside wage 
employment all together affected the power of the bourgeoisie.  
 The growing group of non-industrially employed (service 
workers) and supported persons, I suggest, increased the pressure on 
the profit fund of the bourgeoisie. A larger proportion of that fund 
had to be employed 'unproductively' for education, for different 
kinds of welfare allocations and for unproductive service work in 
finance, trade and public administration. The economic power of the 
bourgeoisie, its ability to absorb wage labour into the surplus-
producing circuit, was reduced. The unemployed and unproduc-
tively employed parts of the population were therefore less 
influenced by the power of economic institutions and could be more 
easily influenced by radical ideas in the labour movement or ultra-
right ideas for that matter.  
 Overall, industrialization increased the power base of the 
industrial bourgeoisie. Industrial capital rapidly became more 
important as an arena for the employment of wage labour. At the 
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same time, the industrial working class increased its power base 
through the increasing numbers of industrial workers. That power 
base could be mobilized through working-class organizations - 
unions, political parties - and the state. To what degree the working 
class actually mobilized on its (increasing) power base in the 
interwar years, is a theme for chapter 12. Let me now turn to a 
closer investigation of the role of the state in these years. 
11 
















     We have identified some of the changes in the 
economic structure up to the Second World War and suggested how 
those changes affected class formation and relations between the 
social classes: continued capitalization of agriculture, modest 
industrialization and an increase in service work within the 
economy. We noted an increasing integration of the Norwegian 
economy into the international capitalist/imperialist system and how 
capital concentration and centralization created firms with market 
power. We saw how the state controlled less real capital and 
different forms of capital than the bourgeoisie. These changes, I 
suggested, put the industrial and financial bourgeoisie firmly in 
control of the economy, but at the same time meant the continued 
formation of a working class. The stable, static agricultural society 
was dissolving. All peasants and farmers had to relate to capital and 
capitalization. The relatively harmonious and expanding market 
capitalism disappeared.125 The capitalist economy became 
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 Market capitalism is where no firm is large enough to affect prices, where the market 
mechanism effectively distributes all that is produced and where the number of small firms in 
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politicized, economic actors entered into the state and the state 
entered into the decision-arena of firms. The capitalist economy 
produced or generated its own stagnation (a constant smaller or 
larger stream of unemployed from the productive sector, elimination 
of smaller firms and smaller farms, increase in capital-unproductive 
but necessary services and overproduction). 
 I now turn to the analysis of new forms of government 
interventions into the economy. I will analyze some aspects of state 




INTERVENTION INTO THE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
PROCESS 
 
An early example of this type of state intervention was the licence 
laws (konsesjonslovene) of 1906-1907, or the laws regulating the 
use of natural resources. Keilhau (1938) gives a description of their 
genesis. They are an interesting example of how private initiative is 
gradually absorbed by the state, transformed into something 
different there and implemented bureaucratically as state policy.126 
The licence laws were initiated by Sam Eyde, the leading industria-
                                                                                                              
the economy as a whole is increasing, more or less in line with the increase in the population of 
working age. 
     126
 Jens Arup Seip has defined a process of statist implementation of privately organized 
initiatives as "The Norwegian system" (Seip 1968:22-). He describes a system that worked in 
the 30-year period from 1855 to 1885, a system organized by the bureaucracy and removed by 
the new Liberal (Venstre) regime. The system had four principles: (1) private initiative, (2) state 
support, (3) state leadership and administration, and (4) private forms. The system was 
advantageous for the bureaucracy at that time because it made it possible to bypass a hostile 
parliament. On the basis of local initiatives and needs the system gave bureaucracy close to 
direct control over especially infrastructural projects. Exactly for that reason, Venstre removed 
the system. Venstre, in its struggle for state control, gave priority to transferring power to 
parliament. 
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list in Norway around the turn of the century. His goal was to 
mobilize government support for investment in large industrial 
enterprises in Norway. He had noticed that in Sweden the parlia-
ment had passed laws approving public loans to private investors, if 
the money was to be used for infrastructural investment and the 
objects invested in became public ownership after an agreed-on 
(long) period. Eyde thought that this might also work in Norway. 
By offering state ownership after, say, 60 years, the state might be 
willing to lend money for substantial private investment in 
hydroelectric generators. Eyde presented the idea to the Michelsen 
government in 1906 and got a positive response. 
 But the opposition within the Liberal Party, with Gunnar 
Knudsen as leader, was sceptical.127 Gunnar Knudsen headed the 
parliamentary commission that looked into the suggestion from 
Michelsen and Eyde. The project was changed. Sam Eyde wanted to 
mobilize public finance for private industry and his strategy was to 
accept nationalization of investments after 60-80 years as a 
concession. The Liberal government turned Eyde's project on its 
head: it wanted government control over the use of natural 
resources and the means to that end was a licence law. Without 
promising any public money, the opposition demanded that private 
investments in waterfalls and lakes should still become public 
property after a certain time.128 
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 Eyde argued that the state in this way got a gift from the private sector. The opposition 
newspaper Dagbladet however voiced scepticism and cited Virgil: "Timeo Danaos, et dona 
ferentes" (I fear the Greeks, even though they offer gifts). 
     128
 Several motives converged in the idea of a law regulating the use of natural resources. 
Christian Michelsen, head of the first independent Norwegian government in 1905, supported a 
license law that would defend petty bourgeois interests in agriculture and forestry against large 
capital. The Venstre opposition under Gunnar Knudsen, as mentioned, was motivated by public 
control of the private use of natural resources, whether national or foreign private interests were 
involved. A third motive was represented by the Bredal commission. It wanted a law against 
foreign investment in the country. Here a specific project, a licence law, can be seen as a 
garbage can where "various problems and solutions are dumped by participants" (March and 
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 With the new government of Knudsen in 1908129 the finalization 
of the licence law was postponed, so that the government could 
produce its own proposal. That job was taken on by the new 
Minister of Justice, Johan Castberg. Two laws were approved in 
September 1909, one for "waterfalls, mines and other property", the 
other for "forests". The first law gave equal, but limited rights to 
nationals and foreigners. All investments of an infrastructural 
character were to become public property within 60-80 years. 
Investors were to make direct payments to the municipality where 
the acquired resources were located and control of waterfalls was in 
no way to be used "to artificially increase the price of energy" 
(Keilhau 1938:131). The law on acquisition of forests was more 
restrictive. It was prepared by a commission organized by the new 
Ministry of Agriculture. First it banned foreigners from buying 
Norwegian forests. Secondly it required a licence if a person was to 
buy forests in another municipality than his place of residence. The 
law on forests had no rules on nationalization. 
 How did the laws function? Did they, as is commonly assumed, 
limit the influx of international capital (which was the motive 
behind the suggestions of the Bredal commission)? That is a 
difficult question to answer, because it is difficult to know what 
would have happened had the laws not been approved. However, 
Bergh and his colleagues suggest that the laws promoted the influx 
of international capital and industrialization. The laws established 
an administrative system for such investments, a system whose very 
existence invited foreign capital into the country, and offered capital 
an organized method of entry into the country (Bergh 1983:160). 
                                                                                                              
Olsen 1976:26). 
     129
 After a split in Venstre and after the Løvland government got a so-called negative majority 
against itself - that is several votes of no confidence where the sum of votes in all represented a 
majority against the government. 
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 If we consider the whole process, from Eyde's initiative to the 
final result, we see that a private initiative oriented towards 
acquiring public money for privately controlled industrial 
investment is transformed to a strengthening of state control of 
economic activities, an increased state control of private invest-
ments that monopolize certain natural resources. Given the validity 
of this interpretation, the transformation, carried through by the 
intervention of the Liberal Party government, is an example of state 
autonomy relative to specific capitalist interests. The state takes on 
a management role over and above the interests of specific groups 
of private capitalists.130 
 In the interwar period the state intervened against the 
development of market monopolies. In 1926 the Trust Law was 
approved, creating a Control Council with Wilhelm Thagaard as 
manager. The explicit purpose of that intervention was to limit or 
even thwart companies acquiring market power. However, 
Thagaard, a member of Venstre, felt that the state should go further 
and introduce public planning, a system whereby companies 
cooperated and the state planned economic production. Generally 
Venstre in government was in favour of individual liberty in a state-
controlled economy. That pitted the party against the labour 
movement when it fought for its organizational freedom in relation 
to the employers and the state. Venstre was positive to state-
controlled decisions on wages. The free market and the free struggle 
between labour and capital was not highly regarded in Venstre. 
Venstre under Gunnar Knudsen had a paternalistic, statist bent. But 
it was a statist orientation built on the assumption that state control 
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 It would be of interest to investigate the role of the bureaucracy in the development of the 
licence laws. A licence law would seem to serve bureaucratic interests in the same way that the 
"Norwegian system" in the 1860-1880's was a way of strengthening the bureaucracy through 
administrative links with private (local) interests. Therefore we might predict that the Liberal 
Party in its opposition to the Michelsen government and in its opposition to state financing of 
privately controlled industry would have had support in the bureaucracy. 
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would secure a more civilized and organized capitalism, leaving 
more, not less, room for individual economic freedom. A well-
known member of Venstre, Bjørnstierne Bjørnson, became involved 
in support for the famous match workers' strike,131 but with the 
explicit intention of criticizing the capitalist system's degradation of 
the individual, not the system itself. "I believe", Bjørnson said, 
"strikes are a good thing. They make the employers do the right 
things. They are alternatives to that which is brutal, they are alterna-
tives to revolution" (Ousland and Skar 1949.vol.2:180). 
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 A strike among 372 female match workers at Bryn and Grønvold's Match Company in 
Christiania in October 1889 when wages were reduced. The strike did not improve the situation 
for the female workers, but it attracted public attention, was an early manifestation of female 
worker activism and was important for the organizational development of the labour movement.  
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STATE INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE IN THE 
INTERWAR YEARS. 
AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF KEYNESIAN INTERVENTION? 
 
In relation to agriculture, the state engaged in technological 
development and education as far back as the 1850's. However, 
according to Jacobsen (1964), the expansion really first occurred in 
the 1890's.132 It took on financial responsibilities through the 
Hypotekbank. In the interwar period the state introduced a system 
of economic support to workplaces in the countryside, not least 
because of the large-scale layoffs in urban industry. Already at this 
time the interest organizations were given public responsibilities 
through public marketing commissions. 
 As demonstrated earlier (Chapter 10), the movement from agri-
culture to urban industry halted in the interwar years. The 
assumption has been that this was an effect of the layoffs from 
industry and the reduction of wages that increased the cost of food 
and housing. Bergh argues convincingly that this "pause" in the 
exodus from the countryside was heavily influenced by public 
policy, by state action (Bergh 1983:59). Labour layoffs in industry 
put thousands out of work, putting pressure on traditional agri-
culture, this time to absorb 'free', unemployed labour. But with 
increased productivity in farming and wide-ranging reductions in 
wages, the outlook for increased demand and therefore increased 
farm production was bleak. In that situation the state intervened. It 
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 This would seem to support Senghaas's theory that "by Swedish and Danish standards, 
agricultural modernization in Norway at the turn of the century was negligible. At that time no 
interconnection between an emerging industry and an agriculture in the process of 
modernization could yet be observed" (Senghaas 1985:81). Bergh (1983) confirms that the 
diffusion of modern technology into Norwegian agriculture was slow and halting in the last part 
of the 19th century. However, Jacobsen (1966:63) suggests that the market and profit 
orientation of agriculture was strong already at that time: "The goal of the rationalization 
movement was the expansion of purely economic or capitalistic values". 
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issued laws regulating agricultural production, prices and exports, 
so that farm produce could be sold above prices otherwise set by the 
market mechanism.  
 This represents a new dimension in state intervention in the 
economy, compared with our findings from the last part of the 
nineteenth century. To the infrastructural activities are added inter-
ventions in the relationship between producer and consumer, with a 
policy for securing employment and agricultural production 
according to real social demands. Not that the state was fully 
successful in that endeavour, but that kind of action was on the 
agenda. 
 Bergh points to an important change in Norwegian agriculture at 
the turn of the century. The penetration of the capitalist mode into 
agriculture was completed. A dynamic technological development 
occurred in agriculture and a more closely knit class alliance 
developed between large and middle-sized farmers and the urban 
bourgeoisie. State economic policy could from then on be 
formulated on the premise that agriculture was an integrated sector 
in the economy; it had its specific needs, but it was a sector that 
developed according to the same logic as the rest of the modern 
economy: 
 
 "The agriculture of the late nineteenth century had favoured economic liberalism, but was 
basically rooted in the pre-industrial society. With the modernization of agricultural 
production there came a change of policy and a new vision of the integrating role of the state 
... The state developed a new vision of the farmers' role in the political system. The farmers 
were no longer an isolated opposition, but an ally of the liberal bourgeoisie under Johan 
Sverdrup's leadership. Agriculture was integrated into the national economy and agricultural 
policy into the national policy." (Bergh 1983:54-55) 
 
The interwar period was a period of overproduction in agriculture. 
Production capacity was above the money-defined demand (market 
demand), a situation created among other things by the policy of 
wage cuts and reduced public expenditure. But the response to this 
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situation in agriculture was not primarily structural change 
(although the debt burden eliminated many individual farmers in the 
period). The primary response was more cooperation, organization 
and state-supported market regulation. Cooperative dairies were 
established. A number of national organizations were created: an 
organization for dairies (Den norske meieriforening) in 1881, a 
farmers' interest organization (Landmannsforbundet) in 1896 and a 
small farmers' interest organization (Norsk Småbrukerforbund) in 
1913, and a farmers' political party, Bondepartiet, in 1920 (Bergh 
1983:58). 
 The crisis policy of these organizations, a policy that was adopted 
by the state, went through two stages. In the first stage, up to about 
1930, the problem was seen as one of reducing production so as to 
balance demand and thus keep prices up. In the second stage, not 
unrelated to advancing Keynesian ideas in the 1930's, the problem 
was redefined as one of organization and market strategy. One 
element in this strategy was to increase exports. A second element 
was to create a public organ to regulate deliveries of dairy products, 
with a majority of representatives from the farmers' organizations. 
A third and perhaps decisive step was taken in 1931, when the state 
intervened in production management. It decided that there should 
be a certain amount of butter mixed into margarine to support 
demand for butter. The consequence of all this was that the prices to 
consumers were well above what the market would autonomously 
have decided. Therefore, at least some small farms survived that 
otherwise would have been eliminated. So, even if the petty 
bourgeois mode of production was common in agriculture at this 
time, the feature of small farmers producing a substantial part of 
national consumption, and also in many places farming that could 
be combined with fishing and small industry, continued to exist.133 
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 Relative to other European countries in this period, the Norwegian countryside had a dense 
population of small producers (see Almås l977). 
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The state became an active manager of the agricultural sector of the 




DEVELOPMENT OF USE-VALUE-ORIENTED 
MANAGEMENT IN THE STATE 
 
Infrastructural development requires a different kind of 
management competence from that required to run individual 
companies. In defining the demand for infrastructure there is no 
market mechanism at work. The size and location of roads, dams 
and railways have to be planned in relation to activity, capacity 
requirements, etc. Money-defined demand for roads hardly exists. 
Infrastructure also requires a type of long-range planning and 
investment strategy that is risky and difficult for private 
entrepreneurs to engage in. This type of use-value knowledge 
creates a demand for professionals and management competence in 
the state different from the management needs of private 
companies. In this sense the state develops management autonomy 
relative to the private sector. 
 Looking at state intervention in the economy over time, there is 
an important difference between the last part of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth. In the last part of the 
nineteenth century the bourgeoisie proper eliminated the bureau-
cratic elite from power positions in the government by entering into 
a coalition with the farmers' movement and through the creation and 
influence of the new political parties, both the Conservative and 
Liberal parties. Then the state moved into agriculture with the aim 
of organizing a profit-oriented, market-related agriculture. The 
programme was fairly simple: the farms, like small industrial 
companies in the towns, should be made into profitable units, 
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managing their production relative to market prices and selling a 
substantial part of their production through the market. This process 
of social reorganization of agriculture furthered the development 
and the pauperization/uprooting of peasants/semi-proletariat in the 
countryside. Those ousted from agricultural production fled to wage 
labour in the cities or emigrated to the United States in the hope of 
more luck there.  
 After independence from Sweden in 1905 the international range 
of autonomous Norwegian state action widened. Although the 
bourgeoisie in Norway had prepared for this over many years (see 
Jacobsen n.d.), it now became an overt public and administrative 
concern how to relate to other countries, economically and 
otherwise. This required new administrative competence in in-
ternational politics and economics. 
 With the rapid influx of foreign capital and with the tendencies 
towards monopolization in markets, the state had increasingly to 
intervene against the bourgeoisie, or at least against specific 
members or member groups in the bourgeoisie. This regulatory 
function, I suggest, also required new public competence, a com-
petence that Venstre rather than Høyre had the best chance of 
developing in the early stages of the parliamentary state and party 
politics in Norway. Venstre had to a much larger degree than Høyre 
become involved in finding class compromises. (The party was it-
self a broad coalition across class divisions.) Høyre was primarily a 
party for individual capital owners, for market expansion and 
individual economic freedom and for efficient pro-capitalist 
bureaucratic administration, and only secondly (if at all) a party for 
dealing with questions of class compromise. 
 My hypothesis here can be put this way: while the state had 
mainly instrumental autonomy relative to the rising bourgeoisie in 
the first part of the nineteenth century and only gradually gained 
programme autonomy in the field of technical infrastructure for 
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(private) industrialization, the state acquired autonomy at a higher 
level at the beginning of the twentieth century. It developed 
programme autonomy across a broader scope, including economic 
and financial infrastructure in addition to the earlier involvement in 
technical infrastructure. Gradually the state developed programmes 
for coordinating the activities of members of the economically 
ruling class itself, the bourgeoisie, both in relation to the economy, 
but especially in relation to the rising working class and its 
organizations. 
 Instrumental or technical autonomy definitely requires admini-
strative competence in public administration, but a competence 
mainly in ensuring that given rules and regulations are adhered to. 
Instrumental autonomy takes goals as given. Programme autonomy 
depends in addition on political competence, an ability to generate 
and specify goals and to modify them when the means for reaching 
goals are unclear or inadequate. Programme autonomy requires an 
understanding of the configurations of class interests in the system 
and an ability to see possible compromises that the state can pursue 
and implement administratively. It is on this score that I suggest that 
the social-liberal, centrist, Venstre had more competence than 
Høyre in the interwar years. Venstre represented a more functional 
state leadership in terms of the objective interests of the bourgeoisie 
in a situation where the state had (or had been forced into) 
programme autonomy. Høyre was more class specific, and thus less 
able to develop public policy on the basis of class compromises. 
 The development of programme autonomy can also "lift" the 
state above specific class positions and thus give the state more 
legitimacy as a democratic and representative state. Programme 
autonomy requires a deeper understanding of the different class 
interests and the policies pursued by class leaderships. One conse-
quence is that the state developed an ability to understand and even, 
to a certain extent, represent the new and rising working class in 
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public policy-making. Those parts of the state apparatus with that 
competence can become locations for oppositional politics, for 
policy-making more directly focused on furthering subordinate class 
interests in public policy. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AUTONOMY IN THE 
INTERWAR PERIOD 
 
I have suggested, on the basis of data on the occupational structures, 
that the bourgeoisie became more powerful and also more 
dependent upon international capital as the first decades of the 
century passed. I have suggested that the contradictions in the 
economy, between different sectors, between productive and 
unproductive work, and in the social system, between the working 
class and the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie and the petty 
bourgeoisie, increased, suggesting the need for a stronger state and a 
more politically competent state. This state was earlier termed "the 
transitional state" (see Figure 6.5(b)), where public consumption 
was gradually supplemented by considerable government transfers 
to households, firms and government investments into consumption 
and production capital. 
 How can this change in state-class relations be explained? 
Several processes seem to have been at work. Let me suggest four.  
(1) With market power located in large firms or corporations, the 
power of capitalist groups increased. Regulation of production and 
distribution through the market mechanism was supplemented by 
state regulation. The opportunities for open conflict between 
capitalist firms and groups increased, requiring a stronger state able 
to develop and implement compromises between them or with the 
ability to support the strongest in efficiently eliminating weaker and 
less productive capitalists.  
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(2) The capitalization of agriculture pushed for a more active state 
with programme autonomy, as Jacobsen (1964) described. To be 
able to modernize the whole agricultural sector, to liberate labour 
and get prices down through increased productivity, the state 
engaged in time- and place-specific activities. The development of 
consequence-oriented (in contrast to a rule-oriented) professions 
was essential in this transformation of state competence. 
(3) The industrialization process itself pitted a growing working 
class against bourgeois employer interests and organizations, a new 
contradiction that required a state able to overview and understand 
working-class demands, so that acceptable reforms could be met 
and unacceptable revolutionary demands could be suppressed. This 
meant, among other things, strengthening the military apparatus, 
preparing for action against 'internal enemies' and against attacks on 
life lines of the economy. 
(4) Lastly, the increase in "inactive" persons in the economy was 
met by a state able to develop policies and organizational systems 
that could keep the inactive within the economy (i.e. educational 
policies, health and pension administration, administration of 
unemployed, etc.).  
 Thus the state acquired increasing degrees of autonomy in its 
relationship with the bourgeoisie; it is able to intervene and regulate 
relations between different parts, groups and elites within that class. 
On the other hand, state autonomy was used to regulate and develop 
capitalism, a system that primarily benefits the bourgeoisie. 
 Several factors can explain this class character of the state. The 
central one, I suggest, is the organizational structure of the state. 
The bureaucracy is, as e.g. Alf Inge Jansen (1971) says, eminently 
suited to understanding and implementing (common) bourgeois 
interests and lacks the competence to register, understand and do 
much with subordinate class interests other than suppress them. The 
parliamentary system had become more democratic as voting rights 
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were expanded, but at the same time a new organizational 
mechanism had come between the voters and the parliament: the 
political parties. They developed internal hierarchies that again 
functioned in line with bureaucratic logic and, as Weber has 
suggested, worked to eliminate irresponsible revolutionary leaders 
from top ranking positions. The Storting was, already at this time, 
being bypassed by direct cooperation between the public 
administration and interest organizations. The autonomy of the state 
from all social classes is developed through the combination of a 
representative parliament and the power of the professions in the 
executive apparatus.134 
 While the subordinated classes in the nineteenth century were 
largely unorganized politically (and the Thrane attempt to organize 
them was crushed at its inception), the working class at the turn of 
the century was organized at the national level and even had some 
representatives in the Storting from the northernmost part of the 
country.135 The working class, as a class more directly exploited by 
capital than rural workers and peasants, and the existence of class-
specific organizations representing that class in politics, made the 
integration of the working class into capitalism a qualitatively 
different task from integrating middle and small farmers into the 
system in the nineteenth century. But to get a hold on that problem 
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 "The large degree of autonomy that large parts of the public administration has in modern 
industrialized societies, follows, not only as a consequence of the constitutional type of 
government, but also from the development of the professions, which is closely related to the 
technical modernization process" (Jacobsen 1964:8). 
     135
 A representation Rokkan interprets as an omen of the alliance between the rural and urban 
proletariat that was to develop in Norway and that was an essential power basis for the Labour 
Party: "It is deeply significant that these first representatives all came from the far North, from 
the economically most backward areas of the country. The Labour Party had built up its initial 
organizational strength in the capital and in the central areas of the East but its political 
breakthrough came in the extreme periphery. This alliance between the rural proletariat and the 
urban working class proved a great force in Norwegian politics and was soon to bring about a 
series of changes in the entire system of party alignments" (Rokkan 1967:395). 
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we have to put the working class organizations into the changing 
process of state-class relations in the interwar period. 
12 








      State power 
      and reformism in the labour movement 
 
 
      Reform: The amendment or altering for the better of some faulty state of 
things, especially of a corrupt or oppressive political institution or prac-
tice; the removal of some abuse or wrong (The Oxford Dictionary, R:347). 
Reformism: A programme in the labour movement saying that capitalism 
can be transformed to socialism through piecemeal changes of the existing 
system (AL:972). Reformism: A trend in the labour movement hostile to 
Marxism and the real interests of the working class; a trend that 'struggles' 
for small reforms that leaves bourgeois exploitation of the working class 
intact. (Marxistisk uppslagsbok, Gidlund 1972:301) 
 
 
     A question in Norwegian historical studies has been 
how the industrialization process, its timing and speed affected the 
formation of the working class, its organizations and political 
ideology. Historians have studied how the internal ideological 
divisions in the labour movement were effects of the rapid influx of 
peasants, the spread of industry into rural areas where energy was 
available, the role of international developments and foreign 
agitators in the movement.136  
 A specific problem was raised in Odd Bjørn Fure's work (1984a): 
was there a revolutionary situation in Norway in the early 1920's, 
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 Edvard Bull, Sr. (1922), Keilhau (1938), Lafferty (1971), Furre (1971), Koht (1975), 
Kjeldstadli (1978), Magdahl (1979), Bjørnhaug (1979), Fure (1984a), Bull Jr. (1985) and a 
number of others. 
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caused by the large nationwide strikes, the international economic 
and political crisis in Europe and the radicalization of the Nor-
wegian labour movement? Could a revolutionary attack on the state 
have succeeded or were the state and the bourgeoisie in control with 
the ability to quell, ideologically, bureaucratically and with military 
force, whatever revolutionary actions the working class might have 
started?  
 My purpose here is to identify the influence of the state on the 
formation of the labour movement, its strength and ideological 
orientation. Did the state actively further reformism in the labour 
movement? If so, through which mechanisms? What role did the 
state play in select class conflicts and strikes in the interwar period? 
How did the state relate to right-wing, anti-labour organizations? 
 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIVISIONS IN THE LABOUR 
MOVEMENT 
 
In 1885, two years before the Labour Party was formally 
established, the Social Democratic Union in Christiania formulated 
a radical conception of capitalism. The Marxist idea of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat (a state as the instrument of proletarian class 
interests) was changed to a concept of a free state, meaning, 
perhaps, some kind of democratic state that did not carry the imprint 
of a specific class. 
 
 "Labour is the source of wealth and culture and the results of labour should therefore be 
acquired by those who work ... Liberating the work process must be the result of the 
working class's own efforts. All other classes are, relative to the working class, only a 
reactionary mass ... The union should by all legal means work for a free state and a socialist 
society." (Lorenz 1970:24). 
 
The Labour Party, established in 1887, produced a coherent 
programme by 1891, based on the radical premise that private 
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ownership of the means of production put most social and political 
power in the hands of a minority. But the programme rejected the 
idea that a new kind of state was necessary to liberate the working 
class: "We do not want any form of state socialism, where the state 
has the power of the private capitalists."137 The programme then 
listed a number of reforms: common right to vote for all over 21 
years of age, public regulation of work time and workplaces, 
insurance against sickness and accidents, prohibition of child 
labour, etc. In 1901 the references to the exploitative character of 
capitalism were toned down and the idea of a new type of state was 
removed from the programme: "There should be common public 
ownership of the means of production, the state should manage the 
economy and distribute the production result equally" (Lorenz 
1970:33). In 1914 the Norwegian Labour Party was prepared to 
enter into a coalition with the bourgeois political parties to defend 
Norwegian neutrality in the war. 
 The Labour Party was formed by radical working-class 
representatives in the Eastern part of the country, with people in the 
capital playing a central role (Christian Holtermann Knudsen and 
Carl Jeppesen). A more radical movement developed in Trøndelag. 
In Trondheim Fagopposisjonen av 1911 (The Trade Union 
Opposition of 1911) was formed. Martin Tranmæl was the leading 
personality in that opposition. Its ideas were of a syndicalist 
character. It was the trade unions and not the party that was the 
central organization in the labour movement. The unions should use 
militant actions against employers and the state, and develop 
workers' committees in the factories to organize the struggle. The 
idea was that the worker committees at the factory level could 
democratically change the capitalist factories into socialist, worker-
controlled factories. From that level mass action would democratize 
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 "Med den såkalte statssosialisme, der setter staten i den private arbeidskjøpers sted, har 
Arbeiderpartiet intet å bestille" (Bull 1985:394). 
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and socialize first the municipal, then the provincial and central 
levels of state. Through coordination of militant local actions the 
political capacity of the working class would be augmented and, 
when the state and bourgeoisie attacked, a general strike would 
force the bourgeoisie into submission.138 
 The syndicalist movement won the leadership of the youth 
organization of the Labour Party in 1916, and reached a majority 
position in the party at the Party Conference in 1918. In 1920 the 
syndicalists acquired a majority in the top organs of the Central 
Federation of Trade Unions (AFL), including the vice presidency 
(Elias Vollan).  
 The AFL had become a strong organization. Membership had 
risen from 15 600 in 1905 to 107 500 in 1918 (Lorenz 1970:39). 
The Labour Party increased its support in the elections. It got 10% 
of the vote in 1903, 26% in 1912 and 32% in 1915. In 1919 the 
Labour Party, with a small margin of votes, entered Comintern. 
Einar Gerhardsen (later - in 1945 - the prime minister in Norway) 
was a delegate to a Comintern congress in Moscow. AFL was in 
1921 represented at the Red International of Trade Unions which 
then vehemently attacked the Amsterdam International as reformist 
and bourgeois. 
 In the late autumn of 1920 and early 1921 the postwar economic 
crisis set in and the conflicts between the different ideological 
tendencies in the Norwegian labour movement - between syndi-
calists, orthodox Marxist revolutionaries (in the party and in the 
youth organization) and the reformists - increased. The battle over 
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 Bjørnhaug (1979) suggests that the syndicalist movement was reformist, except for its 
focus on militant union attacks on employers and state. When the strike movement in the 1920's 
subsided, the syndicalists tended to focus on the strengthening of the unions and, as a means to 
that end, the expansion and even rationalization of industrial capitalist production. The 
syndicalists did not have a specific theory of the state. Magdahl (1979:109) suggests that the 
leading syndicalist theory of the state was: "It is a capitalist organization, it can be used (by the 
working class) to build socialism, but it is not efficient in that endeavour." 
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the 21 Moscow theses (see Langfeldt 1961) was all-absorbing and 
bitter. The theses were approved at the Labour Party Conference in 
1921 with a slight majority. The right wing, the reformists, broke 
with the Labour Party and created the Social Democratic Party, with 
Magnus Nielsen as its first chairman. 
 In the Labour Party, the battle between supporters and opponents 
of the Moscow theses continued (with the communist Olav Scheflo 
as main supporter and Martin Tranmæl as leader of the opposition). 
In November 1923 the membership in the Comintern was defeated. 
The minority left the meeting and created the Norwegian 
Communist Party (NKP) with Sverre Støstad as its first chairman. 
At the same time AFL broke with the Red International of Trade 
Unions. 
 So the Norwegian labour movement entered the mid-1920's with 
three political parties trying to represent working-class interests. 
The question of how to organize a working-class state and how to 
reach that goal was the main bone of contention between them. 
 Other class organizations took form. In 1924 the Workers' Sports 
Organization was created. New industrial federations were 
established in AFL: the Chemical Workers Federation, the 
Federation of Municipal Workers, federations of workers in con-
struction and in food production and distribution. A federation for 
workers in forestry and agriculture was created in 1927. This 
organizational proliferation was an expression of both strength and 
weakness: strength in the number of organized workers; weakness 
in the political fragmentation and internal strife over tactics and 




AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE 1910'S AND 1920'S 
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In 1911, 32 000 workers in mining and industry were locked out 
from their jobs. There was a general depression in the economy; the 
employers reduced wages and were vehemently against any form of 
bargaining. The Liberal Party government (under Gunnar Knudsen, 
ousted 1 February 1910) wanted compulsory bargaining and 
enforced agreements. Voluntary bargaining took place and the strike 
ended with a compromise. This compromise strategy by the 
AFL-leadership was probably part of the reason for the emergence 
of the new syndicalist opposition of 1911. 
 From the end of the war to the end of 1920, Norway experienced 
a postwar boom, with large financial speculations by the bourgeo-
isie who had accumulated financial capital during the war, 
especially through highly profitable shipping operations. The crisis 
made the investment of finance capital in productive activity 
difficult. Workers' wages increased and investments rose. But by 
the end of 1920 there was a sharp downturn.  
 
State intervention in the railway strike in 1920 
The railway workers organized a strike for increased wages in 
December 1920. This sharpened the class conflict. The 
communications sector was (is) important for the capitalist system 
as a whole and the railway workers were state employees. As I shall 
show in some detail below, the state was prepared for such action in 
the communications sector: (1) it had detailed plans for military and 
private operation of the different parts of the transport system in the 
event of strikes in these sectors; (2) the government cooperated with 
private "Society Help" organizations; and (3) it coordinated its plans 
with several other governments in the North Sea/North Atlantic 
area. 
 In the downturn the employers wanted to reduce wages. An early 
reaction to that policy was the railway strike. At that time the 
syndicalist idea of a general strike as a decisive weapon against the 
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bourgeoisie commanded a majority in the Federation of Trade 
Unions. Combined with an understanding of the critical importance 
of communications for the functioning of the capitalist market 
economy, the railway strike was seen by the federation leadership as 
the beginning of a general strike (Skaar 1981). The strike in the 
railway was effective from 1 December. 
 The strike did not develop as the federation leadership had 
expected. In the first days there was no rush of privately and state-
organized transport. That came later. Rail transport halted, but no 
general economic or political crisis followed. Other labour unions 
did not come out in support of the railway workers. After a few 
days trucks and cars were busy taking care of the necessary 
transport, under police protection. The strike ended after about 20 
days, without any concessions to the strikers. How can this unex-
pected result be explained? 
 Investigations have shown that at the inception of economic crisis 
in 1919, sections of the bourgeoisie and members of the 
government had prepared for hostile attacks from the working class. 
These preparations were motivated by an understanding of the role 
of communications in the capitalist economy. That understanding 
led, among other things, to the establishment of private strike-
breaking organizations (Society Help) in the main cities, 
organizations that had members from an array of professions, ready 
to step into firms or state organizations hit by strikes. The liberal 
Venstre government of Gunnar Knudsen cooperated in the creation 
and the operation of these organizations (Gran 1978, Skaar 1981). 
At the same time, the government established a secret 
communications commission, Transportkommisjonen. It was asked 
to work out plans for state-run transportation in crisis situations. 
The basic idea was to make use of the war system for securing 
material supplies to the cities, organized under the Ministry of 
Supplies (Provianteringsdepartementet), with "supply committees" 
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in each municipality with power to requisition private transport 
material for public use. The commission made plans for the 
selection of personnel within the public administration who could 
be transport operators and who would be loyal to 'society' (read: the 
employers). It planned to requisition private cars and trucks to 
transport essential supplies from railway stations to local 
destinations within the cities. 
 The government did not intervene during the first days of the 
strike. It stated later that the reason was to let the standstill in the 
railway deplete food supplies to the cities and in that way create 
animosity in the population against the strikers. 
 The original plans assumed that the Society Help organization 
would take part in the transport of necessities. This arrangement 
was changed. Instead, the government created a central coordinating 
commission and regional commissions, with the mandate to 
organize crisis transports. Skaar (1981) has shown that this move 
was politically motivated. The government feared that using the 
Society Help organization would induce a radicalization of the 
labour movement. 
 The chosen system functioned. No dramatic lack of supplies 
occurred anywhere in the country, even though the railway strike 
was close to 100% effective. 
 The government of Gunnar Knudsen (which sat until June 1920) 
had a clear political and class strategic perspective on the organizing 
of this clandestine, state-run, strike-breaking system of 
transportation. Revolution was a possibility that had to be avoided 
at all costs. In the parliamentary debate on the railway workers' 
wage demands on 28 and 30 November 1920, Gunnar Knudsen 
said: 
 
 This conflict raises the question: who has state power, real state power, in this society? Is it 
Folkets Hus [the labour movement headquarters in Christiania] or is it the Storting and the 
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Government? ... The labour movement is attacking the state. We should counter that attack 
with all means available." (Skaar 1981:82) 
 
Skaar has also disclosed that the government took measures to meet 
more general revolutionary attacks. The wife of Edvard Hagerup 
Bull (finance minister in Otto B. Halvorsen's conservative 
government) wrote a diary. In it, there were notes on how the 
government had agreed to a system of succession should it fall 
victim to a revolutionary attack. 
 
 19 November 1920: "They [the government members] prepared for the most drastic civil 
war ... Of course, a number of things have been prepared, like guards, finding military units 
that will remain loyal to the government, etc. However, the enemies of our society, even if 
they are a minority, might attack the government directly. Edvard therefore suggested 
special steps for supplementing the government. He suggested that Ivar Lykke and Gunnar 
Knudsen be prepared to step in if the present government was ousted by attacks. If they too 
should fall, then the leaders of the departments in the ministries (ekspedisjonssjefene) ... 
should be ready to step in". (Skaar 1981:57) 
 
The Transport Commission was in contact with authorities in 
countries bordering the North Sea, in England, Holland, Belgium, 
Germany and Denmark. The question raised was how to secure 
international transports in the event of strikes in communications in 
one or more of the adjacent countries. Agreements were made that 
military ships from the country hit by strikes should be allowed into 
foreign territorial waters if and when they carried supplies that 
otherwise would have been carried by the strike-hit companies.139 
 The strike failed. Major support for it did not occur in the 
working class and essential supplies continued to flow into the main 
cities and towns. The transport commissions set up regionally 
organized transports that bypassed the strike-hit railway. The 
municipal organs (Provianteringskommisjoner) managed to 
                                           
     139
 Materials from the Transport Commission in the National Archives, Riksarkivet, lent to me 
through the Public Archive, Statsarkivet, in Bergen. 
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calculate quite accurately what transport capacity was necessary to 
supply the cities and towns with necessities.  
 These materials demonstrate what I interpret as a high level of 
strategic consciousness in the state about defensive measures in 
revolutionary situations. The plans disclosed here indicate a 
government prepared to put the public and private transport system 
under direct state and military command to thwart working-class 
actions. 
 This organizing was done in close cooperation with the militant 
Society Help organization, but without the direct participation of the 
larger employers' organizations or managers of private firms or 
banks. The state used Society Help organizations as reserves, rather 
than what the organization itself wanted, to be an independent front-
line organization in strike-breaking. The government wanted to 
avoid giving the labour movement easy targets for revolutionary 
agitation.140 
 The materials on the strike on the railway indicate that in 1920, 
the bourgeoisie, with the assistance of the state, was better 
organized for political struggle than the working class through the 
labour movement. The bourgeoisie seemed more ready to use 
physical force than the working class and the labour movement, 
despite all its agitation about militant strikes. These materials 
support the hypothesis that the syndicalist strategy of militant 
takeover was rather superficial, academic, not seen as practical 
among workers and union leaderships. Once the broad support for 
the railway workers' strike did not materialize, the labour union 
leadership quickly suggested that the working class await 
parliamentary decisions on railway workers' pay. 
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 A parallel relationship between the authorities, Society Help and the labour movement was 
documented in a study of the strike among municipally employed workers in Bergen in the 
summer of 1920, at about the same time as the national seamen's strike was active (Gran 1979). 
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 On the bourgeois side Otto B. Halvorsen (prime minister from 21 
June 1920) hailed the bourgeois unity and the willingness to use 
force against any element of the labour movement that attempted 
anything that could suggest revolutionary changes: 
 
 "Political attacks, directed against the state, will be met by a united bourgeois front, a front 
of the political parties normally called bourgeois. And that is perhaps not the least important 
result [of the struggles over the strike]" (Skaar 1981:90). 
 
The sailors' strike, summer 1921 
The Employers' Confederation (Arbeidsgiverforeningen) was 
aggressive in the Spring of 1921. It required that sailors' wages be 
reduced by 33%, with a further reduction of 25% in October. The 
question was brought to the official government mediator 
(Riksmeklingsmannen). He came up with a more moderate 
suggestion: a 24% reduction immediately.  
 The sailors' strike was a fact from 8 May. Right away the govern-
ment gave the Ministry of Trade the right to requisition private 
ships for government-controlled coastal transport. On 28 May the 
strike was widened with 120 000 workers on strike. The "Society 
Help" organizations moved into action. Police and military units 
were mobilized, in particular to guard the docks so that strike-
breakers could work.  
 
 "Society Help groups went into action at the Gas and Electricity Works, in the harbours and 
other places [in Oslo]. There were demonstrations and unrest in Trondheim, Bergen and 
Stavanger. To thwart the strike the government mobilized sailors into the army. Older 
people and specially mobilized personnel were called up for military service and given battle 
equipment. The military had orders to shoot with live ammunition if necessary." (Ousland 
and Skar 1974, vol.2:48-49). 
 
The leadership in the AFL agreed to enter into negotiations on 10 
June. One of the largest strikes in Norwegian history was over. The 
negotiations resulted in what was interpreted as a defeat for the 
sailors and the working class. Wages were reduced by 17% and 
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vacations reduced from 12 to 8 days. Membership in AFL 
plummeted. By the end of the year it had been reduced by 50 000. 
AFL had 96 000 members at that time (Furre 1971:151). 
 After the strike the government took the labour movement 
leadership to court for "violence against the police". Several leaders 
were put in jail, among them Adolf Olsen, Olsen Hagen in 
Stavanger, Sigurd Simensen in Hammerfest, and the national 
leaders Martin Tranmæl, Aksel Zachariassen and Eugene Olaussen 
(Ousland 1974, vol. 20:54). 
 
The metal workers' strike, 1923 
In 1923 the employers wanted to reduce the wages of the metal 
workers. In the middle of a negotiated wage period the metal 
workers went on strike against that suggestion from the employers. 
The employers' organization reported the action to the "Labour 
Court" (a special semi-public court for wage conflicts in tariff 
periods.) The Labour Court found the strike illegal and the 
employers immediately reported the central strikers' committee to 
the police; 35 labour leaders were prosecuted in the regular courts. 
This caused a large demonstration in Oslo, at the courthouse. 
Workers viewed the trial as a political act in support of the 
employers. AFL widened the strike. All dock workers in the country 
were brought out. Some people thought the general strike the 
syndicalists had been advocating was close at hand.  
 The Employers' Confederation demanded a meeting with the 
government. After that meeting the Ministry of Social Affairs 
issued a statement that supported the decision in the Labour Court. 
The statement went on to say that the government would guarantee 
that "people willing to work in the strike ridden work places" would 
be protected. In the Ministry's own words: "Workers who go to 
work in companies hit by metal workers' or dock workers' strikes 
 Labour activism  212 
 
can in no manner be considered strike breakers. All such workers 
will be given state protection." (Ousland and Skar 1949, vol. 2:83). 
 When the dock strikes occurred in January 1924, the state 
invoked its alternative transportation system. The harbour areas 
were closed off with high fences. The police protected workers who 
went into the docks to work, and military units and units from 
Society Help organizations were mobilized to support the strike-
breakers in the larger cities.  
 The employers met the dock strikes with lockouts. These affected 
61 000, while about 14 000 took part in supportive strikes. The 
government dismissed 9 policemen on the board of the Police 
Officers' Union, because the board had suggested that its members 
stay strictly neutral in the conflict. The strike lasted for seven 
months. 
 The materials show that in these conflicts the state responded 
directly and positively to requests from the employers for action 
against the working class. Important sections of the working class 
did not feel obliged to follow the "rules of the game" agreed 
between AFL and the state. The rule that strikes in tariff periods 
were "unlawful" was openly breached,141 against the will of the 
AFL. The 120-member strikers' committee formulated the 
following critique of the AFL after the strike: 
 
 "The bourgeoisie was gradually finding out that we were determined in our struggle. The 
Employers' Confederation was split and we had a chance of winning. In that crucial moment 
the central labour federation leadership let us down and joined the employers' side in the 
conflict. The leadership was not willing to use the power we had and that made it possible to 
win. Instead of fighting the employers, the leadership turned to the task of putting an end to 
the strike. It used its power against the workers in a way that is unique in labour movement 
history." (Bjørnhaug 1979:50; my translation from Norwegian) 
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 The rule itself speaks of different degrees of freedom for the contracting parties in the 
labour market. While the agreement eliminates the right of workers to "adjust" the price of what 
they have to sell, their labour power, the employers were free to adjust the prices of 'their' 
commodities at will.  
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In this process the state played a role both as a guarantor of 
agreements entered into by labour and capital, and as a supporter of 
the employers' demand that workers (strikebreakers) should be 
guaranteed free access to jobs vacated by striking workers 
("freedom of work"). Both roles can seem ambiguous from a 
worker's point of view. Agreements are in principle a good thing, 
something to be respected. The principle of free access to work of 
one's choice is a good principle. But the strike is at the same time an 
important instrument for defending workers' interests. This 
ambiguity may have influenced workers' understanding of the strike 
and split their ranks. It definitely influenced the labour federation 
leadership, which fought for the agreement against the workers who 
wanted to resist the employers' demand for wage reductions. Here it 
seems that a coalition of employers and the state had managed to 
co-opt the trade union leadership against the interests and demands 
of a majority of the metal workers. The state had both an explicit 
role in supporting the employers politically and a structural role 
guaranteeing the legality of the agreements made.  
 These materials demonstrate the power of the bourgeoisie and the 
state relative to the workers movement in this critical period. What 
these materials document is a close cooperation between 
government and employers' organizations. Exactly which of the 
parties had the initiative and to what degree the government was 
influenced by the employers' representatives, this material does not 
say. However, the organized relation between them was obvious. It 
is also clear that the government had no sympathy for working-class 
demands. The Keynesian perspective - government regulation of the 
total economy, including a possible regulation upwards of demand 
(i.e. wages) when that served the accumulation process, had not yet 
entered into the conception of economic policy.  
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 The working-class struggle at this time was an economic struggle 
against an over-powerful political unity of state and bourgeoisie. 
Through the whole period working-class political strategy and 
internal organization were in disarray, reflecting either a lack of 
understanding of the political situation and the possibilities of 
working-class revolutionary organization and action, and/or 
underestimation of the bourgeois class's and the state's ability and 
willingness to subdue the working class. 
 
 
CORPORATIVE ASPECTS OF STATE 
ORGANIZATION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
 
What role did interest organizations play in the class-state conflicts 
of the interwar period? The unions, as we have seen, had a dual 
role. On the one hand they defined and expressed working-class 
demands. On the other hand the leadership of the unions had a 
tendency to enter into compromises with the employers that at least 
sections of the working class felt were unwarranted or at variance 
with class interests.  
 The role of the Employers' Confederation was the topic for a 
debate among historians in the early 1980's.142 One aspect of that 
debate has been the relationship to the state. Knutsen argues that the 
state, by demanding that wage conflicts under certain conditions be 
regulated by public compromise/arbitration, put the Employers' 
Confederation in a dilemma. On the one hand this could terminate 
conflicts that otherwise would be prolonged by strikes. But, on the 
other hand, the arbitration decisions could limit the freedom of the 
employers' organization, in the sense that, without enforced 
arbitration, the organization could reach much more advantageous 
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outcomes, lower wage bills, less powerful unions, a reduced labour 
movement, etc. Paul Knutsen's point is that in these interwar years, 
and especially in the late 1920's, the employers were on the 
offensive in relation to the labour movement, and in that situation 
they wanted to continue the political/economic struggle with the 
unions unhampered by state intervention. Intervention demanding 
arbitration in that situation was interpreted by the employers' 
organization as negative intervention, intervention in favour of the 
labour movement. 
 Svein Dahl suggested that the employers' organization "turned its 
back on the state" in 1928. Knutsen contests that statement. He 
suggests that the employers' organization became actively involved 
in the corporative channel in order to influence state policy: 
 
 "On the other hand NAF [Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening] had an obvious interest in making its 
influence felt in the state on a number of questions, for example participating in the Work 
Conflict Commission of 1930, a commission created by the Venstre government. It is 
therefore not correct to say the NAF 'turned its back on the government' in 1928." (Knutsen 
1984:65) 
 
Knutsen demonstrates a disagreement between the Employers' 
organization and the parliament, the latter wanting to regulate 
capital - labour relations. He uses this disagreement to suggest that 
Marxist theory of the state as "instrument for bourgeois interests" is 
false (Knutsen 1984:64). But can a conflict between the parliament 
and the Employers' organization on how to relate to labour falsify 
the Marxist theory? It can be argued that the state exactly to be "an 
instrument for a class in the economy" should have autonomy also 
towards individual members or sections of that class so that 
dominant class strategy can be worked out independent of specific 
capitalist groups. To falsify the Marxist theory the state should 
demonstrate an ability to support popular opposition movements on 
 Corporative aspects  216 
 
a par with established movements143. It is the systematic lack of this 
ability that emerges so far, from the present study. 
 These early interwar years also saw the emergence of interest 
organizations explicitly in the service of the employers, the 
bourgeoisie or 'society as a whole' (read: capitalist society). I think it 
is right to say that the creation and mobilization of these 
intermediary organizations was partly a product of vacillation in 
sections of the bourgeoisie about the efficiency of the parliamentary 
system in staving off working-class power. Society Help was anti-
democratic in this sense. An organization called Society Defence 
(Samfunnsvernet) organized paramilitaries.144 
 There was a close cooperation between these "private" 
organizations and government. Research has shown that the 
government was drawn into consultations about the creation of the 
Society Help organization in 1920, by the initiator of the 
organization, Rittmester Fougner. The employer organizations were 
also consulted (Furre 1971:150). The government agreed that 
Society Defence could support the regular police forces when 
approved by the police administration.145 
 If we define corporative trends as tendencies to limit the role of 
parliaments and increase the role of direct cooperation between the 
state, the corporations, capital and "responsible" labour, they were 
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 In a final note in his article, Paul Knutsen criticizes colleagues for overlooking the politics 
of the bourgeoisie in this crucial period. Much research on reformism has been limited to 
ideological conflicts and power play within the labour movement. That has had two negative 
consequences. On the one hand it has left room for much speculation about the bourgeoisie in 
this crisis and conflict period of Norwegian politics. Secondly, it has served "to keep the 
question of class relations and conflicts between classes off the historiographers' agenda" 
(Knutsen 1984:67). 
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 See S. B. Johansen (1967). 
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 In the investigation of the role of Society Help in a large municipal workers' strike in 
Bergen in 1920, it was documented that leaders of Society Help took part in meetings with top 
police administrators and the elected heads of Bergen city (ibid, Gran 1979). 
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present in most political parties at the time.146 But in 1925 a political 
organization explicitly aimed at superseding party politics was 
formed. Its name was "Fedrelandslaget", with dignitaries from the 
1905 mobilization like Fridtjof Nansen, Christian Michelsen and 
shipowner Kristoffer D. Lehmkuhl in its leadership. The 
organization wanted to eliminate class conflict and 'social decay' 
(Johansen 1967). 
 Thus the political crisis in the interwar years created two types of 
intermediary, corporative organizations on the right wing of 
Norwegian politics. One was the explicitly class type of 
organization, wanting to defend the capitalist mode of production 
and the economic interests of the bourgeoisie directly, an activist 
organization organizing and defending workers willing to work in 
firms hit by strikes (strike-breakers, finks, scabs). The other type 
was the above class, elitist type of intermediary organization 
directed at organizing state power on behalf of the 'cultured 
nation'(read: on behalf of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist 
economic system). 
 The conflict over working-class strategy, whether it should be 
reform and participation within the state or revolution and 
establishment of a new proletarian state and a socialist economic 
system was present in the working-class movement all along. The 
Communist Party (after its creation in 1923) argued that strikes 
should be gradually politicized and developed into a battle over 
state power. The youth organization (Ungdomsfylkingen) in the 
Labour Party agitated for strikes among soldiers, because the 
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 The Liberal Party, Venstre, was an active supporter of public arbitration between labour 
and capital. The Conservative Party, Høyre, was always sceptical of 'democracy' including 
'parliamentary democracy', afraid that a popular majority should rule, limiting the freedom of 
the market and the individual. The interest organizations were deemed politically important 
precisely as defenders of specific interests against a threatening majority rule through the 
Storting (Seip 1980). The Labour Party favoured a close cooperation between unions and 
government, given the existence of a Labour government. 
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military served only the interests of the bourgeoisie and was most 
prominently directed at keeping the Norwegian working class in 
place as labour for capital. Military defence of national sovereignty 
was an important, but secondary function. The Labour party 
syndicalist leadership disagreed with the Communist Party strategy. 
It did not want to turn the strikes into contests for state power. Its 
strategy was to use the strikes to strengthen the unions and then use 
the unions and the general strike to establish proletarian political 
power and public ownership in the economy. The Party should, 
according to the syndicalists, have a subordinate role in a 
revolutionary storm on the state. The party should limit itself to 
coordinating work in the unions and representing the class in the 
parliamentary organs. Thus, according to the syndicalists, 
centralism was not needed in the party organization. It was the 
class's own general strike that was the potent revolutionary weapon. 
But was it? Was the organized strength of the class in a general 
strike enough to overcome the power of the bourgeoisie organized 
through and by the state and supported by a large private capitalist 
economic and corporative structure? 
 Towards the end of the decade the militant working-class actions 
subsided and the reformist strategy gained strength in the labour 
movement. A last spurt of class legislation, which perhaps would 
have been more understandable in 1922, was passed in 1927. Since 
1915 there had been a rule, mentioned earlier, of peace in the tariff 
period. As was common in Norwegian jurisprudence, the accuser 
had to prove that the accused had breached the law, in this case that 
the peace agreement had been breached. In 1927 that rule was 
turned around. Now the accused had to prove their 'innocence'. In 
1927 the Storting also decided that it was illegal to give support to 
workers taking part in a strike that the Labour Court had deemed 
illegal. 
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 Still worse, from the labour movement's point of view, was the 
change in the civil law, paragraph 222. According to the new 222 it 
was illegal to make public the names of strike-breakers and to 
hamper them from taking the strike-hit jobs. That was too much, 
even for the reformist labour movement in Norway. In an ongoing 
strike in 1928, which had been termed illegal by the Labour Court, 
the AFL published lists of names of both striking workers and 
strike-breakers. In 1929 the Ministry of Social Affairs suggested 
that paragraph 222 should be prolonged for another two years. The 
Storting, however, backed down and returned to the old rule, 59 
votes for, 37 against. 
 Reformism in the labour movement may have favoured a 
bureaucratization of its leadership, with less room for open debate 
and popular, democratic decision-making. Leif Longum (1986)147 
has recorded criticism against the Labour Party newspaper 
Arbeiderbladet from radical writers, writers who had every respect 
for the labour movement and working-class demands in the 1920's 
and 1930's. Trond Hegna wrote in 1934 against the elimination of 
controversial articles from the Labour Party paper (Mot Dag 
21/1934). Edvard Bull and Olav Scheflo supported him. Helge Krog 
wrote that another (liberal bourgeois) newspaper Dagbladet was the 
only paper that allowed real, radical debate. 
 
 "Skavlan's importance in Dagbladet is, as mentioned earlier, that the paper under his 
leadership has become the natural, and in fact the only, arena for frank discussions of radical 
ideas, even discussions of socialist ideas. Dagbladet has been the open arena. Seen from a 
socialist point of view Dagbladet has had one fault: its basically liberalistic point of view. 
And here is where Arbeiderbladet has failed. It has not, from a socialist point of view, 
created an open arena with freedom to both sides." (Longum 1986:94) 
 
Martin Tranmæl, editor of Arbeiderbladet - answered, it is tempting 
to say, in a traditional power-wielding way, attacking the author, not 
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the question. In Longum's words: "Tranmæl rejected all criticisms. 
In a comment in Arbeiderbladet 12.4.1933 he wrote that the article 
on the Labour Party cultural policy, written by that "eminent 
hysterical person Helge Krog" in Dagbladet, was of no interest 
beyond "characterizing its author"" (Longum 1986:95). 
 The dilemma between the ability to learn against the need to 
wield power, the dilemma between mobilization and control, 
between the ability to understand and define new situations, new 
identities and goals and the need to wield power in politics, on the 
basis of a well-defined identity specified goals, is perhaps common 
to all organizing; it is a dilemma in most organizations (Gran 1988). 
Given that the criticism of the labour movement by Helge Krog and 
others was valid, it is possible to see the closure, the 
bureaucratization as the result of the unification of the movement 
around a reformist ideology. On the one hand the opposition within 
the organization was silenced. That in itself makes closure 'natural'. 
But the reformist ideology itself favours closure. Reformism is by 
definition uneasy with or even foreign to the existence of 
ideological controversy. The reformist ideology assumes that basic 
contradictions are solved within the existing state system by a 
piecemeal method, implementing reforms within the existing rules 
for policy-making, gaining a majority for the suggestions before 
they are implemented, etc. In this sense it is not surprising that 
Tranmæl attacked people and not programmes. The programmatic 
debate was no longer really legitimate within the movement. 
 
 
UNIONIZATION IN AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
 
In the last part of the 1930's the semi-proletarian workers in 
agriculture and forestry started fighting for their right to organize. 
They met opposition from the land owners and large farmers, an 
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opposition that led to conflicts. One of these conflicts was at 
Julussa, where the workers had created a union and where the 
employers would not even meet with its leaders. The timber floaters 
blocked the river. The government mobilized police and soldiers to 
break the blockade. Only gradually did the workers win the right to 
organize. The same kind of conflict, concerning both the right to 
organize and better pay, occurred in other places between 1927 and 
1929, for example the Austmarka conflict and, the largest of them, 
the Randsfjord conflict. By the mid-1930's workers in agriculture 
and forestry had won about the same rights of organization as the 
urban industrial workers, but their wage level was lower. The 
battles fought in the Norwegian countryside for the right to organize 
put this section of the working class into or quite close to the 
Labour Party. It became an important part of the power base of the 
Labour Party.  
 As T.H. Marshall (1949) has suggested, the battle for the right to 
organize is an element in the working-class struggle for citizenship. 
In the struggles mentioned here, the workers met a first line of 
opposition from the employers, the big farmers and forest owners. 
In the rich agricultural areas in the Southeast some of the farm 
owners were rather sympathetic to the authoritarian (Nazi) 
movement that was gaining strength in Europe. Both political 
parties and economic interest organizations were in their view an 
illegitimate element in the capitalist system. An argument used 
against interest organizations was that they intervened illegitimately 
in the process "of natural selection" of leaders. This authoritarian 
movement was aggressive in the 1930's, as this editorial in the 
farmers' paper Nationen (The Nation) on workers' strikes testifies: 
 
 "Tear down what intelligence and ability has built ... If our authorities had tackled the 
problem [the labour movement] at its root, used military force, given the bandits what they 
deserve and put their leaders in jail, then we would have had peace and quiet in our 
country... After this [after the workers were allowed to organize] we farmers know who we 
can trust. Only ourselves. And then we must act. We must organize in all rural communities. 
 Unions in agriculture  222 
 
If the Communists attempt to mingle with us - chase them. If they see red we shall bloody 
their noses. Be ready for action!" (Ousland and Skar, 1949, vol.2:530) 
 
What role did the state play? Generally the state supported the 
employers in these first confrontations. But into the 1930's and as 
the labour movement became explicitly independent of the Soviet 
Union (except for the relatively small Communist Party) and 
increasingly reformist, the labour organizations were gradually 
accepted as legitimate participants in the political process. It seems 
that the employer organizations were active initiators of anti-labour 
public policy in the early 1920's, but that the state transformed or 
expanded the political initiatives into laws that in no simple sense 
were direct expressions of employer interests. As the general 
acceptance of the reformist labour movement increased, the 
employers' opposition to unionization in the rich farm areas north of 
Oslo took on an anachronistic character. The state increasingly 
required that the employers accept the labour organizations. The 
Keynesian perspective on the role of the state, a state that actively 
integrates all participants and all sectors in the economy into a 
balanced, expanding capitalism, was on the rise. 
 
 
THE STATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION AND 
EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM IN THE INTERWAR 
PERIOD 
 
In the last part of the nineteenth century, capitalism was on the rise 
in Norway, penetrating into the cities and into the rural areas, into 
agriculture. That process meant the eradication of dependent 
peasants-crofters, and technological modernization in all sectors of 
the economy. My thesis is that in the first part of the twentieth 
century capitalism extended its economic grip on Norwegian 
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society, with effects on the organizational, state and cultur-
al/ideological levels of society. 
 This consolidation/expansion of capitalism was achieved in at 
least three ways: 
 (1) Through a more vigorous imperialist penetration. 
International capital was invested in many sectors of industry and 
finance, not without some Norwegian control and benefits for the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie. This development of a national bourgeoisie 
meant disintegration of what was left of pre-capitalist modes of 
production in agriculture, manufacture and handicrafts.  (2) Not 
unrelated to that penetration was the process of technological 
innovation. Most strikingly in the electro-metallurgical industry, but 
also in forestry, agriculture and sea and land transport.148 This 
process also reduced the resistance of pre-capitalist modes of 
production which lacked this technological dynamic. 
 (3) Lastly there was the process of infrastructural expansion, a 
process of differentiation and integration of communication systems 
(in the broad meaning of the term). Roads and railway, coastal 
transport systems and international shipping expanded, making the 
transformation to capitalism possible. Because of this expansion, 
banking, finance and trade transactions, which are unproductive 
functions for capital as a whole, accounted for more of the total 
labour force.149 
 Those were changes in the forces of production. The relations of 
production also changed, mainly through the monopolization 
process. Big firms acquired market power and could, through 
policy-making, at least marginally, change the functioning of the 
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 This process was related to the development of scientific institutions in Norway, the 
creation of the College of Technology in 1910, the development of the natural and technical 
sciences at the universities in Bergen and Oslo. 
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 4% in 1900; 4.2% in 1910; 5.6% in 1920 and 6.1% in 1930 (and 1950) - see the Appendix. 
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market to their advantage. This strengthened the power of the 
employers relative to the labour organizations.  
 In the first half of the twentieth century the main classes actively 
developed their class organizations. The labour movement created 
unions to defend wages and battle over questions of political 
strategy and state theory, a battle that resulted in a proliferation of 
party organizations in the 1920's. On the bourgeois side the 
employers' organizations were strengthened and a number of 
militant organizations (like Society Help and Society Defence) were 
created, in addition to elite organizations (like Fedrelandslaget).  
 Most significant was the new role of the state relative to the class 
organizations. On the one hand the workers' organizations were 
integrated into the state system. Around the turn of the century 
citizen rights were expanded. Voting rights were extended to 
women and to all adult persons irrespective of capital ownership. 
Representatives elected on the Labour Party ballot were voted into 
the Storting. Unions were gradually accepted into the wage 
bargaining process, both at the employer and at the state levels. 
 The state established a new relationship with the reformist part of 
the labour movement. The relationship represented a formal 
democratization, that is, more people and organizations acquired the 
right to participate in decision-making (voting, bargaining; legal, 
political and administrative decision-making, etc.) But my 
interpretation is that these rights had backward effects on the 
processes of class formation and class organization. Formal 
democratization supported reformist ideas in the working class and 
reinforced reformism in the labour movement. Bureaucratization of 
the state and the large labour organizations worked selectively to 
eliminate radical ideas and policies from the organization agendas. 
 Some parts of the bourgeoisie saw the advantages of the new 
class cooperation within the state. Other sections feared it. They 
initiated new class organizations that transcended or at least 
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threatened the limits of the parliamentary system and were ready to 
introduce or support more elitist types of leadership (Seip 1980, 
Danielsen 1984). 
 An array of new problems confronted the state apparatus in the 
first part of the twentieth century. In the previous century the 
problem was the transformation of an agricultural society. Now 
industrial capitalism was established. The Norwegian state had to 
expand into the administration of infrastructures, widen definitions 
of citizenship and political participation, engage in initiating and 
regulating loans to Norwegian industry, support Norwegian capital 
on international markets, regulate the activities of the large 
companies that gained market power, take on detailed 
administration of the whole economy during the war years, and 
manage wage conflicts. 
 With the change from the bureaucratic state (embetsmannsstaten) 
to the parliamentary state and the change from a state mainly 
focused on law and order to a state actively engaged in 
infrastructural development, I have suggested that the state 
organization developed a new kind of autonomy. From having 
autonomy in the administration of law and order, or instrumental 
autonomy, the state increasingly developed programme autonomy. 
That is the state became an independent policy maker. Small-scale, 
subsistence agriculture in the first half of the nineteenth century had 
no need for an active state. The bureaucracy had a law-and-order 
function, extracting taxes for its own upkeep and administering 
elementary infrastructural functions. The peasants related reactively 
to the state, defending their interests when the tax burden became 
too heavy. This changed with capitalism. The state took on the 
management of infrastructures on a national scale. New 
professionals penetrated into the state administration. Building 
infrastructures meant looking at the productive and technical 
relations between actors in the economy, thus changing the state - 
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society relation. The state did not only control and tax farmers and 
workers. It brought economic and technical resources into the 
economy. The state took on productive activities. The new working 
class could in addition to a police/tax state see an entrepreneurial 
state, one that engaged in services advantageous to all in the modern 
economy. In that sense it appeared also more democratic. 
Entrepreneurs, farmers and workers gradually developed a proactive 
relation to the state. It could be influenced to serve specific group 
and societal interests. It was important to gain representation within 
the state and to develop schools and colleges within specific sectors 
of the economy so that a group could gain a voice in the 
increasingly active and professionalized state administration.  
 The new parliamentary state acquired administrative 
responsibilities in "all sectors". It had infrastructural functions in the 
economy, regulating functions in the class struggle, and 
organizational functions in developing the state organization proper, 
in acquiring the professional knowledge needed for this varied set 
of administrative tasks, and in organizing a decision-making process 
that had capital-supportive outcomes. 
 While in the last part of the nineteenth century the state 
implemented a programme aimed at expanding the arena for 
individual capitalist, market-related activity, the first part of the 
twentieth century was characterized, by the state intervening 
autonomously into the bourgeois class, regulating its activities and 
developing economic and social programmes that ultimately would 
(or should) serve the expansion of capitalism. This intervention in 
bourgeois class affairs nurtured reformist ideas in the working class. 
The state was obviously not a simple instrument in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie.  
 Given that formal democratization of the Norwegian state had 
advanced in the early years of the twentieth century and that the 
development towards programme autonomy was progressing, did 
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that mean that in acute crisis situations the state would retain its 
traits of democracy and autonomy? Let me develop an answer to 
that question through the second case study, the political conflict 
between the state, the labour movement and the financial elite over 
the rescue of a large faltering private bank in the early 1920's. 
12 








      State power 
      and reformism in the labour movement 
 
 
      Reform: The amendment or altering for the better of some faulty state of 
things, especially of a corrupt or oppressive political institution or prac-
tice; the removal of some abuse or wrong (The Oxford Dictionary, R:347). 
Reformism: A programme in the labour movement saying that capitalism 
can be transformed to socialism through piecemeal changes of the existing 
system (AL:972). Reformism: A trend in the labour movement hostile to 
Marxism and the real interests of the working class; a trend that 'struggles' 
for small reforms that leaves bourgeois exploitation of the working class 
intact. (Marxistisk uppslagsbok, Gidlund 1972:301) 
 
 
     A question in Norwegian historical studies has been 
how the industrialization process, its timing and speed affected the 
formation of the working class, its organizations and political 
ideology. Historians have studied how the internal ideological 
divisions in the labour movement were effects of the rapid influx of 
peasants, the spread of industry into rural areas where energy was 
available, the role of international developments and foreign 
agitators in the movement.150  
 A specific problem was raised in Odd Bjørn Fure's work (1984a): 
was there a revolutionary situation in Norway in the early 1920's, 
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caused by the large nationwide strikes, the international economic 
and political crisis in Europe and the radicalization of the Nor-
wegian labour movement? Could a revolutionary attack on the state 
have succeeded or were the state and the bourgeoisie in control with 
the ability to quell, ideologically, bureaucratically and with military 
force, whatever revolutionary actions the working class might have 
started?  
 My purpose here is to identify the influence of the state on the 
formation of the labour movement, its strength and ideological 
orientation. Did the state actively further reformism in the labour 
movement? If so, through which mechanisms? What role did the 
state play in select class conflicts and strikes in the interwar period? 
How did the state relate to right-wing, anti-labour organizations? 
 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIVISIONS IN THE LABOUR 
MOVEMENT 
 
In 1885, two years before the Labour Party was formally 
established, the Social Democratic Union in Christiania formulated 
a radical conception of capitalism. The Marxist idea of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat (a state as the instrument of proletarian class 
interests) was changed to a concept of a free state, meaning, 
perhaps, some kind of democratic state that did not carry the imprint 
of a specific class. 
 
 "Labour is the source of wealth and culture and the results of labour should therefore be 
acquired by those who work ... Liberating the work process must be the result of the 
working class's own efforts. All other classes are, relative to the working class, only a 
reactionary mass ... The union should by all legal means work for a free state and a socialist 
society." (Lorenz 1970:24). 
 
The Labour Party, established in 1887, produced a coherent 
programme by 1891, based on the radical premise that private 
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ownership of the means of production put most social and political 
power in the hands of a minority. But the programme rejected the 
idea that a new kind of state was necessary to liberate the working 
class: "We do not want any form of state socialism, where the state 
has the power of the private capitalists."151 The programme then 
listed a number of reforms: common right to vote for all over 21 
years of age, public regulation of work time and workplaces, 
insurance against sickness and accidents, prohibition of child 
labour, etc. In 1901 the references to the exploitative character of 
capitalism were toned down and the idea of a new type of state was 
removed from the programme: "There should be common public 
ownership of the means of production, the state should manage the 
economy and distribute the production result equally" (Lorenz 
1970:33). In 1914 the Norwegian Labour Party was prepared to 
enter into a coalition with the bourgeois political parties to defend 
Norwegian neutrality in the war. 
 The Labour Party was formed by radical working-class 
representatives in the Eastern part of the country, with people in the 
capital playing a central role (Christian Holtermann Knudsen and 
Carl Jeppesen). A more radical movement developed in Trøndelag. 
In Trondheim Fagopposisjonen av 1911 (The Trade Union 
Opposition of 1911) was formed. Martin Tranmæl was the leading 
personality in that opposition. Its ideas were of a syndicalist 
character. It was the trade unions and not the party that was the 
central organization in the labour movement. The unions should use 
militant actions against employers and the state, and develop 
workers' committees in the factories to organize the struggle. The 
idea was that the worker committees at the factory level could 
democratically change the capitalist factories into socialist, worker-
controlled factories. From that level mass action would democratize 
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 "Med den såkalte statssosialisme, der setter staten i den private arbeidskjøpers sted, har 
Arbeiderpartiet intet å bestille" (Bull 1985:394). 
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and socialize first the municipal, then the provincial and central 
levels of state. Through coordination of militant local actions the 
political capacity of the working class would be augmented and, 
when the state and bourgeoisie attacked, a general strike would 
force the bourgeoisie into submission.152 
 The syndicalist movement won the leadership of the youth 
organization of the Labour Party in 1916, and reached a majority 
position in the party at the Party Conference in 1918. In 1920 the 
syndicalists acquired a majority in the top organs of the Central 
Federation of Trade Unions (AFL), including the vice presidency 
(Elias Vollan).  
 The AFL had become a strong organization. Membership had 
risen from 15 600 in 1905 to 107 500 in 1918 (Lorenz 1970:39). 
The Labour Party increased its support in the elections. It got 10% 
of the vote in 1903, 26% in 1912 and 32% in 1915. In 1919 the 
Labour Party, with a small margin of votes, entered Comintern. 
Einar Gerhardsen (later - in 1945 - the prime minister in Norway) 
was a delegate to a Comintern congress in Moscow. AFL was in 
1921 represented at the Red International of Trade Unions which 
then vehemently attacked the Amsterdam International as reformist 
and bourgeois. 
 In the late autumn of 1920 and early 1921 the postwar economic 
crisis set in and the conflicts between the different ideological 
tendencies in the Norwegian labour movement - between syndi-
calists, orthodox Marxist revolutionaries (in the party and in the 
youth organization) and the reformists - increased. The battle over 
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 Bjørnhaug (1979) suggests that the syndicalist movement was reformist, except for its 
focus on militant union attacks on employers and state. When the strike movement in the 1920's 
subsided, the syndicalists tended to focus on the strengthening of the unions and, as a means to 
that end, the expansion and even rationalization of industrial capitalist production. The 
syndicalists did not have a specific theory of the state. Magdahl (1979:109) suggests that the 
leading syndicalist theory of the state was: "It is a capitalist organization, it can be used (by the 
working class) to build socialism, but it is not efficient in that endeavour." 
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the 21 Moscow theses (see Langfeldt 1961) was all-absorbing and 
bitter. The theses were approved at the Labour Party Conference in 
1921 with a slight majority. The right wing, the reformists, broke 
with the Labour Party and created the Social Democratic Party, with 
Magnus Nielsen as its first chairman. 
 In the Labour Party, the battle between supporters and opponents 
of the Moscow theses continued (with the communist Olav Scheflo 
as main supporter and Martin Tranmæl as leader of the opposition). 
In November 1923 the membership in the Comintern was defeated. 
The minority left the meeting and created the Norwegian 
Communist Party (NKP) with Sverre Støstad as its first chairman. 
At the same time AFL broke with the Red International of Trade 
Unions. 
 So the Norwegian labour movement entered the mid-1920's with 
three political parties trying to represent working-class interests. 
The question of how to organize a working-class state and how to 
reach that goal was the main bone of contention between them. 
 Other class organizations took form. In 1924 the Workers' Sports 
Organization was created. New industrial federations were 
established in AFL: the Chemical Workers Federation, the 
Federation of Municipal Workers, federations of workers in con-
struction and in food production and distribution. A federation for 
workers in forestry and agriculture was created in 1927. This 
organizational proliferation was an expression of both strength and 
weakness: strength in the number of organized workers; weakness 
in the political fragmentation and internal strife over tactics and 




AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE 1910'S AND 1920'S 
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In 1911, 32 000 workers in mining and industry were locked out 
from their jobs. There was a general depression in the economy; the 
employers reduced wages and were vehemently against any form of 
bargaining. The Liberal Party government (under Gunnar Knudsen, 
ousted 1 February 1910) wanted compulsory bargaining and 
enforced agreements. Voluntary bargaining took place and the strike 
ended with a compromise. This compromise strategy by the 
AFL-leadership was probably part of the reason for the emergence 
of the new syndicalist opposition of 1911. 
 From the end of the war to the end of 1920, Norway experienced 
a postwar boom, with large financial speculations by the bourgeo-
isie who had accumulated financial capital during the war, 
especially through highly profitable shipping operations. The crisis 
made the investment of finance capital in productive activity 
difficult. Workers' wages increased and investments rose. But by 
the end of 1920 there was a sharp downturn.  
 
State intervention in the railway strike in 1920 
The railway workers organized a strike for increased wages in 
December 1920. This sharpened the class conflict. The 
communications sector was (is) important for the capitalist system 
as a whole and the railway workers were state employees. As I shall 
show in some detail below, the state was prepared for such action in 
the communications sector: (1) it had detailed plans for military and 
private operation of the different parts of the transport system in the 
event of strikes in these sectors; (2) the government cooperated with 
private "Society Help" organizations; and (3) it coordinated its plans 
with several other governments in the North Sea/North Atlantic 
area. 
 In the downturn the employers wanted to reduce wages. An early 
reaction to that policy was the railway strike. At that time the 
syndicalist idea of a general strike as a decisive weapon against the 
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bourgeoisie commanded a majority in the Federation of Trade 
Unions. Combined with an understanding of the critical importance 
of communications for the functioning of the capitalist market 
economy, the railway strike was seen by the federation leadership as 
the beginning of a general strike (Skaar 1981). The strike in the 
railway was effective from 1 December. 
 The strike did not develop as the federation leadership had 
expected. In the first days there was no rush of privately and state-
organized transport. That came later. Rail transport halted, but no 
general economic or political crisis followed. Other labour unions 
did not come out in support of the railway workers. After a few 
days trucks and cars were busy taking care of the necessary 
transport, under police protection. The strike ended after about 20 
days, without any concessions to the strikers. How can this unex-
pected result be explained? 
 Investigations have shown that at the inception of economic crisis 
in 1919, sections of the bourgeoisie and members of the 
government had prepared for hostile attacks from the working class. 
These preparations were motivated by an understanding of the role 
of communications in the capitalist economy. That understanding 
led, among other things, to the establishment of private strike-
breaking organizations (Society Help) in the main cities, 
organizations that had members from an array of professions, ready 
to step into firms or state organizations hit by strikes. The liberal 
Venstre government of Gunnar Knudsen cooperated in the creation 
and the operation of these organizations (Gran 1978, Skaar 1981). 
At the same time, the government established a secret 
communications commission, Transportkommisjonen. It was asked 
to work out plans for state-run transportation in crisis situations. 
The basic idea was to make use of the war system for securing 
material supplies to the cities, organized under the Ministry of 
Supplies (Provianteringsdepartementet), with "supply committees" 
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in each municipality with power to requisition private transport 
material for public use. The commission made plans for the 
selection of personnel within the public administration who could 
be transport operators and who would be loyal to 'society' (read: the 
employers). It planned to requisition private cars and trucks to 
transport essential supplies from railway stations to local 
destinations within the cities. 
 The government did not intervene during the first days of the 
strike. It stated later that the reason was to let the standstill in the 
railway deplete food supplies to the cities and in that way create 
animosity in the population against the strikers. 
 The original plans assumed that the Society Help organization 
would take part in the transport of necessities. This arrangement 
was changed. Instead, the government created a central coordinating 
commission and regional commissions, with the mandate to 
organize crisis transports. Skaar (1981) has shown that this move 
was politically motivated. The government feared that using the 
Society Help organization would induce a radicalization of the 
labour movement. 
 The chosen system functioned. No dramatic lack of supplies 
occurred anywhere in the country, even though the railway strike 
was close to 100% effective. 
 The government of Gunnar Knudsen (which sat until June 1920) 
had a clear political and class strategic perspective on the organizing 
of this clandestine, state-run, strike-breaking system of 
transportation. Revolution was a possibility that had to be avoided 
at all costs. In the parliamentary debate on the railway workers' 
wage demands on 28 and 30 November 1920, Gunnar Knudsen 
said: 
 
 This conflict raises the question: who has state power, real state power, in this society? Is it 
Folkets Hus [the labour movement headquarters in Christiania] or is it the Storting and the 
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Government? ... The labour movement is attacking the state. We should counter that attack 
with all means available." (Skaar 1981:82) 
 
Skaar has also disclosed that the government took measures to meet 
more general revolutionary attacks. The wife of Edvard Hagerup 
Bull (finance minister in Otto B. Halvorsen's conservative 
government) wrote a diary. In it, there were notes on how the 
government had agreed to a system of succession should it fall 
victim to a revolutionary attack. 
 
 19 November 1920: "They [the government members] prepared for the most drastic civil 
war ... Of course, a number of things have been prepared, like guards, finding military units 
that will remain loyal to the government, etc. However, the enemies of our society, even if 
they are a minority, might attack the government directly. Edvard therefore suggested 
special steps for supplementing the government. He suggested that Ivar Lykke and Gunnar 
Knudsen be prepared to step in if the present government was ousted by attacks. If they too 
should fall, then the leaders of the departments in the ministries (ekspedisjonssjefene) ... 
should be ready to step in". (Skaar 1981:57) 
 
The Transport Commission was in contact with authorities in 
countries bordering the North Sea, in England, Holland, Belgium, 
Germany and Denmark. The question raised was how to secure 
international transports in the event of strikes in communications in 
one or more of the adjacent countries. Agreements were made that 
military ships from the country hit by strikes should be allowed into 
foreign territorial waters if and when they carried supplies that 
otherwise would have been carried by the strike-hit companies.153 
 The strike failed. Major support for it did not occur in the 
working class and essential supplies continued to flow into the main 
cities and towns. The transport commissions set up regionally 
organized transports that bypassed the strike-hit railway. The 
municipal organs (Provianteringskommisjoner) managed to 
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 Materials from the Transport Commission in the National Archives, Riksarkivet, lent to me 
through the Public Archive, Statsarkivet, in Bergen. 
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calculate quite accurately what transport capacity was necessary to 
supply the cities and towns with necessities.  
 These materials demonstrate what I interpret as a high level of 
strategic consciousness in the state about defensive measures in 
revolutionary situations. The plans disclosed here indicate a 
government prepared to put the public and private transport system 
under direct state and military command to thwart working-class 
actions. 
 This organizing was done in close cooperation with the militant 
Society Help organization, but without the direct participation of the 
larger employers' organizations or managers of private firms or 
banks. The state used Society Help organizations as reserves, rather 
than what the organization itself wanted, to be an independent front-
line organization in strike-breaking. The government wanted to 
avoid giving the labour movement easy targets for revolutionary 
agitation.154 
 The materials on the strike on the railway indicate that in 1920, 
the bourgeoisie, with the assistance of the state, was better 
organized for political struggle than the working class through the 
labour movement. The bourgeoisie seemed more ready to use 
physical force than the working class and the labour movement, 
despite all its agitation about militant strikes. These materials 
support the hypothesis that the syndicalist strategy of militant 
takeover was rather superficial, academic, not seen as practical 
among workers and union leaderships. Once the broad support for 
the railway workers' strike did not materialize, the labour union 
leadership quickly suggested that the working class await 
parliamentary decisions on railway workers' pay. 
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 A parallel relationship between the authorities, Society Help and the labour movement was 
documented in a study of the strike among municipally employed workers in Bergen in the 
summer of 1920, at about the same time as the national seamen's strike was active (Gran 1979). 
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 On the bourgeois side Otto B. Halvorsen (prime minister from 21 
June 1920) hailed the bourgeois unity and the willingness to use 
force against any element of the labour movement that attempted 
anything that could suggest revolutionary changes: 
 
 "Political attacks, directed against the state, will be met by a united bourgeois front, a front 
of the political parties normally called bourgeois. And that is perhaps not the least important 
result [of the struggles over the strike]" (Skaar 1981:90). 
 
The sailors' strike, summer 1921 
The Employers' Confederation (Arbeidsgiverforeningen) was 
aggressive in the Spring of 1921. It required that sailors' wages be 
reduced by 33%, with a further reduction of 25% in October. The 
question was brought to the official government mediator 
(Riksmeklingsmannen). He came up with a more moderate 
suggestion: a 24% reduction immediately.  
 The sailors' strike was a fact from 8 May. Right away the govern-
ment gave the Ministry of Trade the right to requisition private 
ships for government-controlled coastal transport. On 28 May the 
strike was widened with 120 000 workers on strike. The "Society 
Help" organizations moved into action. Police and military units 
were mobilized, in particular to guard the docks so that strike-
breakers could work.  
 
 "Society Help groups went into action at the Gas and Electricity Works, in the harbours and 
other places [in Oslo]. There were demonstrations and unrest in Trondheim, Bergen and 
Stavanger. To thwart the strike the government mobilized sailors into the army. Older 
people and specially mobilized personnel were called up for military service and given battle 
equipment. The military had orders to shoot with live ammunition if necessary." (Ousland 
and Skar 1974, vol.2:48-49). 
 
The leadership in the AFL agreed to enter into negotiations on 10 
June. One of the largest strikes in Norwegian history was over. The 
negotiations resulted in what was interpreted as a defeat for the 
sailors and the working class. Wages were reduced by 17% and 
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vacations reduced from 12 to 8 days. Membership in AFL 
plummeted. By the end of the year it had been reduced by 50 000. 
AFL had 96 000 members at that time (Furre 1971:151). 
 After the strike the government took the labour movement 
leadership to court for "violence against the police". Several leaders 
were put in jail, among them Adolf Olsen, Olsen Hagen in 
Stavanger, Sigurd Simensen in Hammerfest, and the national 
leaders Martin Tranmæl, Aksel Zachariassen and Eugene Olaussen 
(Ousland 1974, vol. 20:54). 
 
The metal workers' strike, 1923 
In 1923 the employers wanted to reduce the wages of the metal 
workers. In the middle of a negotiated wage period the metal 
workers went on strike against that suggestion from the employers. 
The employers' organization reported the action to the "Labour 
Court" (a special semi-public court for wage conflicts in tariff 
periods.) The Labour Court found the strike illegal and the 
employers immediately reported the central strikers' committee to 
the police; 35 labour leaders were prosecuted in the regular courts. 
This caused a large demonstration in Oslo, at the courthouse. 
Workers viewed the trial as a political act in support of the 
employers. AFL widened the strike. All dock workers in the country 
were brought out. Some people thought the general strike the 
syndicalists had been advocating was close at hand.  
 The Employers' Confederation demanded a meeting with the 
government. After that meeting the Ministry of Social Affairs 
issued a statement that supported the decision in the Labour Court. 
The statement went on to say that the government would guarantee 
that "people willing to work in the strike ridden work places" would 
be protected. In the Ministry's own words: "Workers who go to 
work in companies hit by metal workers' or dock workers' strikes 
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can in no manner be considered strike breakers. All such workers 
will be given state protection." (Ousland and Skar 1949, vol. 2:83). 
 When the dock strikes occurred in January 1924, the state 
invoked its alternative transportation system. The harbour areas 
were closed off with high fences. The police protected workers who 
went into the docks to work, and military units and units from 
Society Help organizations were mobilized to support the strike-
breakers in the larger cities.  
 The employers met the dock strikes with lockouts. These affected 
61 000, while about 14 000 took part in supportive strikes. The 
government dismissed 9 policemen on the board of the Police 
Officers' Union, because the board had suggested that its members 
stay strictly neutral in the conflict. The strike lasted for seven 
months. 
 The materials show that in these conflicts the state responded 
directly and positively to requests from the employers for action 
against the working class. Important sections of the working class 
did not feel obliged to follow the "rules of the game" agreed 
between AFL and the state. The rule that strikes in tariff periods 
were "unlawful" was openly breached,155 against the will of the 
AFL. The 120-member strikers' committee formulated the 
following critique of the AFL after the strike: 
 
 "The bourgeoisie was gradually finding out that we were determined in our struggle. The 
Employers' Confederation was split and we had a chance of winning. In that crucial moment 
the central labour federation leadership let us down and joined the employers' side in the 
conflict. The leadership was not willing to use the power we had and that made it possible to 
win. Instead of fighting the employers, the leadership turned to the task of putting an end to 
the strike. It used its power against the workers in a way that is unique in labour movement 
history." (Bjørnhaug 1979:50; my translation from Norwegian) 
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 The rule itself speaks of different degrees of freedom for the contracting parties in the 
labour market. While the agreement eliminates the right of workers to "adjust" the price of what 
they have to sell, their labour power, the employers were free to adjust the prices of 'their' 
commodities at will.  
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In this process the state played a role both as a guarantor of 
agreements entered into by labour and capital, and as a supporter of 
the employers' demand that workers (strikebreakers) should be 
guaranteed free access to jobs vacated by striking workers 
("freedom of work"). Both roles can seem ambiguous from a 
worker's point of view. Agreements are in principle a good thing, 
something to be respected. The principle of free access to work of 
one's choice is a good principle. But the strike is at the same time an 
important instrument for defending workers' interests. This 
ambiguity may have influenced workers' understanding of the strike 
and split their ranks. It definitely influenced the labour federation 
leadership, which fought for the agreement against the workers who 
wanted to resist the employers' demand for wage reductions. Here it 
seems that a coalition of employers and the state had managed to 
co-opt the trade union leadership against the interests and demands 
of a majority of the metal workers. The state had both an explicit 
role in supporting the employers politically and a structural role 
guaranteeing the legality of the agreements made.  
 These materials demonstrate the power of the bourgeoisie and the 
state relative to the workers movement in this critical period. What 
these materials document is a close cooperation between 
government and employers' organizations. Exactly which of the 
parties had the initiative and to what degree the government was 
influenced by the employers' representatives, this material does not 
say. However, the organized relation between them was obvious. It 
is also clear that the government had no sympathy for working-class 
demands. The Keynesian perspective - government regulation of the 
total economy, including a possible regulation upwards of demand 
(i.e. wages) when that served the accumulation process, had not yet 
entered into the conception of economic policy.  
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 The working-class struggle at this time was an economic struggle 
against an over-powerful political unity of state and bourgeoisie. 
Through the whole period working-class political strategy and 
internal organization were in disarray, reflecting either a lack of 
understanding of the political situation and the possibilities of 
working-class revolutionary organization and action, and/or 
underestimation of the bourgeois class's and the state's ability and 
willingness to subdue the working class. 
 
 
CORPORATIVE ASPECTS OF STATE 
ORGANIZATION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
 
What role did interest organizations play in the class-state conflicts 
of the interwar period? The unions, as we have seen, had a dual 
role. On the one hand they defined and expressed working-class 
demands. On the other hand the leadership of the unions had a 
tendency to enter into compromises with the employers that at least 
sections of the working class felt were unwarranted or at variance 
with class interests.  
 The role of the Employers' Confederation was the topic for a 
debate among historians in the early 1980's.156 One aspect of that 
debate has been the relationship to the state. Knutsen argues that the 
state, by demanding that wage conflicts under certain conditions be 
regulated by public compromise/arbitration, put the Employers' 
Confederation in a dilemma. On the one hand this could terminate 
conflicts that otherwise would be prolonged by strikes. But, on the 
other hand, the arbitration decisions could limit the freedom of the 
employers' organization, in the sense that, without enforced 
arbitration, the organization could reach much more advantageous 
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outcomes, lower wage bills, less powerful unions, a reduced labour 
movement, etc. Paul Knutsen's point is that in these interwar years, 
and especially in the late 1920's, the employers were on the 
offensive in relation to the labour movement, and in that situation 
they wanted to continue the political/economic struggle with the 
unions unhampered by state intervention. Intervention demanding 
arbitration in that situation was interpreted by the employers' 
organization as negative intervention, intervention in favour of the 
labour movement. 
 Svein Dahl suggested that the employers' organization "turned its 
back on the state" in 1928. Knutsen contests that statement. He 
suggests that the employers' organization became actively involved 
in the corporative channel in order to influence state policy: 
 
 "On the other hand NAF [Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening] had an obvious interest in making its 
influence felt in the state on a number of questions, for example participating in the Work 
Conflict Commission of 1930, a commission created by the Venstre government. It is 
therefore not correct to say the NAF 'turned its back on the government' in 1928." (Knutsen 
1984:65) 
 
Knutsen demonstrates a disagreement between the Employers' 
organization and the parliament, the latter wanting to regulate 
capital - labour relations. He uses this disagreement to suggest that 
Marxist theory of the state as "instrument for bourgeois interests" is 
false (Knutsen 1984:64). But can a conflict between the parliament 
and the Employers' organization on how to relate to labour falsify 
the Marxist theory? It can be argued that the state exactly to be "an 
instrument for a class in the economy" should have autonomy also 
towards individual members or sections of that class so that 
dominant class strategy can be worked out independent of specific 
capitalist groups. To falsify the Marxist theory the state should 
demonstrate an ability to support popular opposition movements on 
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a par with established movements157. It is the systematic lack of this 
ability that emerges so far, from the present study. 
 These early interwar years also saw the emergence of interest 
organizations explicitly in the service of the employers, the 
bourgeoisie or 'society as a whole' (read: capitalist society). I think it 
is right to say that the creation and mobilization of these 
intermediary organizations was partly a product of vacillation in 
sections of the bourgeoisie about the efficiency of the parliamentary 
system in staving off working-class power. Society Help was anti-
democratic in this sense. An organization called Society Defence 
(Samfunnsvernet) organized paramilitaries.158 
 There was a close cooperation between these "private" 
organizations and government. Research has shown that the 
government was drawn into consultations about the creation of the 
Society Help organization in 1920, by the initiator of the 
organization, Rittmester Fougner. The employer organizations were 
also consulted (Furre 1971:150). The government agreed that 
Society Defence could support the regular police forces when 
approved by the police administration.159 
 If we define corporative trends as tendencies to limit the role of 
parliaments and increase the role of direct cooperation between the 
state, the corporations, capital and "responsible" labour, they were 
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 In a final note in his article, Paul Knutsen criticizes colleagues for overlooking the politics 
of the bourgeoisie in this crucial period. Much research on reformism has been limited to 
ideological conflicts and power play within the labour movement. That has had two negative 
consequences. On the one hand it has left room for much speculation about the bourgeoisie in 
this crisis and conflict period of Norwegian politics. Secondly, it has served "to keep the 
question of class relations and conflicts between classes off the historiographers' agenda" 
(Knutsen 1984:67). 
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 See S. B. Johansen (1967). 
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 In the investigation of the role of Society Help in a large municipal workers' strike in 
Bergen in 1920, it was documented that leaders of Society Help took part in meetings with top 
police administrators and the elected heads of Bergen city (ibid, Gran 1979). 
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present in most political parties at the time.160 But in 1925 a political 
organization explicitly aimed at superseding party politics was 
formed. Its name was "Fedrelandslaget", with dignitaries from the 
1905 mobilization like Fridtjof Nansen, Christian Michelsen and 
shipowner Kristoffer D. Lehmkuhl in its leadership. The 
organization wanted to eliminate class conflict and 'social decay' 
(Johansen 1967). 
 Thus the political crisis in the interwar years created two types of 
intermediary, corporative organizations on the right wing of 
Norwegian politics. One was the explicitly class type of 
organization, wanting to defend the capitalist mode of production 
and the economic interests of the bourgeoisie directly, an activist 
organization organizing and defending workers willing to work in 
firms hit by strikes (strike-breakers, finks, scabs). The other type 
was the above class, elitist type of intermediary organization 
directed at organizing state power on behalf of the 'cultured 
nation'(read: on behalf of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist 
economic system). 
 The conflict over working-class strategy, whether it should be 
reform and participation within the state or revolution and 
establishment of a new proletarian state and a socialist economic 
system was present in the working-class movement all along. The 
Communist Party (after its creation in 1923) argued that strikes 
should be gradually politicized and developed into a battle over 
state power. The youth organization (Ungdomsfylkingen) in the 
Labour Party agitated for strikes among soldiers, because the 
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 The Liberal Party, Venstre, was an active supporter of public arbitration between labour 
and capital. The Conservative Party, Høyre, was always sceptical of 'democracy' including 
'parliamentary democracy', afraid that a popular majority should rule, limiting the freedom of 
the market and the individual. The interest organizations were deemed politically important 
precisely as defenders of specific interests against a threatening majority rule through the 
Storting (Seip 1980). The Labour Party favoured a close cooperation between unions and 
government, given the existence of a Labour government. 
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military served only the interests of the bourgeoisie and was most 
prominently directed at keeping the Norwegian working class in 
place as labour for capital. Military defence of national sovereignty 
was an important, but secondary function. The Labour party 
syndicalist leadership disagreed with the Communist Party strategy. 
It did not want to turn the strikes into contests for state power. Its 
strategy was to use the strikes to strengthen the unions and then use 
the unions and the general strike to establish proletarian political 
power and public ownership in the economy. The Party should, 
according to the syndicalists, have a subordinate role in a 
revolutionary storm on the state. The party should limit itself to 
coordinating work in the unions and representing the class in the 
parliamentary organs. Thus, according to the syndicalists, 
centralism was not needed in the party organization. It was the 
class's own general strike that was the potent revolutionary weapon. 
But was it? Was the organized strength of the class in a general 
strike enough to overcome the power of the bourgeoisie organized 
through and by the state and supported by a large private capitalist 
economic and corporative structure? 
 Towards the end of the decade the militant working-class actions 
subsided and the reformist strategy gained strength in the labour 
movement. A last spurt of class legislation, which perhaps would 
have been more understandable in 1922, was passed in 1927. Since 
1915 there had been a rule, mentioned earlier, of peace in the tariff 
period. As was common in Norwegian jurisprudence, the accuser 
had to prove that the accused had breached the law, in this case that 
the peace agreement had been breached. In 1927 that rule was 
turned around. Now the accused had to prove their 'innocence'. In 
1927 the Storting also decided that it was illegal to give support to 
workers taking part in a strike that the Labour Court had deemed 
illegal. 
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 Still worse, from the labour movement's point of view, was the 
change in the civil law, paragraph 222. According to the new 222 it 
was illegal to make public the names of strike-breakers and to 
hamper them from taking the strike-hit jobs. That was too much, 
even for the reformist labour movement in Norway. In an ongoing 
strike in 1928, which had been termed illegal by the Labour Court, 
the AFL published lists of names of both striking workers and 
strike-breakers. In 1929 the Ministry of Social Affairs suggested 
that paragraph 222 should be prolonged for another two years. The 
Storting, however, backed down and returned to the old rule, 59 
votes for, 37 against. 
 Reformism in the labour movement may have favoured a 
bureaucratization of its leadership, with less room for open debate 
and popular, democratic decision-making. Leif Longum (1986)161 
has recorded criticism against the Labour Party newspaper 
Arbeiderbladet from radical writers, writers who had every respect 
for the labour movement and working-class demands in the 1920's 
and 1930's. Trond Hegna wrote in 1934 against the elimination of 
controversial articles from the Labour Party paper (Mot Dag 
21/1934). Edvard Bull and Olav Scheflo supported him. Helge Krog 
wrote that another (liberal bourgeois) newspaper Dagbladet was the 
only paper that allowed real, radical debate. 
 
 "Skavlan's importance in Dagbladet is, as mentioned earlier, that the paper under his 
leadership has become the natural, and in fact the only, arena for frank discussions of radical 
ideas, even discussions of socialist ideas. Dagbladet has been the open arena. Seen from a 
socialist point of view Dagbladet has had one fault: its basically liberalistic point of view. 
And here is where Arbeiderbladet has failed. It has not, from a socialist point of view, 
created an open arena with freedom to both sides." (Longum 1986:94) 
 
Martin Tranmæl, editor of Arbeiderbladet - answered, it is tempting 
to say, in a traditional power-wielding way, attacking the author, not 
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 Nina Juell brought this book to my attention. 
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the question. In Longum's words: "Tranmæl rejected all criticisms. 
In a comment in Arbeiderbladet 12.4.1933 he wrote that the article 
on the Labour Party cultural policy, written by that "eminent 
hysterical person Helge Krog" in Dagbladet, was of no interest 
beyond "characterizing its author"" (Longum 1986:95). 
 The dilemma between the ability to learn against the need to 
wield power, the dilemma between mobilization and control, 
between the ability to understand and define new situations, new 
identities and goals and the need to wield power in politics, on the 
basis of a well-defined identity specified goals, is perhaps common 
to all organizing; it is a dilemma in most organizations (Gran 1988). 
Given that the criticism of the labour movement by Helge Krog and 
others was valid, it is possible to see the closure, the 
bureaucratization as the result of the unification of the movement 
around a reformist ideology. On the one hand the opposition within 
the organization was silenced. That in itself makes closure 'natural'. 
But the reformist ideology itself favours closure. Reformism is by 
definition uneasy with or even foreign to the existence of 
ideological controversy. The reformist ideology assumes that basic 
contradictions are solved within the existing state system by a 
piecemeal method, implementing reforms within the existing rules 
for policy-making, gaining a majority for the suggestions before 
they are implemented, etc. In this sense it is not surprising that 
Tranmæl attacked people and not programmes. The programmatic 
debate was no longer really legitimate within the movement. 
 
 
UNIONIZATION IN AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
 
In the last part of the 1930's the semi-proletarian workers in 
agriculture and forestry started fighting for their right to organize. 
They met opposition from the land owners and large farmers, an 
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opposition that led to conflicts. One of these conflicts was at 
Julussa, where the workers had created a union and where the 
employers would not even meet with its leaders. The timber floaters 
blocked the river. The government mobilized police and soldiers to 
break the blockade. Only gradually did the workers win the right to 
organize. The same kind of conflict, concerning both the right to 
organize and better pay, occurred in other places between 1927 and 
1929, for example the Austmarka conflict and, the largest of them, 
the Randsfjord conflict. By the mid-1930's workers in agriculture 
and forestry had won about the same rights of organization as the 
urban industrial workers, but their wage level was lower. The 
battles fought in the Norwegian countryside for the right to organize 
put this section of the working class into or quite close to the 
Labour Party. It became an important part of the power base of the 
Labour Party.  
 As T.H. Marshall (1949) has suggested, the battle for the right to 
organize is an element in the working-class struggle for citizenship. 
In the struggles mentioned here, the workers met a first line of 
opposition from the employers, the big farmers and forest owners. 
In the rich agricultural areas in the Southeast some of the farm 
owners were rather sympathetic to the authoritarian (Nazi) 
movement that was gaining strength in Europe. Both political 
parties and economic interest organizations were in their view an 
illegitimate element in the capitalist system. An argument used 
against interest organizations was that they intervened illegitimately 
in the process "of natural selection" of leaders. This authoritarian 
movement was aggressive in the 1930's, as this editorial in the 
farmers' paper Nationen (The Nation) on workers' strikes testifies: 
 
 "Tear down what intelligence and ability has built ... If our authorities had tackled the 
problem [the labour movement] at its root, used military force, given the bandits what they 
deserve and put their leaders in jail, then we would have had peace and quiet in our 
country... After this [after the workers were allowed to organize] we farmers know who we 
can trust. Only ourselves. And then we must act. We must organize in all rural communities. 
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If the Communists attempt to mingle with us - chase them. If they see red we shall bloody 
their noses. Be ready for action!" (Ousland and Skar, 1949, vol.2:530) 
 
What role did the state play? Generally the state supported the 
employers in these first confrontations. But into the 1930's and as 
the labour movement became explicitly independent of the Soviet 
Union (except for the relatively small Communist Party) and 
increasingly reformist, the labour organizations were gradually 
accepted as legitimate participants in the political process. It seems 
that the employer organizations were active initiators of anti-labour 
public policy in the early 1920's, but that the state transformed or 
expanded the political initiatives into laws that in no simple sense 
were direct expressions of employer interests. As the general 
acceptance of the reformist labour movement increased, the 
employers' opposition to unionization in the rich farm areas north of 
Oslo took on an anachronistic character. The state increasingly 
required that the employers accept the labour organizations. The 
Keynesian perspective on the role of the state, a state that actively 
integrates all participants and all sectors in the economy into a 
balanced, expanding capitalism, was on the rise. 
 
 
THE STATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION AND 
EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM IN THE INTERWAR 
PERIOD 
 
In the last part of the nineteenth century, capitalism was on the rise 
in Norway, penetrating into the cities and into the rural areas, into 
agriculture. That process meant the eradication of dependent 
peasants-crofters, and technological modernization in all sectors of 
the economy. My thesis is that in the first part of the twentieth 
century capitalism extended its economic grip on Norwegian 
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society, with effects on the organizational, state and cultur-
al/ideological levels of society. 
 This consolidation/expansion of capitalism was achieved in at 
least three ways: 
 (1) Through a more vigorous imperialist penetration. 
International capital was invested in many sectors of industry and 
finance, not without some Norwegian control and benefits for the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie. This development of a national bourgeoisie 
meant disintegration of what was left of pre-capitalist modes of 
production in agriculture, manufacture and handicrafts.  (2) Not 
unrelated to that penetration was the process of technological 
innovation. Most strikingly in the electro-metallurgical industry, but 
also in forestry, agriculture and sea and land transport.162 This 
process also reduced the resistance of pre-capitalist modes of 
production which lacked this technological dynamic. 
 (3) Lastly there was the process of infrastructural expansion, a 
process of differentiation and integration of communication systems 
(in the broad meaning of the term). Roads and railway, coastal 
transport systems and international shipping expanded, making the 
transformation to capitalism possible. Because of this expansion, 
banking, finance and trade transactions, which are unproductive 
functions for capital as a whole, accounted for more of the total 
labour force.163 
 Those were changes in the forces of production. The relations of 
production also changed, mainly through the monopolization 
process. Big firms acquired market power and could, through 
policy-making, at least marginally, change the functioning of the 
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 This process was related to the development of scientific institutions in Norway, the 
creation of the College of Technology in 1910, the development of the natural and technical 
sciences at the universities in Bergen and Oslo. 
     163
 4% in 1900; 4.2% in 1910; 5.6% in 1920 and 6.1% in 1930 (and 1950) - see the Appendix. 
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market to their advantage. This strengthened the power of the 
employers relative to the labour organizations.  
 In the first half of the twentieth century the main classes actively 
developed their class organizations. The labour movement created 
unions to defend wages and battle over questions of political 
strategy and state theory, a battle that resulted in a proliferation of 
party organizations in the 1920's. On the bourgeois side the 
employers' organizations were strengthened and a number of 
militant organizations (like Society Help and Society Defence) were 
created, in addition to elite organizations (like Fedrelandslaget).  
 Most significant was the new role of the state relative to the class 
organizations. On the one hand the workers' organizations were 
integrated into the state system. Around the turn of the century 
citizen rights were expanded. Voting rights were extended to 
women and to all adult persons irrespective of capital ownership. 
Representatives elected on the Labour Party ballot were voted into 
the Storting. Unions were gradually accepted into the wage 
bargaining process, both at the employer and at the state levels. 
 The state established a new relationship with the reformist part of 
the labour movement. The relationship represented a formal 
democratization, that is, more people and organizations acquired the 
right to participate in decision-making (voting, bargaining; legal, 
political and administrative decision-making, etc.) But my 
interpretation is that these rights had backward effects on the 
processes of class formation and class organization. Formal 
democratization supported reformist ideas in the working class and 
reinforced reformism in the labour movement. Bureaucratization of 
the state and the large labour organizations worked selectively to 
eliminate radical ideas and policies from the organization agendas. 
 Some parts of the bourgeoisie saw the advantages of the new 
class cooperation within the state. Other sections feared it. They 
initiated new class organizations that transcended or at least 
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threatened the limits of the parliamentary system and were ready to 
introduce or support more elitist types of leadership (Seip 1980, 
Danielsen 1984). 
 An array of new problems confronted the state apparatus in the 
first part of the twentieth century. In the previous century the 
problem was the transformation of an agricultural society. Now 
industrial capitalism was established. The Norwegian state had to 
expand into the administration of infrastructures, widen definitions 
of citizenship and political participation, engage in initiating and 
regulating loans to Norwegian industry, support Norwegian capital 
on international markets, regulate the activities of the large 
companies that gained market power, take on detailed 
administration of the whole economy during the war years, and 
manage wage conflicts. 
 With the change from the bureaucratic state (embetsmannsstaten) 
to the parliamentary state and the change from a state mainly 
focused on law and order to a state actively engaged in 
infrastructural development, I have suggested that the state 
organization developed a new kind of autonomy. From having 
autonomy in the administration of law and order, or instrumental 
autonomy, the state increasingly developed programme autonomy. 
That is the state became an independent policy maker. Small-scale, 
subsistence agriculture in the first half of the nineteenth century had 
no need for an active state. The bureaucracy had a law-and-order 
function, extracting taxes for its own upkeep and administering 
elementary infrastructural functions. The peasants related reactively 
to the state, defending their interests when the tax burden became 
too heavy. This changed with capitalism. The state took on the 
management of infrastructures on a national scale. New 
professionals penetrated into the state administration. Building 
infrastructures meant looking at the productive and technical 
relations between actors in the economy, thus changing the state - 
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society relation. The state did not only control and tax farmers and 
workers. It brought economic and technical resources into the 
economy. The state took on productive activities. The new working 
class could in addition to a police/tax state see an entrepreneurial 
state, one that engaged in services advantageous to all in the modern 
economy. In that sense it appeared also more democratic. 
Entrepreneurs, farmers and workers gradually developed a proactive 
relation to the state. It could be influenced to serve specific group 
and societal interests. It was important to gain representation within 
the state and to develop schools and colleges within specific sectors 
of the economy so that a group could gain a voice in the 
increasingly active and professionalized state administration.  
 The new parliamentary state acquired administrative 
responsibilities in "all sectors". It had infrastructural functions in the 
economy, regulating functions in the class struggle, and 
organizational functions in developing the state organization proper, 
in acquiring the professional knowledge needed for this varied set 
of administrative tasks, and in organizing a decision-making process 
that had capital-supportive outcomes. 
 While in the last part of the nineteenth century the state 
implemented a programme aimed at expanding the arena for 
individual capitalist, market-related activity, the first part of the 
twentieth century was characterized, by the state intervening 
autonomously into the bourgeois class, regulating its activities and 
developing economic and social programmes that ultimately would 
(or should) serve the expansion of capitalism. This intervention in 
bourgeois class affairs nurtured reformist ideas in the working class. 
The state was obviously not a simple instrument in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie.  
 Given that formal democratization of the Norwegian state had 
advanced in the early years of the twentieth century and that the 
development towards programme autonomy was progressing, did 
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that mean that in acute crisis situations the state would retain its 
traits of democracy and autonomy? Let me develop an answer to 
that question through the second case study, the political conflict 
between the state, the labour movement and the financial elite over 
the rescue of a large faltering private bank in the early 1920's. 
13 







      The Trade Bank affair. 
      Finance capital 
      in the state apparatus 
 
 
      "Experience proves that the bourgeoisie does not hesitate to break the law 
or the Constitution when its class interests are threatened." (From the 
Labour Party Programme, 1927, cited in Magdahl 1979) 
 
 
     In the weekend of 26-27 May 1923, the Norwegian 
Government met with top leaders of the three largest private 
banks,164 and the leader of the national bank, Norges Bank. The 
meeting agreed that NOK 25 mill. was to be transferred to the 
failing Trade Bank. The government agreed to transfer the money 
without a decision in government and without informing or 
consulting with the Storting. 
 Even with this extraordinary government support, the Trade Bank 
did not survive. About a year after receiving state support 
clandestinely, the Trade Bank was put under government 
administration. The Bank was bankrupt. Why? What had happened? 
In January 1925 the government's parliamentary report was 
published (Stortingsmelding 12, 1925) and the clandestine support 
became public knowledge. There was a demand for a Court of 
Impeachment (Dagbladet, 5 January 1925). The opposition in the 
Storting demanded impeachment. Impeachment was approved in 
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 Bergens Privatbank, Den norske Creditbank, Christiania Bank og Kredittkasse. 
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July 1926. The Court laboured through investigations and evidence 
for about a year, after which the government, surprisingly, was 
acquitted. 
 The court procedure set in motion a process of data collection 
about the bank sector and its relations to government that made 
insight into the details of the interaction possible.165 
 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
I want to use the evidence gathered by the Court and the National 
Bank Investigation Committee to answer the following question: 
what autonomy did the state have relative to the elite of finance 
capitalists and to the labour movement leadership in the Trade Bank 
affair? What role did the financial elite play in government 
decision-making? In the relatively deep economic and political 
crisis of the early 1920's, and in the actual affair, did the state (a) 
follow the rules of the Constitution? (b) allow for participation from 
all interested parties? and (c) work out compromises within existing 
law? 
 I will approach the problem by studying the action models of 
central decision-makers, the values embedded in the organizational 
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 This material has been only cursorily investigated by historians. It is presented in two large 
protocols from the Court. One contains the transcript of the proceedings in Court (RRTF), from 
the day the Court was set in up the Lagting room in the Storting on 3 September 1926, through 
to its last day, 7 months later, on 25 March 1927. The proceedings cover 2146 pages. The other 
protocol contains documentation presented to the Court (RRTD), six notebooks (notated as 
volumes in the following) and the investigation report (innb), produced by a commission set up 
and monitored by the National Bank. It is a detailed material. The Workers' Encyclopedia 
(AL:882), wrote about the affair: "It represents one of the most important materials for 
understanding political and socioeconomic processes in Norway in the decade after the War." 
Many historians have commented on the Trade Bank affair, but, as far as I know, only Jan 
Støren (1971) has written systematically about it. I will therefore leave out the year in references 
to Støren and give only the page. The affair was widely discussed in the press at the time. I will 
limit myself to the articles presented as evidence in the Court. Emil Stang, a central 
lawyer/politician at the time, wrote an article on the affair in 1926 (Stang 1926). 
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structures in both government and the bank sector, and the relations 
between the central state institutions, the Storting, the Court of 
Impeachment and the state administration. 
 A thesis is that finance capital and government operated together 
in the Trade Bank affair, suppressing the interests of the labour 
movement, the small shareholders and customers. The financial 
elite had the initiative, but the role of the state cannot for that reason 
be reduced to a simple extension of the subjective interests of the 
finance capital elite.  
 A methodological tenet informing the following analysis is that, 
to the extent that such functionality exists between the private and 
the public sector, it will manifest itself most clearly when the 
system is in crisis (Offe 1976). In crisis situations it is more difficult 
to defend special interest policies in terms of general public needs. 
 I will look into the constitutionality of the government support to 
the bank. Did an anti-parliamentarian action model among central 
government members legitimate breaching the constitutional order? 
I will limit my analysis to the arguments presented by the defence 
and the prosecutors and to the Court's verdict. 
 A second thesis is that the government breached the Constitution. 
The government acted against the constitutional rule, paragraph 75, 
stating that the Storting approves all use of public monies. The 
government, and especially the prime minister, Abraham Berge, 
acted on the basis of an authoritarian, anti-parliamentary conception 




My aim is to clarify the role of the state in the Trade Bank affair, as 
it took form in the banks and the state and as it was reacted to by the 
labour movement. I am interested in how institutions constitute and 
set limits on action models, how action models guide and organize 
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actions and how and under what conditions actions conform to or 
transcend the institutional structures. I will search for the action 
models (Jacobsen 1964, Silverman 1970, Gran 1985) employed by 
the central decision-makers, that is, their conceptions of problems, 
definitions of situations, of legitimate/illegitimate participants in 
decision-making and types of reasonable solutions. As Charles Tilly 
has suggested, actions are seldom generated by individuals in 
isolation. Action strategies are formed through interactions, where 
persons adjust to each other and form coalitions. Tilly, with 
reference to Elster (1985), suggests that game theory may help us 
understand the character of those interactions. "What we need, 
however, is better means of moving from the action of a single 
person or group taken in isolation, to rational interaction among two 
or more actors" (Tilly 1984a:30). 
 Organizations can be seen as systems of decision-making rules, 
(laws and regulations, formal divisions of labour horizontally and 
hierarchically, job definitions, salary structures, etc.), structures that 
influence action models and that support values through their 
selectivity. Alberto Melucci (1985) defines actions in organizations: 
 
 "Action has to be viewed as an interplay of aims, resources and obstacles, as a purposive 
orientation which is set up within a system of opportunities and constraints ... That is why 
the organization becomes a critical point of observation, an analytical level too often 
underestimated or reduced to formal structures. The way the ... actors set up their action is 
the concrete link between orientations and systemic opportunities/constraints."  
 
 
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
CAPITAL INTERESTS IN THE TRADE BANK 
 
The Trade Bank was created in 1917 by a merger between two 
small banks, Trondhjems Handelsbank166 and a bank in Christiania 
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 First established in 1885 in Trondhjem, with Patrick Volckmar as manager. Professor Rolf 
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(now Oslo) called "Privatbanken for Norge". It catered for the large 
amounts of free floating finance capital that the Norwegian 
bourgeoisie had accumulated from lucrative shipping operations 
during the war. The bourgeoisie had difficulty in finding profitable 
investments in the postwar economy. New and potentially 
innovative banks quickly received large inputs of finance capital.167 
In 1916 Trondhjem's Handelsbank increased its capital assets from 
NOK 5 bill. to 16 bill. The Christiania bank, Privatbanken, was new 
and small. But it was important for the manager of the Handelsbank 
in Trondheim, Mr Volckmar, to break into the financial circles in 
the capital. Through the merger with Privatbanken he achieved that 
goal. The new Trade Bank was created. 
 The established commercial banks in Christiania met the 
'speculative' Trade Bank with scepticism. But the managing director 
Volckmar was trusted by the Liberal government and in finance 
circles. The prime minister, Gunnar Knudsen, had used Volckmar in 
international financial negotiations. Volckmar was invited to a 
financial congress in 1919, at which both John Maynard Keynes 
and the Swedish capitalist, Marcus Wallenberg, participated.168 
                                                                                                              
Danielsen (1958) presents a detailed study of the bank. 
     167
 As demonstrated in Figure 10.3, the number of independent commercial banks in Norway 
increased to an absolute maximum of 200 in 1918. 
     168
 Information given by Arne Sunde in the Trondheim newspaper Nidaros, January 1923 
(RRTD vol.4:59). 
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 The Trade Bank expanded in its first years of operation. In 1918 
it controlled NOK 25 bill. It drew a profit of NOK 7.3 mill. and 
gave 14% on its shares. Gradually members of the established 
bourgeoisie joined its management. From 1917 the industrial 
entrepreneur Sam Eyde headed the board, followed in 1920 by 
General Jens Bratlie and in 1923 by consul and parliamentary 
president of the Right Party, Ivar Lykke. By 1922 the bank's 
management was a broad coalition of industrial managers, 
shipowners, lawyers, high-ranking military officers and former 
members of government. As noted in the case of banks in Tønsberg, 
the bank's board became an arena for coordinating activities 
between companies and institutions in both the private and the 
public sector. Some members of the board were known for their 
extreme right-wing ideological leanings.169 The Bank expanded 
through new mergers with smaller regional banks.170 But the 
mergers, it has been suggested, contained the seeds of the bank's 
decline. The Trade Bank did not bother to make serious investiga-
tions into the regional banks. The placement of the ever larger 
financial assets became more difficult. But Volckmar was 
unconventional. The bank invested widely in Norway, especially in 
fisheries. It invested abroad, in Germany and the USA. In 1923, 40 
foreign banks had accounts with the Trade Bank. The most 
important international connection was with the Hambro Bank in 
London. That Bank's representative in Norway, Karl Knudsen, told 
the Court of Impeachment that the Hambro Bank was active among 
Norwegian banks: "There is probably not a bank of some 
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 Examples were Henrik Ameln, Bergen, who in 1933 was head of the Conservative Party 
when it entered into an electoral coalition with "Nasjonal Samling", the explicitly Nazi-
supporting party, and Johan Throne Holst, the manager of the large Freia Chocolate Company, 
who, according to Støren:31, took part in organizing Nasjonal Samling and introduced Vidkun 
Quisling into Norwegian financial circles. 
     170
 Like Kristiansunds Handels og Landmannsbank, Bergens Handelsbank, with the Henrik 
Ameln at the head of the board, Sønnenfjeldske Privatbank and Røros og Opplands Privatbank. 
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importance in Norway, both in the capital and in the provinces, that 
we do not have quite an intimate relation to" (RRTF:556). The 
Trade Bank was a node in a broad network of banks, both in 
Norway and internationally; competition is a part of capitalism. So 
is the opposite, organized cooperation on questions of finance and 
investment of capital. 
 In March 1923 the Storting passed a law on state administration 
of failing banks. The law gave banks "under administration" the 
right to freeze accounts, while they still could accept new deposits. 
The state guaranteed the new inputs. The law required a state-
controlled management of the administered banks. Several banks 
used this opportunity. In 1923 alone, 30 banks were put "under 
administration" (Støren 1971:9). In 1923 the Trade Bank was under 
heavy pressure from its investors. Bankruptcy loomed. However, in 
this situation the management of the Trade Bank chose a different 
strategy. It used contacts in the state to avoid administration. 
 
 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
The postwar economic decline 
Because the Trade Bank was built mainly on speculative capital 
accumulated during the war, the economic decline from early 1921 
had a serious impact. Through 1920 the economy was booming. 
Mean wages in industry increased from NOK 11.70 in 1918 to 
NOK 18.62 in 1921 (RRTD vol.4:7). But then the decline set in. 
The accumulated finance capital and the international credits 
disappeared (see Figure 10.6 on foreign debt). Incomes from 
shipping, which reached NOK 1.3 bill. in 1920, were NOK 540 
mill. in 1921 and NOK 460 mill. in 1923 (Furre 1971:304). Less 
capital flowed into bank accounts, and less was lent. The banks lent 
out NOK 4 bill. in 1920 and NOK 2.6 bill. in 1923 (RRTD 
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vol.6:15). Hermod Skånland has described the effect of the 
economic decline on the banks: 
 
 "... loans from private commercial banks increased by leaps and bounds between 1914 and 
1920. The loans were mainly in the form of short-term credits. The reduction in company 
profits [from the end of 1920] made it difficult to repay loans. There was a run on the banks. 
The downturn in the price level reduced the nominal value of the securities the companies 
had put up for the loans." (Skånland 1967:148) 
 
Sharper class conflicts 
Unemployment increased from the end of 1920. In June 1921, 
45 000 were registered unemployed. In 1922 the number rose to 
69 000 (RRTD h6:10). The working class reacted against lay-offs 
and wage cuts, but without much success (Furre 1971, Ousland 
1974). The bourgeoisie, as demonstrated earlier, was well prepared 
to stave off the attacks, both through state organized, clandestine 
strike-breaking, and direct use of police and military force. At the 
same time the debate about revolutionary strategies raged within the 
labour movement, especially about membership in Comintern and 
the 21 Moscow theses (Langfeldt 1961, Fure 1983). Even though 
the Labour Party joined the Third International, it seems correct to 
say that, as the economic decline set in and the working class was 
set on the defensive, the reformist strategy gained ground. The 
ideological conflict affected the labour movement's relations to 
finance capital and the banks. Reformists tended to view the banks 
as technically necessary, but often in need of new leaders and state 
control. The communists on the other hand tended to view the banks 
as the command posts of the bourgeoisie in the economy. 
 
 
STATE SUPPORT FOR THE TRADE BANK 
 
The decision 
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Just after the approval of the "bank administration law" in 1923, two 
large banks171 collapsed. Even in international financial circles that 
created some anxiety. The law may have made it difficult for 
investors to get their money out of failing Norwegian banks. Karl 
Knudsen approached the Government and suggested that it should 
avoid taking banks into administration and that foreign investors 
should be exempted from the closing of accounts (RRTF:556). The 
decision of 26-27 May 1923 allotted NOK 25 mill. in government 
bonds to the Trade Bank. That support automatically gave the bank 
the right to borrow up to NOK 35 mill. more from Norges Bank. 
The meeting decided that the NOK 25 mill. should be transferred 
clandestinely. Not only should the decision be kept secret from the 
Storting and not presented for discussion in the government. It 
should be listed in a secret protocol in the Ministry of Finance, 
under the personal responsibility of head of department 
(ekspedisjonssjef) Lorentz Smitt. 
 At the meeting the government also decided that it should issue a 
statement about Norwegian banking, reassuring the public that the 
banks were safe money holders and that no crisis was pending. The 
statement contained the following points: "Taking two large banks 
into administration has created some uneasiness, in Norway and 
internationally. However, false rumours have been spread that 
Norway is near a financial collapse. There have been meetings 
between the large banks, Norges Bank and the government to 
review the situation. The meetings have concluded that there is no 
cause for concern. However, the public should know that if large 
banks get into trouble the government will support them. Banks that 
are basically solvent will get government support." This statement 
was widely publicized in the press, both in Norway and 
internationally. Karl Knudsen was pleased. The statement was 
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useful for two reasons. It didn't say that support had actually been 
given from public coffers. Such information would only have 
fuelled the scepticism internationally and in the labour movement. It 
confirmed that reserves were available and that they would be used 
in case of crisis. The Conservative parliamentarian, member of the 
Finance Committee in the Storting and businessman, Mr. Astrup, 
expressed his delight at hearing the statement: 
 
 "Day by day our worry increased. If I can put it this way, we listened nervously to the 
feverish breathing of our sick society. The economy was on the brink of collapse. Then the 
government statement came on 28 May, 1923. I'll never forget the impression it made and 
the peace of mind it created." (Støren:96). 
 
The effects: money to the large investors 
What were the effects of the government support of the Trade 
Bank? The effect of the public statement seemed to be that small 
investors and ordinary account holders felt reassured. The large 
investors, and amongst them the other major banks, continued 
withdrawing their money from the Trade Bank. The Investigation 
Commission, set up by Norges Bank 8 December 1924, said about 
the withdrawals: "large inputs in Oslo had been reduced from NOK 
79 to 17 million in the defined period. Of these 17 million, 8 million 
belonged to public institutions ... The other large investors had 
therefore removed practically all of their assets" (RRTDinnb:35).  
 As a result, the clandestine government input into the Trade Bank 
quickly vanished. The bank undertook a number of quasi-operations 
to improve the situation and its public image. The number of shares 
was increased, but largely by the bank itself buying them. New loan 
guarantees were given to the bank by an institution called "The 
Emission Institute". The later investigation of the bank showed that 
the Institute was a division within the bank itself. The Trade Bank 
entered investments in the Soviet Union as assets in its accounts, 
investments that long ago had been nationalized. 
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 4 April, 1924, the Labour paper, Arbeiderbladet, published an 
article about the Trade Bank. It was written by the labour leader, 
Martin Tranmæl. It said that the value of the shares was decreasing 
rapidly and that the bank was in serious trouble. The article 
triggered hectic activity in finance circles and in the state financial 
administration. The Trade Bank immediately suggested that it 
should have more money. But now Norges Bank was sceptical. Its 
reserves were being depleted. It therefore wanted to involve the 
Storting in the matter. That way the responsibility for eventual 
problems would not rest with the National Bank alone. The 
manager of Norges Bank, Nicolai Rygg, was also ideologically 
involved. He felt that confidence in Norges Bank was essential for 
the stability of capitalism in Norway.  
 The prime minister, Abraham Berge, followed Rygg's counsel. 
On 7 April the Storting met behind closed doors. Berge suggested 
that the Trade Bank should receive NOK 15 mill. in support, a 
suggestion that was approved by 79 to 62 votes (the Storting had 
150 members at that time). However, neither Abraham Berge, nor 
any other member of government, nor Ivar Lykke, who presided 
over the Storting meeting, made any mention of the earlier support 
of NOK 25 mill. 
 In July 1924, the Mowinckel minority government (Liberal 
Party) was installed, with Arnold Holmboe as Finance Minister. Did 
the new government disclose and halt the Trade Bank support, 
demonstrating that the clandestine support was an idiosyncratic trait 
of the Berge government? Not at all. The Mowinckel government 
continued to honour the Trade Bank bonds. In other words, there 
was broad unity in the bourgeois political camp on the support to 
the Trade Bank. 
 By 1924 the Trade Bank was bankrupt and put under government 
administration. In 1925 the clandestine support became public 
 State intervention  230 
 
knowledge. In 1926 a Court of Impeachment was set in motion. The 
Trade Bank affair was put on the regular agenda of the state.  
 
 
THE COURT OF IMPEACHMENT. 
WAS THE SUPPORT FOR THE BANK 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
 
How did the prosecutors and the defence, and the members of the 
different political parties, view the government support of the Trade 
Bank? What did the Court decide? First, some words on the 
organization of the Court of Impeachment. 
 
The organization of the Court of Impeachment 
Most of the Court members were politicians, recruited from the 
Lagting, one of the Storting's two houses. The other house of the 
Storting, the Odelsting, decides on whether a case should be raised. 
Justices of the Supreme Court are a minority of the Court. In 
September 1926, when the Court of Impeachment first met, the 
rules were still such that the accused (in casu the Berge 
government) could remove one-third of the Court's political 
members.172 In the Berge case, this led to the removal of all the 
Labour Party members from the Court. Thus, when the Court met, it 
had 25 members, 16 parliamentarians and 9 Supreme Court justices. 
Of the 16 parliamentarians, 9 were members of the Conservative 
Party (Høyre), who unanimously supported the government's 
actions, 4 were from the Farmers' Party (Bondepartiet), 1 from the 
Liberal Party and 2 from the Social Democrats. The accused prime 
minister, Abraham Berge, "felt the Court was a haven". 
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 "But I want to add, that now that the case is being tested here, it is, compared with the fierce 
battles in the press, good to be here. Here I know that the case, in all its aspects, will be 
evaluated and judged objectively. And with that I am content." (RRTF:87) 
 
The defence 
The government's defence admitted that supporting the Trade Bank 
with NOK 25 mill., bypassing the Storting (twice), was at odds with 
the letter of the Constitution and with normal constitutional practice. 
However, taking the critical political situation into consideration, 
the action was defendable on the grounds of extra-constitutional 
legality (nødrett). The Constitution does not explicitly mention that 
principle, but the defence argued that political practice, both in 1905 
and during the First World War, documented the existence of such a 
principle. The defence adopted the government's own argument: 
letting the Trade Bank collapse could have been the incident that 




The Prosecution did not accept that the political situation in 1923 
and 1924 was such that total collapse of the state and a revolution 
were imminent. That was a cover-up argument. What the 
government knew, but could not say, was that the support was a 
way of bailing big capital out of the sinking Trade Bank. The bank 
administration law, just approved by the Storting, was intended to 
avoid such use of public funds. The law was meant as an organized 
way of dismantling failing banks, not a way of supporting their 
continued existence. Here was a reason why the government had to 
bypass the Storting. It wanted to act contrary to both the 
constitutional law and the intentions of the bank administration law. 
One of the prosecutors, Schjødt, argued that the government, with 
its support of the Trade Bank, demonstrated its only partial and 
conditional support of the Constitution.  
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 "Looking at the Trade Bank affair as a whole, it is obvious that the Berge government, in the 
existing political situation, considered the constitutional rules on the power of the Storting as 
useless and invalid. It was then necessary and commendable to ignore, even bypass it. 
(RRTF:1248) ... What characterizes the government action is that the Storting was bypassed 
with the explicit argument that it would be politically dangerous to raise the question of the 
Trade Bank support there. Therefore, the government argues, it was in the interests of 
'society' to bypass the Storting." (RRTF:1873). 
 
Both prosecution and defence agreed that the clandestine support 
was against the letter of the Constitution. The disagreement 
concerned the more sociological question of whether the relative 
strength of the social classes in Norway was such that a Trade Bank 
bankruptcy could have led to a revolution. The government acted on 
the assumption that support to finance capital was more important 
than strictly following constitutional rules and letting the Storting 
and the labour movement representatives in on the decision-making.  
 
The verdict 
The verdict was acquittal, based on a formality: too much time had 
passed between the action and adjudication. A major reason for the 
time taken to get through the matter was, of course, the length of the 
judicial process itself. The correctness of deeming the case outdated 
was ambiguous. There was no explicit rule defining how much time 
could pass before a case was obsolete. By mistake no decision had 
been made on that question. A suggested 10-year rule had for an 
unknown reason been dropped from the law-making process. 
Therefore, the Court majority argued, the one-year rule common in 
civilian cases should be applied. This clarification took place just 
days before final verdict. Even so, acquittal only just made it in the 
Court: 13 voted for, 12 against. 
 The minority of 12 said that bypassing the Storting in April 1924 
was unconstitutional. 6 of the 9 Supreme Court justices were 
members of that minority. On this point acquittal was secured by 
 The trial  233 
 
the smallest possible margin. Bearing in mind that the Court was 
'stacked' from the very beginning, this bare acquittal supports the 
idea of the unconstitutionality of the government support for the 
Trade Bank. It was (and is) the Storting that should decide on the 
use of public funds. 
 On one other question the Court gave the government more 
substantial backing: 17 stated that it was not a breach of the 
Constitution to use a separate and clandestine protocol to prevent 
the decision from appearing on the agenda of the Protocol 
Committee in the Storting. 
 
 
THE SELECTIVE ROLE OF THE STATE 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
The institutionalization of Abraham Berge's action model 
When in May 1923 the government decided to support the Trade 
Bank, Abraham Berge was Finance minister in the Halvorsen 
government.173 Berge was 72 at the time, and had since 1912 been 
prefect (fylkesmann) in Vestfold province. He was a school teacher 
and became active in politics at the national level in 1892, as a 
member of the Liberal Party (Venstre). Through his participation in 
politics he gradually developed a more conservative stance. He got 
involved in Christian Michelsen's programme for bourgeois unity, 
above party politics, and took part in creating Frisinnede Venstre, 
which was a right-wing offshot from the Liberal Party. Berge was 
Frisinnede Venstre's first chairman. The Halvorsen government was 
a Right Party government. Why was Berge chosen to be its Minister 
of Finance? 
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 Two explanations have been suggested. The liberal newspaper, 
Dagbladet, of 8 March 1923, spoke of Berge as the Halvorsen 
government's rural alibi (Støren:40). Another explanation was his 
interest in above-party politics, his attraction to Michelsen's unity 
programme. Even if the Halvorsen government was formed over a 
conflict on wine imports from Portugal, the problems of economic 
crisis and the control of the radical working-class movement were 
the main questions confronting it. In those projects, Berge was a 
favourite in Right Party circles. 
 Berge's affinity to above-political-party-unity was demonstrated 
as early as 1909 in his evaluation of the liberal politician, Johan 
Castberg:  
 
 "I respect him as a strong man, one that weaklings have to succumb to ... I am perhaps too 
independent to join his movement, but I admire power when I see it. I know that it is a law 
of nature that weakness and indecisiveness must lose out, and I accept that the powerful 
stand on its shoulders." (St.tidende:1244, Støren:42). 
 
Berge supported parliamentary government, but, as he said, the 
roots of the Storting went deeper than the party system and party 
bickering. Politicians should have their loyalty in the roots of 
society. "The majority in political matters should not only be 
found/constructed in the Storting. It has its roots in the country 
itself." (Samtiden 1909:209; Støren (1971:43)). Berge dismissed 
public debate with the socialists, "with the revolutionaries. I shall 
not moralize over their project, but I do not consider myself obliged 
to enter into any debate with them" (Støren:44). When Berge went 
to the Storting for support for the Trade Bank, he deliberately 
avoided any discussion with representatives of the labour 
movement. "No one from the working-class parties were brought 
into the discussion, not even Hornsrud, who was secretary in the 
Storting Finance Committee" (Støren:22).  
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 Here we discern the central elements in Berge's action model: 
The working-class, socialist project was illegitimate. The political 
parties were noise in a system where the voice of the people should 
speak through strong leaders. 
 In the government this 'model' was commented on by the head of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Klingenberg: Berge decided in a 
quite dictatorial way which government members should speak in 
the Storting and what they should say. Several administrators and 
politicians suggested that he should report to the Storting the 
support given to the Trade Bank. But Berge decided against this. 
And everyone involved followed his decision, even Ivar Lykke, the 
President of the Storting. This authoritarian side of Berge was also 
hailed in the right-wing conservative paper Tidens Tegn and the 
finance journal Tidsskriftet for Bank og Finansvesen. He was 
described as "one of the great patriarchs our political culture has 
nurtured". The editor, Balchen, wrote: "One of Berge's striking 
features is that he has stuck to his position even when quite alone. 
He did not make the government collectively responsible. Nor did 
he need to build a secure coalition in the party or in the Storting 
before implementing his own decisions. Calmly, he has taken 
responsibility. He saw that one strong person had to take control" 
(Balchen 1925:22).  
 This anti-parliamentarian strand developed in the course of his 
participation in the parliamentary political system. He started his 
career as a teacher in a rural district of Southern Norway, Lyngdal, 
and was involved in the Norwegian language question on the radical 
side. He was then a member of the Liberal Party, which was in 
sharp political conflict with the Right Party and the industrial 
bourgeoisie represented there. Ideas about national unity above 
politics and strong-man leadership were not totally alien to the 
Liberal Party (Seip 1981). But it was through his contact with the 
radical labour movement and Christian Michelsen that his 
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authoritarian stance took form. Berge emerged as a traditional 
conservative (as opposed to a utilitarian conservative): Harmony in 
society should be achieved in the same way as harmony was 
achieved on the family farm, under strong patriarchal leadership. 
Berge's support in the Right Party was based in his being a strong 
and uncompromising leader of bourgeois forces against the whole 
labour movement.  
 Was this ideological movement of Berge to the right and towards 
an authoritarian stance, influenced by his experiences in the state 
apparatus? Perhaps, in the following way. The Storting has 
representatives from different social classes and categories, 
however skewed that representation might be; but it has no direct 
control of the economy. That gives the Storting its bourgeois 
character. Democracy yes, but democratic management of the 
economy, no. That is constitutionally left to the private sector. In 
Berge's thinking, the Storting should be sidestepped on some 
matters: "the real majority should be found in society." This can be 
interpreted as "the Storting should not mingle in private economic 
affairs" and thus neither into the interaction between the 
government and the Trade Bank. 
 For the petty bourgeois parties, like Venstre and Frisinnede 
Venstre, a strong state might seem less threatening than for the 
industrial/financial bourgeoisie. A strong state can defend petty 
bourgeois interests against big capital and/or the labour movement. 
The petty bourgeois position in the economy could in this sense 
foster authoritarianism. But, with working-class representatives in 
the Storting, it becomes an even more ambiguous institution for the 
whole bourgeoisie. Berge expressed that ambiguity, moving 
towards an authoritarian stance and using state administrative power 
unconstitutionally. 
 
Who had the initiative? 
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Who had the initiative in the policy-making process? Was it the 
finance capital elite or was it the government? My thesis is that it 
was the financial elite that organized the process and developed the 
policy of support in principle and in detail, with the government 
implementing it without alterations. In the financial crisis that 
followed the collapse of Fellesbanken in April 1923, the value of 
Trade Bank shares fell and a number of individuals and institutions 
approached the bank to rescue their money. In that critical situation 
Volckmar suggested that Bratlie contact the Finance Minister 
Abraham Berge to find out if the government was willing to support 
the bank. Bratlie replied to Volckmar in a letter: "Berge agreed that 
action should be taken immediately to avoid a panic and a run." 
Bratlie told Berge about meetings between the Trade Bank and 
Norges Bank. Berge agreed to arrange the necessary government 
decisions. Bratlie wrote: "Berge is open to policy suggestions to 
solve our specific problems" (RRTD vol.1:10).  
 From 22 May, the Trade Bank management put the plan into 
effect. Volckmar wrote to Nicolai Rygg at Norges Bank, telling him 
about the run on the bank and the withdrawal of about NOK 100 
mill. over the previous few days, about the falling value of the 
shares, and that the other big banks had denied the Trade Bank 
assistance. "To approach them for support seems useless." 
Volckmar tried to convince Rygg that the Trade Bank was fully 
solvent, that it had over 5000 savings accounts, 7000 shareholders 
and an important position in the Norwegian economy. "Letting the 
Trade Bank fall will be critical for the economy as a whole." The 
next day Volckmar sent Rygg a list of the 40 foreign banks with 
accounts in the Trade Bank.  
 25 May Volckmar wrote to Berge, suggesting that the 
government should keep the Trade Bank going as a private bank, 
avoiding public administration. "Letting the Bank fall could have 
drastic consequences for our economy." During the Court 
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proceedings, the prosecutor, Skogen, claimed that it was the bank 
that raised a Trade Bank collapse to the level of a national crisis 
(RRTF:1744-1748). He argued that Berge and the government acted 
in a number of other political matters without mobilizing the crisis 
perspective. "I must say, that if the government felt a total crisis was 
imminent, it is hard to find traces of that conception in any of the 
other political matters the government was engaged in at the time" 
(RRTF:1000).  
 A member of the Trade Bank board, Kristian Brøgger, was the 
bank's voice in the central state apparatus. On 25 May he sent the 
same letter to Klingenberg, to the President of the Storting, Ivar 
Lykke, and to Nicolai Rygg at Norges Bank. It described the bank's 
critical situation and painted the national crisis perspective in even 
starker terms than Volckmar had done. Letting the Trade Bank fall 
"may create a general economic collapse".  
 Brøgger's letter contained a five-point programme for 
government action.  
 (1) The Trade Bank is in trouble, but it should not be taken into 
administration.  
 (2) The four large private banks, Norges Bank and the Ministry 
of Finance should together produce a statement that could appease 
the public.  
 (3) Bank shares should be suspended from Stock Exchange 
dealing. 
 (4) The guarantee given to Fellesbanken should be restricted to a 
certain amount to limit the influx of capital to it. 
 (5) The Trade Bank should be given NOK 25 mill. in support 
clandestinely.  
 Thus, the Trade Bank leadership had a keen eye for government 
policy. Brøgger wrote to Lykke that his plan was better than a state 
guarantee, "because it can be implemented without going through 
the Storting...". 
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 The plan, as I have shown, was implemented exactly as 
suggested by the members of the Trade Bank board. The 
government was a passive but important instrument for finance 
capital. The case demonstrates that, in times of crisis, finance 
capital was able to use government power directly. At the same 
time, the labour movement was efficiently side-stepped, even when 
members of it had a fully legitimate place in the decision-making 
process (Hornsrud).  
 This material does not prove that the state apparatus is without 
autonomy. The specific functions of the state were: (a) to make 
public funds available to the Trade Bank; (b) to appease public 
unrest and stop a public run on banks; (c) to let big capital retrieve 
their investments, and, (d) to have physical force available that 
would be able to stave off militant actions from the labour 
movement.  
 In the first phase of the Trade Bank affair, state power was 
concentrated in the government apparatus. The Storting and the 
courts did not enter the process until after the Trade Bank had 
collapsed.174 
 
Action models in the state administration 
The clandestine support to the Trade Bank was known, according to 
the National Bank investigation, to about 70 high-ranking 
administrative officials and bank managers soon after the decision 
in May 1923. No one leaked the decision to the parliament or to the 
public.175 The government could in other words count on a loyal top 
                                           
     174
 Another example of the government bypassing the Storting was when the report on the 
Kings Bay Mine accident was withheld in the summer of 1963. But that time information about 
the report was picked up in political circles and a parliamentary crisis arose, leading to the 
downfall of the Social Democratic government. See Chapter 18. 
     175
 See Eckhoff and Jacobsen (1960) for a discussion of the ambiguous relationship between 
loyalty, political neutrality and professional independence in public administration. 
 The initiative  240 
 
level in the administration. Two central administrators were Lorentz 
Smitt, the head of department in the Finance Ministry, and Nicolai 
Rygg, director of Norges Bank. Smitt suspected that the 
government action was unconstitutional: "I remember that I once [in 
May 1923] mentioned for the Finance Minister [Berge], when we 
were alone, that he should confer with the head of the Finance 
Committee in the Storting [Hornsrud] or with the Storting 
Presidency. The suggestion was turned down" (RRTF:307). The 
prosecutor, Skogen, asked Smitt if he was the one who raised the 
question: "I was in the Finance Minister's office on some other 
matter; yes, it was I who raised the question" (ibid.). Smitt 
confirmed the government's motives: it wanted to avoid a general 
collapse of the economy. Clandestine support was necessary, 
because the plan would not have worked otherwise. Bypassing 
official government decision-making channels was in accord with 
earlier administrative practice during the First World War. 
 Nicolai Rygg was the central administrator in the process, as he 
was generally in government bank and finance policy-making at the 
time. The labour movement saw him as the prime agent in state 
finance policy, the spearhead of bourgeois interests in government. 
The Communist representative, Sverre Krogh, said that the working 
class had never benefited from government finance policy no matter 
whether it was managed by Venstre or Høyre, "a banking policy that 
essentially was dictated by Norges Bank." (Støren:66). The 
newspaper Arbeiderbladet felt that Rygg was the lone dictator of 
government economic policy: "We find Rygg on Kapitol, the 
dictator of state economic policy" (Sejersted 1973:12).  
 Given that Rygg identified with the aims of the bourgeoisie, what 
can be said about the sources of Rygg's action model? In his 
younger days Rygg felt affinity to socialist ideology. He came from 
a working-class family, and during his studies in economics he 
focused on social statistics, a marginal topic at that time, but a topic 
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of some relevance for the labour movement. Francis Sejersted 
(1973) proposes a structural/institutional answer to our query. Once 
in the state system, Rygg wanted to move up in the hierarchy, and 
that ambition formed him: "Rygg liked to be embraced by the 
powerholders. No doubt about that. But he, just as MacDonald in 
England, was not a class traitor. In his new position as Bank 
manager, he was exposed to institutionalized norms and 
expectations that to a large degree determined his actions" 
(Sejersted 1973:15). 
 Not that Rygg had given up his affinity to the working class. The 
point is that, as manager of the National Bank, he implemented a 
policy primarily oriented toward securing the continued functioning 
of the capitalist system. He attempted to increase the value of the 
krone, making it harder to service debts and especially the debts of 
small farmers and of the municipalities. In the Trade Bank affair he 
did not disagree with any aspect of the government's policy (taking 
part in formulating that policy himself). That meant, among other 
things, not saying a word about the affair in the Storting.  
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THE TRADE BANK AFFAIR IN THE STORTING 
 
Indirect democracy 
The parliamentary system is characterized by a specific institutional 
division of labour. The Storting should express the people's will in 
law and policy decisions. However the connections from people to 
policy are far from direct. Direct democracy in the form of 
discussion and binding decision in popular meetings is effectively 
excluded from the national parliamentary system of government 
(Hviid Nielsen 1977). What we find is a hierarchical system of 
institutions, at each level reorganizing the political process, 
sequentially limiting political participation to responsible elites. A 
separate administrative system, populated by increasingly 
specialized professionals in a complex hierarchy of decision-
making, should implement decisions made in the Storting. How did 
this system function in the Trade Bank affair? 
 A striking feature was how decision-making was limited to the 
executive branch, to the government and administration until the 
Trade Bank went bankrupt. The affair first reached the agenda of 
the Storting in April 1924. The reason was, as we have seen, that 
the National Bank wanted to involve the Storting in its own 
problems of liquidity. But only certain aspects of the support to the 
Trade Bank were revealed in the Storting. The full extent of the 
support was first made public in the parliamentary report after the 
Trade Bank bankruptcy (St.meld 12, 1925). That initiated public 
debate and eventually the government action was challenged in a 
Court of Impeachment. These two phases, first decisions only in the 
executive branch of government, then, after the bankruptcy - 
democratic decision-making, were important for the financial elite. 
In the first phase it rescued its investments from the sinking Trade 
Bank. The small investors lost their money. The general tax-payer 
contributed their share, unwittingly through the government grants 
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to the Trade Bank. In the second phase, when there was no more 
money in the Bank, the doors to democracy were opened.176 The 
strict separation of a professional bureaucracy from elected 
parliamentary organs was a structural condition for such a closed, 
extended and instrumental interaction between finance capital and 
government. If the Storting had participated more directly in 
administrative decision-making, the illegal evasion of the Storting 
would have been more difficult and a closer fit between the public 
interest and the functioning of the banking system might have been 
achieved. 
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Why a Court of Impeachment? 
Both Arbeiderbladet and Dagbladet demanded a Court of 
Impeachment after the publication of the parliamentary report, 
St.meld. 12. A vehement debate raged in the press. In 
Arbeiderbladet, on 6 February, 1925, Johan Scharffenberg 
demanded an indictment of the government "to find out whether the 
large investors had benefited unreasonably and if the Trade Bank 
had contributed to the Right Party's election campaign". The major 
conservative paper, Aftenposten, reacted to Scharffenberg three days 
later: "Dr. Scharffenberg, whose mental state has been questioned 
several times lately, has written on the Berge government affair." 
The paper cites his points and continues: "There is not much 
honesty in a man who can suggest such things [Trade Bank support 
of the Right Party's election campaign]. Probably it is a serious case 
of hallucination." A broad coalition of workers' parties, the Liberal 
Party and parts of the Farmers Party, demanded that the 
conservative Right Party (Høyre) admit the unconstitutionality of 
the government's support. Høyre abstained. The Odelsting decided 
to propose the case for the Court. 
 
Delays 
The Finance Committee discussed the matter in February, but the 
central controller of government decisions, the Protocol Committee, 
came up against several administrative barriers. First, the 
government decisions were not in the normal government protocols. 
No other evidence was formally available to the Committee. It 
therefore suggested that it should have access to supplementary 
materials. That suggestion was voted down in the Storting. The 
Committee then attempted to get a right to work on the affair 
between sessions of the Storting. That too was voted down by the 
conservative, bourgeois majority. The conservative majority, which 
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supported the Government's decisions all along, was able to delay 
the parliamentary investigations. 
 The Mowinckel government engaged Norges Bank to make an 
investigation of the Trade Bank. As mentioned, Norges Bank 
played a central role in organizing the support for the Trade Bank in 
the first place. While the investigations were going on, the Storting 
was off the case. In June 1926, one and a half years after the 
Investigation Commission was created, the report on the Trade 
Bank was ready.  
 
The political parties 
What positions did the political parties take? Høyre was in favour. 
The social democratic parties were against the government support. 
The middle parties, typically, were more ambiguous and indecisive. 
The Liberal Party was divided. On the one hand it felt that a private 
banking system was essential and should be protected. On the other 
hand, the government should follow constitutional procedures. 
Liberal Party opposition to the support followed two lines. One was 
those members who saw the defence of the constitutional rules as 
most important. This was the pro-state faction of the party. The 
other was among Liberal party groups in rural areas. They felt that 
the big banks mainly served rich people in the cities; they had little, 
if anything, to offer small farmers and rural workers. 
 In the Farmers' Party, opposition to the big banks was weaker 
than in the Liberal Party. But the party was divided between 
members who identified with the interests of private business and 
those who felt popular interests and common sense should permeate 
public policy. Støren has studied the Farm Party's voting in the 
Storting on questions of bank/finance policy in the 1920's. He found 
that opposition to government policy was on the increase in the 
party. On the question of creating a public bank control council in 
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1924,177 only one Farm Party representative voted in favour. On the 
question of support for the Trade Bank in 1924, opposition had 
increased to 4 and on taking Berge to court to 6 (11 against, 
Støren:87). Thus the middle parties were split, but with a tendency 
to move in a radical direction, toward the labour movement 
positions for public control of private banks and against the 
clandestine Trade Bank support.  
 The working-class parties all agreed that the clandestine support 
should be attacked and criticized. But they were not in agreement 
on the question of support to big private banks. The reformist 
arguments were put forward by the Labour Party and the Social 
Democrats.178 The banks should generally be supported because 
most common people had their savings there. But they should be 
under continuous public control. Hornsrud argued: "Why should we 
be interested in attacking the private banks? Common people 
receive their pay in money. So the purchasing power of money is an 
interest common people have" (Støren:105). Martin Tranmæl 
argued within a reformist action model: "Our interest", he said, 
"was controlling the banks, public control, taking care of common 
interests and defending the smaller investors" (RRTF:725). The 
Communists argued differently. They were not against banks or 
money as such. The problem was that the banks served private 
capital accumulation, the bourgeoisie and its state. Through the 
state, the bourgeoisie managed "a somewhat disguised dictatorship" 
(Sverre Krogh, mentioned in Støren 1971:103). Emil Stang, a 
member of the Communist Party from 1923 to 1928, viewed the 
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 In 1923, after it became clear that the administration law was not working as intended, the 
Labour Party suggested the creation of a parliamentary bank control council. At first the 
Storting proposed to forward the suggestion to the government. But during 1924 the Right Party 
lost interest in such a council, and in the end it was voted down, arguing that banking policy was 
a professional, not a political question. 
     178
 They had 32 representatives in the Storting in 1924. 
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Norwegian state, not as a dictatorship in itself, but as a guarantor for 
an economic dictatorship. The economic position of the bourgeoisie 
gave that class state power. As Stang wrote in 1926: 
 
 "Finance capital expropriates values also from the state and the municipalities, and, thus, 
from the people. The state and the municipalities are today blocked in their development by 
the interest they have to pay on loans during a period of deflation. While the value of the 
krone goes up, debt burdens increase to the advantage of bank and finance capital. Finance 
capital exercises a dictatorship over the people, with the Storting and government as the 
dictatorship's formal implementers." (Stang 1926:21-22) 
 
Both these positions - the reformist control model and the 
communist revolutionary conception of the banks - were at variance 
with the government's point of view. Keeping the labour movement 
outside the decision-making process and implementing support for 





The instrumental theory of the state gains limited, but specific 
support from the evidence on the Trade Bank affair. But only in the 
sense that it demonstrates that in a crisis situation it was possible for 
finance capital to penetrate the government process, propose a 
policy and get it implemented. Beyond that, to argue that the 
bourgeoisie in some direct, concrete sense generally manipulates the 
different parts of the state to its advantage does not gain support in 
the present study. 
 The state apparatus demonstrated its autonomy in the Trade Bank 
affair. The state was instrumental for the financial elite through its 
intervention in the economic struggle between large and small 
investors and between the labour and bourgeois political 
movements over bank policy. The state system served two different 
and partially contradictory functions: (1) to get a maximum amount 
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of money out of the Trade Bank for the large private investors; and 
(2) to activate a form of democracy that motivated all classes to 
participate in the political and economic system, even though it was 
riddled with crises. The organizational elements in this doubly 
functional system seemed to be: (1) the strict separation of 
parliament from the administration; (2) a genuinely representative 
parliament; and (3) a judicial system that tested the accusation that 
the government acted contrary to the Constitution. Because the state 
was split between a bureaucratic administration that was easily 
accessible for finance capital and a truly representative parliament 
without, however, direct insight into or control over the 
administration, an elite of finance capitalists and government 
personnel was able to implement an unconstitutional project without 
any parliamentary intervention until after the project was a fait 
accompli. 





    PART  THE STATE AND 
    E  SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 
      "Each time that I have been to Jouy I have seen a bit of a canal in one 
place, but when I saw the second I could no longer see the first. I tried in 
vain to imagine how they lay by one another; it was no good. But, from 
the top of Saint-Hilaire, it's quite another matter; the whole countryside is 
spread out before you like a map. Only, you cannot make out the water; 
you would say that there were great rifts in the town, slicing it up so neatly 
that it looks like a loaf of bread which still holds together after it has been 
cut up. To get it all quite perfect you would have to be in both places at 
once; up here on the top of Saint-Hilaire and down there at Jouy-le-
Vicomte." 
 
       Marcel Proust (1923:142, translated by C.K Moncrieff). 
 
 
     My argument so far has been that the state, through 
indirect democracy (a representative parliament) and an alienated 
bureaucracy, was an autonomous organizer of capitalism, and 
through that organizing widened its autonomy relative to leading 
sections of the bourgeoisie. My method has been to investigate how 
capitalism emerged and through interaction with people in pre-
capitalist modes of production, changed the class structure. The 
state was seen as an organizer of relations between the classes, 
influenced structurally by the historical movement from one regime 
to the next, with a policy-making role in its own right, the logic of 
the state organization sought for in this interplay between state and 
society. I have attempted to combine analysis of the long lines of 
development in production, class relations and state organization, 
with detailed analysis of select cases of state - class interactions, the 
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reorganization of the agricultural administration and the government 
support to the Trade Bank. 
 The state expanded its role from instrumental to programme 
autonomy, from autonomy in choosing and developing means to 
autonomy in developing policy. Programme autonomy meant that 
the state increasingly intervened in conflicts and policy-making 
within markets and within the bourgeois class. 
 The state had class autonomy relative to the working class over 
the whole period investigated. That is, the state was organized 
within the project of the bourgeoisie of building and sustaining a 
capitalist economy, but with instrumental autonomy in the 
nineteenth century and in addition, programme autonomy in the first 
half of the twentieth in relation to the bourgeois class and its class 
organizations and economic elites. The state was active in law and 
order, in building infrastructure for a capitalist market economy, 
both technical, social and financial infrastructure, and in controlling 
the politics of the working class, its organizations and elites, both 
the external public actions of the class and the internal 
organizational development. It was when reformism was established 
in the working class organizations that the Labour Party could 
succeed in elections and take on government responsibility. 
 Over the long run, with increasing ideological hegemony, the 
autonomy of the state has been on the increase. Society has become 
increasingly 'statified'. The power of an alienated bureaucracy has 
increased and had the effect of fragmenting civil society, isolating 
individuals, families and other micro-communities. 
 The analysis of state-class relations in the interwar period was 
completed with the study of the Trade Bank affair. I described how 
the finance elite used the government as an efficient political 
instrument for its interests. The finance elite had both the initiative 
and the ideas about what the state should do. Thus, I suggested that 
state autonomy relative to the bourgeois class in politically peaceful 
periods did not exclude the possibility of a faction of the 
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bourgeoisie intervening directly and efficiently at the top level of 
government in periods of political crises. 
 The opposite possibility, that a leading section or faction of the 
working class might succeed in such an intervention, seems 
unlikely. It seems unlikely even if the political goal of the 
intervention could be met without overturning the class relations of 
the capitalist mode of production. Thus, it does not seem correct to 
consider the state either as autonomous or as an instrument for a 
class or class faction outside the state, independent of time and 
place. The state in the modern period of Norwegian history has 
always had class autonomy relative to the revolutionary interests of 
the working class. When reformism dominated the movement the 
state was open to bargaining and compromises. When the class 
struggle became sharper, more antagonistic and more overt, the 
state was put under more direct bourgeois command and the power 
of the bureaucracy increased. 
 What the Trade Bank affair demonstrates is that the 
parliamentary state can become a simple instrument for finance 
capital in crisis situations. 
 A central variable for understanding the degree of autonomy is 
thus the intensity of the class struggle, the level of political conflict, 
the character and degree of value conflicts in society at large.179 
When these reach breaking point, the state is put under ruling class 
administration and more powerful sanctions are directed against the 
subordinate classes. We might expect that the degree of autonomy 
relative to the bourgeois class will vary between different parts of 
the state at one and the same time, depending upon where in the 
state subordinate class demands are most prevalent and upon the 
ideological orientation and loyalties of the state personnel. Put in 
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 See Jacobsen's and Eisenstadt's concepts of the concentration and diffusion of power - 
diffusion, or a spreading out of state power, in particular to administrative units in times of 
political and ideological peace, concentration of power in the top echelons of the state in conflict 
periods (Jacobsen 1964). 
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general terms, the more loyalty administrative personnel have to 
subordinate or exploited classes, the stronger the demands of these 
classes are on that particular part of the administration, the more 
will the autonomy of that part of the state be limited and controlled 
from above, or from the outside by sections/organizations of the 
bourgeoisie. Jacobsen's study of the agricultural administration 
through the change of regime in 1884 is a case in point. 
 I now turn to the period after the Second World War. Again I 
begin by investigating developments in the economic structure, 
searching for their effects on class formation, class strengths and 
class relations. With the Social Democrats firmly in government, 
the state expanded that part of the gross domestic product that is 
channelled through the state. But the expansion of the public 
relative to the private sector was moderate (Table 6.2).  
 I will in Part E look into the role of social democracy, the Labour 
Party and the trade union leadership in state organizing. Has it 
managed to establish a new democratic state dominated by 
popular/working class interests? Or has the state under Labour 
management continued in its role of developing capitalism and 
harmonizing, as far as possible, the conflicts and contradictions 
within it, making the bourgeoisie in Norway more effective on the 
international markets and in the national and international class 
struggles? Or, in other words, has the political base for social 
democratic ascendancy been a real compromise with the 
bourgeoisie, changing the economic and political system to somet-
hing different from both capitalism and socialism, or has social 
democracy in some way been co-opted by the old bourgeoisie, as 
the manager of an active state serving capitalism?180 Is the result 
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 The problem of the role of social democracy has been approached from different angles. 
Torstein Hjellum (1987b) has looked at how the Social Democratic Party programme and 
leadership have changed over time, and the basis for these changes. Ole Johnny Olsen (1984) 
has looked at social democracy as it unfolded at the firm level in the early postwar period, and at 
the interactions between it, company management and labour organizations at the national level, 
trying to define the kind of adjustments that took place. Hans Ebbing (1981) has taken as his 
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that the social democratic leadership has become a part of the 
bourgeoisie as a state-based, bureaucratic elite?181  
 The state apparatus expanded and the state intervened more 
deeply into society, into wage and welfare relations and in 
production and distribution of goods and services. How did this 
increased involvement come about? What are the organizational 
mechanisms that mediate the changes? I will look into three 
mechanisms: (a) the process of bureaucratization, the internal 
differentiation of the state organization itself, the development of 
more specialized and more powerful organs of administration and 
how this process affects democracy in policy formulation and 
efficiency in programme implementation; (b) the continued 
professionalization of the state; and (c) the infiltration of interest 
organizations into the state apparatus and their role in policy 
implementation (corporatism). 
 That is, did state autonomy in this period develop further, to a 
point where the state apparatus and its specific position and 
activities in the economy represented a new mode of production, a 
statist mode, which is significantly different from the capitalist 
mode? If we call the statist involvement in the economy after the 
SWW for "state capitalism", is it reasonable to consider that 
engagement a separate mode of production, generating a new social 
class in the state, or is state capitalism just a variation on the 
                                                                                                              
starting point the idea of a class compromise, how it came about and what consequences it has 
had for the working classes. A research project at Bergen University, the MORAL project ("Mot 
en rasjonell ledelse: profesjonsutvikling mellom kunnskapsproduksjon og teknologisk endring" 
or "Towards rational management: the development of the professions between science and 
technological change" - see for example Sakslind 1983), has attempted to study state-class 
relations by investigating the role of the professions as intermediaries in that relationship, as an 
intervening variable in some way giving form to the relationship. Jonas Pontusson of Cornell 
University, has recently ventured into the comparison of Swedish and British social democracy 
(Pontusson 1987). 
     181
 Edvard Bull (1979) and John Higley (1975) come close to defining the Social Democrats 
this way. I will return to their analyses.  
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capitalist mode of production, modifying marginally that mode of 
production and the class relations within it? 
14 







       
      Capitalism supreme 






     How did the capitalist mode of production change in 
the postwar period? Let me investigate the internationalization of 
the Norwegian economy and some salient developments within the 
main sectors of the capitalist economy. I shall relate my findings 
and interpretations to the debate among historians and social scienti-
sts on state-class relations in Norway in the postwar period, with a 




INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTO THE NORWEGIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
It is probably correct, as Edvard Bull (1979:100) suggests, that 
Marshall's speech 5 June 1947 on economic aid to Europe ushered 
in a flow of capital to Norway that changed, or at least revitalized, 
the capitalist market economy in the country, moving it away from 
wartime regulation and social democratic hopes of a publicly 
planned economy. 
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 By 1952 $250 mill. had been put into the Norwegian economy 
through the aid programme. The Social Democratic government had 
accepted the conditions: free trade under international supervision 
through OEEC (later OECD). International capital was invested in 
the aluminium industry. The international company Nestlé invested 
in the fish industry through the acquisition of Findus, with the state 
as part owner. Bull demonstrates how Coca Cola entered soda water 
production, the Swedish Wasa into production of bread products 
and Unilever into detergents. The Norwegian economy was 
becoming a node or element in the international capitalist system.  
 Internationalization was not new. International capital was an 
important element in the economy in the 1850's, when British 
capital was in railway and French capital in banking (Seip 1968). 
We have seen how international capital was a prime mover of the 
early Norwegian industrialization around the turn of the century, 
e.g. in the electrochemical industry. We saw how Hambro's bank 
(London) was a major actor in the Norwegian banking system in the 
1920's, integrating Norwegian and international finance capital.  
 An example of international capital in the Norwegian economy in 
1970 is the ownership structure of the large bank Christiania Bank 
og Kreditkasse (CBK). About 37% of the shares were at that time 
owned by international companies (Table 14.1). 
 
Table 14.1 International capital in a Norwegian bank. 




Name of company Shares 
 No. % 
Norwegian companies   
Borregaard (wood industry) 8000 31.8 
Saugbruksforeningen (wood industry) 2431 9.7 
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Løvenskiold Vækerø (wood industry) 1180 4.7 
Harald A. Møller (car/truck sales) 1094 4.4 
Joh Johansson (food wholesale) 665 2.6 
Thor Furuholmen (engineering) 2075 8.3 
Kefas (food wholesale) 330 1.3 
Subtotal 15775 62.8 
International companies    
Elektrisk Byrå (electrical engineering) 1840 7,3 
Siemens (electrical/electronic equipment) 1809 7,2 
Standard telefon og kabel (ITT) 4141 16,5 
Norgas (gas) 861 3,4 
Granges Essen 720 2,9 
Subtotal 9371 37,3 
TOTAL 25146 100,1 
 
Source: Røde Fane no. 3 (1973:27-28). 
 
 
By 1974, Norges Industri (the periodical of the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries) had located 131 Norwegian-owned industrial 
firms in other countries. It found that 7 were established before 
1940 and fewer than 10 were established per five-year-period up to 
1960. But from 1960 there was an increase: 1965:38, 1970:47. Of 
these international establishments 67% were in Europe. The 
dominant sector was machine production/metal works (43%). In 19 
of the 131 companies did the state have major shares, and 28 of the 
establishments were in what the Federation characterized as 
development countries. 
 The data indicate that the Norwegian bourgeoisie as a class up to 
1970 has been a relatively weak and subordinate partner to 
international capital, and that international capital has played a 
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major role in the development of the national economy.182 On the 
one hand that may have reduced the autonomy of the state relative 
to international capital. The Norwegian state has not had much 
backing from the national bourgeoisie.183 On the other hand, it may 
have increased the autonomy of the state in the national economy 
because there was no strong bourgeois resistance. When capital 
became abundant (with the export of oil) the relatively weak 
bourgeoisie may precisely because of its weakness, have opted for 
strong state participation in both the accumulation and export of 
capital.184 
 The integration of the Norwegian economy into international 
capitalism, or into the imperialist system, does produce what the 
Norwegian Power Study (NPS) has called market dissolution in 
Norway (Hernes and Berrefjord 1975). National markets dissolve 
under the increasing size and power of large firms and institutions, 
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 The weakness and/or reluctance of Norwegian capital in the international markets was also 
demonstrated in the early 1970's when the Norwegian development aid administration took the 
initiative to mobilize Norwegian capital into aid. Norwegian industry and finance capital were 
rather reluctant. As Arnold (1982), among others, has demonstrated, private capital in countries 
like France and Germany has participated quite actively in exports of capital and technology 
through cooperation with the national aid administrations. (For studies of the role of Norwegian 
industry in the aid process, see Sjøli 1981, Thorseth 1983, Grimstad 1984 and Gran 1993). 
Within the bourgeoisie shipowners have had an exceptionally powerful position, both nationally 
and internationally (Hjellum 1983). 
     183
 That might also explain why the Venstre Party government at the turn of the century was 
able quite actively to develop rules for the regulation of foreign ownership in Norway.  The 
national bourgeoisie would have gained some freedom from such a regulation.  A weak national 
bourgeoisie might explain why state wage regulation in the 1920's and 1930's (regulation 
through arbitration) was easily implemented by Venstre governments. As Bergh (et al. 
1983:159-160) argued, even international capital gained some advantage from the regulations 
about access to natural resources of the Venstre government after the turn of the century. The 
regulations clarified how such resources could be acquired.   
     184
 With the oil economy in the 1970's the Norwegian state substantially reduced the national 
debt, increasing Norway's 'loan worthiness' in international financial markets. The oil economy 
has most likely increased the power of the Norwegian bourgeoisie in relation both to the state 
and to international finance capital. 
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developed to participate in international economic circuits. The 
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 The banker Sven Viig said in 1972 that the private banks needed the state.  Even if all the 
Norwegian banks merged into one unit, they would still be too small to operate efficiently in the 
oil market (Norges Industri, no. 18, 23 October 1972). 
 Agriculture  250 
 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY 
 
How did the occupational structure change in the postwar period? 
As we see in the Appendix, the agricultural sector decreases from 
10.1% in 1950 to less than half of that (4.5%) in 1970. Fishing and 
forestry were hit as hard or harder. The process of centralization and 
concentration worked its way in agricultural, creating larger farm 
units and demanding larger investments in modern technology, with 
the concomitant dependency on finance capital. Edvard Bull 
suggests that it was in this period that the rural mode of production, 
focused on household consumption, was finally eradicated. 
 
Eradication of the rural life form 
As I have shown earlier, capital and the state filtered into agriculture 
gradually in the last part of the nineteenth century, and more rapidly 
with the urban industrialization process around the turn of the 
century. A technological development took place, expanding the use 
of tractors and introducing labour-saving equipment in animal care, 
milking, etc. In the interwar period, traditional subsistence 
agriculture was strengthened again, because of unemployment or 
falling wages in industry. 
 In the postwar period, Professor Bull (1979) suggests that 
fundamental changes took place. It was in this period that the whole 
capitalistic, urban lifestyle got a final grip on rural Norway and 
eradicated the way of life connected with subsistence production. 
The distinction between urban and rural, between two cultures 
within the nation, disappeared: "a two thousand year old rural 
culture is dissolved" (Bull 1979:237). It was an eradication that was 
willed, organized and implemented by the state. The political 
involvement of the state in agriculture had been introduced in the 
1930's. In the postwar period this leverage was used to eradicate the 
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family subsistence culture in favour of market- and profit-oriented 
farming. 
 What were some of the parameters of this process? In the 37 
years from 1939 to 1976 the number of farms over 5 mål186 was 
reduced by 47%, from 214 000 to 114 000 (Almås 1977:27). Small 
farms were almost completely eradicated as the quantity of products 
that could sustain a family income increased. In 1939 there were 
150 000 farms between 5 and 50 mål. In 1976 there were 54 000 of 
them left. The number of middle-sized farms was about constant 
(the stable core of the farmers' movement?), while the number of 
big farms over 100 mål increased over the same period from 21 000 
to 26 000. In the 1960's and 1970's there was a marked increase in 
the number of farms over 200 mål, from 5 000 to 8 300 (CBS 
1980). During the same 20 years there was a rapid mechanization. 
In 1976 there were 128 000 tractors in Norway, more tractors than 
there were farms over 5 mål. This structural reorganization implies 
a deep penetration of the market economy into the rural areas, and a 
double penetration, (1) The market spreads new commodities into 
the rural districts, undermining the household mode of production 
and drawing members of the farm household into vocational educat-
ion and urban/industrial jobs; and (2) a relative reduction of 
agricultural prices, making the small family farm untenable as the 
base of a household economy. 
 Productivity increased nearly to the level of industry (Cappelen 
and Hellesøy 1981:148). The agricultural population was 30% of all 
employed in 1950. In 1978 the same group was 8% of all employed. 
The farmers became dependent on substantial investment in 
machinery and buildings. They became dependent on bank loans. 
 Ramsøy (1977) has shown that losing work in agriculture does 
not necessarily mean that you immediately transfer to urban 
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 One mål (1000m2), as mentioned earlier (Table 10.1), equals 0.247 acres. 
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industry. The often assumed `migration` pattern from farm labour 
into industry, pushing industrial workers "up" into service and 
administration, is not typical in the postwar period. Rather it seems 
that people who don't find employment in agriculture often go 
directly into urban service work (administrative or commercial 
work). Ramsøy found that there was systematic internal recruitment 
in the working class in the postwar period. This counters the thesis 
that reformist ideology in the working class has an important basis 
in the dilution of the class through recruitment of rural labour into 
the class. 
 The strengthening of the group of middle farmers as capital 
producing farmers is politically ambiguous. On the one hand social 
democracy loses its traditional support among rural small-holders. 
On the other hand, the middle farmers become petty capitalists, 
strongly dependent on state intervention and support for that 
position. 
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Changes in industry and the industrial working class 























Figure 14.1 depicts the periods of stagnation and expansion in 
Norwegian industry from 1927 to 1954. Stagnation occurred in 
1929-1932 in connection with the world crisis; from 1938 through 
the war; and in 1951-1953 in connection with the Korean war. 
Comparing periods of stagnation we see that the changes are more 
marked for the data on employment than on number of firms. From 
1930 to 1931 employment plunges by nearly 30 000, while the 
number of firms was about constant. In the war period, employment 
in (registered) industry was about constant while the number of 
firms increased. 
 The expansionary periods are from 1927 to 1929, from 1932 to 
1938 and, dramatically, the first years after the war. These data 
support my earlier interpretations: the industrial bourgeoisie 
experiences a general period of expansion and consolidation right 
through crisis periods; the working class is exposed to the vagaries 
of the capital accumulation cycle, with rapid expansion in the 
number of jobs on the upturn, with quite dramatic reductions in 
depressions. 



















Figure 14.2 (all firms) on the period 1955•1974 indicates how the 
mid-1960's were a turning point. At that time the number of firms 
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fell markedly, with a reduction of some 6 000 mål over a 10-year 
period. At the same time, employment in industry flattened out. The 
epoch of capitalist expansion on the basis of concentrated industrial 
production was over. 
 While the small industrialists in the postwar period were 
eliminated (or - which is more or less the same - swallowed by 
larger companies), the large industrialists merged with each other 
by exchanging positions on boards of directors. Torstein Hjellum 
described this centralization process with evidence on how the 
board members of the Bergen company Rieber and Sons were 
members of other company boards. He found l5 companies with 
Rieber representatives on their boards, among them 3 insurance 
companies, 2 banks, 9 industrial firms and 1 public company 
(Hjellum 1971:39).187 
 A consequence of this process of concentration and centralization 
of industrial capital was to strengthen that section of the working 
class which was located in the large industrial firms. The section of 
the class in the large metal and chemical industries enhanced its 
organizational strength (through the main federation, Jern og 
Metall), its bargaining power and its power within the Federation of 
Trade Unions (LO).  
 Did that section of the class pull the weaker sections along, either 
because the wage-bargaining mechanisms functioned that way or 
through explicit trade union solidarity? It can be argued that it did 
not. Weaker industries outside the large cities, smaller firms in 
textiles and food production, those with a large percentage of 
female employment, were not pulled or pushed along. The wage 
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 The NPS attempted to register this type of merger in the economy as a whole in 1975. Of 
1231 managers 941 had only one board post. The rest, 291 had 857 board posts, or a mean of 3 
per member of the group (variance between 2 and 15). And these 291 managers were mostly 
managers in large firms (NPS 1982:148). As NPS points out, this network of big company 
managers enables them to act in a coordinated way towards markets and towards the state.   
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differentials in the working class were not reduced in the postwar 
period. As Edvard Bull puts it: "The wage differentials in Norway 
were mainly reduced before 1920. The Labour governments did not 
have a large effect on wage differences" (Bull 1979:283). 
 Thus concentration, centralization, marginalization (of certain 
sectors) and internationalization produces structural divisions within 
the industrial working class. The industrial working class was not 
encroached upon by other class elements and it did not experience a 
substantial reduction in size up to 1970. However, it stopped 
growing in the mid 1960's relative to the total work-force.  
 This unity and stability, together with the successful suppression 
of radical opposition within the movement, suggest that reformist 
ideology was common in the working class itself, while the class 
probably at the same time had a well-established conception of 
itself as exactly that, a working class, distinct from the owners of 
capital, the bourgeoisie. Support, however passive, for working-
class organizations was strong throughout the whole period.188 
 Thus in the postwar period Norway had a relatively large, 
consolidated working class, largely self-recruiting, and ideologically 
secure in its class-based reformism. The Labour Party ruled and 
constructed the modern welfare state, fulfilling some of the goals set 
by the more radical labour movement in the 1930's. 
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 Henry Valen (1981:134) has looked at class consciousness in Norway, surveying whether 
people see themselves as class members. The results show that both in 1965 and 1973 39% of 
those asked explicitly considered themselves as members of the working class. Then in the last 
part of the 1970's the percentage plummeted, to 30% in 1977 and to 24% just two years later. 
The percentage who saw themselves as belonging to a middle class was 19% in 1965 and 22% 
in 1979, while those who felt the class concept was irrelevant increased in line with the decrease 
in working-class identity: 1965: 9%, l973: 8%, 1977: 13% and 1979: 21%. 
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 But what about the revolutionary tendencies in the working 
class? Had they disappeared into a welfare state euphoria? In other 
words, what kind of power did the social democratic government 
wield relative to the class in this period? Did the government 
closely represent working-class ideology, or were the class 
members heavily influenced by state, by the media, the schools etc. 
to accept reformist thinking? That is, had the Labour Party "taken 
on (in practice, if not in intention) the programme of its earlier 
enemy, the bourgeoisie, while at the same time maintaining its 
electoral support among the working class?" (Seip 1963:37) 
 The data in the Appendix show an industrial decline between 
1950 and 1970, with a larger decline from 1950 to 1960 than over 
the next ten years. In the first period, both manufacturing and 
construction had a smaller share of total employment. In the second 
period, manufacturing was constant while construction lost 0.5%. 
The table covers a larger part of the economy and eliminates the 
variations we found when looking at data on industrial firms 
(Figures 14.1 and 14.2). 
 All the service sectors expanded. If we add them together, the 
percentages are: 1950: 15.1, 1960: 16.7, and 1970: 20.5. The 
structure of the 'inactive' group changed dramatically. First we see 
that the relative number of housewives in the economy dropped 
between 1960 and 1970 from a high of 28% to 21%. At the same 
time the number of women in the wage economy expanded, 
increasing by over 80 000. Although I do not have data on where 
they were employed, later studies indicate that women went into 
service work and often part-time work (St.meld. 79, 
Langtidsprogrammemet 1982-1985). We can assume that women in 
wage labour continued to do housework at home. 
 The number of children working at home was reduced to 0.6% in 
1970, indicating at least two things; (1) that farm work became 
increasingly mechanized on larger farm units, requiring less family 
 Service sector  259 
 
labour, and (2) that the educational system expanded, absorbing 
young people, who after education enter wage labour or 
unemployment. 
 The table reveals the beginnings of the pensioned society, with 
the number of people living off pensions and capital incomes 
increasing from 11% in 1960 to 21% in 1970.  
 Together, the increases in the service sector, in service work 
within the industrial sector, in children in education and in people 
living off capital incomes in one form or another, deepen the 
problems of capital accumulation in the economy as a whole. From 
1950 to 1970 the percentage of the population in productive activity 
(as defined in the table) fell from 56% to 51%. Within that group 
the amount of service work was increasing, aggravating the problem 
of reproducing the source of surplus value for the bourgeoisie as a 
class • the industrially employed working class (broadly defined). 
 
The banks 
The commanding heights of the bourgeois 'private' economy are the 
large banks. The three largest in the 1920's held their position into 
the 1960's. As Figure 10.3 demonstrated, the smaller banks were 
radically eliminated from 1918 into the 1970's (often being taken 
over by the larger ones). Even in 1938 the three largest banks 
controlled 48% of commercial bank capital, a percentage that 
increased to 54% in 1964 (Formuesfordelingskomiteen:217). In 
1960 the banks administered finance capital equal to 139% of the 
total state budget. 10 years later that percentage had only marginally 
gone down (to 133%). There is reason to believe that the boards of 
these banks were important centres for the coordination of both 
national and international bourgeois economic interests relative both 
to the market and to the state. 
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THE CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD 
 
The data indicate some striking differences between the classes in 
this first, long postwar period. While the capitalist farmers were 
strengthened, through an increase in the number of larger farms, the 
middle farmers held their position, and probably had problems 
doing that (increased demands on them to invest, high interest 
payments, etc.). The small farmers, the traditional allies of the 
industrial working class and the labour movement, were drastically 
reduced in numbers. They were still present as a group, but their 
strength relative to other classes had been reduced and their mode of 
production had been eroded, making them more dependent upon 
supplementary wage employment. 
 The working class, at least the traditional industrial working 
class, maintained its position in the class structure in the whole 
postwar period up to 1970. But the working class more widely 
defined probably expanded: including clerical and service personnel 
with wages at the level of or lower than the mean industrial wage, in 
subordinate positions in large organizations. The working class 
became a more complex social (and ideological) formation, became 
more fragmented with more movements in and out of the class. It 
became more difficult for one organizational movement to represent 
all sections of the class. 
 The bourgeoisie experienced large changes, generating political 
conflicts and tensions within the class. First, small industrialists 
were under threat and the number of larger companies grew. Then 
there was the networking process, involving the exchange of board 
positions and mergers among the banks and the big company 
boards. Lastly, there was the internationalization process in both 
directions - Norwegian capital moving out and meeting the harsh 
conditions of the international market, and international capital 
moving into Norway, allying itself with Norwegian capital, but also 
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generating conflicts with national capital over investments and 
markets. This represents a conglomeration of uniting and fracturing 
forces, a bourgeoisie torn between ruin and expansion, a situation 
that could be expected to create quite different relations to the state 
for different parts or segments of the class. Small capitalists losing 
out in the markets demanded state support, but did not get much 
(see Barton 1963 and Chapter 16 point 4). Middle capitalists in 
profitable expanding sectors were supported, while those in 
unprofitable sectors were left out in the cold. Capitalists in export 
sectors were favoured with capital inputs, capitalists in important 
home market sectors were protected and so on. It was inevitable that 
the bourgeoisie would have difficulty in agreeing as a class on 
political and economic strategies. Bourgeois organizations were 
often in conflict and different sections of the bourgeoisie clashed 
within the state over state policy. For that very reason an 




THE DEBATE ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE STATE, 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REGIME 
AND THE WORKING CLASS IN POSTWAR NORWAY 
 
How have the social scientists Vilhelm Aubert (1975) and Johan P. 
Olsen (1983) and the historians Edvard Bull and Jens Arup Seip 
suggested we perceive social democracy? Does the preceding 
interpretation of the changes in the class structure help us 
understand their positions? 
 First I want to argue that Aubert and Olsen have basically the 
same understanding of the social democratic state: it is a state 
controlled by the working class in an economy controlled by capital. 
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The pluralist state and the division of 
economic and political power between classes 
Aubert has studied the Labour Party in power. He argues that its 
members and voters mostly belong to the working class. But does 
that mean that the working class has state power when the party is 
in control of government? His answer is that in some instances the 
state and the capitalist class have been in conflict, but in many 
policy areas in the postwar period they have been in agreement. So 
Aubert (like Walter Korpi 1978 and 1983) posits that the Labour 
government has some degree of working-class power over the state 
indicated by conflict between the state and the bourgeoisie. "But", 
as Aubert puts it, " - [government power] does not mean that the 
working class necessarily has a power position equal to that of 
capital." Aubert's conclusion is that the Labour government has 
given the working class dominant political power, while the 
capitalists, through their ownership of the means of production, 
have dominant power in the economy. 
 
 "Examining the voter backing of the Social Democrats gives the impression that political 
power is located in a completely different group from the one with economic power. Capital 
dominates the economy while the working class dominates politics. This is an accurate 
picture in that capital and state are in conflict on some questions, but they also control each 
other. However, there is not (yet) anything close to a balance of power between capital and 
labour." (Aubert 1975:185; my translation from Norwegian) 
 
Johan P. Olsen and his collaborators, using a wide range of 
empirical research (see Lægreid and Olsen 1978, Olsen 1983), have 
reached somewhat the same conclusion. However, in their theories 
of state-society relations in postwar Norway, the class dimension is 
hardly mentioned.189 Their view is that the state-society relationship 
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 If we examine the way the problems in the research were posed, the question of the 
structure of society (whether a pluralist or a class model or both were relevant) was never 
addressed. Thus, the likelihood of finding a class structure is rather slight.   
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is basically democratic: representation is equitable, and the political 
system, through processes of negotiation and bargaining, 
continuously reproduces this balanced representation. Who is 
represented? They answer: all groups in the parliamentary system, 
interest groups and their organizations in the state administration. 
The state administration is an arena for bargaining and compromise 
between the large economic interest organizations, especially the 
federations of employers on one side and the Federation of Trade 
Unions on the other. 
 In their 1983 publication Olsen and the other contributors 
investigate the internal structure of the state, and find that it is a 
segmented structure, that is, a system of many elite groups, each 
representing a sector interest (agriculture, industry, tourism, etc.), 
each with representatives of the sector recruited from different 
institutions (the administration, parliament, science, etc.), each with 
a specific set of political values, and all in some sort of competition 
for attention and resources in the state. Thus there is a division of 
labour in the state that parallels the divisions of labour in society. 
Politically the system is in harmony - a pluralistic state in a 
pluralistic society, with some impurities and marginal imbalances, 
or using concepts from the Power Study: a segmented state in a 
homogeneous society. I will return to the strengths and weaknesses 
of this view later, when I discuss the one party state and the 
politicization of the administration. 
 
Jens Arup Seip on the one-party state 
Seip has presented six general, but incisive hypotheses about state-
class relations in postwar Norway. I will examine three of them. 
Together they indicate that the state was in no simple sense 
representative of all groups in the population. One of the hypotheses 
I think is wrong. The other two I believe convey a conception that 
will stand empirical testing. The one I think is wrong says that the 
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working class never was "a normative order on its own". Here is 
Seip's hypothesis on that point. 
 
 (1) "When a new society is established alongside an old one, independently of the old 
society, it can more easily develop a new normative order that withstands attack. The 
bourgeoisie in the feudal world was such a society. But the proletariat is not in such 
an independent position in the bourgeois world. Rather it was the necessary antithesis 
to the bourgeoisie, formed within the common economic system." (Seip 1963:40; my 
translation) 
 
What I believe is incontestable here is the definition of the 
difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as 
subordinated classes (see Anderson 1979 and Therborn 1978). 
Certainly, the proletariat is not an autonomous society within 
capitalism as the bourgeoisie was relative to the nobility in feudal 
Europe. The proletariat is, as Seip says, the necessary antithesis to 
the bourgeoisie, essential part of the capitalist mode of production. 
But does that mean that the class formations do not have "separate 
normative orders"? First, what is meant by "separate normative 
order"? A normative order is a collective identity, a life style with 
specific norms on behaviour and ideas of class specific organization 
of the economy and the society as a whole. The bourgeoisie had 
such a normative order compared to the feudal aristocracy and 
compared (partly) to the bureaucratic elite. The bourgeoisie could 
not expand and accomplish its historical role within the feudal mode 
of production. The conceptions of personal ownership, entrepren-
eurship and political (indirect) democracy stood in deep contrast to 
feudal aristocratic conceptions. My contention is that the working 
class in the modern period of Norwegian history had its own, 
distinct normative order: wage labour as a no-ownership-status, 
wages as a precarious resource, dependent on active defence and 
(class) solidarity, and from the earliest phases of class formation (cf. 
the Thrane movement in Norway) ideas on how the realization of 
workers interests are dependent on a new type of society: without 
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private ownership of the large firms, the communalization and 
planned use of the means of production and the elimination of 
exploitation. 
 Aspects of the working-class struggle in Norway support the 
thesis of a separate normative order. I have argued in previous 
chapters: 
 (1) The working class had already in the 1850's, exposed its own 
existence alongside and under the bourgeoisie, and outside the state 
(without representation there). In that early phase the class 
representatives and leaders had relatively unclear ideas about how 
the new socialist society should or could be organized, but 
expressed an interest in acting separately from the bourgeoisie and 
the state bureaucracy.  
 (2) Working-class members in the 1890's withdrew from the 
Workers' Organizations of Venstre, and formed their own 
organizations.  
 (3) Working-class literature was part of the class formation 
process. 
 (4) Sections of the working class in the 1920's looked beyond 
participation in the existing state to the formation of a new state (a 
working-class state, a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'). That idea has 
survived in organizations like the Norwegian Communist Party 
(NKP), in the radical organization among academicians, Mot Dag, 
in minority groups within the labour unions and, from the early 
1970's, in the Workers' Communist Party (AKP). 
 (5) Wage-labourers, despite heavy homogenizing ideological 
pressure, still had a class consciousness in the 1970's (Valen 1981). 
 (6) The disappearance of a separate working-class culture could 
be the result of ideological hegemony, of a type of intellectual 
normative pressure, rather than an indication of the non-existence of 
such a culture. 
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 The second hypothesis is that the social democrats had not 
eliminated the class system. Rather they had become a controlling, 
oppressive force within the working class. 
 
 (2) "The social democratic regime does not eliminate the social classes as groups in a 
specific position in the production system with unequal access to the economic 
results of production. But the social democrats enter into cooperation with top 
business through the government apparatus, thus creating a coalition of technicians 
that, through the one-party system, has the voters under control." (Seip 1963:41) 
 
In Seip's formulation: "The apparatus built for revolt became state 
management - the criminal turned policeman." Such a 
transformation of labour movement leadership indicates that the 
working class is a threat to the bourgeoisie, that it does have a 
project based in a different normative order. 
 What mechanisms were at work in the transformation of the 
labour movement leadership from "criminal" to "policeman"? One 
was the recruitment to parliamentary and bureaucratic positions. 
That process is highly selective. As Weber suggested, it eliminates 
'irresponsible' elements at each gate. As mentioned earlier, there are 
many gates on the way to a position in the state: from the first entry 
into high school, via recruitment to colleges and universities, via the 
exams at the end of that career and through the employment 
process, for example into the lowest positions of the state 
bureaucracy and the gates on the way up in those systems (see 
Lægreid and Olsen 1978). 
 The result is doubly functional for capital. On the one hand the 
recruitment process neutralizes the revolutionary tendencies in the 
labour movement and selects 'reasonable and able' members to the 
state elite. On the other hand, capital selects partners from the 
labour movement who officially and effectively appear as 
representatives of working-class interests.  
 The central concept in Seip's theory is the one-party state, that is, 
a political system dominated by social democracy, with the 
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government as a committee of the party and with parliament 
reduced to a rubber-stamping assembly: 
 
 (3) "The government was transformed into the executive committee of the party. The 
Storting was eliminated as an independent political actor. (P.21) It was transformed 
into a committee under the government. The Social Democratic Party absorbed all 
political power. (P.23) The party permeated the all-encompassing bureaucracy. Thus 
the government administration had control over the voters." (Seip 1963:21-26) 
 
This harmony model is different from the balanced/negotiated, 
pluralistic harmony model of Aubert and Olsen. Seip's harmony is a 
one-party affair, a function of a near-total domination and 
hegemony of one concept of Norwegian society and politics. It is a 
harmony created by control, by the use of political and bureaucratic 
power from above.  
 I have argued: 
 (1) The state organization in the 1920's was able to function as a 
power instrument for a specific, even unconstitutional, project. This 
might suggest that it is not the state organization that prevents one 
party dominance. 
 (2) We have seen that the state organization did not 
fundamentally change during the first phase of social democratic 
rule in the 1930's. Before the social democrats came to power the 
agreements between them and the Employers' Confederation and 
the agricultural lobby laid the foundations for one-party rule. A 
coalition for using the state to regulate relations between labour, 
capital and agriculture was constructed, a coalition that guaranteed 
that all the partners in it would be able to coexist under a social 
democratic regime. 
 (3) This guarantee was in many ways realized after the Second 
World War. The social democrats took over government, but did 
not reorganize the economy according to socialist principles. The 
old economic structures • private investment, private trade and 
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government restraints on wage demands and wage bargaining • 
were rebuilt (see Gran 1987). 
 The main argument against Seip's third hypothesis is that the 
postwar state has implemented working-class demands and interests 
and that the government had active support in the working class and 
among important sections of the middle classes. Here the welfare 
state is the trump card. Through it working-class demands were 
met. So the theory goes. I will return to the welfare state in Chapter 
19. The hypothesis there is that the welfare state has met important 
demands from the working class, but that these are mainly demands 
related to capital reproduction. Other system transcending demands 
have been suppressed. Welfare was also distributed in a 
systematically skewed fashion, reproducing inequalities in the 
reproduction of capital. The welfare project, I suggest, has 
historically been dependent upon the workings of the politi-
cal/administrative recruitment system described above. Not that 
economic demands are inferior demands. The point is that the social 
democratic government and the welfare provisions together 
systematically eliminated revolutionary ideas and tendencies within 
the working class. It is my contention that this elimination was 
essential to the functioning of the social democratic one-party state.  
 
Edvard Bull confronts Seip 
In general, Bull finds Seip's hypotheses worthy of support. But on 
some counts he disagrees. One contention is that Seip, in 1963, did 
not see the importance of the semi-private interest organizations. 
According to Bull (as Olsen and his collaborators also suggest), the 
most characteristic aspect of the government system after 1945 was 
the cooperation between top public officials and leaders of the 
economic interest organizations, what Bull calls the system of 
"organized capitalism". Therefore, Bull contends, the concept of a 
one-party state exaggerates the role of politicians and public 
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officials. The representatives of employer and employee 
organizations are mistakenly left out of the model.  
 Bull is also, for this reason, in disagreement with Seip's 
periodization; 1945 did not imply a change of system. 1945 was a 
continuation and a culmination of a process of integration between 
state and the large interest organizations (representing both labour 
and capital) under the command of the Labour Party. 
 Both have a point. The state was dominated by the Labour Party. 
The Party reorganized along corporative lines, where the 
government organized representatives of the bureaucracy, the 
national labour federations and the capital-employer organizations 






Perhaps the most important and interesting contradiction between 
Seip and Bull concerns class consciousness among the working 
class. Seip's hypothesis is that the social democrats, through state 
power, pressured and manipulated (at least parts of) the working 
class into submission, under the bourgeoisie, to the welfare form of 
capitalism after the war. Bull's thesis is different. He suggests that 
after the Second World War the working class as a whole was 
ideologically uninterested in socialism.190 The workers wanted to 
increase their living standards, a goal they had fought for in the 
interwar period. Now that goal was at hand, the working class did 
therefore not have to be forced to accept the capitalist economy. 
With the social democrats in power, class interests were taken care 
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 The substantial vote for the Communist Party in 1945 does not alter things for Bull. 
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of, even if it meant leaving the economic power positions to the 
bourgeoisie.191 
 This is an important disagreement. Was the class or at least 
substantial parts of it, actively suppressed by the social democratic 
regime and its allies or was the class in the late 1940's ideologically 
consolidated on the social and political theory of that regime? In 
either case the state could have a specific autonomous role relative 
to the working class. But the two theories lead to two different 
definitions of that autonomy. If Seip is correct, autonomy 
counteracts the ideological leanings of the working class. The state 
has to be an active controlling and oppressing power instrument. If 
Bull is right, the autonomy is supported by the working class. The 
state is able to take on a more administrative coordinating character. 
In this case we would expect hierarchical power to be reduced and 
the power of parliaments and professionals to expand (diffusion of 
power); bureaucracies should diminish in size as local communities, 
interest organizations and private and public firms increasingly 
manage their own affairs in harmony with both labour and capital. 
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 The social democrats at this time also launched a programme of industrial nationalization. 
But it can be argued that in practice the nationalizations seldom affected Norwegian capital 
owners directly. The Norwegian Steel Company (Jernverket) was a new and 'national' project, 
unanimously approved in the Storting in 1946. The aluminium company in Årdal was a 
continuation of the production the Germans had organized during the war. It was a controversial 
project, but mainly on the issues of markets and use of energy. 
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      The social democratic project 
 
 
      "The military secret service unit, headed by General Vilhelm Evang, 
financed a major part of the registration of communists within the labour 
movement. Secret registrations of opposition was the job for a section of 
secretaries in the Party and National Trade Union (LO). Officially they 
were engaged in public information. The secretaries were paid by the 
military secret service." 
 
 Andreas Andersen (Dagbladet, Monday October 12, 1987:5) 
 
 
     What effect did the Labour Party ambition of taking 
over government - and the fulfilment of that ambition - have on the 
goals and the organization of the labour movement? Was the social 
democratic project of putting the interests of working people in the 
forefront of public policy actually realized? Did the Labour Party 
change the organization of state to serve those purposes or was it the 
other way around: did the functioning of the government apparatus 
change the Labour Party? Did being in government work selectively 
to induce a shift in the party and the party leadership away from 
popular working-class demands and conceptions of a good society?  
 What does the National Power Project (NPS) say about that 
question? How does the NPS describe the postwar state 
organization, its value bias, and its relation to the labour movement? 
I will suggest that two assumptions in NPS should have been 
investigated empirically: (1) that the Labour Party and the 
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Federation of Trade Union (LO) in most of its activities represented 
wage worker interests; and (2) that the state was genuinely 
representative of the main social groups and classes in postwar 
Norway. I will query the Labour policies toward the role of private 
capital. I will investigate the strategies chosen by leading sections of 
the bourgeoisie towards the social democratic regime. I will suggest 
that the bourgeois elite faced a dilemma in its relations to the 
Labour Party. On the one hand it was important to uphold a sharp, 
ideological front against the labour movement. On the other hand, 
important sections of the bourgeoisie saw how an active, 
interventionist state was to their advantage. 
 
THE POWER STUDY: THE STATE DOMINATED 
BY THE ECONOMIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
An approach to state analysis similar to the one applied by 
Gudmund Hernes (Chapter 2), focusing on strategic rational action, 
has been developed by Johan P. Olsen. Olsen, however, puts more 
emphasis on the role of the institutional structures of the state than 
Hernes, and pays less attention to the relation between the state and 
the economy. 
 
The organization state 
Olsen studied processes of intended rational decision-making and 
confluences of such processes within organizations. The 
organization is seen as an independent variable, that is, he asks how 
the type of organization or choice of decision-making model in 
organizations affects what organizations do. A concept of the 
postwar state that has emerged from this research is that interest 
organizations have state power: the state is decisively influenced by 
the large interest organizations in the economy, especially the 
employers' and the trade union federations. 
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 "It is not a state that looks after of all segments of society, whether they are organized or not 
(as democratic theory would have it). Nor is it a state under the command of the owners of 
the means of production (as Marxist theory suggests). It is not the state of a ruling elite (as 
elite theory depicts). The state is an organization dominated by the large interest organiza-
tions ... It is at present not possible to understand the content of public policy without 
looking into the role of the large organizations in public decision-making." (Olsen 
1978:137,259) 
 
Among the organizations it is the large national federations in the 
economy that dominate the state. They are heavily represented in 
government decision-making. They have substantial secretariats. 
The smaller organizations had few administrative resources. Of 
1200 organizations in 1975 only 8% of them had secretariats with 
more than 31 people. The organization state is not perfectly 
representative. One-third of the population are not members of an 
interest organization and are for that reason poorly represented in 
the state. 
 There is little reason to doubt the NPS statements about the 
political power of the large organizations. But it is a large leap from 
that fact to a statement about the character of the state. Whom do 
the large organizations represent? To what degree has the state 
influenced the organizations, their structure and their policy 
profiles, making it pertinent to speak of statist organizations rather 
than the organization state? 
 Olsen implies that since both employers and wage workers are 
formally represented by the large federations, the organization state 
is representative of at least the main parts of the population. But that 
is an empirical problem and cannot be assumed on the basis of who 
the organizations say they represent. An employers' organization, 
under certain circumstances, may represent the interests of a whole 
nation. A trade union federation may become more involved in 
defending the national interests of the bourgeoisie (in the 
international economy) than workers' interests and demands. 
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 There are studies of how Norwegian trade unions imperfectly 
represent the interests of their members, how they acquiesced in or 
even actively developed policies that served employers rather than 
common members, e.g. severe restraints on wage demands, actions 
against strike activity, etc.192 Studies suggest that the leadership of 
the trade union federations have assimilated the ideology and 
politics of capitalist-oriented elites (Higley, Brofoss and Grøholt 
1975). The NPS draws a different picture from a different source. 
The NPS interviewed 673 people who were not members of 
organizations. Of these, 378 were without wage work and 295 were 
employed. The NPS says that: (a) the unorganized do not express 
opposition to the organized society or any feeling of alienation; (b) 
they do not feel they are losers; and (c) the unorganized employed 
have about the same level of wage incomes as the organized (NPS 
1982:110). 
 
Who had the initiative in policy-making? 
Who had the initiative and who determines the political agenda in 
the state • the organizations or the state leadership? NPS 
interviewed state, organization and private company leaders about 
their participation in and influence on public decision-making. The 
NPS report (1982) says that in the Federation of Trade Unions there 
was a relatively large group of members who were not happy with 
the main policies. 15% of the members reported that there was often 
policy disagreement. Only student- and women's organizations had 
a higher percentage reporting dissatisfaction with organization 
policies. Over one-third (37%) in LO organizations said that 
minorities among members were seldom given a chance to voice 
their views. On that score only student and pensioners' 
organizations had larger percentages. However, instead of following 
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 See, for example, Solvang (1974) and Rønning (1974). 
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these indications, and probing for the reasons behind the 
dissatisfaction, the report concludes: "It is rather agreement on a 
number of questions and the general member satisfaction with their 
leaders that is the main finding of our study." (NPS 1982:123).  
 The NPS considers interest organization penetration of the state 
to be an expansion of parliamentary democracy. The welfare state is 
seen as an expansion of the representative state.193 However, 
representation is not perfect. 
 
 "The Norwegian welfare state is a cooperation and insurance state. It has been served by a 
reservoir of solidarity and common understanding among the Norwegian people ... Thus the 
government has been autonomous and efficient and there has been little need to use force. 
Norway can be seen as a federation of functional and regional groups, partly independent, 
partly united by common rules and regulations... Not all groups and interests are equally 
well represented in the state. The differences emanate from differential resources. Resources 
and influence on public policy are related. Power over the state and state power are related." 
(Olsen 1980:14) 
 
Confrontation with historians 
Olsen and his colleagues had the ambition of formulating a general 
theory with their concept of the "organization state". A paper by 
Lægreid and Olsen in 1981,194 contested Edvard Bull's concept of a 
"state elite", a coalition of politicians, bureaucrats and interest 
organization leaders all set on the project of organizing capitalism: 
"we are ... sceptical of the concept of a united elite, a grand coalition 
of politicians, civil servants and organized interests (at least partly) 
in opposition to ordinary people" (Olsen 1983:144). The researchers 
                                           
     193
 When the Power Study chooses to investigate its hypotheses through questionnaires 
administered to this broad state-economy leadership, there is some danger of a circular proof. 
Questionnaires register the opinions of those questioned. The theory I am suggesting about the 
role of the social democratic leadership is that its position in the parliamentary state necessitated 
the defence and development of capitalism but, at the same time, made it possible to argue that 
it was representing the working class and popular interests. That the state-economy elites, when 
asked, answered in terms of the 'popular representation' thesis would not be surprising. 
     194
 Which later appeared as Chapter 4 in Olsen (1983). 
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argue that Norway is a value-homogeneous society and that the 
state is a segmented system, in which each segment defends its 
political/economic values. Contrary to Bull's and Higley's theses, 
the segments are not coordinated by a common, overarching value. 
"Norway is fairly homogenous, with a well developed division of 
political labour - a segmented state in an unsegmented society" 
(Lægreid and Olsen 1981:38). 
 While Olsen and Lægreid have little to say about the character of 
the economic system and its relationship with state activity, they - in 
contrast to Hernes - focus more consistently on how institutional 
structures and decision-making rules influence the conceptions and 
actions of both administrators and politicians. They suggest that 
administrators in the Norwegian postwar government, no matter 
what their class or regional background, become defenders of 
institutionalized interests.195 But, because they assume the 
possibility of agreed upon, equitable distributions of resources, 
through the interplay of the interest organizations and the 
segmented state, they conclude that state structures are not value-
biased and that class distinctions are unimportant in public policy. 
The state and the government is more or less representative of all 
major groups in Norwegian society. 
 In this way Olsen suggests that the main actors in the 
parliamentary state are the interest organizations. The interest 
organizations, rather than the political party groups in the Storting, 
deliver the decisive premises for public policy. The organization 
state has an internal power structure at odds with the constitutional 
setup, but its representativeness is not basically challenged by the 
new role of the interest organizations. The social democrats and the 
Power Project have essentially the same understanding: the role of 
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 See Max Weber's concept of the bureaucracy as an iron cage, a structure that systematic-
ally directs individual activity and that gradually standardizes identities and languages. 
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the interest organizations in the state strengthens democracy and 
increases the representativeness of the state.196 
 
Negotiations in markets, market transactions in state 
Hernes has more to say about the economy than Olsen, but comes to 
the same conclusion about the character of the state. Political and 
economic institutions are merging into one tightly knit system, with 
politics playing a role in the economy ("the bargained economy") 
and economic actors from the private sector playing a role in the 
state bureaucracy ("the mixed administration"). A consequence is 
the withering of markets. Hernes points to the internationalization 
of both state and economy in Norway.  
 These concepts suggest that decision-making processes in the 
state are not adequately described in constitutional and 
administrative law. The state is not a unitary hierarchic system 
subordinated to policy-making in the Storting. It is a segmented 
state, each segment related to a sector in the economy and to a 
specific, often well-organized interest organization there. The 
administration is a policy-maker, partly independent of the Storting. 
The importance of activities in the parliamentary arena has 
diminished, not least because it has become increasingly dependent 
upon the knowledge accumulated in the administration. The public 
administration accumulates policy-relevant knowledge through its 
privileged interactions with interest organizations, scientific 
institutions and international administrations. The large, privately 
owned firms and banks become autonomous and powerful actors in 
national markets and small and dependent actors in international 
markets. The banks and large companies participate in government, 
actively bargaining for their interests. The companies are 
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 See Per Maurseth (1986) and Hans Fredrik Dahl (1986) for a presentation of the view that 
the Labour Party has given the organizations priority in its 'theory of state' right from the 1930's. 
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politicized, the government is changed to an arena of bargaining 
systems between well organized public and private interests. The 
state becomes an active economic agent through partial ownership 
of shares, representation on boards and in tripartite, corporative 
organs. On the one hand there is a more statist society, in which 
politics enters into business leadership. On the other hand, the 
continued and expanded absorption of the Norwegian economy into 
an international, imperialistic economy limits the political freedom 
of the Norwegian state and strengthens the capitalist market 
character of economic activity in Norway. 
 
Social democracy co-opted 
The theory of a statist and corporative society has empirical support. 
But the NPS does not manage to transcend the traditional 
constitutional explanation of these changes. The new organization 
state, or the new management state as I have named it, is formally 
democratic and substantively representative. The constitutional 
description, with a democratic state representing the people is still 
valid. 
 To transcend a theory, alternatives are needed. Theories about 
social and political systems are seldom demolished by facts. 
Hypotheses, however marginal they may be, can be defended by 
select facts. Theoretical innovations require the formulation of new 
theories that through a renewed analysis of both old and new data, 
prove more able to explain the phenomenon, explain it more 
extensively or more in depth. Thus scientific advance is more a 
question of dialogue and comparisons between theories and their 




THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 
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Apart from the welfare state, the realization of a legally defined 
minimum income, public insurance and welfare guarantees (which 
will be investigated in Chapter 19), what were the goals of the 
social democratic movement in postwar Norway and, in particular, 
did the social democrats manage to use the state apparatus to fulfil 
its goals? 
 
Effects of war and German occupation 
A number of conditions combined from 1935 through the Second 
World War to give the labour movement the political initiative at 
liberation in May 1945. The reformist ideology was established as 
official ideology. The Communist Party had lost confidence in 1940 
for its neutral position in the conflict between England and 
Germany. But after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union the Party 
gradually, through its active struggle against the Germans in 
Norway, regained popular confidence. The bourgeois political 
movement had a stronghold in the resistance movement 
(Hjemmefronten). It did not develop plans for a liberated Norway 
during the war. Reconstruction of the old arrangement was the 
common assumption for postwar politics in those circles. 
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New class relations, state-organized planning and increased 
productivity 
The radical academic organization, Mot Dag, was disbanded in 
1936 and many of its members entered high positions in the Labour 
Party government. The party was in power from 1935. Even if it 
was criticized for its lack of firmness during the German invasion, it 
wielded state authority from its offices in London all through the 
war. During the last part of the war, the Labour Party and the 
Federation of Trade Unions developed a political programme for the 
postwar period. The bourgeoisie was on the defensive. Its leading 
elements had been timid and indecisive in the resistance movement. 
Resistance versus economic cooperation was a constant dilemma. It 
had lost the battle over government position in 1935. The 
bourgeoisie was ambivalent about the Labour Party's compromises 
with the farm movement and with the Federation of Employers. On 
the one hand they made the labour movement a responsible 
participant in the capitalist economy. On the other hand, they gave 
the Labour Party government power. 
 The bourgeoisie was both surprised by and split on Keynesian 
economic theory. The idea that an active state using more money 
than it had extracted could benefit capitalism was a hard nut to 
swallow for at least sections of the class. Høyre was split between a 
traditional parliamentary wing, with Carl Hambro as its central 
personality, and a corporative, pro-state wing with Smitt 
Ingebrigtsen - editor of Aftenposten - as leader. 
 Many of these tendencies can be noted in the "Common Political 
Programme" (Fellesprogrammet), which was approved by all 
political parties in 1945. It spelled out the basic elements in the 
social democratic strategy for the postwar organization of the 
economy and the state. The basic idea in the Programme was 
national unity: "In the minds of most Norwegians the war has 
created a concept of national unity which no military power could 
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dissolve. No one asked what party you belonged to or whether you 
were rich or poor" (Bull 1979:72). If the social democrats and the 
communists proposed that idea, it was not because they felt that 
class distinctions had been done away with. The main reason was 
the assumption that the labour movement would be dominant in 
government, and thus have superior power to that of private capital, 
and that working-class interests for that reason could be realized 
within the existing state structure. 
 The principles of state organization had a corporative bias. The 
three large corporations in society - labour, capital and the state - 
should cooperate on a rational and equal basis in tripartite organs 
for decision-making and planning. Combined with this horizontal 
cooperation between equals, the Labour Party envisaged a vertical 
democratization process, from the "bottom up". At the company 
level the Programme suggested the creation of "production 
committees" (produksjonsutvalg) between labour and management. 
However, to get support for that idea in bourgeois circles, the 
cooperative committees were not given decision-making power. 
 The Programme suggested branch or economic sector 
committees with the same kind of representation. At the national 
level the Programme envisaged an "Economic Cooperation 
Council", again with tripartite representation.197 The political parties 
were assigned a secondary role in the new state organization (Bull 
1979). This change of emphasis away from the political parties and 
the parliament towards organizations and bureaucracy was probably 
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 As early as 1933 Colbjørnsen and Sømme (both within the labour movement) had worked 
out similar ideas, but going much further, suggesting an economic corporate council at the same 
level as the Storting (see Hjellum 1980). "The national economic council should be the main 
part of a new parliament, elected among the main groups and corporations in the economy. 
When this economic democracy develops the new corporate parliament will merge with the 
existing Storting, creating an economic and political bicameral parliament" (from Colbjørnsen 
and Sømme's document, cited by Hjellum 1980:4.8, my translation). 
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influenced by the tendencies in the Storting in 1940 to cooperate 
with the German occupants. 
 Different conceptions of corporatism were present in the labour 
movement. Some, like Colbjørnsen and Sømme (1933), saw 
corporatism transforming the parliamentary form of democracy into 
a new kind of socialist state. In this perspective the corporative 
organization of the state had similarities to developments in Italy 
and Germany under the fascist and Nazi regimes. The differences 
between the socialist and fascist forms of corporatism were 
therefore explicitly argued by the two authors. Others saw 
corporatism as an expansion of democracy within the parliamentary 
state. 
 The system of corporative organs actually implemented in 
Norway after 1945 was a weak type of corporatism. The main 
difference to the stricter model were (1) the representatives of the 
state in the corporative organs did not have a superior formal 
authority; (2) the state did not formally approve organizations; in 
principle, representation was open; in practice, however, the large 
employer organizations and the National Federation of Trade 
Unions did play dominating roles; and (3) the corporative organs 
did not formally prevent activity in the parliamentary arena (Wyller 
1963, Østerud 1972, Bull 1979). 
 However, Østerud (1972) and Svensson (1969) have pointed to 
how the corporative planning organs did change patterns of political 
decision-making. First, the political importance of discussions, 
planning and law-making in the Storting was reduced. Secondly, the 
system worked to split what remained of working-class solidarity 
into trade-specific solidarity. 
 
 "Public planning according to the new corporative model changed the character of the liberal 
democratic society. It split that society into vertical segments, segments that were 
coordinated primarily at the top level" (Østerud 1972:74). 
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The corporative model was built on the socialist idea of a planned 
economy. What is more difficult to see in the corporative 
conception of the state is class struggle. At best it was assumed to 
be present in the sense that the Labour Party was the representative 
of the working class and would, through peaceful cooperation, 
gradually win over bourgeois interests and power positions. But the 
idea of class struggle was played down in the postwar corporative 
strategy of the Labour Party. Even the political parties were not 
thought of as important political actors, at least in the field of 
economic planning and decision-making. The idea of reconstruction 
on the basis of the traditional, private ownership structure, was 
accepted without any fear that it might prolong the traditional class 
cleavages. The corporative channel of decision-making - it was 
assumed - would give decisive state power to the labour movement. 
 Edvard Bull (1979), argues that this social democratic strategy 
had support in the working class, and that most members of that 
class were not bothered by whether the system was socialist or 
capitalist. The working class was interested in its daily work and 
living conditions. The social democrats in power would improve 
those conditions. There was no radical longing for a new socialist 
society among the working class in 1945. There was approval for 
the idea of more public control of the capitalist economy, but there 
were no revolutionary demands. Nor can the large vote for the 
Communists in 1945 be interpreted as an expression of 
revolutionary aspirations, as their party programme in 1945 was 
based on the concept of "patriotic unity":  
 
 "It is not possible to document the statements that there existed "important revolutionary 
movements" in the population. The Communist Party got 12% of the vote (and the Labour 
Party 41%). But the Communist Party did not in any way advocate a revolutionary program-
me in 1945. Rather the opposite. It agitated forcefully for participation in the patriotic unity." 
(Bull, 1979:81). 
 
 Corporatism  273 
 
There are not many studies in sociology or political science which 
attempt to describe the ideological and political tendencies in the 
working class in this period. Most studies concentrate on 
developments in the unions, in the political parties and in the 
elections. Still there are some data that counter Bull's thesis. 
 The Communist Party had support in the working class in 1945 
and, even if Bull may be right that the party focused 'patriotic unity', 
it was still a party at odds with the Labour Party, for example on 
local trade union participation in the political process. It was also a 
party harshly attacked by the Labour Party, especially with Soviet 
expansion in Eastern Europe and the installation of a communist 
regime in Czechoslovakia. The Labour Party faced opposition in the 
working class when it accepted the bourgeois demand of no wage 
increases during the reconstruction period (see O.J. Olsen 1984, 
Lorenz 1974), and also when it tried to prevent boycott of ships 
from Spain in 1946 (Benum 1969). 
 Jens Arup Seip (1963) suggested that the Labour Party was a 
bureaucratic machine directed at using the state to manage and 
develop capitalism ("the programme of the Party's enemy"). Now, 
Seip may argue that capitalism did not contradict the interests of the 
working class. The class did not demand socialism. But even that 
does not solve the problem of bureaucratic power wielding by the 
Labour Party. If the party and the working class were in line 
ideologically in the early postwar period, it is rather difficult to 
understand the need for so much state and party power directed at 
controlling the political actions of the working class.198 
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 See the novel 15. septemberplassen by the Norwegian writer, Dag Solstad, for a vivid 
description of working-class longings for 'a new start' in an industrial city, Halden, just after the 
war. 
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 Torstein Hjellum (1987b) has suggested that 1945 ushered in a 
period of Labour Party decline, at least in the sense of popular, 
democratic activity in local party organs. Passivity at the local level 
may indicate that everyone was in agreement with the leadership. 
However, bearing in mind the project of winning over bourgeois 
economic power, we might expect that ideological unity between 
party and class on reformism would favour struggle for economic 
control in the private sector. But that mobilization did not occur.199 
Thus, I choose to interpret corporative centralization in the Labour 
Party strategy as an indication of conflict between party and class, 
in line with Seip's suggestion that the Party had to use power to 
isolate and neutralize working class opposition. 
 
The historical pattern of labour conflicts in Norway 
Can data on the labour-capital conflicts from about 1900 to 1975 
inform us on the Labour Party's relations to the working class?  
 From Figure 15.1(a) we see that the number of workers involved 
was intermittently high through the 1920's and 1930's. The period 
1945 to 1955 saw a low number of workers in strikes. In 1956 the 
number was large and substantial numbers of workers went on 
strike up to 1964, with a new upsurge in 1974. Thus we see that 
workers were struggling to some degree against capital/corporative 
power from 1956 to 1964, when the Labour Party was advocating 
cooperation. 
                                           
     199
 The study of Arne Fabrikker (Gran and Jensen 1978) demonstrated the passivity thesis. It 
was only at the very end of the struggle over integration into Norion that the union leaderships 
mobilized the workers. Even then, this focused more on giving information than on organizing 
workers' initiatives. 
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Compared with lost work days (Figure 15.1(b)) we see that in the 
1950's and 1960's few work days were lost, indicating that strikes 
were shorter, perhaps more directed at influencing media and public 
debate than actually forcing capital to succumb for economic 
reasons.  



















From Figure 15.1(c) we can see that up to 1932 there was a rising 
number of lost work days over time, while after the War the 
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tendency was the opposite. Thus these data give some support to 
Bull's suggestion that the Labour Party and large sections of the 
working class were in agreement on the corporative strategy and 
that the bourgeoisie should continue owning and controlling the 
means of production.  
 We can distinguish three phases in the development of labour-
capital conflicts: (1) the mobilization phase, 1900-1920, the will to 
struggle for better working conditions spread; (2) the ambiguous, 
transitional stage (1923-1939), when the number of conflicts was 
still rising, but participation was dwindling. This was the period 
when the labour movement was hammering out its strategy of 
reformism; (3) the postwar peace period, which was interrupted by 
some large conflicts between 1956 and 1964 and in 1974. This 
periodization parallels the distinction between the three stages of 
state development • the consuming state, (up to the First World 
War), the transitional state (1914-1945) and the managerial state 
(1945-1970)(cf. Figures 6.6. a-c). My thesis is that the two 
processes are related: corporative reorganizations of the state are 
closely dependent upon the development of reformism in the labour 
movement. 
 Why the passivity after the war? Was the welfare state the 
fulfilment of old working-class demands or did the social 
democratic leadership efficiently suppress radicalism in the class? 
Edvard Bull may be right: the ideological development in the social 
democratic movement toward entrenched reformism mirrored a 
parallel development in the working class. The state may have 
played an important role in absorbing (and changing) the labour 
movement: the Storting was open for working-class representation; 
gradually the Labour Party leadership attained legitimacy as 
government and agreements were made with the employers' 
organizations; The alliance with peasants was important, limiting 
the 'relevance' of socialist ideology. All these factors may have 
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influenced the ideology of the working class. However, what about 
the militant strikes that did take place at times in all three phases: 
workers gone astray under radicalist leadership, workers divorced 
from the normal working-class culture in the country? We do not 
have conclusive studies or convincing answers to those questions. 
As the 1920's passed, the discussions within the labour movement 
and in the media on the question of state organization and 




THE BOURGEOISIE ON THE DEFENSIVE 
IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ARENA 
 
Wars are not congenial to laissez-faire ideologists. Wars require a 
strong state with the ability to regulate the economy internally and 
externally.200 During the Second World War the Germans expanded 
the state apparatus. During the war the new state profession, the 
social economists, reached positions of power within the Labour 
Party, influencing the party's views on the role of the state in the 
economy. The Norwegian economist, Erik Brofoss, one of the 
pupils of Ragnar Frisch, was instrumental in creating the new, 
conception of the integrated national economy and the state budget. 
In that concept the Labour Party had a new language for 
disseminating its ideas on a publicly planned economy. In the "Law 
on prices" it had an instrument for influencing the location of 
companies and on production, wages and technology in them. The 
liberalists within the bourgeoisie were against such regulation, but 
they succumbed. 
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 See Tønnesson (1979) for a description of the state regulatory system during the First 
World War. 
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 By the end of the 1940's the situation was changing for the 
bourgeoisie. The Labour government had accepted the principle of 
private ownership of the means of production. Under the 
reconstruction programme (gjenreisningen), capitalist industry and 
trade developed rapidly. In 1947 the Marshall Aid programme was 
introduced, at first with some reluctance on the part of the Labour 
government. 
 The bourgeoisie organized outside the state. Cooperation was 
established between employer organizations. Political propaganda 
for the free market and a laissez-faire state was disseminated 
aggressively by new interest organizations like Libertas.201 The 
Price Law and the power of the Price Directorate were contested. In 
that battle, which ended in 1957, the social democrats lost. They 
had to surrender their ambitions of direct state intervention in 
company management. 
 While the social democrats seemed to have a conception of state 
socialism in the first years after the war, the organized bourgeoisie, 
in coalition with American government interests and well aided by 
Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, managed to defeat that 
concept and to initiate an integration of the social democrats into the 
bourgeois state elite. Several outcomes of political conflicts in the 
period we are studying indicate that such an interpretation is 
reasonable. After a harsh battle in the Labour Party, where 
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 On the initiative of the Shipowners' Association, political cooperation was organized 
between that Association, the Bankers' Association, the Federation of Norwegian Industries, the 
Association of Craft Employers, of Employers in Trade and the Association of Insurance 
Companies. Their purpose was, according to Bull (1979), twofold: (1) to influence public 
opinion an in anti-socialist direction. Libertas was created for that purpose in 1946, although 
without direct participation from the six federations, and (2) to produce 'counter-experts' to the 
'socialist' social economists and their national planning. For this purpose a research Institute 
(Næringsøkonomisk Forskningsinstitutt) was created. Libertas was publicly exposed by the 
social democrats as a propaganda machine for the bourgeoisie in 1948. Bull notes the lukewarm 
support for Libertas from capitalist leaders. As he puts it: "At least some of them probably felt 
quite at ease with the Labour Party government" (Bull 1979:105). 
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historians have indicated that not only democratic means were used 
(Skodvin 1971, Eriksen 1972, Lundestad 1980), NATO 
membership was approved. In the battle over state ownership of 
industry the outcome was an industrial management system that 
included worker representatives, but where the management 
principle was traditional production/profit maximization. The 
Federation of Trade Unions (LO) accepted that the workers had 
some responsibility for increasing productivity in industry and that 
wage restraint and a hierarchy of wages could serve that goal. 
 The changing class structure can also help explain this integration 
process. The working class became more complex, with a large 
influx of administrative and technical workers from both private and 
public sectors. This made it more difficult for working-class parties 
to propagate a traditionally socialist programme and still hold on to 
the new class members (Esping-Andersen 1985). The capitalist 
economy was expanding in the 1950's and the 1960's, fulfilling 
economic goals set by the working class in the interwar period, 
while the growth of bourgeois wealth was increasing at a higher 
rate. The fact that the social democrats were responsible for policy-
making in an ever larger and more complex state apparatus reduced 
the need and the time available for mobilizing initiatives in the local 
groups of the labour movement. The importance of extra-
parliamentarian struggle seemed to diminish. So did interest in state 
theory and the debate on whether a proletarian or socialist state 
could and should be organized differently from parliamentary 
democracy. 
 Bull (1979) coined the phrase "the partnership of the elites in 
organizing capitalism", the elites being the top leadership in the 
labour movement, in the state and in the business community. Are 
all these elites members of the bourgeoisie? The policies produced 
within the labour movement and the Labour Party may support that 
interpretation. The state seemed systematically oriented towards 
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sustaining the capitalist economy, even if that meant an ever deeper 
penetration of political power into economic processes and 
relations. But has the government structure itself influenced the 
labour movement leadership in a reformist, pro-capitalist direction? 
In the following chapters I will develop answers to that question and 
attempt to define some organizational mechanisms that might have 





The studies of the social democratic project reveal a watering down 
of its class-specific character in postwar Norway. The socialist goal 
of the movement is not respecified according to experiences and 
changing conditions, but is gradually suppressed and finally taken 
out of the Labour Party programme. The party formulated its 
political and organizational principles in 1949. 20 years passed 
before they were revised. Government responsibility and the strat-
egy of a planned economy integrated the social democratic 
leadership into a network of decision-making bodies where 
capitalist managers and leaders of bourgeois interest organizations 
were active. This integration process divorced the labour leadership 
from its base, from the members in the labour organizations, and 
gradually generated an action model among them focused on 
managing capitalism and worker interests within that system. The 
idea of liberating the working class (and everyone else) from the 
oppression, insecurities and crises of that system was dropped. This 
change can be a consequence of the labour leadership becoming 
involved in a complex, institutionalized government structure that 
gradually worked to transform the leadership into an active 
pro-state, pro-capitalist leadership within the bourgeois class, with 
its base in the state. That was, in case, of strategic importance for 
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the bourgeoisie. With a labour government the democratic character 
of the state was close to indisputable. It could also legitimate 
clandestine state actions against political opposition to the Labour 
Party, as such opposition could be construed as directed at the 
democratic state. 
 The Power Study produced a different theory about the role of 
social democracy in the Norwegian capitalist economy. It said that 
the labour movement was representative of wage labour interests. It 
was a democratic movement because it sought power within the 
democratic state. Thus, in the Power Study it is the representative 
state apparatus that guarantees democracy. The state organization is 
class neutral. Implicitly the means of production are seen as a 
resource for the bourgeoisie, as wages are seen as a comparable 
resource for the working class. 
 This theory of the democratic state is implied in Hernes' theory 
about the state as mediator in conflicts. The concept of the 
organization state contains the same general theory: organizations 
have varying degrees of influence on state policy, but the main ones 
represent the two principal forces in Norwegian society, the wage-
labourers and the employers. Their participation makes the 
organization state a democratic state.  
 The Power Study identified a number of problems in the 
realization of democratic rule. Hernes points to the distortion of 
democracy through the functions of the market and the bureaucracy. 
But the deviations are seen as marginal, transitory and correctable. 
Olsen and Lægreid have pointed to how organizational participation 
in administrative policy-making is skewed to the advantage of the 
organizations in the economic sector and the large organizations 
among them. Again the perspective is the same. The skewed 
representation is marginal and can in principle be corrected by more 
organization among the weakly organized and unorganized. 
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 How the biases of the state organization in favour of capitalism 
and the bourgeoisie have developed historically was a minor 
problem for the NPS researchers. As suggested in the present study, 
the biases of the state organization, seen historically, may be 
connected systematically to the power differentials between the 
classes in the economy, differentials that might be changed if the 
state lost its oppressive character and capacity. 
 Let me now investigate the thesis of a bourgeois state in more 
detail through the workings of the Norwegian state under social 
democratic management and how the state organization, seen as 
both a formal structure and a decision-making system, has affected 
the social democratic leadership. First I will turn to the two salient 
features of the state apparatus; (1) the increasing differentiation of 
the structure of the public administration concomitant with its 
professionalization; and (2) the participation of interest organiza-
tions in decision-making. Then I will investigate the role of the 
Labour Party government under Einar Gerhardsen in the 
management of the Kings Bay Coal Mines on Svalbard. 
16 Professionals in the state 
"The philosophers and even all intellectuals often defend themselves and 
mark off their identity by drawing a nearly absolute distinction between 
the area of knowledge, which harbours freedom and truth, and the field 
of power. What strikes me is that when we consider the humanities, the 
knowledge developed there can in no way be seen as separate from the 
application of power in society." 
Michel Foucault (Morgenavisell , 20 August 1984) 
How do professionals and the professions affect the autonomy of the 
state organization? In this chapter two steps are taken to answer this question. First 
it delineates the development of the whole personnel structure in the postwar 
Norwegian state. Second it investigates some of the mechanisms and dynamics of 
professional functions within the state organization relative to the economic 
modernization process. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN THE POSTWAR STATE 
In 1973 the central government had about as many employees working in non-priced 
service work as in priced services and material production. If we include the 
municipal level of government the non-priced service activity dominates (Figure 4.3 
and Table 4.2). The proportion of the state budget used for services was approximate-
ly equal to the part material commodities represented in the national budget (Table 
4.2). In this sense the state was an inverse mirror of the capitalist economy. I asked 
if the increase in service work in the total economy represented an increased strain 
on the capacity of the economy to produce surplus values. Seen from the pointof 
view of capital, state financing of necessary (reproductive) services has at least the 
advantage of being paid for by revenues from all classes. 
State expansion 277 
As shown earlier the relative distribution of state personnel in the categories state 
administration, public commodity production and public services was about the same 
in 1950 as in 1900. (administration: 24/26%, commodity production: 50/47% and 
services: 27/27%, see Table lOA). In the 1950's and 1960's these relations changed 
(Table 16.1). 
Table 16.1 Public employees, 1950- 1970 
Category 1950 1960 1970 
Public administration and defense 23.9 23.6 23.4 
Administration 17.6 18.3 19.2 
Defence 6.3 5.3 4.2 
Public commodity production 49 .6 39.8 26.4 
State banks 0.5 0.7 0.7 
Post/tele/radio 11.7 10.8 9.8 
Railways 15.8 9.6 5.7 
Public transport/energy systems 21.6 18.7 10.2 
Public services 26.5 36.6 50.2 
Education 13.9 17.4 24.4 
Health/social services 11.7 18.4 25.4 
Religious services 0.9 0.8 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 195000 229000 311000 
As % of all employed 13.7 16.3 21.3 
Source: CBS, S0S 3 and Census Data 1960 and 1970. 
From employing close to 50% of all public personnel in 1950, commodity production 
(as defined earlier) plummeted to 26% in 1970. The opposite development took place 
in the service sector: from 26% of all employees in 1950 to 50% in 1970. This 
demonstrates the expansion of the managerial state (see Figure 6.5c) and a movement 
from general administration to a service-producing state. The change indicates that 
the needs for public services in the care and reproduction of labour power grew and 
that the state increasingly supplied services to adults without wage-employment, to 
the unemployed, supported and pensioned parts of the population. The change 
represents a movement towards activities that are labour intensive. 
Given that the services mainly benefit non-capitalist sections of the popUlation, 
these data could support the democratic theory of the state. The managerial, service 
state demonstrates that the social democratic project has succeeded. A different 
interpretation is that the expansion of the service sector in the economy, and in the 
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state in particular, is a result, not mainly of democratic influence, but of increasing 
difficulties in reproducing and expanding the capitalist fund of surplus values, 
difficulties that result in greater pressure and tear on the employed wage-earners and 
in more people being excluded from wage employment. Factors behind the increase 
in state services would then be problems of capital circulation, demanding more 
service work in personnel and finance/banking administration, in advertisement/sales 
promotion and in communications and transport. Or the expansion is a response to 
a demand for more preparatory and repair work on the labour force (schooling, health 
care, socioeconomic support for the unemployed, etc.) This would, if it is true, 
support the crisis theory of state expansion. That theory does not contradict the view 
that services can meet popular needs and demands. But it suggests that the expansion 
of public services results from the pressure of problems experienced by representa-
tives of capital (broadly defined) in the privately owned sector of the economy. The 
two variables, democracy and crisis, may be mutually reinforcing in explaining 
expanded services. The democratic influence of the working class may support a 
move toward service production, which - indirectly - serves capital accumulation. 
I will return to the class content of the welfare state in Chapter 19. In the present 
chapter I will look more closely at the organization of the postwar state, and the 
distribution of state personnel in that structure, searching for the role of the 
professions in the state. 
The expansion of the state 
If we tabulate the total number of state employees over time, we see that the increase 
accelerated from 1930 through the war to 1970 (Table 16.2). 
Table 16.2 Increase of public employees, 1930- 1970 
1930-46 1946·50 1950·60 1960·70 
No. of employees at 
beginning of period 94000 184000 195000 229000 
Years of period 16 4 10 10 
Absolute increase 90000 110000 34000 82000 
% increase over 
whole period 96 6 17 36 
Mean yearly increase 5600 2700 3400 8200 
Source: CBS, S0S 3 and Census Data 1960 and 1970. 
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'Jiven the chosen time periods, these data demonstrate that there were two periods of 
expansion of the state apparatus: (1) the prewar and war period, I and (2) the period 
1960 - 1970. In the late 1940's and the 1950's the state expanded at a slower rate. 
Combined with the sectoral analysis, the first period of expansion was a general 
expansion of the state apparatus across all three sectors, while the second period was 
typically the expansion of the service sector. 
This change in the character of the work of the majority of state employees, from 
infrastructural, commodity-producing work to more non-commodified services, may 
affect ideology among state employees. A hypothesis could be that with the welfare 
service expansion, middle-level and especially street-level employees (Lip sky 1980) 
come increasingly into contact with the social, psychological and material problems 
and demands of those who are eliminated from or never get into wage employment. 
This may affect state employees ideologically. We might expect that working in 
public material production would not condition workers and employees to any special 
type of ideology different from that in the private sector. The relatively radical social 
workers' trade union (NOSO) may be one expression of this experience. The idea that 
the development of services expresses as much problems of capital accumulation as 
it expresses democratic influence on state policy would get some support from the 
phenomenon of radicalization of service-producing personnel. If the capitalist class 
has no need for the services, i.e. they express only popular, working-class influence 
over state policy and such service work radicalizes the state employees, we would 
expect more opposition against that expansion from bourgeois political circles and 
parties. But as Kuhnle and Solheim (1985) demonstrate, there was little opposition 
from the bourgeois political movement to the expansion of the welfare services.2 
The wage structure in government 
The wages people receive influence their way of life. They determine where in the 
class structure people exist as consumers. People living mainly off capital income and 
those living mainly off wages will most often belong to different social classes. If we 
divide the state wage-scale in 1969 into three categories - (1) wages for employees 
I The details here would be interesting. What did the social democrats in power before 
the war do with the state administration? How did the numbers increase between 1935 and 
1940? What effect did the German occupation have on the size of the state after the war? See 
Gran (1987) for a note on war settlement in Norway. 
2 Edvard Bull (1982) cites Haakon Lie, the long-serving general secretary of the Labour 
Party: "The Labour Party wanted to introduce a five day week by 1970. We waited in 
suspense for the reaction. It was different from what we expected. John Lyng [from the 
Conservative Party] was positive - absolutely. And Per Borten [from the Agrarian Party]? Of 
course, he said, we should have a five day week by 1970, especially now that the Finns 
already had introduced a 40 hour week". 
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in top managerial positions, (2) wages for employees with higher education in middle-
range positions and (3) wages for employees in technical/routine administration and 
manual work - we find the distribution of government employees among the three 
categories, shown in Table 16.3. 
Table 16.3 Government employees according to wage, 1969 
Category 
Group 1. Top state employees 
Group 2. Administrators 
Group 3. Workers (widely defined) 
N= 
Source: NOD (1974:7:69). 
Formal 
wage group 
S 1 and 
over 
15 - 23 
4 - 14 






All the means of production in the state are public property. As suggested earlier, this 
allows a freedom of decision-making relative to capital accumulation in the state that 
capital owners in the private sector do not have. However, it could be argued that 
being in top position in the state creates a form of responsibility in terms of the 
rational use of the public means of production which is parallel to the responsibility 
of top management in the private sector? Especially in the commodity-producing 
sectors of the state, the logic behind the administration of the means of production 
may be analogous to profit accumulation in the private sector (maximize production 
relative to production costs), with profits (maximum difference between income and 
production costs) as the primary management principle. 
With three-quarters of all government employees on wage scales at or below level 
15 (in 1969), we can say that the majority of state employees were then economically 
at the level of, or below, the mean wage in the industrial working class.4 
What can these data tell us about the class structure within the state? Do all state 
employees, or important segments of them, belong together in a separate class, 
3 Although prices may be fixed, so that public managers have a kind of Smithian relation 
to the market - i.e. no market power. 
4 In the 1980's segments of the industrial working class received wages above even the 
highest-paid segments of state employees, a process influenced by the expanding, capital-
intensive oil industry. 
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separate from the three main classes identified in Norwegian society?5 
Top bureaucrats (about 6 500 persons in 1970, if we take all in the top income 
bracket, or 2.1 % of 311 000; see the preceding tables) are not identical in economic 
position, economic role and motivations to the private capitalists. However, changes 
that have occurred in the private sector, have reduced the differences between public 
and private managers. The typical family firm is less common in the private sector. 
More and more capitalists are a combination of capital owners in several firms and 
managers working in large, integrated organizations. Ownership and management of 
capital tend to flow together into the managerial (ownership) role. Bureaucratization 
in the private sector creates management systems requiring professionals, often 
without private ownership of capita1.6 In this sense we could suggest that top 
managers are increasingly alike in the two sectors, with a comparable responsibility 
for the means of production, although maximizing company profits and responsibility 
for the state budget represent different types of goals and incentive structures. 
However, in commodity producing, public companies the difference from privately 
owned large companies is probably small. It might even be that state companies are 
harsher and more oppressive exploiters of labour than private companies.7 With pay 
at the level of private capital owners, positions in the top levels of the state may 
make the step into the modem bourgeoisie relatively short.8 We might speak of top 
level bureaucrats as part of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, with their economic base in 
the state bureaucracy. 
The public administrators in the middle layers of the state are a complex group 
with many internal variations. Here we find managers in the central, provincial and 
municipal administrations, but also many technicians/engineers in infrastructural 
5 For discussions of aspects of these problems, see CarriIlo (1977), Gouldner (1979) and 
Jens Hoff (1984). The debate on the state apparatuses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
is also interesting in this context (see Djilas 1957, Bettelheim 1971, Enerstvedt 1973, Bahro 
1978). Jens A. Seip's discussion (Seip 1974) of the bureaucrats in the Norwegian state in the 
nineteenth century is a contribution to that debate, although he variously describes the 
bureaucrats as a group, several groups, an elite and a class. See Fure (1984b) for a presen-
tation and discussion of Seip's theory of bureaucracy and Ringdal (1981) for a comprehensive 
presentation and discussion of his state theory. 
6 See data on the structure of the Norwegian economy in NPS (1982), Chapter 5: (on 
"Economic power groups"). Berge (1984) draws a somewhat different picture of the industrial 
economic structure in Norway, with more emphasis on the small and fragmented of structure 
that industry still has and that makes implementation of a policy for industrial development 
difficult. See also Meynaud 1968 on technocracy, and Galbraith (1967) on the technostructure. 
7 I will investigate that possibility later, in Chapter 18 on the administration of the state-
owned mines at Svalbard. 
8 By membership in the bourgeois class I mean having a position in the economic, 
commodity-producing system that generates a 'capital accumulation orientation' and an 
identification with the capitalist production system. 
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activities (telecommunications, transport, statistical and geographical data production, 
research, etc.), many teachers in the secondary and tertiary school systems, doctors, 
lawyers, etc. The group as a whole can probably, most fruitfully, be seen as belonging 
to a petty bourgeois type of middle class, some middle layer between the bourgeoisie 
and the working class, a class segment which, as Eric Olin Wright suggests, may have 
many, relatively deep, internal contradictions (Wright 1979). We may identify the 
group as part of a middle class because they allegedly have one foot in the working 
class (or close to that class) in that they work for their main means of living and they 
earn it in the form of a wage, and one foot close to the bourgeoisie because of their 
career possibilities, their privileges, their relatively free and unsupervised work 
situation, and because, in contrast with workers, they often have many subordinates. 
They do not, however, belong in the petty bourgeoisie, the class of small 
producers, producing for the market with none or only a few wage-labourers, in either 
industry, crafts, agriculture or small scale-trading. The owners work in production 
and, if successful, accumulate some capital. These owners have problems both ways: 
They fear the working class for wanting to socialize or nationalize their shops and the 
bourgeoisie proper for threatening to swallow them into their large corporations and 
chain stores. 
Most of the low-paid public employees who do routine, manual and administrative 
work, who do not have subordinates, who are at the bottom of the pyramid and 
whose wages are at working-class levels, can appropriately be classified as part of the 
working class. There may be some ideological factors that set these employees apart 
from the working class in the private sector. 
This way of thinking categorizes most state employees into the main classes under 
capitalism: the working class and the bourgeoisie have some of their members (many 
in the postwar period) in the state apparatus. Relatively few in public employment can 
be categorized in the petty bourgeoisie. As in the private sector, the state has 
employees that fall between the main classes, into middle classes or layers, people 
often on the move from one of the main classes to another (See Enerstvedt 1971 and 
Carchedi 1977). 
The special characteristics of the state as organization 
All the same, it is important to note how the state is distinctly different from 
organizations in the private sector. One difference has been mentioned already: public 
ownership of the means of production, a form of collective ownership of the 
infrastructural apparatus, state and semi-state owned companies, and public funds, 
leaving top managers without responsibility for the expansion of a limited amount of 
capital as is the case in the private sector. Secondly, there is a coherent state 
organization, a centralized management system for a whole territory, with absolute 
authority and with a monopolized right to use police and military force to implement 
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decisions within that territory.9 Top level-politicians and bureaucrats in particular 
have access to these potent means of control, a power that is as relevant in the control 
of production as it is in the control of the country's borders. A third element is the 
public election system for recruiting members to parliamentary organs . This process 
imbues the public sector with a public responsibility which the private sector lacks. lO 
Public capital - a basis for a statist social class? 
To what degree does state ownership of capital in industry and in infrastructure 
represent a potential base for a new class formation within the state? The state owns 
a substantial number of shares in Norwegian industry (1960: 15%, 1980: perhaps 
60%). The Power Study produced the following picture of the economic position of 
the state in large industry in NOlway (Figure 16.1). 
Figure 16.1 Finns where the state owned more than 50% of the shares 
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The state is sole owner in large basic industry, in iron and steel production (l and 2), 
in advanced electronics and weaponry (3 and 7), in oil (from early 1970's) (4), in 
mining (5) and in chemical industry (6). Except perhaps for oil, the state does not 
9 The monopoly of the right to use force, is the most salient difference. However, many 
organizations and individuals without public authority have the right to use force for defensive 
purposes. 
10 To what degree those norms actually impinge on politicians and administrators is 
another matter. What we can see is that the government administration prepares and suggests 
public measures after evaluating the political situation in the Storting and the possibilities there 
for support or opposition. 
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control whole branches of the economy. If it did, we know from other Western 
countries that it is difficult for state-owned companies to operate on anything but the 
traditional profit-maximization strategy. Any specific use-value considerations above 
and beyond the principle of profitability (for example, job security, workers' 
participation, etc.) easily put the state-owned companies into the red. 11 The state 
companies often have access to a wider range of decision-criteria and different social 
use-value considerations. But the markets and institutional systems that the companies 
"depend on limit the scope for applying the use-value criteria. The consequence is 
often that private industry gladly nationalize~ industries which, under private tutelage, 
produce use values but at a loss. State companies have difficulty adjusting to market 
demands because entrenched union interests defend specific job structures more 
efficiently there than in the private sector. This also reduces private interest for the 
company . 
The state bureaucracy, as argued earlier, is a structure that allows for differing 
management strategies from the private sector. However, tight budgets and public 
control pressure bureaucrats to apply rather strict economic criteria in decision-
making. Professionals are subordinated a profit criterium in the private sector. 
The analysis so far indicates that the state is systematically subordinated to the 
private sector in terms of capital. It is engaged in infrastructural investment and 
management, which - at best - plays a peripheral role as supplier of surplus value, 
requires large investments and gives returns over an extended period of time. State 
ownership in industry is substantial, but the market system strongly limits the state's 
possibilities of operating beyond the simple profit-maximization criterion. The state 
banks are, as we have seen, specialized institutions, at least originally serving special, 
relatively weak interests in the economy, making them dependent upon surplus 
accumulation in the productive sectors. The state welfare services are most clearly 
dependent upon successful capital accumulation in the private sector. Maybe we have 
a first delineation of a state mode of production here, one that does not produce a 
new class formation but rather is characterized by these three dependency traits: infra-
structure, specialized service banking, and the supply of welfare services (dependent 
traits in the sense that they derive their rationale from the functioning/dysfunctioning 
of capitalism in the private sector). The state mode is characterized by use-value 
rather than exchange-value considerations. The state mode of production is closely 
connected to servicing the dominant capitalist mode of production through its 
dependency on surplus value created in the private sector. 
11 This is a main point in the large article on state-owned industry in The Economis 30 
December, 1978. See also chapter 18 on state-owned industry. 
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PROFESSIONALS IN THE STATE · A BASIS FOR STATE AUTONOMY? 
The professions can be seen as autonomous corporations in modern societies, groups 
constituted on a body of knowledge, monopolizing the use and development of that 
knowledge through privileged access to positions in the private and public sectors. 
Professions control admission of new members. They draw economic advantage from 
that control. They shield and develop the knowledge base and the economic and other 
privileges of the group.12 The professions carry models of reality and knowledge of 
means to ends (rationality) into the state, supplying decision-makers with specified 
ways of reaching or implementing goals. 
On the other hand, the state generates professions. State tax extraction, law 
making, policing and war making through bureaucratic forms of organization 
demanded increasingly specialized knowledge within the state apparatus. 
Professions can be seen as mediations between state and society, corporations with 
the special, autonomous role of transferring problem/demand definitions and resources 
from society to the state (problem extraction) and transferring state policies back to 
society (policy implementation). 
Dahl Jacobsen suggested that the influx of professionals into government has been 
an important source of state autonomy (Jacobsen 1964:8). What place and roles do 
professionals have in the postwar Norwegian government system? 
Distribution of professionals in government 
Professionals represent a relatively small part of the total population in public service. 
Lregreid and Roness (1983) have counted the professionals in ministries and 
directorates in 1975, and published the results in their "state statistics". We can 
distinguish three types of professions: management, technical and cultural. Lawyers, 
economists and social scientists belong in the management category, doctors, 
agronomists and engineers in the technical category and the humanities in the cultural 
category. Distinguishing between ministries and directorates, we get the distribution 
of professions in the state in 1975, shown in Table 16.4. 
12 See Rueschemeyer (1983). Max Weber (1947:145) defines a 'corporate group': "A 
social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders by rules, will be 
~alled a 'corporate group' (Verband) so far as its order is enforced by the action of specific 
mdividuals whose regular function this is, of a chief or 'head' (Leiter) and usually also an 
administrative staff." Do the professions meet this leadership/administration criterion? We 
could see the professional organizations, like the Association of Doctors (Legeforeningen), of 
Engineers (Ingenil1lrforeningen), of Political Scientists (Statsviterforeningen), in that light. 
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Table 16.4 Professionals in ministries and directorates, 1975 
Professions Ministries Directorates 
% % 
Management: 72 40 
Lawyers 45 21 
Business economists 13 11 
Social economists 8 5 
Social scientists 6 3 
Technical: 10 46 
Engineers and archi-
tects 4 42 
Doctors 2 1 
ABronomists 4 3 
Cultural: 5 2 
Humanists 5 2 
Other Erofessions 12 12 
TOTALS 101 100 
N= 1528 2408 
Source: Lregreid and Roness (1983), Tables 4.9 and 5.9. 
These data confirm the assumption that the ministries are designed to implement 
policy (often making policy), while the directorates are more technically oriented -
they manage the more specialized, technical activities of state. While 72% of the 
professionals in the ministries were in the management category, 40% of the 
professionals in the directorates were in that category. Only 10% of the professionals 
in the ministries belonged to the technical category, while 46% of the professionals 
in the directorates were in that category. Look for example at engineers and 
architects: 42% of all in the directorates, and only 4% in the ministries. 
The lawyers were by far the largest single category of professionals in the minist-
ries, filling 45% of the professional positions. This underscores that the administration 
of rules and regulations is a dominant decision-making and regulating mechanism in 
the ministries. The lawyers were not a small group in the directorates either; they held 
21 % of the positions there. 
The economists were a major group in both systems, 21 % .in the ministries and 
16% in the directorates. Business economists (micro-economics) were more prevalent 
than social economists (macro economics). The social scientists were the smallest 
group among the management professions: 6% or 92 persons in the ministries, 3% 
or 72 persons in the directorates. There were about as many social scientists as there 
were professionals from the liberal arts/humanities (5 % and 2%). The state 
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administration could obviously manage without many specialists in politics and 
culture ... 
Lregreid and Olsen (1978) have registered how professionals in the state 
administration interacted with the environment. It was the lawyers who primarily 
interacted with individuals, "with people who only represented themselves or their 
family" (p. 216). Neither economists nor social scientists had many such relations. 
The economists had (typically) contacts with well-organized interests at the national 
level. The social scientists interacted primarily with the political system (the Storting, 
the political parties and the media). Neither economists nor social scientists had much 
contact with regional and/or local institutions. Again the lawyers scored highest. The 
pattern is as we might expect, given the character of the Norwegian parliamentary/ 
corporative system in the mid-1970's: the most rule-oriented profession was most in 
contact with individual citizens and the local institutions. The specialists in production 
and distribution (economists) interacted most actively with the corporative interest 
organizations, among which the economic organizations were the most powerful in 
state policy-making. The social scientists, the specialists in politics and social 
relations, were active in the political, policy-making sphere. 
On the basis of these findings we can formulate the 'inverted access' hypothesis: 
Weak clients: controlled access, stronger clients: free access. Individuals and local 
institutions, often having the least knowledge of the rules, meet at first hand the rule 
specialists. Publicly employed lawyers helping peripheral clients to bypass legal 
barriers is not likely. The interest organizations, which often have good knowledge 
of the rules, meet the specialists in economics. Their chances of access are thereby 
augmented by the professionals they interact with. The social scientists, who may be 
best suited to help the peripheral clients, because of their ability to see political 
realities behind the rules and formal structures, are farthest away from them, engaged 
in advising the political institutions at the apex of the state system. If this model is 
correct, it reminds us of the Mathew effect: make access most available to the 
strongest who need that access the least. 
Variations in professional structures: 
comparison between a ministry and a directorate 
If we compare the Directorate of Highways and the Ministry of Social Affairs, are 
they examples of the differences between ministries and directorates identified above? 
(1) In the Directorate of Highways there were nearly 100% engineers below top 
management. Roads at this level of government are thus defined as a technical affair. 
But in the top management of the Directorate we find a professional mix somewhat 
parallel to the general profile depicted for directorates in Table 16.4: 10 or 34% 
engineers, 8 or 27% lawyers, 8 or 27% economists and one psychologist, one 
agronomist and one from the humanities (State Calendar 1984). 
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(2) In 1965 there were 50 professional employees in the Ministry of Social Affairs: 
38 or 76% of them were lawyers; only 4 had other kinds of higher education. In 1976 
the number of professional employees had risen to 84. The number of lawyers was 
exactly the same as in 1965, 38, reducing the percentage of lawyers from 76% to 
45%, which at that time also was the mean number of lawyers in the ministries. 
Even if we take two extremes on the continuum of administrative organs, from the 
highly technical Directorate of Highways to the social service administration, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, we thus find the same general structure. The lawyers and 
engineers are the largest groups, with the economists in third place. The social and 
human sciences are weakly represented. 
The state is thus a rule-oriented system at 'street level' where most citizens meet 
the state. The politicians are sifted through numerous ideological screens before they 
reach the top positions in parliaments and government. The central state is rule-
oriented towards clients and local communities, offering rich and varied sources of 
professional knowledge to politicians and leaders of interest organizations that 
penetrate into the top levels of the state. 
Professions and state autonomy 
With these data on professional structures in state administration, let me turn to the 
discussion of the relationship between the state and the professions. Is science, 
developed and administered by professionals, an autonomous force in the state, 
capable of changing paradigms at the base of public policy-making, or should the 
professionals mainly be seen as consultants working within value premises defined 
by governments and administrative leaders. Some case materials are available. 
(1) Professionals and the EEC membership question 
Gleditsch, 0sterud and Elster (1974) have demonstrated how the higher-level 
bureaucrats in the state systematically supported Norwegian membership of the EEC, 
and how they gradually took on an active political role, agitating for that membership. 
They stuck to the activist position all through 1972, even when it became obvious 
that opposition to membership was widespread in the population. 13 EEC membership 
was a policy preference held by the bourgeoisie, at least the urban part of it. Large 
sections of the top-level bureaucrats and professionals in the state sided actively and 
publicly with that position. The political neutrality of the top bureaucracy evaporated 
in that sharpened conflict situation. 
Torstein Hjellum (l987a) made a study of the stance on the EEC question among 
academics at the universities of Oslo and Bergen. Not that the universities are typical 
13 The plebiscite gave a majority against membership and led to the downfall of the 
Bratteli Labour Party government. 
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of the organization cultures of public bureaucracies, but the results even there, where 
the formal structures perhaps are less strict in controlling the incumbents than 
elsewhere in the administration, indicate a systematic relationship between position 
in the organization hierarchy and support for membership. In 1972, the higher up the 
incumbent was in the university hierarchy, the more likely he was to support member-
ship. 
Table 16.5 University teachers and the EEC question. 
Stance on EEC membership, Universities of Bergen and Oslo 
Position in university 'Yes' 'No' N 
hierarchy % % 
Professors 59 41 326 
Lecturers 26 74 470 
Research fellows 11 89 438 
Total N 362 872 1234 
Total % 29 71 100 
Source: Hjellum (1987a:1). 
Hjellum registered the number of professors and lecturers across the disciplines who 
took an anti-position on EEC membership. He found that a negative stance was 
generally higher among lecturers than professors. He found that the common 
assumption about social science radicalism did not hold (given that a radical stance 
was an anti-stance). The data show that only 10% of the social science professors in 
Bergen signed 'no' petitions, while the figures were 24% among arts professors and 
22% among natural science professors. Social scientists were not more radical than 
the natural scientists: both groups had 42% 'no' . Lecturers in the humanities were not 
far behind, with 37% 'no'. 
This demonstrates that moving up the hierarchy meant moving closer to the 
bourgeois position on the EEC question in 1972. The data support the idea that higher 
levels in public bureaucracies (widely defined) are closer to/more influenced by 
bourgeois ideology than lower levels. The data can be interpreted to support the idea 
that the bureaucratic, hierarchic organization, through connections to the class system, 
functions selectively to strengthen dominant values and modes of understanding. If 
that mechanism works in university hierarchies it might be more active and powerful 
in state bureaucracies, which are more involved in the management of the economic 
system than are the universities. 
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(2) Professionals in the agriculture and fisheries administrations 
Sigmund VoId (1968) demonstrated the same kind of mechanism at work in the 
central agriculture and fisheries administrations of the 1950' sand 1960' s. He disputed 
Knut Dahl Jacobsen's findings (1965) that the agriculture and the fisheries 
administrations functioned differently relative to their clients. Jacobsen's hypothesis 
was that a client group with a client-conscious profession in the state would be better 
served by the state than those groups without such a profession. The coastal, small 
fishermen in Norway lacked such a client-conscious profession and would therefore 
be less well served by public policy. VoId investigated the action models of the 
bureaucrats in the two administrations and found that, in both sectors, the higher in 
the hierarchy the bureaucrat was located the more likely he was to support large-scale, 
profit-oriented production in both sectors. 
Per Otnes (1973) makes the same assertion studying the plight of small farmers 
and peasants in the nineteenth century, pointing to the fact that small-scale farming 
had as difficult material/economic conditions as coastal small-scale fishing. Small-
scale fishermen met increasing difficulties as the capitalist mode of production 
expanded. So did small farmers. The number of small farms was drastically reduced 
(Table 7.4). That reduction and the expulsion of small farmers from the primary 
sector cannot easily be termed 'in their interests'. The agricultural administration did 
not manage to defend small scale agriculture. Rather, it furthered that development. 
(Fisheries did not have a separate ministry until after the Second World War.) 
THE RECRUITMENT OF PROFESSIONALS TO GOVERNMENT SERVICE 
An additional socializing mechanism at work in the formation of professions is the 
recruitment system to them, i.e. the educational route a person has to pass through to 
become qualified as a professional and a candidate for government employment. 
Bureaucrats in public administration are required to have an academic education. 
University education was still in the 1960's clearly biased in favour of males from 
the urban, bourgeois class. 14 The class structure of the administration does show that 
a biased recruitment system has been at work. The NPS made a study of the 
sociological composition of the employees in state administration (Table 16.6)Y 
14 There has been a gradual and marked improvement in the social and gender composition 
of the student body at higher educational institutions, as I will demonstrate later. 
15 Table 16.6 does not distinguish between decision-makers with and without higher 
education. But most of them have higher education. The data should therefore be representa-
tive of the professionals. 
Table 16.6 The social structure of government. 
Class, gender and region in the central government 
Father's Region 
occupation of origin 
% % % % 
1 2 3 4 
Government personnel 
(N = 784) 71 25 67 33 
Population 
(N = 4 million) 20 80 45 54 
Key: 
1. Academic, company owner, higher level bureaucrat. 
2. Farmer, fisherman or worker. 
3. Oslo, the eastern region. 
4. Other parts of Norway. 
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The overrepresentation of urban/central areas and males is clear: 71 %,67% and 85% 
respectively. It would not be surprising if the ideology of this group of professionals 
was positively oriented towards the general concept of organizing capitalism (not 
investigated in the Power Project). If they were, that would add support to the state 
elite thesis propounded in Higley, Brofoss and Gr~holt (1975), and in Bull (1979), 
that there is a state elite, the sum of leaders in political, administrative, business and 
labour organizations, who all subscribe to the same societal values and agree on the 
political project of organizing capitalism. The elite researchers demonstrated how 
these leaders often were more in agreement with each other than with members of 
their own organizations. 16 
Surprisingly, the NPS researchers interpret these data on skewed recruitment 
differently. They claim the opposite of what I have suggested above. They claim that 
the organization structure in the administration neutralizes the effect of the 
bureaucrats' sociaVregional background and gender representation: "The bureaucrats 
fill complex roles, but our analysis illustrates an important point. Social background 
is important for who is recruited, but has little effect on what values and opinions 
they have as bureaucrats" (NPS 1982:53). The point the NPS is making is that sector-
specific values and biases are embedded in the role and rule structure of each 
ministry. That the sectoral values could be bits and pieces of a larger, superordinate 
16 Indirectly this finding indicates that members and leaders in the large, national interest 
organizations are not always in agreement. That finding also contradicts the interpretations of 
democracy in the interest organizations set forth in NPS (1982), Chapter 5 on Organizations. 
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project of organizing capitalism is not investigated. Thus the NPS has the following 
conception of the formation of the professional action models: 
(1) Social class, region and gender are important variables in the recruitment 
process. People from the upper classes and from central areas and males are recruited 
to the public administration. 
(2) However, upon taking up an administrative position, the organization structure 
and the education of the bureaucrat neutralizes the background variables. 
(3) Social class has for that reason little influence on what choices the professional 
bureaucrats make in their position in the ministry. 
(4) Therefore the value orientations vary between ministries. There is no unitary 
state elite. "Bureaucrats do not have the same values and opinions" (NPS 1982:54). 
On this basis the NPS concludes that the state administration is segmented and 
value plural, representing most regional, gender and group/class interests in society. 
There is reason to believe that the role and rule structures of institutions and their 
links with society influence decision-making, as the NPS suggests. If you are an 
economist in the Ministry of Industry, working with production problems in state 
owned companies, or you work in the Ministry of Social Affairs with unemployment 
benefits, your work in these different positions will gradually produce different 
identities and action models. The economist is oriented to maximizing production; the 
social worker engaged in unemployment is oriented toward reducing unemployment. 
At this level of analysis, the influence of role and rule structures on action models is 
probably quite strong. Comparing data at this level between ministries will create a 
picture of segmentation and of value pluralism in the state. 
But how are the role and rule structures in the ministries formed? Those structures 
favour the recruitment of persons of a bourgeois class, urban and male bias. That 
should mean that the role and rule structures imbue incumbents with exactly those 
values: bourgeois class, urban and male values. The different working class culture, 
the rural values of peripheral regions and female values are not represented. 
There is an interesting methodological aspect to the investigation of institutional 
hypothesis. If we choose to study what the bureaucrats actually do and say in the 
decision-making process, the chances are that the critical data for testing the 
hypothesis about structurally embedded bourgeois/urban/male values will not appear. 
To test the structural hypothesis we would have to study what the ministries do, what 
policy choices are made in situations where class, regional or gender alternatives are 
present. 17 This problem - the content of government policies and the degree to 
17 Jorun Wiik (1986) has related structural aspects of the political system to the contents 
of policy. She has produced a study of the role of the state structure in relation to demands 
for a more liberal abortion policy in Norway. 
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which the content is influenced by the bureaucracy and biased in favour of bourgeois 
class interests - is not present, not formulated in the Power Study. IS 
PROFESSION-SPECIFIC ACTION MODELS 
Value ambiguity and power 
What do we know about the action models of the different professions in the state 
administration? The formation of professional action models is an important area for 
research on the role and the autonomy of the state administration in the political 
process (John son 1992). 
Eckhoff and Jacobsen (1960) suggested that bureaucrats in the Norwegian system 
are confronted with three partly contradictory value systems: applying science to 
decision-making; applying existing law and decision-making rules; and, being loyal 
to the majority in parliaments and to government decisions. The norms are the basis 
for different types of criticisms of administrative decision-making and they can be 
mobilized alternately by the bureaucrats to defend their autonomy. If they are 
criticized for incomplete knowledge, they can mobilize the norm of loyalty to 
government decisions. If they are criticized for taking political stands they can 
mobilize scientific arguments etc. The autonomy of the professional bureaucrats is 
enhanced when it is expected that all three norm sets are valid and relevant. The role 
of the bureaucrat becomes complex and unclear. The scope for decision-making in 
the bureaucratic administration is expanded and the bureaucrats can avoid specific 
forms of criticism by subsuming their decision under other norms than the one 
applied by the opponent. 
Eckhoff and Jacobsen call rational decisions of the scientific type (where means 
are chosen because it is expected that they will lead to the chosen ends) consequence-
oriented decisions. They compare consequence- and rule-oriented decisions and 
suggest how the distinction can increase autonomy: 
"To sum up: in respect to rule-oriented decisions the public servant is free from criticism 
referring to the consequences of the decision, and with respect to consequence-oriented 
decisions he is free from criticism in relation to the activities leading to the decision. It is 
possible that this connection between type of decision and type of criticism stimulates the 
unintended growth of rules in public administration. Decisions planned to meet 
18 See 0sterberg (1979) who first put forward the criticism that there were 'no politics' 
in the NPS study. Alford and Friedland (1974:79) level the same criticism against Stein 
Rokkan's analysis in Rokkan (1970): "Very little of the content of politics appears in the key 
categories of analysis. The various thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation, 
and power refer to degrees of participation, of access and of influence, but they say nothing 
about the nature of the issues over which groups and elites have been struggling." 
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consequences turn into rule-oriented decisions, with the result that the decision-maker is 
protected against self-criticism. On the other hand, the fact that the decision-making 
process cannot be criticised in the case of decisions that are declared as consequence-
oriented, has the effect of protecting the official against criticism from the outside. The 
situation thus offers ideal conditions for the public servant wishing to avoid criticism, but 
is not quite so advantageous either from the point of view of the clientele or with regard 
to the implementation of declared goals." (Eckhoff and Jacobsen, 1960:33) 
Eckhoff and J acobsen' s analysis suggests that members of professions in the state 
administration have the freedom to choose and structure their strategies and their 
action models. Even if they are educated within a specific profession, their situation 
allows them to choose between legal norms, political values and scientific knowledge 
as the basis for decisions. 
Research within NPS argues that the administrative institutions limit professional 
manoeuvring. As Lregreid and Olsen (1978:9) put it: 
"Our main finding is that the bureaucrats neither represent the social group they are 
member of nor are they neutral experts. Our interpretation is that they primarily are 
defendants of the institutions they work for, those goals, tasks, means and target groups 
they are set to serve. Bureaucrats [in the Norwegian ministries] are to a high degree 
influenced by the organizational structures at their workplaces." (my translation from 
Norwegian). 
They demonstrate that newcomers to the ministries who are critical of the established 
programmes, the pattern of client relations and/or the methods of work in the 
ministries often and quickly resign. They are not fired, they are frozen out. If this is 
correct, we see a professional autonomy based on a complex set of expectations, but 
severely limited and controlled by organizational structures (established rules, values, 
expectations etc.) of the state. The problem then - of course - is who has given form 
to the organizational structures? 
Allen Barton on the political role of the Directorate of Industry 
An aspect of the relationship between professional autonomy and institutional control 
of professional action is brought out in Allen Barton's study (1963) of the licensing 
of imports in the Directorate of Industry in the 1940' s and early 1950' s. Even though 
it is a study of decision-making in one specific organ in the turbulent period just after 
the Second World War, the materials gathered and the analysis of them support the 
hypothesis suggested above, that the professions have autonomy but that the stable, 
bureaucratic structure of the administration limits that autonomy. Barton specifies how 
the limitation manifests itself and some its consequences in the case of import 
licensing. 
Just after the war the demand for import licences outstripped the resources 
available to meet the demand. In 1947, for example, demands totalled NOK 866 mill., 
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while the government had suggested that licences be given for NOK 458 mill. worth 
of imports. So the problem in the Directorate was one of selection between applicants. 
The Directorate was organized with a director at the top, with department and 
office heads, with consultants and secretarial staff at the bottom. The Directorate had 
three departments - a law department, a statistics/information department and the 
licensing department. The licensing department had its own division of labour. The 
model chosen was to structure it according to the branches of industry. The 
organization was related to the ambitious, social democratic programme of industrial 
democracy, where a hierarchy of democratically elected, cooperative organs should 
serve democratic control within each branch of industry (Bergh 1983). 
The government did not furnish the Directorate with clear criteria for evaluating 
the requests for import licences. The policy was that licences should be given to those 
firms which best served the reconstruction programme. Therefore the Directorate had 
to specify its own criteria for licence allocations and investigate how the applicants 
met those criteria. 
Barton found that the decision-makers responded rationally to the organization 
structure. That is, the applications were sent directly to branch offices. There they 
were to some degree compared. But comparison and coordination of decision-criteria 
between the branch offices hardly occurred. Decision-making went on in the 
Marchian style: the applications were reviewed sequentially and those applications 
which met some reasonable standards that had been agreed on among the decision-
makers were accepted (eyert and March 1963). 
The Directorate had to gather information about the applicants to be able to argue 
decisions. However, because the purpose of the licensing was unclear, the criteria for 
data collection were unclear. Data collection was therefore experienced as a cumber-
some and frustrating exercise. The Directorate was therefore compelled to search for 
information where it was most easily available. And, of course, that was in the large 
companies, whose staff knew the kind of information the Directorate needed and 
could supply it. 
The Directorate was continuously under pressure. The employees worked under 
conditions of uncertainty, not necessarily because they had uncertain knowledge about 
means - ends relationships, but because the decision-criteria were unclear. Demands 
exceeded supply, the Directorate had to make selective decisions. The outcome was 
that decisions were made in favour of the largest firms. Their importance in 
reconstruction was taken as given. Giving licences to smaller firms required more 
work and implied more uncertainty, more chance of criticism - especially from the 
large firms. 
In this situation of insecurity the professionals in the Directorate (typically an 
engineer or economist) organized buffers against uncertainty: 
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(1) The decision-maker concentrated his attention on the allotted branch or sector. 
He avoided any attempt at evaluating an application against decisions in other branch 
offices. 
(2) The decision-maker developed some simple criteria for accepting/rejecting 
applications. 
(3) The decision-maker sought meaningful information where it was available, i.e. 
in the secretariats of the large companies. When small companies passed the threshold 
to a licence it was often because the decision-maker knew the firm manager and 
therefore felt he knew the company and could argue for the license. 
(4) The loyalty of the bureaucrats was directed inwards, towards the Directorate. 
They identified with and defended the autonomy of the Directorate. Criticisms of it 
might disclose the tenuous criteria that were being applied. 
Barton suggests that the professional bureaucrats were autonomous because goals 
and decision-criteria were not defined by the external authorities. However, the 
organization of the Directorate conditioned the decision-making and guided the 
outcome selectively in favour of the large companies, the strong and rich clients. 
That result was not dependent upon any normative/political identification with the 
large firms either in the government or among the professionals. It seems more 
reasonable to say that the organizational structure set certain decision-rules and 
generated, through professional intervention, action models which systematically put 
the Directorate in the service of the strong clients. 
STRUCTURAL CONTROL OF PROFESSIONALS? 
Postwar Norway experienced an expanding state apparatus, engaged in the 
administration of welfare services to the population and regulatory and allocative 
services to the capitalist economy. Both, I suggest, are necessitated by structural 
breakdown tendencies in capitalism, in the form of a diminishing base for surplus-
value production in the population (more necessary capital-unproductive service work, 
structural unemployment etc.). The new service state has a relatively small elite of 
professional bureaucrats at its apex (2.5% of all state employees) and a large base of 
workers and service personnel with varying degrees and kinds of vocational 
education, paid at or below the level of the industrial working class. The main finding 
is that the state organization has embedded in it decision-rules which (a) to a large 
degree orient state administrative policy toward strong clients in the environment and 
(b) generate professional action models that adjust professional actions to the values 
and orientations in the organization structure. The leading professionals in the state 
have autonomy, but that autonomy has structurally been limited to the major project 
of organizing capitalism in the period studied. Thus the state organization emerges 
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as a crucial variable for understanding the content of state policy and the value 
orientation of the professional action models. 
The expansion of the state, and the greater use of professionals within it, may 
represent an absorption of competence from local communities, from wage-labourers 
in private production and services, and a concentration of competence in the state. 
Through their specialization, the professions transform common knowledge into a 
language foreign to common people. The state administration concentrates power and 
becomes more accessible to strong, professionalized organizations in civil society and 
much less accessible to smaller organizations, common people and their social and 
political movements. In that way the state is continuously organized and reorganized 
in relation to the demands of strong actors in society. As the state becomes an 
organization itself, it gradually acquires autonomy and the ability to intervene in 
society on its own premises, premises formed historically, embedded in the formal 
structure of the state, but also premises formed by opposition movements, like the 
bourgeois opposition to the bureaucratic elite in power in nineteenth-century, and like 
the labour movement opposition to the parliamentary, bourgeois state in the first half 
of the twentieth century. 
The structure and the accepted tasks of the state also affect institutional develop-
ments in the civil society. The government's demand for professional knowledge 
affects the development of the educational and the scientific institutions. 19 
The expansion of the state generates middle classes, groups of people who cannot 
easily be subsumed under the old class categories relevant in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. And through its intervention, the state politicizes the social classes, 
in the sense that implementing their interests increasingly becomes a question of state 
policy and state power. The direct class-to-class relation is severed by state 
intervention. Through that process the classes themselxes, as sociological phenomena, 
change, become fragmented because the state allocatei resources unevenly within the 
classes and interacts with different elements and sections of the classes in different 
matters. To the degree that such mechanisms are at work, the management or service 
state becomes an autonomous entity at the class level, expanding the scope for 
autonomous professional intervention in society and breaking up (or at least contra-
dicting) the assumed predominance of the economy in giving form to classes and 
19 Peter Wagner (1989) has an interesting analysis of how political science in the Western 
world changed between the interwar and the postwar period. From studies of state-society 
relations and normative studies of the state seen from the point of view of different classes 
and different cultures, political science increasingly became organized around policy studies 
and studies of policy making in specific sectors of public activity. His suggestion is that this 
was a response to pressing government demands. The question of the macro structure of the 
West European state was finalized with the democratic parliamentary state. The problem taken 
on by political science was to define policies within each sector, with increasing intensity -
and research funds, as the problems of efficient state intervention cropped up. 
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the political ideal 
of the social democratic movement 
"If what I have said about depoliticization is correct, corporatism and the 
ideology of cooperation mean a suspension of conflicts, or put another 
way: it means that conflicts between groups are transformed up into the 
bureaucracy - where they are harmonized away." 
0sterud (1972:69) 
PROFESSIONS · AND CORPORATIONS 
The economic sectors represented in society by interest organizations can be seen as 
corporative formations, that is, groups of people with an autonomous economic -
functional role in society, groups that create organizations (leadership) to defend the 
interests of the group and/or sector. If we look at the large national federations of 
employers and trade unions in Norway, they were originally formed on a class basis. 
But the member organizations on both sides were grouped according to sector and, 
as the twentieth century wore on, the trade unions in particular became increasingly 
sector responsible, that is, they felt responsibility not only for workers' interests but 
for the work-places and branches of industry. This encompassing responsibility 
developed most clearly after the Second World War, when social democracy took on 
responsibility for the expansion of the capitalist economy as a basis for building a 
welfare state. 
Corporatism can be defined as a political system of sector-specific corporations 
with representatives for the corporations, and especially the employer and the 
working-class organizations, cooperating with representatives of the state inside the 
state. In this sense the economic and professional interest organizations are elements 
in a corporative system, given that admission to the system is regulated and the 
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organizations have the right to participate in policy-making within the state apparatus 
and especially within the bureaucracy, on a par with representatives of the state. l 
Little in the foregoing analysis suggests that the corporations and interest organiza-
tions as such dominate the Norwegian state. In this sense concepts like the 
organization state or the corporative state are misleading. The Norwegian state in 
1970 was still a parliamentary bureaucratic state with policy-making authority rooted 
in political movements and parties, however, a state with strong corporative traits. 
This difference between the Norwegian parliamentary state and corporatism 
becomes more obvious if we accept Schmitter's strict definition of corporatism 
(1979), that is: (1) that the circle of corporative organizations is closed and there is 
no internal competition between the organizations; (2) membership in those 
organizations is obligatory; and (3) the state authorizes and in practice has decisive 
power in the organizations.2 Using this definition even the corporative traits are weak 
in the Norwegian state. The system is still plural and open. The circle of organiz-
ations is in principle open to new members3 and there is competition between the 
organizations. The state does not formally authorize the organizations. But if we look 
more closely at corporative development (in the weaker meaning of the term) since 
the war, the corporative traits were strengthened during the 1960's and 1970's. 
What role has the corporative system had, and how has the social democratic 
movement related to it? Is corporatism an extra channel of influence open to all, in 
addition to other influence channels (cf. Figure 4.6) or is political power invested in 
the corporative channel an expression of strong class interests seeking forms of 
control more advantageous to them than that offered through the parliamentary forms 
of government? In other words, does the corporative system strengthen the democratic 
aspects of the modern Norwegian state or weaken democracy and strengthen the 
1 Formally the participating organizations are not allotted state authority. However, 
corporative organs, like boards for public institutions, can have public decision-making 
authority. Being represented on commissions and boards appointed by government does in 
practice often mean being included in the administrative planning and decision-making 
processes on a par with other public institutions. In practice the representatives of the 
organizations become a semi-official part of the public administration. 
2 Or in Schmitter's own words: "Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest repre-
sentation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (Schmitter 1979:13). 
3 The development of trade unions not affiliated to the Labour Party in the 1970's and 
1980's attest to this openness. 
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power of the bureaucracy?4 Or how has corporatism functioned relative to the main 
actors in the modernization process in the 20th century? 
INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STATE 
As mentioned earlier, it is the large economic interest organizations on both sides, the 
employers' federations and the labour federations, that, among the organizations, play 
the dominant role in state policy-making. This dominance is documented in the NPS. 
A typical NPS description of the organized society is given in Skare (1979): Most 
interest organizations (88%) were created after 1900. The largest and most influential 
organizations were created earlier. In 1975 there were about 1200 registered national 
interest organizations, that is, including every kind, from organizations representing 
a particular sport to employers' federations. Together they have 7 000 - 8 000 persons 
permanently employed in their secretariats, but only 8% of them have large 
secretariats (31 or more people employed). Nine out of ten secretariats are located in 
the capital, in Oslo. They produce a myriad of publications. One-third of the 
organizations have companies as members, the rest have individual members. But not 
all Norwegians are organized. One-third of the Norwegian population in the mid-
1970's had no formal or practical contact with any of the interest organizations. 
A rationale for the existence of the interest organizations is to influence state 
policy-making. NPS asked the secretariat leaders about their membership on public 
commissions. Table 17.1 gives the answers, distributed among five types of 
organizations. 
4 Katzenstein (1985) distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic corporatism and 
between corporatism in the economy, in the system of interest organizations, and in the sphere 
of the state. Such taxonornies are useful for c1assificatory, comparative purposes. Their 
weakness can be that, once a system is classified, variations and developments of that system 
are seen as movements within each category. Transformations from one to another category 
can. become difficult to discern. Therefore, when analysing the Norwegian political system, 
I w.ll.1 limit the definition of corporatism to the character and role of corporate groups in the 
polItIcal system, as above, and leave it to the empirical analysis to define the degree of 
democracy. 
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Table 17.1 Secretariat members on public commissions, 1975 
Distribution between types of organizations, %. 
Type of organization 
LO organizations 
Labour federations outside LO 
Cooperative organizations 
Employers' organizations 
Farmers' /fishermen' s organizations 
N= 
Source: NPS (1982:98). 
Membership of commissions 
Two or Total 
more One None % No. 
35 26 39 100 107 
6 18 76 100 78 
21 21 58 100 62 
16 19 65 100 240 
31 13 56 100 45 
532 
This table demonstrates how the commissions are primarily policy-making arenas for 
the labour federations and big capital. LO and employers' federations had 347 out of 
532 persons or 65% of all members in the commissions. The employers had close to 
half of the total number of secretariat members (240). Although the percentages in 
the first column indicate that unions and organizations in the primary sector dominate, 
when we compute the actual number of secretariat members engaged in commissions, 
LO and the employers' federations clearly take the lead. For LO, 37 secretariat 
members are in more than two commissions. The number for the employers' 
organizations is 38. The number for the three other types of organizations is 32 
secretariat members. 
Who were the secretariat members that typically represented the organizations in 
the state? They were people with university degrees, often from an urban background 
and males, that is, they are sociologically quite similar to their counterpart group in 
the government administration (see Table 16.6). Hallenstvedt and Hoven (1974) state 
that 
A closer investigation of about 1800 members [of government committees] in 1966 demon-
strates that 8% were from farming and 1 % from a fisheries background. Somewhat over 
1% were industrial workers ... Among the members of the committees in the transport 
sector between 1961 and 1968, 78% had university degrees. 
The authors conclude that through the commission/committee system the public 
administration adds a substantial amount of professional resources to its ranks. In 
1968 the state commissions had about 4 000 members with a university education. 
These people were mostly appointed by the government. For that reason alone we 
might expect that both the professional and the ideological profiles of the two groups, 
the bureaucrats and the commission members, will be comparable. In this way the 
bureaucracy is able to select large sections of the professional community in Norway 
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to serve in the decision-making process in government. It is a closed, bureaucratic 
selection process in which the interest organizations have some say. 
In the Norwegian political system, popular democracy is invoked on one day every 
other year to vote alternately for some 30-100 members of municipal and provincial 
parliaments and for all the members of the Storting, with the public voting on party 
lists. Not that the 4 000 commission members have the authority of these elected 
people. But in defining what the parliaments shall decide on (the political agenda) and 
which solutions to choose among, the parliaments are probably heavily influenced by 
the knowledge and problem conceptions of professionals in government at work in 
the corporative channel, be they permanently employed there or engaged in 
commissions as representatives of the interest organizations. 
Whom do the representatives of the interest organizations meet in the commis-
sions? Primarily state bureaucrats, often bureaucrats from the top echelons of the 
administration. Some details of the corporative system can be discerned if we look 
more closely at the corporative organs in one ministry. I have investigated the social 
and organizational composition of commissions under the Finance Ministry in 
1973/1974. I have distinguished between: boards with decision-making power and 
advisory commissions; between members from parliaments, from public administra-
tion, from employers' federations, from labour federations, managers in private firms, 
farmers, and workers. 
Table 17.2 The composition of boards and advisory commissions under the 
Finance Ministry, 1973/1974 
Membel'S 
Advisory 
Boards commisions All 
% % % No. 
Parliamentarians 10.6 5.6 8.7 24 
State bureaucrats 40.6 53.3 45.5 126 
University academics 2.4 8.4 4.7 13 
Representatives of employer federations 6.5 7.5 6.9 19 
Representatives of trade union federations 5.9 6.5 6.1 17 
Business leaders 18.8 11.2 15.9 44 
Lawyers/professionals 5.9 2.8 4.7 13 
Farmers 2.9 2.8 2.9 8 
Workers 2.9 0.0 1.8 5 
Home workers/housewives 3.5 1.9 2.9 8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 
N= 170 107 277 
Source: St.meld. no. 7 (1974-75:9-20). 
Table 17.2 shows that the majority of the members of the commissions and boards 
under the Ministry were state bureaucrats and business leaders. The trade union 
federations had a surprisingly small number of representatives (17 in all). That the 
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number of workers, farmers and housewives on the boards was small, should not 
cause surprise any longer (21 in all, out of a total of 277). How were the occupational 
and organizational categories represented on the permanent commissions under the 
Finance Ministry? 
Table 17.3 Full and alternate members on permanent commissions under the 
Finance Ministry, 1973174 
Full Alter- All 
members nates % No. 
Parliamentarians 10 11 11 18 
State administrators 46 31 41 69 
University academics 3 2 2 4 
Representatives of employer federations 7 6 6 11 
Representatives of trade union federations 6 6 6 10 
Business leaders 16 23 19 32 
Lawyers/professionals 6 6 6 10 
Farmers 2 5 3 5 
Workers 2 5 3 5 
Home workers/housewives 3 5 4 6 
Total 101 100 101 
N= 170 
Source: St.meld. no. 7 (1974-75:9-20). 
A striking feature of Table 17.3 is the prominence of representatives of private firms 
and the comparatively minor position of the interest organizations. Although the NPS 
in no way covers up the direct participation of business managers/capital owners in 
government (NPS (1982) Chapters 5 and 6), the message from that study has been 
that the interest organizations play the front role relative to the administration. This 
may well be the case for the corporative system as a whole. But in the Finance 
Ministry the managers and owners of firms take 1 in 5 positions (32 out of 170). 
Where do we find the few people from the working class in the commissions 
under the Finance Ministry? We find them in the administration of the National 
Pension Fund. Looking at the Pension Fund's management in relation to the 
membership of all the commissions, there is a marked over-representation of both 
politicians and workers there (Table 17.4) 
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Table 17.4 The composition ofthe boards managing the National Pension Fund 
Full members Alternates Totals 
Parliamentarians 7 3 10 
State administrators 4 8 12 
University academics 1 1 2 
Representatives of 
employers federations 0 0 0 
Representatives of trade 
union federations 3 1 4 
Business leaders 5 7 12 
Lawyers/professionals 3 0 3 
Farmers 1 2 3 
Workers 2 3 5 
Home workers/housewives 3 3 6 
Totals 29 28 57 
Source: St.me1d.no.7 (1974-75:9-20). 
The parliamentarians are prominent, with 10 members in all. But the business leaders 
have 12 members. In general the representation of groups seems to be broader on the 
boards of the Pension Fund than is typical for all commissions and boards under the 
Finance Ministry in 1973/74. The problem is: do they play an important political role 
there, or are they show pieces, used to give the administration a democratic, 
representative look? An answer to that question would require a study of the political 
and administrative power of the management system of the Pension Fund relative to 
other parts of the corporative structure under the Finance Ministry. 
CORPORATIVE ORGANS IN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 
We mentioned earlier how corporative ideas of state organization were peddled within 
the labour movement in the interwar years by Colbjjllrnsen and SjIlmme (Chapter 11). 
How did the Labour government after the war conceive of democracy? What roles 
were the corporative, the administrative and the parliamentary channels assigned by 
that regime? 
If we study the Labour Party programme as it was decided upon in 1930, that is, 
well before the 1935 Labour Party government under Nygaardsvold, there is a striking 
message in that programme: The debate on the socialist state is over. The existing 
state apparatus is acceptable. The problem is working class influence in the state. 
The model in the 1930 programme (Hjellum 1987b) can, I suggest, be rendered 
by the following five points: 
(1) The labour movement's political goal is to subordinate the bourgeoisie to the 
pOwer of the working class and working people generally, "to develop the struggle 
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all the way to the situation where working people control the land and the industrial 
means of production and where exploitation no longer exists". 
(2) The primary weapon of the working class is its own organizations. Therefore 
the "class needs organizations that can help it seize state power". 
(3) The primary arena for the struggle is the existing parliamentary state. Through 
the parliamentary organs the working-class representatives defend the economic 
interests of the class. But they simultaneously struggle for the ultimate goal: "the 
labour movement wants to seize state power and use it to implement the interests of 
the working classes". 
(4) When the bourgeoisie uses force to defend itself, the defensive weapons of the 
working class are its own organizations. The working class must meet bourgeois 
violence "by strengthening its own organizations". 
(5) When representatives of the working class reach a majority, it is possible, 
through legal channels, to change the constitution and the state organization to better 
serve working-class/popular interests. The political and administrative organs of 
capitalist society are not good enough to serve the interests of the working class. 
"From the base of the economy workers, fishermen and farmers must create a new 
constitution and the organs that the new class relations require and that give room for 
popular participation and for individual initiative and responsibility". 
The statement in the programme that alludes to the need for a new type of state 
is the last point (new constitution, new organs). But, I contend, the message of the 
text is clearly reformist - this reorganization should take place after parliamentary 
state power has been conquered and the reorganization shall follow the legally 
established rules for such reorganizations. 
Thus already in 1930 the Labour Party had accepted participation within the 
established, constitutional rules. The organization of the state was accepted as a given 
starting point for political participation. Working-class power was to be attained by 
winning votes and positions in the parliamentary arena. This conception of the social 
democratic project is the basis of the political strategy and the concrete organizational 
measures taken by that movement after the Second World War. 5 
5 Per Maurseth (1986) suggests that the Labour Party's opinion on parliamentary demo-
cracy was 'unclear' in the early 1930's and that a united, pro-democratic position was first 
established in 1939. He cites the 1939 program: "The Labour Party is against dictatorship in 
any form. An effective democracy is the best guarantee for a peaceful development and for 
the working people to gain government power. Democracy can best represent the will of the 
people and safeguard political freedom under responsibility and discipline." (Maurseth 
1986:13, my translation). 
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Organizing capitalism 
What were those organizational measures? Specifically, what place did corporative 
organs have in the scheme of the Gerhardsen regime? I contend that the idea of state 
in the Gerhardsen regime and the Labour Party in the immediate postwar period was 
deeply corporative. The idea was that state power should be wielded by the social 
classes as they were constituted in the economy, through cooperation between their 
interest organizations and the state. That would give the working class the upper 
hand. 
The political parties had a subordinate place in the model (Bull 1979). Even the 
Labour Party was not conceived of primarily as a representative organization. Its role 
was to organize cooperation between the state, labour and capital corporations. The 
assumption was that democratic corporatism would realize working-class interests 
through open and democratic competition and cooperation with representatives of 
other social classes. 
This model justifies using the party and the state apparatus against specific radical 
and conservative tendencies in the working class. Keeping the cooperative process 
going was more important than short-term advances for the class, advances that the 
bourgeoisie might use as pretext to exit from the corporative system. 
This interpretation of the model is supported by several facts. The Labour Party 
engineered the "Common Political Programme" of 1945. The first drafts had already 
been made in August 1940. The political parties were hardly mentioned. The idea was 
an all-encompassing cooperative society: 
"Rational, planned exploitation of the country's human and material resources, in a loyal 
cooperation between all interests. All sectors of the economy should be given equal 
opportunities for development" (Bull 1979:73). 
The programme was built on that idea. It represented a compromise between the 
bourgeois parties and the social democrats: The bourgeois parties got approval for the 
continued existence of the private sector in the economy; the social democrats got 
acceptance for the idea of a state-managed economy. Generally the programme 
expounded the idea that increased production and increased capital and labour 
productivity were a condition for increased wages and welfare services. 
The Labour Party in government set about building a complex system of corpora-
tive bodies, from the firm level, through sectoral or branch organs, to the national 
level. All the bodies even at the level of the firm (the production committees), were 
given advisory status, as mentioned. It was not long before the production committees 
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proved to be rather subordinate to the power of the owners and their "right of 
management" .6 
At the sectorallevel, the corporative bodies were somewhat more successful. The 
reason may have been that their existence was less dependent upon the cooperation 
of workers. They planned the reconstruction of the main sectors of the economy. The 
Labour government had accepted that reconstruction meant leaving private capital in 
control of most of production and distribution. 
At the national level the apex of the corporative system was the "Economic 
Cooperation Council" (Samordningsradet). The employers' federations had 6 
representatives on it. The state, the Federation of Trade Unions and the representa-
tives of home workers (mostly women in unpaid housework) together had 13 
representatives. The Committee functioned unti11952, when the employers withdrew, 
arguing (internally, according to Bull: 1979) that pa#ipation represented too many 
ideological concessions to the Labour Party. But Bull documents that the employers' 
organizations were interested in such cooperation with the trade unions and the state 
if it could only be shielded from public attention. A representative of the Shipowners' 
Federation put it this way after the Council had been formally dissolved: "How 
important this cooperation has been for the shipping trade and will be for that trade 
in the time to come, is understood by only a small circle [of our members], and I 
think it is best it stays that way" Bull (1979:106). Corporative cooperation continued 
after 1952 - in an inconspicuous form - in meetings within the ministries, through 
working lunches between representatives of the state, organized labour and capital. 
Historians in Bergh (1977) suggest that the corporative ideas were introduced into 
Norwegian political thinking during the Second World War by the labour movement. 
The aim was to plan the economy through a vertical structure, putting representatives 
of the state and the private economy together in cooperative planning units. But the 
leaders of the labour movement knew that their ideas could be criticized as 
reminiscent of fascist ideology. They therefore, as mentioned, explicitly distinguished 
their position from the fascist model: 
"The labour leaders pointed out that the suggested corporative system - in contrast to the 
fascist model - was democratic, among other things because the economic interest 
organizations would have access to the state in those matters that really are important for 
them and because the economic interest organizations should participate with other 
democratic organizations (the Storting and the parties) so that they did not become power 
instruments for a small economic elite." (Bergh 1977:38) 
6 "The enthusiasm of 1946, when over 600 'production committees' were created in 
industry, soon disappeared. Many of them hardly functioned at all. And in several cases it was 
felt that the owners were the only ones to benefit from them" (Lorenz 1974:117-118). 
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The historians suggest, in accordance with this author's interpretation, that labour 
leaders in the party and the unions conceived of the corporatist system as a way to 
a planned economy serving the working class. Capital cooperated. But, "when profits 
started accumulating, capital wanted out of the cooperative system" (Bergh 1977:39). 
Accepting the enemy's programme and keeping the working-class vote 
Studies support Seip's thesis that the Labour Party used bureaucratic power to 
suppress opposition to its programme in the working class. As I have argued, the use 
of power could logically be defended within the corporative strategic model. The 
outcome was improved living standards for the working class . The cost was the 
possibility of strengthening private capitalism. However, state nationalizations of 
industry and large private firms was a way of counteracting that increase in bourgeois 
power. The class benefit was the welfare state. That was no poor benefit. The welfare 
state met salient economic and social demands of the working class. 
The conclusion is that the Labour Party corporative strategy was, if not in every 
detail, consistent with the strategic thinking in bourgeois circles in the early postwar 
period. The welfare state was implemented with only weak and uncoordinated 
opposition from the bourgeoisie and its organizations. The reason is, I suggest, that 
the bourgeois elite at that time understood the need for political intervention in the 
distribution and control of the wage fund. 
Olsen's and Aubert's thesis about the division of power in Norway, with the 
bourgeoisie having economic power and the working class political power is, I 
suggest, in the main wrong. The Labour Party became the political manager of the 
capitalist economic system in Norway, a manager that served the strategic interests 
of the bourgeoisie, but at the same time utilized state autonomy in the capitalist 
system to adjust the wage structure to increase demand and secure income to people 
outside the la,b~ur markets (the welfare state). Given the reformist perspective, the 
Labour govetnment was an efficient regime for the capital-owning bourgeoisie 
because it had confidence in and controlled the working class. The Labour Party's 
suppression of working-class radicalism supports the idea that state power was 
wielded within the confines of capitalism. Through that suppression, and through the 
regime's focus on corporatism rather than class struggle, the Labour Party revealed 
its strategic subordination to bourgeois society. Professor Seip (1963) says, rightly I 
believe, that the Labour Party basically adopted the political programme of the 
bourgeoisie, but at the same time managed to keep the loyalty of the working class. 
Or, as Professor Edvard Bull says: the Labour Party leadership was, through a 
complex of mechanisms, co-opted into the state elite, an elite united in the project of 
organizing and defending capitalism. 
Given that this theory of co-optation is valid, it suggests a high degree of 
institutional stability and power. The state organization stays the same, unswayed by 
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the tumults of the class struggle and the German occupation. The Labour Party was 
transformed, from an extra-parliamentarian, activist movement struggling for a new 
conception of both the economy and the state, into a ruling party within the 
parliamentary bureaucratic state structure, adding corporative traits to it, but using all 
its r~sources to mange and modernize capitalism and developing a welfare state to 
meet working-class demands within that economy. 
It seems that the social democratic project of corporative economic cooperation, 
motivated by the idea of a publicly planned economy and a bourgeois interest in a 
planned capitalist economy coincided in the corporatist organization of the Norwegian 
state after the war. The Keynes-inspired national economic accounting, proposed by 
the social economists after the war, was the language in which this planning exercise 
was to be formulated. It was a coincidence of forces, the social democratic labour 
movement and a statist tendency in the bourgeoisie, which pushed in the same 
direction, towards active state intervention in the economy. And it was af\jfficient 
language the economists worked out in their equilibrium theories of the national 
economy, a language that on the one hand articulated with the socialist idea of a 
democratically planned economy and, on the other hand, accepted the continuation 
of the capital-labour relationship, moving as that language does at the level of 
products and prices, supply and demand, assuming that both labour and capital make 
their contributions to the total fund of economic values. 
Votes count, resources decide 
Stein Rokkan (1966) developed an important insight into the state - society 
relationship in Norway in his article on numerical democracy and corporative 
pluralism. He studied the relationships between the three main economic formations 
in the country, which he named labour, business and agriculture. He asked why the 
opposition against social democracy did not mobilize to defeat it and established a 
"bourgeois regime". His thesis: because social democracy did not threaten the 
bourgeoisie. 
"Clearly if voters in the established block really felt oppressed by the Labour regime, they 
would forget their traditional differences and rally to the defence of their cause in a broad 
antisocialist front. But so far there have been few signs of such a development. The 
explanation is very simple: The opposition may have been losing in the fight for votes but 
the interests it represents and the causes it stands for can still be defended through other 
channels of influence on government decision-making. Votes count in the choice of 
governing personnel but other resources decide the actual policies pursued by the 
authorities." (Rokkan 1966:106) 
In his now classic statement "Votes count, resources decide" (1975b), his position on 
state autonomy can be interpreted as similar to Poulantzas' relative autonomy. The 
state-specific processes, the electoral processes, among others, count. They select and 
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give form to the problems to be attended to in the political institutions. The numbers 
decide the party profile and thus the composition of the Starting and the government. 
But resources decide. The distribution of resources - material and ideological 
resources, ownership and control of capital and the ability to produce hegemonic 
ideas - decides much of what the state does with the defined problems. Thus the 
resources the working class control decide - in Rokkan's view - how far the working-
class representatives can get in formulating and influencing state policy. We can put 
it this way: it is the resources the classes control, and mainly the control of the means 
of production (including labour), that determine who has state power. We might 
expect that, when a policy threatens that control, state power will be used to defend 
the existing order. Rokkan's formulation allows for the interpretation presented 
earlier, that the labour movement changed the government personnel, but because the 
bourgeoisie kept control of the means of production it also kept a basic grip on state 
organization and policy-making. 
Rokkan's studies in the 1960's and early 1970's led him to see interest 
organization participation in state decision-making as an expansion of representative 
democracy. In his 1966 article on numerical democracy he viewed the "corporate 
channel as a supplement to the parliamentary channel, opening new arenas for 
participation". But he was not sure. At that point he could see the democratization of 
the corporative channel as a possibility, bqt not an established fact. When writing 
again in 1975, the optimism was no longer there. The system was ossifying "there is 
evidence of a trend towards a closing of membership markets and the establishment 
of clearly delimited circuits of corporative negotiators controlling all major units in 
the distributive as well as the productive system" (Rokkan 1975b:220). Rokkan saw 
a concentration of power (cf. Jacobsen 1964) in the corporative channel. The process 
of democratization, if it ever was part of the corporative process, had been halted and 
~n reversed. But Rokkan leaves the question open: "The modem industrial state is 
constantly tom between these two poles of plebiscitarianism and corporatism" 
(Rokkan 1975b:219). 
Corporatism, the system of tripartite cooperation in the state administration, can 
be seen as a democratization process: a new channel for political participation and 
influence, generally open to organized interests. The social democrats saw it that way 
from the early 1930's and into the postwar period. The idea was that corporative 
economic planning should function democratically in the service of working-class 
interests. But the opposite interpretation is also possible. The corporative system 
limits and undercuts representative democracy. The expansion of corporatism weakens 
the representative, parliamentary system. Or, put another way, the corporative channel 
is primarily used by the bourgeoisie to bypass a bothersome parliamentary democracy. 
Rokkan (1975b) can be interpreted that way. The corporative system was closing its 
boundaries and limiting participation to those large organizations that controlled 
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capital resources and that were loyal to privately controlled capitalism. It excluded 
movements and individuals that argued for a transformation of the economic system. 
The support for corporative cooperation within the state, among employers and among · 
the social democrats in Hf/Jyre (Bull 1979) supports this hypothesis. 
This anti-democratic interpretation of corporatism is even stronger if the social 
democratic cooptation thesis is correct. Olsen in the NPS demonstrated how selective 
the organization state was: one-third of the population was not represented by the 
organizations at all, and only the large economic organizations played an important 
role in the state. But, Olsen implicitly assumed that, since both labour and capital 
were among those strong organizations, the system still had a basically representative 
character. If the labour leaders have lost the ability to represent deeper working-class 
interests, then that premise in the Power Study is negated. 
THE ASYMMETRY BETWEEN POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 
This wider corporative system (including the language of the social economists) had 
consequences beyond bringing labour and capital leadership together on organizing 
capitalism. The participation of interest organizations in the administrative policy-
making process probably reduced the political power of the Storting and the 
parliamentary channel. But the interest organizations, enmeshed in state policy-
making, also fragmented the working class and made the corporative divisions in the 
class more important politically. The unions were politicized. Politics became 
increasingly a question of the ability to participate in the dialogues in the corporative 
organs and to influence a number of questions on the public agenda simultaneously. 
The Labour Party drew the unions into the corporative process. In that process the 
union leaders met a control-oriented, statist Labour Party more interested in pacifying 
the working class and getting it to increase its contribution to productivity, than in 
representing it directly and efficiently in the struggle with company owners and the 
state. 
This alienated leadership function, this 'labour leaders as police' (Seip 1963), was 
also present in the leadership of the national federations of trade unions. They became 
participants in state administration, an administration with many irons in the fire, 
irons that the union leaders had to attend to all at the same time. So, while labour 
leadership previously had been a question of defining the most important questions 
affecting the union members at anyone time, formulating them as demands to the 
state and to the bourgeoisie, and struggling in an organized, collective fashion for 
those demands, the leadership role changed. The unions became testing grounds for 
specific state policies on questions that often were of minor interest to the working 
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class at large (Solvang 1974). A democratic, representative leadership is thus, through 
corporative participation, transformed into an alienated management, working to get 
the union members into line on questions generated within the state and to suppress 
all and any form of extra-corporative, extra-parliamentarian activism. 
The idea of economic democracy has historically been an important labour 
demand. The "Common Political Programme" of 1945 suggested an advance in that 
area. However, even with the Labour Party in government the production committees 
were a limited success, if not a direct failure. The analysis of the many attempts at 
introducing more democracy in the economy goes beyond what can be attempted 
here. Both the social democrats and the explicitly bourgeois parties acclaim the 
importance of democracy in the political realm, but have worried little about the lack 
of democracy in the management of capital in the private sector. If the Labour 'Party 
could use state power to give wage-labourers and their organizations power over 
capital at the firm level, that would support the hypothesis that the parliamentary state 
is an open structure that can be utilized in the service of long-term working-class and 
popular interests. 
Given that socialization of private capital has been abandoned, how did the state 
and the Labour Party as government manage one of the state-owned companies? Did 
the Party use its government position to introduce 'economic democracy' and 'worker 
participation' in state owned companies? How, if at all, was the management system 
different from a privately organized firm? Does the management system support or 
weaken the hypothesis in the present study that the state has had a powerful role in 
mobilizing and organizing the bourgeois class and integrating a reformist labour 
leadership .into the state? The management system of the Kings Bay Coal Mine is a 
case at hand. In 1962 it was hit by an explosion killing 21 workers. The investiga-
tions into the accident produced a detailed material on the organization and the 
management of the firm. 
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      The Kings Bay affair. 
      Social democratic 
      management of state industry 
 
 
      "And still the coal dust from Kings Bay lies as a dark cloud over the 
Ministry of Industry. Since [the accident] the Ministry has attempted to 
keep its distance from the state-owned companies. They are managed as 
private companies under the private law on share companies, without any 
special demands for information or management from the Ministry." 
 
 Arne Selvik (Arbeiderbladet, Monday 13 October 1986.) 
 
 
     The privately owned Norwegian coal mine at Ny 
Ålesund on Svalbard became state property in 1931, four years 
before the social democrats came to power. It had been a private 
company since its inception in 1917. We could for that reason 
expect that it would be relatively easy for the new Labour 
government to reorganize the mine, if it for example wanted to 
introduce workers' democracy. No statist, bureaucratic interests 
were entrenched in the Mine organization. 
 How did the Labour government intervene in the management of 
the mine? Specifically, did the ideas of economic/working-class 
democracy affect the management of the Kings Bay Mine 
Company, so that the management system at Kings Bay became 
more democratic, more open for introspection and more directed to 
the public good than comparable mines in the private sector? 
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 To answer that question, I will first present some data on state 
ownership of industrial firms globally, to indicate how common this 
form of industrial organization is. My brief report on that point will 
be abstracted from The Economist, December 1978. I will describe 
the system of state-owned industry in Norway. Then I will 
investigate materials on the Kings Bay administration produced in 
connection with the drastic accident in the mine on 5 November 
1962. I will search for the characteristics of the management system 
and how they compare with characteristics of mine managements in 
the private sector.202 I will draw on Alf Inge Jansen's study (1971) 
of the organization of the Ministry of Industry, using it to clarify the 
contributions and the limitations of organization theory in studying 
state structures and policies. 
 Even if we should find that the social democrats did little to 
change the administration of state-owned companies in democratic 
direction, that in itself does not prove that the Social Democrats 
were prisoners of a bourgeois state structure. It may be argued that 
they concentrated their political efforts elsewhere, struggling to 
acquire firms from the private sector and creating a corporative 
planning system at the policy-making level of government. 
 What kind of administration of the Kings Bay Mine would we 
expect to find, if the theory of the alienated state and the theory of 
bureaucratic power wielding are correct? We would expect to find a 
management without much understanding of workers' interests and 
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 The accident instigated a number of investigations. One was the Tønseth report, produced 
by the commission the government set up immediately upon hearing about the accident. The 
Board of Kings Bay Mines produced a response to the Tønseth report. This response, together 
with the government's evaluation of the accident, was published in the parliamentary document 
Stortingsmelding no. 86 (1962-63). The accident happened at a time when a number of other 
questions concerning state management of industry were being discussed. A commission was 
set up in the autumn of 1963 to make a more general investigation of the management system in 
the Ministry of Industry. It was named the Fleischer Commission, after its president, Carl 
Fleischer. It is data produced by these public inquiries that will be used in the following 
analysis. 
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heavily focused on maximization of production. We would expect 
the mine management to consider economic democracy, a thriving 
local community and stable production to be beyond its 
responsibility. We would also expect a hierarchic and top-down 
type of management, with barriers against bottom-up and horizontal 
flows of information.203 
 
 
                                           
     203
 Margalef (1968) has some interesting hypotheses about energy and information flows in 
biological systems. He suggests that there is always some exchange of energy between 
subsystems and that the stronger subsystem normally 'exploits' the weaker: "There is some 
energy exchange between two subsystems (arbitrarily chosen), in the sense that the less 
organized subsystem gives energy to the more organized, and, in the process of exchange, some 
information in the less organized is destroyed and some information is gained by the already 
more organized". 
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STATE-OWNED INDUSTRY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
OVERVIEW 
 
Looking at state-owned industry globally, we might intuitively 
expect a relatively low level of state ownership in the USA and 
Japan, and relatively high levels in third world countries like Brazil 
and India. We might also expect state ownership to be highest in 
infrastructural kinds of activity and lower in the field of consumer-
type industry. Both of these expectations are born out by the data 
(Table 18.1). 
 
Table 18.1 State owned production. International comparison 


















































* 94 79 61 34  
 
* % state ownership in all four sectors 
Source: The Economist, December 1978. 
 
The variations in this table are quite systematic over both countries 
and types of production. In each case (except for Brazil and 
Mexico), the percentage of state ownership declines as we move 
from left to right in the table (from infrastructure to industry). In 
most sectors of production the percentage of state ownership 
increases as we move from top to bottom of the table (from USA 
and Canada to India). Industry is the sector with lowest degree of 
stateness. We might expect the opportunities for profits for private 
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owners in the short run are greater in that sector than in the 
infrastructural sectors.  
 If we look at the ownership of the largest industrial firms in 
Europe, we find that they usually are private. Of the five largest in 
1978, Shell, Unilever and Philips were totally private and 
represented 59% of the total employment and 65% of total 
production of the five firms. IRI ITALIA was the fourth largest and 
totally state owned, while British Petroleum was second largest and 
60% state owned. Among the 50 largest firms in Europe, The 
Economist found the same relationship: 31 all private, 10 all state 
owned, and approximately 60% state ownership in the rest. So there 
is no question: state ownership of industrial-type production is a 
common element in most modern capitalist societies. 
 Can one of the reasons be that state ownership generally has left 
the internal social relations and management processes in the firms 
untouched, so that state-owned firms could not be used positively in 
the political struggle of the left? Several things suggest that. It 
seems that the reason for nationalization in many capitalist countries 
is either that the firms are operating at a loss and/or that they play an 
important part in the labour and/or commodity markets, delivering 
important use values to the economy. The Economist reported that 
in 1978 the 50 largest firms in Europe had a large net surplus, while 
the wholly state-owned firms made a loss of GBP 0.8 mill.  
 
 
STATE-OWNED INDUSTRY IN NORWAY 
 
In Norway, state ownership of key industries was one of the 
ideological banners of social democracy after the war. The state 
took over large industries established and run by the Germans 
during the occupation (Årdal Aluminum, 1946, Årdal at 
Sunndalsøra, 1951). The government established state-owned 
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industries, Jernverket in Mo i Rana (1946), Norsk Koksverk (1961) 
and Søral at Husnes (1962). The state also involved itself as a minor 
or major shareholder in private companies (Siemens, AEG, 
Telefunken, Norsk Hydro and Sydvaranger).204 
 We can distinguish between state companies (statsbedrifter) and 
administrative companies (forvaltningsbedrifter). The first function 
by definition as private firms, regulated by the same laws and free 
to use the surplus after taxes as they wish. The administrative 
companies (like the railways, the post and telecommunications) 
have their economies integrated into the state budget and are 
formally controlled by the government and the Storting. The 
relative distribution of real capital between the public and the 
private sector and the subordinate position of the state has been 
described earlier (Tables 6.3 and 10.2). Norway was comparable to 
other European states: most state-owned capital in infrastructure, a 
limited position in machine investment and consumer-type industry. 
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 In the study by Gran and Jensen (1978), mentioned earlier, on Arne Fabrikker, we 
investigated the merger of Arne into the holding company Norion. The state, through the 
Ministry of Industry, had the initiative in creating Norion. But the project was far from any 
general reorganization of the textile industry from private to public management. In Norion the 
state settled for 40% of the shares while the majority of shares stayed with Peter Jebsen, private 
owner of the textile mill Høye outside Kristiansand. If you asked the workers and the unions at 
Arne who gained and had control of the merger they would quickly respond Jebsen. In other 
words, the state organized a merger that mainly benefited the largest private capitalist. The 
consequence of the merger for Arne was an almost total shutdown of production. 
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THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF 
INDUSTRY: 
THE EXAMPLE OF KINGS BAY 
 
The Ministry of Industry 
A salient feature of the management system for the state-owned 
companies is that the Ministry of Industry is general assembly for 
all the 100% state-owned companies.205 Under the social democratic 
regime the old system was continued: the minister for industry was 
general assembly in all the state-owned companies. The Labour 
Party did not appoint larger, more representative assemblies for the 
companies. On this point therefore management systems in the 
larger privately owned industrial firms are more democratic. Their 
general assemblies are often large bodies of shareholders and their 
composition, notwithstanding duplications (same person in several 
assemblies), varies across firms.  
 How was the management of the state-owned Kings Bay Mine 
organized? Figure 18.1 (next page) presents the formal structure. 
The figure demonstrates the complex structure of the Ministry of 
Industry in 1957, a structure evolved over time, each new unit 
solving particular problems at specific points in time. The result is a 
sedimented structure, one layer of units created on top of the earlier 
layers. The two departments were the early elements. The 
Directorate was created in connection with the management and 
licensing problems after the war. The General Office had an 
independent position relative to the Ministry with more general 
planning and evaluation functions.206 
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 State companies are regulated by the law on shareholder companies (Lov om 
aksjeselskaper, no.59 of June 4, 1976). It defines the general assembly (generalforsamlingen) as 
the supreme authority where all shareholders can meet and where both person and number of 
shares count. The general assembly elects the board of the company.  
     206
 Alf Knag (1971) has produced a brief history of the Ministry. Industrial affairs was part of 
a Ministry for Social Affairs up to 1916. Then Social Affairs was separated out, leaving behind 
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a Ministry more focused on industry. Knag does not describe the creation of the directorate or 
the general office. Both organs are postwar creations. It was only in 1955 that water transport 
was taken out of its sphere of responsibility. This long time melange of industry and other 
affairs in the same ministry may support Dag Magne Berge's thesis that Norwegian industry was 
fragmented and poorly organized as an 'interest group' right up to the 1970's (Berge 1984).  
Figure 18.1 The formal structure of state industrial manage-
ment and the Kings Bay organization, 1957 
 






































Figure 18.1 depicts the large number of companies that the Ministry 
and the top administrator, the counsellor (departementsråd) were 
responsible for (administratively reporting to the Mining Office and 
the Legal Office). The diagram shows how the Kings Bay Company 
was subordinated to dual authority, the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs - the latter with responsibility for 
control of working conditions, labour safety, etc. The whole system 
was highly hierarchical with about 13 levels in the administrative 
ladder. 
 The State Calendar for 1957 tells us that the Mining Office, 
administratively responsible for Kings Bay, had a complex set of 
tasks. It had to control the companies allotted to it. It had to control 
scientific institutions like The Geological Research Institute and the 
Materials Research Laboratory. It had to prepare industrial laws and 
regulations concerning Svalbard and it was the secretariat for the 
Commission of Mining, a corporative body for policy advice to the 
government.207 
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 Nils Christie (1964) demonstrates some consequences of having a complex set of tasks in a 
welfare agency. Parliamentarians of all political shades find some 'legitimacy' in the agency, 
however differently they may define state responsibility for welfare. It creates ambiguity as to 
what the task of the agency is, making external criticism of the agency difficult and increasing 
the agency's freedom to define what it should do. The role of the unclear goal definition was in 
practice to allow strong pressure groups outside the agency play a dominant role inside it. 
Aubert argues that the control dimension rather than the service dimension became dominant in 
the agency's practice, quite in contradiction to what parliament explicitly intended. The agency, 
as he puts it, worked more as a section of the police, than as an assistant and supporter for 
clients in need. The complex tasks of the Mining Office might have some of the same 
consequences. Complex goals make rational organization difficult, make the organization liable 
to diverse forms of criticism, put the employees on the defensive and make it tempting to adjust 
to and accept dominant values in the organization's task environment. We would therefore 
expect that administering the Kings Bay Mine according to goals of public service, workers' 
interests and economic democracy would require a specific and explicit focus on such goals in 
the administratively responsible organs in the state. 
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 What professional profile did the Ministry have? Three central 
administrators in the Ministry in 1960 were lawyers (Harry 
Lindstrøm, Egil Hammel and the Counsellor, Karl Skjerdal). The 
lawyers had a strong position. According to the State Calendar, 
1957 there were 62 people in decision-making positions: 33 of them 
were lawyers, 9 were economists, 12 engineers, 1 military and 7 
without a specified higher education. We might expect this structure 
to produce a strong focus on legal control and less focus on 
processes of administrative, technical and economic innovation and 
workers' and customers' interests. We might well expect a rule-




KINGS BAY: THE ACCIDENT AND PUBLIC 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
On 5 November 1962, in the deep, cold winter of Svalbard, there 
was a large explosion in the mine, setting the mineshaft Esther I on 
fire, and killing 21 workers. It was not the first fatal accident in the 
mine. In December 1949 an explosion killed 15 workers. Three 
years later, in January 1952, an explosion killed 9 workers. One 
year later, in March 1953, 19 lost their lives in the mine. In addition, 
from 1948 to 1962 12 workers were killed in individual accidents. 
Thus 76 workers lost their lives in the mine between 1949 and 1963. 
 The accident in 1962 led to two critical investigations. First, it 
instigated an examination of the government system responsible for 
state-owned industry. Secondly, the accident initiated a political 
evaluation process which led to a vote of no confidence toward the 
Einar Gerhardsen government in the summer of 1963. Thus the 
bourgeois parties plus the Left Socialist party in the Storting put an 
end to the social democratic government. A bourgeois, four-party, 
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coalition government under Prime Minister John Lyng was 
installed. That government lasted for three weeks, from 27 August 
to 20 September 1963, when it was defeated during the inauguration 
debate in the Storting. A new Gerhardsen government was 
appointed a couple of days after the municipal elections. The 
political process has been analyzed in detail in Karmly (1975) and 
will not be a matter for analysis here. I will study the administrative 
management of the Kings Bay Company. 
 
The Tønseth report 
Immediately after the accident the government sent a commission of 
investigation to Svalbard. It did not get down into the mine because 
of a blazing fire and had to leave after just 15 days of interviews and 
investigations. Ice and snow were closing in on the island and 
threatening to block the exit back to the mainland. Still, the 
Commission managed to gather a substantial amount of 
information. 
 Management of the Kings Bay Mine was not an easy task. The 
harsh winter climate has been mentioned. During the six winter 
months the mine was completely isolated. The coal was difficult to 
get at: the coal layers were slanted at a 15 degree angle, making 
transport and movement cumbersome; the layers were of varying 
thickness, so that in certain parts there were only a few feet of coal 
between hard rock. However, the Tønseth Commission found that 
these harsh conditions could not excuse the death toll experienced 
in the mine: "There are few mines in the world that have had four 
major explosions over a period of 14 years and where coal dust was 
implicated in two of them." The Commission presented an analysis 
of the processes leading to the accident. Its main criticism was that 
questions of safety had been blatantly overlooked by the mine 
management over a long period: 
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 (1) Stone dust, to keep the coal dust from mixing with air, had 
not been spread in the Esther I shaft. The ventilation system was 
inadequate. The technical administration did not become alarmed 
when concentrations of gas were registered in the shaft on 5 
November. Generally the Kings Bay management had been 
"completely passive" in the field of work safety.  
 (2) Open wick ignition was widely used in the mine at the time, 
contrary to the rules. 
 (3) Newly employed workers were not given any on-site training 
before entering the shafts. 
 (4) Shafts taken out of production were not sealed off as they 
should have been.  
 (5) Dynamite ignition materials were openly accessible to all 
workers in the shafts. These materials should have been under the 
control of a foreman. The electrical system was not routinely 
controlled.  
 
On 15 July 1963 the board of the company made its views on the 
Tønseth report public. It criticized the Tønseth Commission for 
being too sure about its conclusions. But, looking more closely at 
the board's response, none of the criticisms set forth by the Tønseth 
Commission were refuted. Nor did the board suggest any alternative 
explanation of the cause of the explosion. 
 The board responded that it had been active, but "that it is not the 
board's responsibility to control work safety in the mine". It argued 
that there were advantages in using wick ignition and that the board 
had applied for the right to use such a method. However, it had to 
admit that it had not received authorization for using wick ignition. 
 The board's conclusion was that the cause of the explosion had 
not been fully clarified. It argued that: (a) the amount of gas 
registered was not sufficient for such a large explosion; (b) ignition 
seemed unlikely at the place the Commission assumed it had taken 
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place; (c) the presence of coal dust had not been definitely 
documented; and (d) the Commission had not evaluated other 
possible causes of the explosion. 
 In the board's reaction we can discern two main arguments: one is 
that the board has limited responsibility for the practical 
management of the mine; the other is that the Tønseth 
Commission's analysis was hypothetical rather than definitive. The 
first argument is formalistic: if the board had wanted to expand its 
area of responsibility, it would have met little opposition. The other 
argument at best weakens the Tønseth Commission's conclusions.208 
 The mine was, as mentioned, administered under the same law as 
private owned firms (Aksjeselskapsloven). The social democratic 
government had not widened the responsibility of the boards in 
state-owned firms. The idea in the existing law of the limited 
management responsibility was also peddled by the government 
when it was criticized for passivity in management of state-owned 
industry. 
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 According to Karmly (1975), the board's rebuttal of the Tønseth Commission represented a 
turning point for the Labour Party leadership. From being rather discouraged and defensive, the 
Gerhardsen government gained renewed political confidence in its struggle against the 
bourgeois parties. 
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Management of the company 
How did the board manage the company? The Tønseth Commission 
is critical: in a period when plans were approved for major 
expansions of production the technical management at the site in Ny 
Ålesund was reduced from three engineers to one. As the 
Commission says, the government had already been criticized in the 
1950's for operating with a technical management that was too 
small. 
 
 "Against the advice of earlier commissions, the board planned for a production of 110 000 
tons during the winter of 1962. The plan for 1962-63 was increased to 200 000 tons with 
only one mining engineer on site. We state that one should never start a production of that 
magnitude with such a limited technical management." (Tønseth Commission 1963:17-18) 
 
The Commission argued that the Kings Bay Mine was managed 
well below normal standards in privately owned mines, in terms of 
both production safety and size of technical management. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
Continued production 
The Gerhardsen government decided in those November days of 
1962 that production should continue in the mine shafts not hit by 
the accident. On November 15, while a first investigation 
commission was looking into the accident, the government sent the 
following telegram to the technical management at the mine: 
 
 "It has been decided today that production should continue in Vestre Senterfelt this winter as 
planned. It is requested that special attention be given to safety. The government will later 
consider the question of continued production in Ny Ålesund. Boger is informed. (Tønseth 
1963:6) 
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This decision was probably influenced by the plans for starting a 
coal-processing plant in Mo i Rana (Norsk Koksverk) by the 
summer of 1963. That project required increased production of coal 
from Kings Bay. The bourgeois parties had criticized those plans. A 
successful start in the summer of 1963 was therefore of high 
political priority for the Gerhardsen government.  
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The composition of the board 
The boards of state-owned companies are selected by the 
government. The board consisted of three people. The leader was 
Karl Skjerdal.209 As top administrator in the Ministry he was the 
central bureaucrat in relation to the general assembly of the Kings 
Bay Company. Skjerdal was a lawyer. He had no technical training 
in the field of mining or mine management. The second member of 
the board was the general manager, Larsen, from Oslo. He had 
some practical experience of mining on Svalbard, but, as he said to 
the Tønseth Commission: "My experience of the mines at Longyear 
town had little relevance for work at Ny Ålesund, where the 
conditions were quite different." The third member of the board was 
Consul Odd Berg from Tromsø. He was an economist, also without 
any experience of mining. As it is dryly stated in the Commission 
report: "The board usually visited the Mine at Svalbard once a year. 
He was the one who consistently never joined the others when they 
went down into the shafts for inspections." 
 The composition of the board is at the discretion of the 
government. Although it might be difficult to evaluate the quality of 
the chosen board, it is possible to reflect on what it lacked, given the 
general ideas of industrial democracy propounded by the labour 
movement.  
 (1) The workers and the unions had no representatives on the 
board.  
 (2) There was no representative of the political side of the labour 
movement  
 (3) There were no representatives with specific, relevant 
technical expertise, either in management, mining or work safety.  
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 Skjerdal wrote a long defence of his activities in the Ministry, criticizing the Labour 
government for blaming him and other bureaucrats (among them Harry Lindstrøm) for the 
mismanagement of state industry (Skjerdal 1967). 
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 Why not? Why had the government not used its prerogative to 
select people who could have attempted to implement good working 
conditions and economic democracy? Looking at the composition 
of the board, two criteria seem to have been activated in the 
selection process: appoint people who will secure direct and strong 
government control of the mine; appoint people who are 
knowledgeable about laws, rules and business aspects of company 
management. An investigation of the selection process would 
probably show that political considerations had hardly come into the 
choice of board members. 
 
Limited political responsibility 
When the question of responsibility was raised in the Storting in the 
summer of 1963, Einar Gerhardsen defended the government with 
the same arguments that the board of Kings Bay had used earlier: he 
cited the law regulating the responsibility of boards of private 
companies (Bergh 1977:163). That law limited the responsibility of 
the general assembly (composed in the private sector of 
stockholders). The Labour Party faction in the Storting also cited 
the limited responsibility when criticized by the bourgeois parties. 
As the faction said: "When not otherwise decided, a member of 
government - or the general assembly of a firm - has no obligation 
to ensure that a state-owned company actually abides by its safety 
rules" (Karmly 1975:91). But, as Karmly points out, that argument 
is flawed, as the Storting already in 1956 had decided, after noting 
the number of fatal accidents in the Kings Bay Mine, that 
"everything possible should be done to prevent further accidents" 
(Bergh 1977:162, Karmly 1975:91). 
 
The double role of the mine controller on Svalbard 
The government had responsibility for the public control of mining 
on Svalbard. The mine controller on Svalbard (bergmesteren) had a 
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specific, politically important, double function. He was mining 
controller, responsible for all mining in the archipelago of 
Svalbard.210 As such he was subordinated to the Ministry of 
Industry. On the other hand, he was the Regional Inspector of 
Works and as such responsible for work safety in companies on 
Svalbard. As Inspector of Works he was subordinated to the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs. In both these positions he had the 
authority to require remedial action by company managements. But, 
in suggesting such action in the Kings Bay Mines, he would 
confront his main employer and superior, Karl Skjerdal in the 
Ministry of Industry, who was Counsellor and head of the Kings 
Bay board. As the Tønseth Commission puts it. "There is reason to 
believe that the mine controller in such situations would not feel 
completely at ease." All the same, the Commission criticized the 
mine controller for inaction on the question of safety measures at 
Kings Bay.211 
 The most likely explanation for this ambiguous administrative 
structure is that it arose by default (non-decision). The system 
developed gradually, over time, without any specific intervention 
from the government - the result being unclear lines of authority, 
conflicting definitions of tasks and concentration of power in the 
hands of the Counsellor. The administrative structure, so to speak, 
had a life of its own, quite independently of the political colouring 
of the government. However, the system does indicate that the 
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 Svalbard is a Norwegian protectorate. Norway and the Soviet Union are engaged in 
economic exploitation of the archipelago. 
     211
 The Fleischer Commission points to another such dual role for one of Skjerdal's confidants, 
the head of the Mining Office, Harry Lindstrøm. The government had a commission for policy 
issues on processed coal, 'Koksutvalget'. Skjerdal was the head of that commission and 
Lindstrøm was appointed its secretary. Koksutvalget sent recommendations to the Ministry of 
Industry. There Lindstrøm as head of the Mining Office received and processed the 
recommendations he had just participated in making as secretary to Koksutvalget (Fleischer 
Commission 1964:45). 
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Labour government was not overly engaged in limiting the power of 
top bureaucrats. 
 That safety matters were ignored becomes increasingly 
irrefutable as we move up the administrative structure. The 
government did not offer much attention to safety in state 
companies. The Directorate for Work Inspection (Arbeidstilsynet) 
had approached the board of Kings Bay, suggesting safety 
regulations. But the company had not responded. The Tønseth 
Commission found that the suggested rules were never put before 
the board. The Kings Bay manager in Oslo (Boger) sent the 
proposals directly to the technical management at the mine in Ny 
Ålesund. A technical expert who had visited the mine for an 
inspection, told the Tønseth Commission that he had never seen any 
such proposals there. The proposals just disappeared. Why the 
Directorate did not request a response to its suggestions is not clear. 
 According to the Tønseth Commission, even the safety 
commission set up by the trade union at Kings Bay was inactive.212 
The few initiatives taken to improve safety routines were swallowed 
up and neutralized by the administrative system. The goal of the 
company seems to have been maximum production at least possible 
cost. The union was wage-oriented and seems to have ignored 
security questions. The workers acquiesced.  
 
The Storting - to be avoided 
It is well documented that the government attempted to withhold the 
Tønseth report from the Storting until after the summer recess. On 
13 June the report was put on the government table. The contents of 
the report were a hot potato for the Gerhardsen government. On 19 
June the Storting discussed further budgetary allocations to Kings 
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 It has been suggested that the wages were relatively high for work on Svalbard. The mines 
therefore attracted many young workers who were happy with the wages and relatively 
uninterested in work conditions. 
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Bay, without the report being mentioned by any member of the 
government. The Storting was scheduled to adjourn on 21 June. On 
20 June information about the existence of the report was leaked to 
the Storting. Adjournment of the Storting was postponed and a 
heated political battle over government responsibility could not be 
avoided. 
 When the Gerhardsen government was forced to defend itself in 
the Storting, it argued that the report was delayed because of 
technical difficulties of reproduction. However, it seems beyond 
doubt that the government was playing for time by trying to 
suppress the report until the adjournment of the Storting. It was 
perhaps a smaller sin than the Berge government's withholding of 
information on budgetary allocations to the Trade Bank (Chapter 
13), but it was a decision in the same vein: the Storting was seen as 
a hindrance in the political process, not the natural and superior 
decision-maker in the system. It would in this case seem that the 
government operated within a corporative, rather than a 
parliamentary action model. 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATION 
OF KINGS BAY 
 
What emerges, then, is an administrative system characterized by a 
high degree of centralization of power, especially in the position of 
Counsellor in the Ministry of Industry, and by ambiguous lines of 
authority. The board of the company was oriented to maximizing 
production at the least possible cost and with a concomitant lack of 
interest in work safety. What seems likely, given the sources I have 
had access to, is that the Labour government had not invested much 
political energy in organizing the administration of state-owned 
industry. What was at stake for the Labour government was not 
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economic democracy but a conflict with the bourgeois political 
parties over the efficiency of state-owned industry. That can explain 
the stark government focus on output from the mine on Svalbard. In 
this sense the state organization limits and conditions government 
action models. 
 The structure of the administration reinforced a capitalist-type 
relationship between management and workers. As Schattsneider 
put it: "Organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are 
organized into politics while others are organized out" 
(Schattsneider 1960:69). In the case of Kings Bay under social 
democratic management, maximization of production was 
organized into the management structure, while economic 
democracy and workers' interests were organized out. The 
interventions of such an administration take on the form of 
bureaucratic power wielding: centralize power, suppress popular 
participation, avoid marginal matters (like work safety) and act 
forcefully to maximize production. 
 
 
THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF STATE ADMINISTRATION 
OF INDUSTRY. 
THE FLEISCHER COMMISSION 
 
By November 1963, after the parliamentary battle was over and the 
Lyng government had its brief session in power, the new 
Gerhardsen Government was ready to put the question of state 
administration of industry to a commission. The Fleischer 
Commission was appointed on 15 November 1963, with Carl 
Fleischer as chairman, and with the Ministry counsellor Agnar 
Kringlebotten and Supreme Court lawyer Finn Arnesen as members 
(all three were lawyers). The government mandate focused on the 
internal workings of the Ministry of Industry and said that the 
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Commission should not raise the question of parliamentary or 
government responsibility. The result was a study of the formal 
system of management in the Ministry and how and to what degree 
administrative practice diverged from the formal requirements 
embedded in rules and regulations. The assumption was that 
following the rules would eliminate many of the weaknesses 
revealed in the management of state-owned industry. 
 What did the Fleischer Commission (FC) find? It found what it 
was looking for: on a number of points the administrative practice 
was at odds with the rules and regulations. The standard operating 
procedure is case oriented. When a question arises it should be 
allocated to that part of the organization considered most competent 
to handle it. Then the case should be sent to the bottom of the 
decision-making pyramid, each decision-maker adding his or her 
comments as it passes upwards. The final decision is made at a 
predetermined level, although with the possibility of sending the 
case higher up if that is deemed necessary by the decision-making 
unit or a higher authority.  
 The FC found that in the Ministry of Industry:  
 (1) cases were often not sent to the bottom of the pyramid, but 
dealt with and decided upon at intermediate or higher levels. FC 
points specifically to Harry Lindstrøm, and says that he often 
decided questions in the Mining Office without consulting 
subordinates;  
 (2) when cases and suggested decisions were sent upwards in the 
pyramid, particular bureaucrats in the formal line of authority were 
bypassed, when or if it was considered necessary by certain other 
powerful bureaucrats; 
 (3) when Harry Lindstrøm considered it appropriate, dossiers 
would not be sent horizontally to offices that by formal definition 
should have had a say in the case;  
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 (4) the rules concerning dual roles were unclear and should be 
standardized for the whole public administration, so as to avoid one 
person dealing with the same case in several positions within the 
administration.  
 
Skjerdal's reaction to the Fleischer report 
Karl Skjerdal wrote a book on the Commission's evaluation of the 
Ministry. In it he is highly critical, making basically two points: (1) 
the government mandate forced the FC to study the internal 
workings of the administration when the problem was government 
responsibility; and (2) therefore the FC had to put the blame on 
particular bureaucrats, i.e. himself and Harry Lindstrøm. Thus, he 
suggests, the Gerhardsen government appointed the FC so as to 
evade its own responsibility. 
 The FC report is remarkable for its explicit evaluation and 
criticism of named bureaucrats. It makes specific and conclusive 
statements about decisions made by Lindstrøm, decisions that later 
were to be tested in the courts.213 Lindstrøm's internal notes are 
exposed as statements unfitting for a government employee. For 
example: 
 
 "It was in 1962 that Lindstrøm's notes really became unfitting. In a note of 17 August he 
wrote that a representative of the Working Men's Union at Svalbard (Norsk 
Arbeidsmannsforbund på Svalbard) was a paid agent of [the mining company] Store 
Norske... In a note of 7 October Lindstrøm characterizes two government representatives on 
the board of a [state-owned] company as "worthless" and "sheepish". (FC 1964:48) 
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 FC says that Lindstrøm kept to himself information that made it possible for him to engage 
in economically dubious transactions when Kongsberg Sølvverk was dismantled. 
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Skjerdal suggests that FC missed the main point in its focus on 
formal procedures and questions of control. In his opinion, an 
understanding of the problems in the Ministry could not be achieved 
by comparing practice with formal rules and regulations. It was 
rather necessary to analyze the government goals for industrial 
development and the problem of the appropriate organization for 
implementing those goals (Skjerdal 1967:73). Skjerdal refers to an 
article by Høye, the editor of the newspaper Vårt land, supporting 
his own views. Høye states that the FC report is a hodgepodge of 
politics and administration. 
 
 "The focus is on internal matters when it should have been on political responsibility. What 
one should have asked was whether ministries and directorates, as they were organized by 
government, could reach the level of efficiency, autonomy and decision-making ability that 
the development of an industry competing in international markets requires." (Vårt land, 12 
February 1965, referred to in Skjerdal 1967:170-171) 
 
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, 
SEEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MODERN 
ORGANIZATION THEORY 
 
The theory of innovation in formal organizations 
Alf Inge Jansen (1971) adopts the same perspective as Skjerdal and 
Høye in his analysis of the FC report. The problem, as he sees it, is 
precisely: was the Ministry organized to manage the new industrial 
development projects that were on the political agenda in the 1950's 
and 1960's? He suggests that the Ministry should be considered a 
political organization: "The Ministry of Industry was the central 
development organization in the country in the 1960's. It was an 
organizational instrument for industrialization and modernization. 
Its primary tasks and functions were therefore of an eminently 
political character" (Jansen 1971:239). 
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 The problem with the Ministry, according to Jansen, was that its 
organization structure was not fit to that political task. The FC 
analysis was mistaken because it defined the task as one of 
administrative implementation of externally defined policies. The 
FC developed a model for routine administration, i.e. a classic 
bureaucratic model, focused on a rigorous, one-dimensional 
division of administrative labour and on ensuring that existing rules 
and regulations for classifying tasks and for problem-solving were 
followed. 
 
How should the Ministry be organized? A normative model 
How should a political ministry be organized? Jansen suggests that 
the studies of innovation within modern organization theory contain 
some guidelines. He refers specifically to the rational, open system 
models of organization developed by James Thompson (1967). 
They question how organizations become conscious of new tasks 
and how they develop new programmes and administrative 
structures for solving those tasks. Theory suggests that innovation 
depends on a number of specific characteristics. Innovative 
organizations have the ability to evaluate and revise their own goals; 
understand their relationship to the environment; and choose 
organizational forms that actually serve goal implementation in the 
specific task environment. Such an innovative organization requires 
an action model among its policy-makers that goes beyond the 
application of rules. It has to have personnel imbued with 
knowledge about the consequences of decisions and chosen 
strategies. A critical variable is the ability of the decision-makers to 
identify with and understand the interests of those groups or clients 
that they are meant to serve. An innovative organization should 
have the ability to drop bureaucratic procedures and engage itself 
normatively in the implementation of the clients' own values. 
Political tasks require a politicized administration, one that defines 
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specific groups as clients and that abandons the abstract 
bureaucratic idea of serving everyone. Jansen agrees with Jacobsen: 
groups that want to succeed in Norwegian politics have to have pro-
fessionals, in interest organizations and public administration, that 
identify with the interests of the client groups. 
 The idea of a politically defined administration alludes to a 
classic axiom of Marxist political theory: if the working class wants 
to realize its interests in capitalist society it has to build a state 
organization that is normatively and organizationally set to serve its 
interests, that is, a state that identifies with the interests of the 
working class against the exploitative interests of the bourgeoisie.214 
 The idea that administrative structure should vary with political 
values suggests that the Labour Party leadership might have 
underestimated the importance of changing the structure of 
government, the system of recruitment to the administration, and the 
relationship between parliamentary and administrative organs if it 
wanted to develop a new type of society, a socialist society. The 
Gerhardsen regime limited its reorganization to the corporative 
channel, assuming that the combination of labour movement and 
labour government in cooperation with private capital would give 
the working class the upper hand also in the economy. 
 Jansen assumed, on the basis of historical knowledge, that strict 
bureaucracies were beneficial primarily to the bourgeois class, 
interested in controlling industrial innovation and in limiting the 
state to infrastructural activities serving the expansion of capitalism. 
Thus, to implement a more democratic industrialization policy, 
Jansen suggested: 
 (1) the Ministry should be reorganized on a political and conse-
quence-oriented professional basis; 
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 Marx added, quixotically perhaps, the assumption that such a class state would also take 
care of a general societal interest in development and, eventually, lead to the elimination of 
classes and state altogether. 
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 (2) the bureaucrats should be trained in the process of politics and 
policy-making, in addition to being trained in the formal routines of 
administration; 
 (3) they should work in teams within a flat, non-pyramidal 
organization, with active, problem-oriented communication; 
 (4) they should identify normatively with their clients, and 
participate in developing client organizations.  
 If such an organizational model had been implemented in the 
management of Kings Bay, what would have been the likely 
consequences? Would the mismanagement reported in FC have 
been avoided? Would it have been an administration more identified 
with workers' interests and working-class/popular interests in 
society? 
 Jansen assumes, rather surprisingly, that a politicized 
administration, according to the model, would serve what he calls 
"the interests of low-status clients". But why low status? Why 
should an innovative politicized, professionalized administration as 
such serve low status clients? That question is sidestepped in 
Jansen's analysis. 
 It is an important sidestep. On the one hand Jansen's model is 
normatively appealing: it is a model directed at increasing the 
power of low-status clients. But, would a politicized administration 
have worked that way in the existing Norwegian administration of 
the 1960's? The evidence and interpretations of the Kings Bay 
administration presented here suggest that the structure of the 
administration systematically favoured bourgeois values and 
identifications and that the state administration already was 
politicized. There was an elite in the industrial administration, with 
connections across institutional boundaries that identified with the 
project of state management of firms that should compete with the 
private firms. Would not new identifications (in casu: with working 
class interests) at the top of the Ministry of Industry require both a 
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reorganization of the ministry and a professional education that 
imbued potential bureaucrats with those values, and with action 
models that could serve working class mobilization?215 
 Karl Skjerdal was a politically conscious administrator. Skjerdal 
worked in a team of chosen, loyal bureaucrats. He saw the political 
nature of the task (efficient state industry as an alternative to 
private) and focused on strategic planning of that task. Skjerdal was 
a member of a number of policy-making commissions in the latter 
part of the 1950's. The top administration was politicized.  
 Organization theory in both the Jacobsen and the Thompson 
versions has produced insights into the prerequisites for innovative 
organizations and public administration in modern industrialized 
societies. It raises the problem of how organization structures 
influence the attitudes and character of individual and group 
decision-making (the formation of action models). It poses the 
empirical problem of how bureaucracies function politically. 
However, it seems that organization theory has to go one step 
further, into the analysis of social relations in the economy and how 
they influence the formation of organizations and state structures if 
the contents of the innovative activity is to be understood. Avoiding 
that exercise, organization theory can exaggerate the degrees of 
freedom that exists for realizing new class interests through the 
existing state organizations. 
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 That the Labour Party managed an educational policy that put relatively more women and 
youngsters from the middle and working classes into higher education certainly led to the 
possibility in the long run of a broader representation of class identifications in the ministries. 
However, the selection process, as mentioned earlier, from high school, through university and 
into government positions was in the 1960's still highly skewed against people from the working 
class. The socialization effect of passing through that highly structured educational system may 




The Kings Bay affair demonstrates that the Labour Party, by 
choosing to develop socialism primarily by top-level, corporative 
cooperation, left large sections of the state administrative apparatus 
unchanged. The administration of the Kings Bay Mine was 
alienated from popular and working-class participation. It was that 
elite orientation, reproduced and developed within the 
administrative structure, that explains the lack of identification with 
workers' interests and the safety. The Kings Bay administration did 
not pay any more attention to safe working conditions or economic 
democracy than other comparable firms in the private sector. 
Perhaps less. It was a bureaucratic administration. The government 
or the central administration made no attempts at making the legally 
defined, representative elements, like the general assembly or the 
board, more democratic. The Gerhardsen regime seemed to allot 
more power, not less, to the top administrators, both inside the 
company and in the Ministry of Industry. 
 The centralization of power in the Ministry of Industry produced 
a management system for Kings Bay that - at best - maximized 
production. On most other dimensions, like democracy, work 
safety, technical competence, etc., the mine seemed to fall well 
below an accepted standard for the privately owned mining 
industry. 
 The administrative elite in the Ministry was a politically 
conscious elite, an elite that had little or no motivation in terms of 
personal/family accumulation of capital. Rather its motive was to 
strengthen the position of the labour movement leadership against 
the elites in the private sector. Karl Skjerdal's book is permeated 
with criticism of the Gerhardsen government and its handling of the 
Kings Bay affair. But behind that critique persists a strong 
identification with the project of public responsibility for economic 
and social development. However, Skjerdal reveals a concept of 
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social development which does not question the capitalist mode of 
production or the existing bureaucratic/representative state.  
 The Labour government had the freedom to intervene in the 
composition of the board. It did not use that freedom. It could have 
used public funds to develop safer work procedures and rules in the 
mine. It did not use funds for that purpose. The organization 
structures developed historically in the Ministry and in the mine 
administration were biased against the values of economic 
democracy. In this sense the state organization severely limited the 
actions of the Labour government in the Kings Bay affair. 
 Let me now turn to the last step in this analysis of the role of the 
state in the modernization process: the welfare state. In the 
preceding chapter I analyzed the development and the functioning 
of the corporative channel in the Norwegian state system. The 
integration of the labour movement organizations and the 
leaderships of the central employers' organizations into the state 
apparatus was important for two developments in the postwar 
period: the politicization of the capital-labour struggle over wages 
and working conditions, and the development of the welfare state. 
On the one hand the welfare state can be seen as a fulfilment of 
economic demands of the labour movement. On the other, it can be 
seen as an expression of the historical compromise between capital 
and labour on organizing capitalism, a complex statist system for a 
more workable way of distributing and regulating the wage fund in 
society. No evaluation of the role of the state in the development of 
class relations after the war in Norway would be complete without a 
study of the welfare state, not least because the welfare state is the 
prime proof of the social democratic regime's identification with the 
working class.
19 







       
      The welfare state: 
      a new type of state? 
 
 
      "An obvious reason for the wave of public welfare contributions [after the 
SWW] is that there was money available as the reconstruction of the econ-
omy was completed. When political strife over the contributions was mod-
erate it is because their organization and contents were well adjusted to a 
social order where competition, careerism and inequality were central 
values." 
 
 Edvard Bull (1979:346) 
 
 
     The area of state activity that most clearly supports the 
theory that social democracy has represented working class interests 
within that state is the development of the public welfare services. Is 
the postwar welfare state a manifestation of a new class basis of the 
Norwegian state, that the state is no longer a bourgeois state, 
perhaps a new type216 of social democratic state, based in a compro-
mise or a common interest between the bourgeoisie and the working 
class? Or is the welfare state a new set of programmes based in state 
control of the wage fund (variable capital), making the distribution 
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 Inspired by Arvidsson and Berntson (1980), I suggest that a state of a new type concerns 
the class basis of the state. The form of state concerns the various forms of state organization 
that can occur within a type. Regime denotes the political conceptual and organizational profile 
of the government or the political class, the group occupying the central positions of 
government.  
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of that fund part of the political process and thus substantially 
increasing the power and the autonomy of the state in the economy? 
 To answer this question I will review some recent theories on the 
genesis of the welfare state in modern European societies, 
extracting their positions on the role of the state and the effect of 
regime. I will present the cornerstones of the welfare programmes 
and the welfare situation in the 1970's for those sections of the 
population with the lowest allotment of economic resources. I will 
place the Norwegian welfare programmes in a Nordic and 
European/OECD comparison, testing the hypothesis that Norway is 
an exceptionally positive case of welfare state allotments. I will 
attempt to define the role of the state in the establishment and 
development of welfare services, looking both at the role of the 
increasing numbers of welfare administrators, especially at the 
"street level" and the role of the accumulation of pension funds 
within the state economy. 
 In the present chapter, I will attempt to defend the hypothesis that 
the welfare state should primarily be seen as a response to problems 
of capital accumulation, but that it becomes through its service 
production, an organization with employees increasingly conscious 
of the limits and the problems created by mature capitalism. That is, 
it generates sections and/or sub-organs of the state which in no 
simple sense are functional only for bourgeois, pro-capital interests. 
I will also suggest that, through its financial funds and administra-
tive apparatus, the welfare state is part of an economic base for a 
state elite that, as mentioned earlier, we might call a bureaucratic 
section of the bourgeoisie. 
 
 
REGIME-PAUPER RELATIONS OVER TIME 
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The data on the development of the Norwegian social service 
state217 make it possible to return briefly, to the historical 
development of class-state relationships and state autonomy in the 
modernization process. The data depict what the governments did to 
meet specific needs in the poorest sections of the population. The 
data on welfare services are important in any attempt to contradict 
the theory of the Norwegian state as a bourgeois state, closely 
linked to capital expansion and reproduction. Substantial welfare 
services reduce the scope of capital's exploitation of labour. 
 It seems that in mid-eighteenth century, with the law on 
"workhouses" (tukthus) being approved in 1741, taking care of the 
poor became acknowledged as a public responsibility, not only in 
Denmark, but also in Norway. What the motivation of the ruling 
circles was is unclear: humanitarian concern or concern for 
bourgeois public order in the streets and villages. Nakken (1980:63) 
assumes the latter to be the case. Given the Danish colonial rule in 
Norway, which probably considered poverty as a natural 
phenomenon, this is perhaps the most likely hypothesis. But several 
public organs had some kind of responsibility for poor and sick 
people expelled from private households. Each church district in the 
countryside and each town had to have its "poor commission", with 
the church minister or chief of police as its leader. 
 Changes in the Poor Law mirrored the process of gradual 
democratization. Under pressure from the liberal farmers' 
movement in the nineteenth century and the strengthening of the 
local government apparatus (from 1837), the poor commissions 
increasingly became elected organs. At the same time the 
commissions were subdivided into districts and subdistricts (roder) 
within the municipality, making it easier both for the clients to find 
the commissions and for the commissions to find the paupers.  
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 I will use the descriptions given in Kluge (1973), in Anne Lise Seip (1981 and 1984) and 
Nakken (1980), on the early poor relief administration in Larvik on the east coast. 
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 With the change from the mercantilist economic policy of the 
Danish government in the eighteenth century, to the liberal, laissez-
faire policy of the bourgeois farmer/bureaucrat coalition in the 
nineteenth century, the state limited its involvement in social 
welfare. Budgets were cut. The commissions' use of public money 
was curtailed. The poor commissions at subdistrict level (roder) 
were done away with. Again, whether this was to save money and 
give the municipal representative organs more power over pauper 
care, or whether it was to remove local organs which became more 
loyal to the paupers than to a restrictive budget policy, is hard to 
say. Kluge (1973:40) indicates that the latter interpretation is likely.  
 This first phase of state responsibility for the poor seemed to be 
motivated primarily by a ruling class need to suppress or hide a 
problem through control and sanctions. As Kluge says, the 1863 
revision of the Poor Law put more emphasis on the use of sanctions 
against paupers who did not comply with the rules than on the 
positive benefits that should be distributed. The focus was on the 
paupers and the seriously ill at the bottom and most destitute level 
of society. There is hardly any social responsibility discernible in 
the poor policy of this time. In the Storting in 1873 it was even 
suggested that the condition for receiving help should be that the 
client own or earn absolutely nothing - a suggestion, however, that 
was voted down. In 1896 this control orientation was strengthened: 
the state should assist only the absolutely destitute, where the 
likelihood of improvement without aid was close to nil. The 
argument was that assistance to the only temporarily destitute 
"would ruin personalities" and "people's ability to take part in the 
normal [sic] struggle for existence" (Kluge 1973:49).  
 A change in the character of public social policy was initiated 
around the turn of the century. The definition of the clients changed, 
from paupers as a natural phenomenon to paupers and workers with 
needs that could be alleviated. In the Storting it was decided that 
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people in temporary difficulty could get aid. The right of public 
authorities to use physical sanctions against paupers was curtailed. 
The buoyant economy before the First World War may have played 
a role. It made an expansion of public assistance possible. But the 
rise of the organized labour movement, both in Norway and in 
Europe more generally, had its effect on the understanding of social 
policy in ruling circles. A number of initiatives were taken, 
especially by the Liberal Party (Venstre). State support for workers' 
unemployment schemes and public accident and sickness insurance 
were introduced.  
 Anne Lise Seip identifies this change towards state responsibility 
for the economic situation of poor and sick people in her definition 
of the "social state" that took shape around the turn of the century. 
She says that already in the 1890's "all politically engaged were into 
the social question ... Those public programmes that were 
established became a general system, making it reasonable to talk of 
a new type of state, "the social state". It was a transcendence of the 
liberal, laissez-faire state, a transcendence furthered by the social 
responsibility of, among others, the bureaucratic elite at the time." 
(Seip 1984:281). 
 Edvard Bull (1982) points to the fact that, while the early public 
insurance schemes were directed at the workers in industry, those 
sections of the working population were not the worst off. Problems 
were more rampant among wage workers and peasants in the 
primary sector. 
 
 "The industrial workers were not those who had the most dangerous work. Neither were 
they the poorest. Rather the opposite. Industry attracted workers by offering better 
conditions than labourers had elsewhere. But the industrial workers were conceived of as a 
potential danger to the establishment... But were they conceived of that way in the latter part 
of the previous century, before the national trade unions were even created, before even a 
single social democrat had been elected to the Storting? Yes. But the conception expressed a 
European phenomenon. Its source was the Paris Commune, with ideological effects even in 
distant Norway." (Bull 1982:17). 
 History  339 
 
 
The early public schools and the first hospitals were organized 
within the Poor Law. Gradually the functions of these institutions 
expanded so that they lost their specific connection to the public 
administration of poverty. The idea of social responsibility worked 
its way gradually into the public sphere.  
 That this responsibility developed slowly and was dependent on 
the economy became obvious in the crisis-ridden 1920's and 1930's. 
Instead of a broadening of the services as poor people's problems 
increased, the Poor Law was again interpreted by government and 
parliament in a restrictive manner. As Kluge says: (1) the paupers' 
right to refuse assigned work at an allotted place was reduced; (2) 
the state's right to use force and confinement in workhouses was 
reintroduced; (3) an attempt was made to remove those members of 
the poor commissions who themselves had received assistance; and 
(4) increasingly the government tried to introduce aid in kind 
instead of aid in monetary form. 
 In the early administration of social services there was no idea 
that the state could change or eliminate pauperism. Therefore the 
primary orientation was control. The project was to integrate the 
poor into institutions and markets, without concern for the specific 
needs of the poor people, without any attempt at changing the 
conditions that produced poverty. 
 Then in periods of economic expansion and when there were 
public demands for specific services, there was room to implement 
social services over and above what was required to keep the poor 
population under control. Assistance to the poor was expanded and 
reduced as the cyclical movement in the economy seemed to 
demand, with cost reduction being a base line of the social policy of 
both the conservative and liberal democratic political movements. It 
seems that the new idea of taking the needs of the poor as a starting 
point and expanding programmes as needs increased was brought 
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into the debate by the socialists in the labour movement. By 1945 
all the political movements in the country supported the following 
formulation of what social policy was about.  
 
 "Social policy has the overriding goal of making any specific assistance to the needy 
superfluous. All the social security systems should be integrated into one national insurance 
system covering sickness, disablement, unemployment and old age. State support to families 
with small children should be considered and sailors should receive a public pension at a 
reasonable age." (From the "Common Political Programme") 
 
This statement indicates a change from a particularistic to a 
universalistic social policy, from assistance to specific needy groups 
to assistance to everyone with specific problems, a change from a 
social state to a welfare state. However, the Programme was mute 
on the relation between capitalism and social policy. It was assumed 
that an expanding capitalism was a basis for the resources needed to 
meet social goals. 
 If social policy up to 1900 was oriented toward control of 
paupers, towards changing them from an anarchic and potentially 
dangerous mass to an ordered category of individuals, from 1900 up 
to the Second World War it was in addition oriented to integrating 
the new working class into the economy as participant wage-
labourers and into society as a class positively accepting an 
existence within capitalism. Social policy after the Second World 
War was oriented in the same way. But now the expanding 
economy allowed a major expansion of programmes, thus fulfilling 
a goal of public regulation of the labour market.  
 The main changes in social policy were universalization of earlier 
particularistic programmes, integration of the disparate organs at the 
municipal level into one "social commission" and integration of the 
disparate social security/insurance systems into one national scheme 
(The Peoples' Pension). 
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LIVING STANDARDS AS A MEASURE OF WELFARE 
 
What do data on living standards tell us about the welfare state in 
Norway? Living standards are high, but income distribution is 
skewed: Kuhnle and Solheim (1985:131) show that in 1979 the 40% 
of individual income recipients at the bottom of the income scale 
took 12% of all income, while the 10% at the top took 27% of the 
income. The difference was somewhat smaller when comparing 
households: the bottom 40% took 18% of the income, the top 10% 
21% of the income.  
 The government programme for 1982-1985 presents the 
following picture of living standards in Norway: The Norwegian 
population nearly doubled between 1900 and 1980, increasing from 
2.2 million to 4.1 million people. The growth rate gradually slowed 
down; in 1900 it was 1%, in 1980 it was 0.34%. That worried the 
government: "This low growth rate will result in an absolute 
reduction of the population after the year 2000." Fertility in 1980 
was the lowest ever: 1.7 children per woman. For a constant 
Norwegian population the fertility rate had to be 2.1. This low 
growth creates a certain short-term welfare gain for those presently 
living in the country (fewer children drawing on family incomes). 
On the other hand, there are several negative welfare consequences: 
strong relative growth of the oldest sections of the population and a 
smaller workforce. The mean life-span increased between 1900 and 
1980: for men it increased from 53 to 72 years, for women from 56 
to 79 years, a good indication of better welfare. The reason was the 
near-elimination of neonatal infant deaths: in 1900 1 in every 10 
newborns died; in 1980, 1 in every 100 newborns died.  
 In 1920 housing was overcrowded. There was on the average one 
person per room in 69% of all dwellings. That meant, at least for the 
working class, several people sleeping in the same room and regular 
use of living rooms as bedrooms. By 1970 the situation had 
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improved. There was then one person per room on average in 18% 
of all dwellings. In 1973, 400 000 or 10% of the population still 
lived in houses without running hot water, and 60 000 lived in 
dwellings without any running water. A substantial number of 
people had only chemical toilets. 200 000 people reported that they 
were seriously bothered by traffic noise in the area where they lived.  
 The success of the welfare state is limited: unemployment was 
over 70 000 in the early 1980's (150 000 in 1992), affecting 
especially young people; large numbers of poor people with money 
incomes under the minimum pension level and no other form of 
income; strenuous and boring jobs; large groups of patients who are 
waiting for simple, but important treatments (like hip surgery), the 
proliferation of alcoholism and drug use, etc. 
 Kuhnle and Solheim (hereafter K/S) give a somewhat different 
synopsis: "The welfare state has met all fundamental needs for 
social and economic security in our society." It has created more 
equality, although with one qualification: "The old age pension 
however, reproduces inequalities. Position in the labour market 
when employed still determines the level of pension 
payments."(K/S 1985:133). 
 According to the statistics some 400 000 members of the 
population visited health care institutions every year in the 1970's. 
Larger numbers received some kind of state support for education, 
health and social services. These are ambiguous indicators of 
welfare. On the one hand, they testify to a service system that 
alleviates some problems. On the other hand, they testify to the 
existence of problems: Health care means health problems. 
Educational services are generally valuable but the need for 
education may equally well express demands generated within a 
changing and alienating production system. A large social service 
administration testifies to the existence of social problems. 
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 The proportion of the population in school has increased: in 1980 
about 20% were working/studying full time in schools and 
universities. Women have gradually gained an equal place in the 
school system. They increased from 13% to 30% of enrolment from 
1900 to 1917. In the 20's and 30's there was stagnation, but after 
1935 an even increase of women took place, up to the 50% level of 
secondary school enrolment by 1975. In the universities 
developments were slower, but the distribution between the sexes 
has changed: 16% women in 1952, 30% in 1972 and 49% in 1987. 
 The data demonstrate an increase in the living standards of the 
working class as a whole. However, they show that at the beginning 
of the 1970's there were still significant sections of the population, 
parts of the working class, the unemployed and pensioned who had 
not reached the standard. Ownership of the means of production and 
finance capital has been redistributed in the opposite direction. 
Taking capital wealth in general, including both private houses and 
shares in companies, K/S demonstrate massive inequality: 40% had 
no registered capital wealth and the top 20% of owners of capital 
owned 80% of it all (K/S 1985:132). This suggest the continued 
relevance of the concepts of class, class relations and class 
contradictions in the analysis of modern Norway and a basic factor 
limiting the development of the welfare state, both in economic 




CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM AND 
SECURITY 
 
Some studies go directly into the processes producing the welfare 
state, without asking what the welfare state is (Alestalo 1985). 
Other studies raise the conceptual question. Korpi, for example, 
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suggests that the welfare state should be termed welfare capitalism, 
at least when looking at Sweden. Welfare capitalism is a 
"combination of capitalism and political power used to regulate the 
capitalist market and to distribute resources according to a norm of 
justice" (Korpi 1978:15). In 1983, Korpi says that "It is the degree 
of equality in living standards that is the crucial variable" (Korpi 
1983:185). Korpi's definition suggests that the welfare state is a 
political regulatory mechanism in a capitalist economy. It is focused 
on securing everybody a minimum living standard and reducing 
differences in living conditions.  
 In a study of the Norwegian welfare state a definition is taken 
from Anne Lise Seip (1981): the welfare state has an explicit goal 
of securing welfare for everyone; it is an active state and uses its 
power to reach that goal (Kuhnle and Solheim, 1985:19). 
 Even if the Norwegian state has intervened in the life of the poor 
and destitute over the centuries (A.L. Seip 1984), the involvement 
was, at least before the rise of social democracy, motivated by the 
need to control threatening, potentially anarchic elements in the 
population. The legally based, representative state introduced a new 
dynamic concept of equality and responsibility which was unknown 
in earlier discourse on the character of the state. But the basic idea 
of that state was still that individual liberty and the right to 
individual acquisition of capital through market transactions should, 
gradually and autonomously, produce equality.  
 With the rise of the working-class movement, the "social state" 
ideology gradually developed in many European societies. That 
ideology defined the purpose of the state in other terms than those 
liberalists had used. The state should not only defend individual 
freedom in market systems. It should defend and implement a social 
goal: it should create a more equitable and just society. The state 
should not just defend a certain type of society (read: economy), it 
should actively change it. Solidarity was the key word of the 
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emerging labour movement. To implement change the state needed 
not only specialists in law, public finance and religion, but 
professionals who could organize the production of material 
infrastructure (engineers) and who could investigate causes and 
define solutions to social inequalities (social scientists). 
 This ideology developed in Norway in the nineteenth century, as 
both A.L. and J.A. Seip have shown us. Liberalism was on the rise 
in the first part of the century, guiding the elimination of economic 
privileges in markets, focusing on the need for competition and the 
individual right to accumulate capital. The laws limiting the 
freedom of poor people were revised, increasing their freedom of 
action. Putting people in repressive workhouses was criticized. 
Paupers were given the right to migrate across county and province 
borders, etc. However, the budgetary support to social programmes 
and the interest in reforms varied with the economic cycle. 
 Both the liberal and the social concept of the state put the focus 
on individual freedom, but they differed on how that freedom was 
to be attained. Liberalists saw the market as the arena guaranteeing 
freedom. The labour movement saw individual freedom as 
dependent on the existence of a cooperative (planned) economy and 
a public consciousness of solidarity. The difference appeared in the 
debate on how to finance the welfare state. The liberals wanted to 
employ the insurance principle, while the socialists wanted to 
invoke government responsibility and finance welfare through 
taxes. In that way the rich population would be forced to add some 
of its income and wealth to public, popular welfare.  
 This conflict between individual freedom and collective 
solidarity, as far as I can see, dissolved in a class compromise in the 
interwar years, a compromise that during and after the Second 
World War ushered in a general consensus on the need for 
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economic development within the capitalist economy as a basis for 
continued welfare services.218 
 
 
THEORIES OF THE GENESIS OF THE WELFARE STATE 
 
The discussion of the welfare state in Skocpol (1984) centres to a 
large degree on its origins. A question addressed there is to what 
degree it should be seen as a functional response to imbalances and 
contradictions in the capital accumulation process, and/or to what 
degree it should be seen as a product of working-class and labour 
movement influence within the state. The welfare state is at least a 
service state in development, a state that increasingly intervenes in 
the distribution of consumption funds and organizes the production 
of services to broad sections of the population. The character of this 
state is contested. On the one hand it can express working-class and 
popular political advances. On the other, it can be a politicization of 
the distribution of consumption funds in the population, a 
distribution that is basically formed by the bourgeois criteria of 
profit maximization in privately owned industry and trade. 
 Although Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta (1986) do not raise 
the problem of what the welfare state is, relative to the laissez-faire 
state, the bourgeois state and the socialist state, their discussion of 
the different theories of the development of the welfare state is a 
fruitful starting point for understanding the Norwegian case. 
 They present four theses about the generation of social policy, 
called industrialism, capitalism, social democracy and crisis.  
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 "In the period 1945-1980 there is little relationship between social reform activity and the 
political colour of government ... Especially it cannot be said that Labour governments were 
more active or had higher budgets than non-socialist governments. Our data support the 
consensus thesis: in the whole period there has been political consensus on the development of 
the welfare state" (Kuhnle and Solheim, 1985:102, my translation). 
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 (1) The industrialization thesis says that the generation of social 
policy is closely related to the expansion of industry, a system that 
severed the bonds wage-labourers had to local self-sufficient 
communities (Gellner 1987) and at the same time created systematic 
forms of destitution (unemployment). The state could absorb people 
into national development programmes and use taxes to prevent 
absolute destitution.  
 (2) The capitalism thesis says that public welfare policies should 
be seen as functioning within the cycle of capital accumulation. 
Welfare contributions affect demand for commodities positively in 
periods of slump, possibly reducing the depth of the downturn in 
capital accumulation. Welfare contributions ameliorate the 
condition for unemployed, reducing frustrations created by the 
slump both among employed and unemployed. Welfare 
bureaucracies, however, are unproductive employment seen from 
the vantage point of accumulation, drawing on the total fund of 
finance capital, being labour that does not contribute to 
accumulation. Here we find an economic logic behind the demand 
for reducing the size of the welfare state. 
 (3) The social democracy thesis falls within the idea "government 
matters". Social security policies are a product of social democratic 
influence. The labour movement in government creates more equal 
living conditions by increasing government income through 
taxation and using the resources to implement a redistributive social 
policy. The strategy is dependent upon a surplus producing 
economy. 
 (4) The crisis thesis says that public social security systems 
develop in periods of socioeconomic breakdown or when the 
population in general experiences insecurity. 
 Skocpol and Amenta's view is that the first two theses, the 
industrialization and capitalism theses, receive little support in 
cross-national surveys. Both marxist and neo-corporative forms of 
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the capitalism thesis "have come up against strong criticisms from 
scholars who regard both the state as organization and democratic 
political forces as more causally significant than monopoly 
capitalists or state managers acting as executors for capitalists" 
(1986:8). Identifying the capitalism thesis with the idea of 
"capitalists in control" leads, as I have argued earlier, to an 
empirical refutation. But specifying it as a generation and 
reproduction of the welfare state within a (crisis-ridden) system of 
private accumulation of capital makes refutation of the thesis more 
difficult.219 Giovanna Procacci (1989) suggests an explanation 
within such a capitalism thesis: (1) wage labour is the overriding 
most important source for common people's welfare within 
capitalism, (2) capitalist society typically does not make wage 
labour a legal right, (3) the social state through a concept of public 
responsibility and the organization of public service institutions of 
diverse kinds, administers support to people who fall outside the 
labour markets. Thus support is administered without infringing on 
the capitalists' management and sacking right in the firm. 
 Dryzek and Goodin (1985) develop the crisis theory of the 
welfare state. They suggest that in crisis periods (economic crisis, 
war etc.), personal life paths are insecure and that inspires an 
involvement in collective social security arrangements:  
 
 "The aim of this article has been to explore the motivational bases of moral behaviour. Our 
thesis is that rare moments of deep and widespread uncertainty - war being only the most 
dramatic example - provide one such basis. Under such conditions, anyone's future might be 
one's own. That forces each of us to reflect impartially upon the interests of all. Welfare 
states and such like constitute the appropriate institutional response." (Dryzek and Goodin 
1985:31) 
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 K/S (1985) find some relation between the development of GDP and total social budgets in 
the period 1973-1980. but they are sceptical of a long-term correlation. 
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When the basis for effective individual insurance mechanisms 
breaks down, the population is willing to finance and participate in 
collective social security systems. This ideological support for 
social policy in the population then spurs government to develop 
and finance a public social security arrangement. Taking "transfers 
to households" in Figure 6.6 as an indicator, this thesis would hold 
for (a) the First World War when there was an absolute increase, (b) 
the crisis around 1930, and (c) the immediate post-Second World 
War period. But what about the expansion of welfare services in the 
1950's and 1960's? In this period the private/personal insurance 
system was working. An argument could be the Stinchcombeian 
one: once established, an administrative system is stable and 
reproduced even when ideological support dwindles or when new 
problems requiring new organizational forms arise (Stinchcombe 
1965).  
 Despite the expanding economy and the acceptance (however 
passive) of capitalism in the labour movement, the crisis theory may 
have some explanatory power. The attacks on the welfare state in 
the 1970's and 1980's may indicate that state policy was changing 
because the populations in western societies increasingly saw 
markets rather than states as problem-solving institutions. Korpi 
turns the Dryzek/Goodin thesis around. Since the social democrats 
are the driving force of progress, they are the cause of social policy. 
He says: "Since such a social policy benefits the vast majority of 
households in one way or another, it can be expected to generate 
relatively strong political support among voters" (Korpi 1983:207). 
In the same way he sees a process in which social democrats initiate 
the programs, people gradually find them advantageous and then the 
bourgeoisie finds the welfare programs acceptable. 
 The crisis theory is interesting in three ways; (1) it indicates that 
in crisis situations public authorities, independent of class base, will 
be oriented towards expanding social assistance because of the 
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precariousness of the nation's economy and the need for 
strengthening its competitiveness; (2) in crisis situations individual 
insurance systems break down, leading to widespread ideological 
support for state-sponsored social security; and (3) a necessary 
condition for a reduction in social security programmes is 
anti-statist and pro-market sentiments in the population. 
 
 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES 
 
The first elements of the Norwegian "social state" were the Laws on 
Industrial Company Inspections and Accident Insurance for 
Workers in Industry approved in 1892 and 1894 respectively. Since 
then the following cornerstones of the social security system have 
been established:  
 
• Health Insurance introduced in 1909, first limited to low-income 
groups of wage-earners, gradually expanded to include every 
resident in Norway.  
• Unemployment Insurance was introduced from 1938 
• Family allowances were introduced from 1946. 
• In 1958 all public insurances were put into one system, soon after 
also including military personnel. 
• Old age pensions were introduced in 1936. The scheme was 
based on a means test until 1957 when old age pensions were 
given to all who had reached 70 years of age. Since then the age 
limit has been reduced to 67, a relatively high limit compared 
with other western states.  
• Disability pensions were made available in 1960, having already 
been introduced for specific groups in 1936. 
• Survivors' benefits for children were introduced in 1957. 
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• The main innovation, the National Pension Fund, came into force 
on 1 January 1967, integrating all the previous security schemes. 
 
 "The purpose of the national insurance is to provide benefit in cases of sickness, infirmity, 
pregnancy and childbirth, unemployment, old age, disability, death and loss of breadwinner. 
The scheme also provides support for unmarried mothers. The national insurance covers - 
with few exceptions - the entire population." (CBS 1978:581) 
 
This welfare system has been successful relative to a goal of 
stabilizing the social and economic relations in the capitalist 
economy in Norway, at least up to the early 1970's. However, wage 
differentials have not been substantially reduced (Noack 1973, Bull 
1979). The social service state has not eliminated the process 
whereby those clients who are best off and have the least problems 
get the most from the public service institutions.220 The welfare 
services have reduced but not eliminated the differences in living 
standards mentioned earlier. The social service state has in no way 
changed or eliminated the class differences based on the private 
ownership of the means of production. The welfare state never set 
out to eliminate those differences. It has, therefore, not changed the 
bourgeois character of state power, that is, a state structured and 
(indirectly but efficiently) controlled by bourgeois class interests, 
oriented toward reproducing and expanding capitalism. But it has 
managed to reduce tensions and the most blatant social inequalities 
in the field of consumption. That is no poor feat. On the other hand, 
as the following evidence will show, the Norwegian welfare state is 
not very different from other small, industrialized, capitalist 
countries. What does this 'not very different thesis' say about the 
influence of the labour movement and the autonomy of the state 
apparatus in the development of the Norwegian welfare state?  
 
                                           
     220
 The Mathew effect, substantially documented in studies of the distribution of public goods 
and resources. See, for example, Thor Øivind Jensen (1981). 
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THE NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
 
Norway is among those nations in Europe with the highest GDP per 
person and a country that channels a relatively large part of the total 
economic product through the state.  
 
Table 19.1 Public expenditures in the western world, 1975 













































































Ranking in (). 
Source: Lågergren et al (1984:51). 
 
Table 19.1 shows that Norway ranks just below Sweden in taxation 
and social insurance costs relative to GDP. It ranks high on public 
income transfers and total public expenditure. However, Norway is 
closer to the middle ranks in public consumption and public 
investment. Computing the means for the four variables and 
comparing Norway to the mean demonstrates both the differences 
and the similarities between Norway and the OECD mean, 
presented in Figure 19.1. The striking difference is in taxation, 
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where Norway was significantly above the OECD mean.221 The 
Norwegian state was high on taxation and on transfers. This might 
reflect the priority given by the Labour Party to labour market 
regulation and the power of the private sector in the field of 










                                           
     221
 The variation between lowest and highest percentage between the 10 countries is 12% in 
consumption and investments, 18% in public income transfers and total public expenditure and 
23% in taxation. 
     222
 See Jonas Pontusson (1983) for a comparison between social democracy in Sweden and 
France in which he demonstrates that the Swedes have given priority to labour market 
regulation while the French have put more importance on the control of capital and investments. 
 
 










If we look at social security coverage over time, defined as the 
percentage of the labour force that is covered by social security 
arrangements, Norway does not differ very much from other 
western countries (Alestalo 1985). Figure 19.2 shows that up to the 
installation of the Nygaardsvold government in 1935, Norway 
lagged well behind the European average for social security 
coverage. But then Norway reached a very high score just after the 
war and held that position, although with the margin to the 
European mean gradually becoming smaller. 
 


















How does Norway compare with the other Nordic countries? In 
Lågergren et al. (1984), we find a detailed comparison between the 























We see that Norway quite generally is below the Nordic mean. Only 
in general health services and pensions does Norway score above 
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the mean. In this sense there is little reason to consider Norway a 
leading welfare state among the Nordic states.  
 We can also use Alestalo's data to make comparisons with other 
Nordic countries over time (Figure 19.4). These data demonstrate 
how the Nordic countries from about 1965 to 1975 all cluster at a 
high level of coverage. But at the other end of the diagram, in the 
1920's and 1930's, there are some significant differences. Finland 
and Norway were considerably below the rate of coverage in 
Denmark and Sweden. Both countries made a leap forward from 
1935, but Finland only about half as far forward compared with 
Norway. Then Finland lingers on at the 40-50% level until the 
1960's, while Norway joined Sweden and Denmark in a continued, 
gradual increase of the coverage rate toward the 90% mark. Then by 






















Why these differences before the war, and why are they erased in 
the course of the 1960's? Alestalo and his co-authors address the 
explanation of the Finnish case, finding that differences in 
economic structures between the countries, and relatively slower 
industrialization in Finland, may explain part of the difference. In 
addition: "The social democratic hypothesis is right in emphasizing 
the active role of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions, but 
the party and the unions have been too weak in Finland to make the 
welfare state alone, partly because of the split of the left into Social 
Democrats and Communists" (Alestalo 1985:34).  
 For Norway these comparative data give some support to the 
social democratic thesis. A major expansion in social security took 
place from 1935 and into the postwar period. Social security 
coverage was improved throughout the stable Labour Party reign 
after the war. The social democrats in Sweden gained power earlier 
than in Norway, explaining the higher level of social security earlier 
there. However, according to Korpi, the early social democratic 
governments were without much influence in Sweden. It was only 
with Per Albin Hansson's government in 1932 that social 
democracy was institutionalized in the Swedish government system. 
Thus, as Alestalo indicates, we need more variables to explain the 
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differences between the welfare state systems, more than 
industrialization, capitalism and the social democracy theses.  
 It may be important to expand investigations of the capitalism 
thesis, starting from a labour market model of the welfare system: 
public welfare services are an administered wage, an intervention 
that becomes increasingly important as: (a) the strength and 
militancy of at least parts of the labour movement in wage 
bargaining increase; and (b) larger parts of the working population 
are "decommodified" (taken/pushed out of capital-labour exchange, 
Offe 1985), and thus in potential danger of unemployment, a 
no-wage destitution in an unregulated labour market. The active 
role of the welfare state in income redistribution can increase the 
government's autonomy. An administrative system has to be built to 
administer income distribution. This function can make employers 
more tolerant of state intervention as the state covers necessary 
wages to decommodified, capital-unproductive people. 
 If we turn back to Figure 6.6, the category "transfers to 
households" is an indicator of the size of the social service state. In 
this sense, the welfare state was established in the 1920's. The 
1930's saw a retardation, with transfers at a low point just after the 
Second World War, but moving briskly upwards in the 1950's.  
 In 1970 education and welfare services took about 50% of the 
budget. All the other sectors were decreasing at the end of the 
1960's - expenditure on the military and police, infrastructural 
investments, support to private commodity production and 
administration costs. This can be interpreted in the same direction: 
the welfare state expanded and the budget was being subordinated 
to this new social responsibility and redistribution of income 
through state policy-making. 
 The government payments for welfare services after the war 
(Table 19.2), excluding education, demonstrate the increasing 
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weight of these costs in the economy as a whole, from 7,2% of net 
domestic product in 1948, evenly rising to over 19% in 1974. 
 
Table 19.2 Welfare services 1948-1974  
























Source: CBS (1978), Table 319. 
 
There was a steady expansion from 1948, with a marked levelling-
off in the mid-1960's, with a new surge from 1966, and a weak 
tapering off towards 1974. We lack a good explanation of the 
levelling-off between 1964 and 1966. In 1963 a bourgeois coalition 
government took over for a short time, as a consequence of a split in 
the Labour Party and the creation of the Socialist People's Party. 
The Kings Bay affair led to a serious parliamentary crisis. This may 
have affected social security budgets.  
 The three social service areas that took the largest parts of the 
public budgets - health, pensions and transfers to families - are 
presented in Figure 19.5. 
 


















Figure 19.5 demonstrates how old age pensions took the number 
one position early in the 1960's, the jump being explained by the 
elimination of a means test in 1957 (K/S 1985:48), with health 
expenditure tapering off at the same time (the two are perhaps 
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related), but then increasing again from the end of the 1960's. 
Family allowances tapered off in the 1960's, but made a jump 
upward around 1970 because families at that time received child 
allowance also for the first child. They then fell to around 10% of 
government expenditure in 1974.223  
 By 1974 the government-financed welfare services were 
accounting for about one-quarter of the net domestic product. The 
data show that health and family allowances took a constant share, 
but that old age pensions were on the increase all through the 
postwar period. The pensions to elderly people not receiving wages, 
and to people who could not get wage labour when they wanted it, 
can be seen as a compensatory, state-administered wage when 
family structures are no longer capable of or geared to taking care of 
elders and unemployed.  
 
                                           
     223
 The three other welfare services that are not included in the diagram are: work injuries, 
payments to disabled military personnel and tax reductions for childcare. They are left out 
because even combined they represent a small part of the welfare budget. 
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WELFARE SERVICES AND STATE AUTONOMY 
 
Capitalism and social democracy 
The welfare state can be explained: (1) as a political response, 
mediated by powerful elites, to shortcomings and crises in the 
capitalist economic system (the breakdown theory); and (2) political 
intervention into the distribution of the wage fund in the population 
as a whole, promoted by the labour movement and its allies, 
diverting funds from accumulation to popular welfare (the 
democratic theory),224 That welfare services are internal to mature 
and crisis-ridden capitalist economies is supported by (1) the spread 
of welfare state arrangements in most central and northern European 
states; (2) the increased focus on how faltering and skewed demand 
creates problems for mature capitalist mass production; and (3) the 
correlation between welfare budgets and the cyclical movement of 
the capitalist economy.  
 The exact form and size of the welfare state arrangements are 
influenced by the type of regime and popular ideology. The welfare 
state is essentially, I suggest state management of variable capital, 
political management of the consumption fund, a consequence of 
the market mechanism's tendency to concentrate those funds on the 
most capital-productive labour. In societies like Norway, with a 
strong labour movement and a relatively weak bourgeoisie (without 
allies in strong aristocracies), political control of the consumption 
                                           
     224
 Note that Titmuss (1974) poses more or less the same problem, distinguishing between 
'residual' and 'institutional' welfare systems, the first adjusting to market irregularities like 
unemployment, unacceptable wage differentials, overproduction of commodities, etc., the 
second being welfare institutionalized as a superordinate goal for public policy, the system 
functioning outside the market mechanisms, on the basis of explicit, political, normative 
decisions (also cited in Tvede 1979). In his classic work of 1963 Titmuss includes a third model 
in his analytical repertoire: "the industrial achievement-performance model", in which, 
according to O'Connor, "welfare policies are designed to reinforce capitalist discipline" 
(O'Connor 1984:216). 
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fund is perhaps more likely than in societies with strong 
bourgeoisies.  
 
Radicalization of welfare administrations 
Given that we have correctly defined the relationship between 
capital-functional aspects of the welfare state and the role of 
politics, how can the organization of the welfare administration help 
explain the development of the welfare state? 
 At "the street level" (Lipsky 1980), state personnel come into 
contact with a large number of clients, people who have substantial 
social and economic problems, and who have been expelled from 
labour markets, or at least are marginal there. This interaction can 
develop an understanding among social service employees of how 
social problems are generated and left unsolved. This experience 
creates a state-internal pressure for welfare services. 
 The street-level personnel usually have low wages. Many of them 
belong to the exploited classes. The mechanisms in the state 
bureaucracy that draw personnel away from the lower classes and 
create identities with middle and higher echelons in the social 
structure, may for these reasons be less effective among welfare 
state personnel. 
 The welfare state institutions may themselves be highly 
bureaucratized, with strict mechanisms of both decision-making and 
ideological control (Stjernø 1983). This can strengthen the working 
class and popular identifications among street level welfare service 
personnel. They have low wages and bureaucratic power hampers 
their work, hampers their possibilities for flexible and problem-
oriented responses to client demands. 
 In Table 4.1 we saw that 18 300 or 15.1% of state employees in 
1973 were engaged in educational and health services. At the 
municipal level, teachers accounted for 29%, and health care 
workers 42%. Thus the welfare sector employed 71% of all 
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personnel at the local government level. In this sense, it is the 
municipal level of government that carries the main burden of 
distributing welfare services in Norway. This large involvement in 
practical welfare work and interaction with clients may strengthen 
identifications with the clients, with those who are not successful in 
the markets for labour and other commodities.  
 The national accounts and Lægreid and Roness' work from 1983 
depict the development of the group of welfare state personnel, 
defined as personnel in health and education at all levels of 
government (Table 19.3). 
 




















Health and social services 



































Total 211 253 312 384 82 
 
Sources: National accounts and Lægreid and Roness (1983:7). 
 
Health and welfare services increased from 21% of total 
government employment in 1962 to 29% in 1974 to 33% in 1980. 
In 1974 there were 90 000 employees in health care and social work 
and 82 000 in education, totalling 172 000 or 12% of the total 
workforce (of 1,41 million in 1970).225 The increase in numbers 
                                           
     225
 The 172 000 social/health/education workers compare for example with the 130 000 totally 
employed in agriculture in 1970, 130 000 in the construction industry, 200 000 in retail trade. 
The total employed in industry at this time (manufacturing and construction) was 520 000, 
treble the size of the social service group (CBS 1978:37). 
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employed in the welfare sector over the whole period was the 
highest of all sectors, 186%. The increase in the group of employees 
in education was also large, 109%. How did this rapid growth in 
size influence ideology in the welfare group? I suggest, tentatively, 
the following set of factors. If the wage hierarchy in the group is 
parallel to the hierarchy in the state in general, then 70% to 80% of 
them have wages at or even below the level of the working class in 
industry. Their separation from any, even petty ownership of the 
means of production, their exposure to statist ideology through the 
public institutions they work in, and the fact that entrants to the 
group probably come from even lower levels of the class hierarchy, 
might well lead to underclass/working-class identifications. 
 
Taxation and state power 
Accumulating taxes for social services leads to large financial funds 
in the state. As mentioned earlier, the different programmes were 
combined in the National Pension Fund in 1967. The Fund's balance 






















The Fund's financial balance (its investment basis) has increased 
exponentially from 1970, reaching over NOK 12 bill. in 1975. 
These resources have for the most part been channelled into public 
investments, but smaller shares have been deposited in accounts in 
private banks and lent out to the private sector. As the percentages 
at the top of the bars indicate, that orientation towards the private 
sector increased from 8% in 1968 to 27% in 1972, but then it 
dropped to about 16% in the mid- 1970's. 
 How were these financial resources managed? What criteria were 
used in their placement? Is there reason to believe that any other 
criteria than maximizing capital income have been applied? We see 
from the diagram that a large part of the accumulated funds is 
invested in the public sector. If the receiving institutions pay interest 
on those investments, we can compare those rates with rates in the 
private sector. I would expect that state investments give smaller 
financial returns to the Fund than private investments. If that is the 
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case, the idea of using the funds to strengthen the state economy has 
been prevalent.  If so, this supports the hypothesis that state 
economic management is guided by a somewhat wider set of 
criteria than comparable private investment decisions.  
 Is the Pension Fund economically important, relative to financial 
resources in the private sector? Let me compare it with net 





















Figure 19.7 depicts a stronger state up to 1972, when the Fund 
reached 27% of total net investments. The Fund held that position 
for the next two years. At the end of 1972, a bourgeois coalition 
government took over from the Labour Party government, after its 
loss in the plebiscite over Common Market membership. Given that 
the Fund is only a part of the capital that the state controls, and 
remembering that government investment is included in the 
comparative measure, we can say that the state over this period had 
a substantial independent economic base in the Fund. 
 
 
A NEW TYPE OF STATE? 
 
The welfare services made the Norwegian state a larger and more 
complex organization. Welfare programmes demand use-value 
considerations in state decision-making: which types of services 
will alleviate which problems? The exchange value of welfare 
services, for example to the unemployed and sick people, is difficult 
to specify. The welfare state absorbs a large part of the domestic 
product, channels it through the state and returns (parts of) it to the 
population in the form of welfare services. The public welfare 
system is not easy to change because of its size and the substantial 
administrative system connected with it. The welfare function 
increases the autonomy of the state relative to the social classes. 
People in welfare organs become involved in the negative 
consequences of the competitive, capital-oriented market economy 
and might for that reason develop political identifications with 
working-class interests. The task of the welfare administrations, 
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even though they are organized according to the classical 
bureaucratic model, swamp them, specially at the street level, with 
social considerations. The welfare state, once established, does not 
in any simple and uniform way serve the reproduction and 
expansion of capitalism. 
 However, is the welfare state "a new type of state"? In 1970 the 
power over the means of production in society was still 
overwhelmingly in the hands of the bourgeoisie in the private 
sector. The Pension Fund has not changed that. The welfare state 
channels large parts of the created exchange values, a large part of 
the consumption fund, through its offices. But the bourgeoisie has 
direct power over the means of production and finance capital. The 
bourgeois approval of the welfare state, at least after an initial 
period of ideological opposition, attests to the relevance of this 
theory. If it threatened bourgeois economic power more opposition 
to the welfare state would be expected. 
 The genesis of the Norwegian welfare state seems to have two 
sources. On the one hand, both the bourgeois farmer/peasant 
movement and the labour movement have influenced its 
development. The bourgeois movement was crucial for the 
institutionalization of parliamentary democracy, that is, for opening 
a part of the state system to influence from popular movements and 
local communities. That was advantageous, perhaps a condition for 
later welfare state developments.226 The parliamentary state both 
allowed popular demands to be voiced at the political centre of 
society and made realistic, situation and context-specific policy-
making possible, in addition to being a mechanism for ruling class 
control and guidance of the bureaucracy. The labour movement was 
important in that it voiced specific demands and pressed for their 
realization: a shorter work-day, better insurance against accidents in 
                                           
     226
 As can be seen in countries in southern Europe, where both the parliamentary system and 
the welfare state, have been slower in developing than in Scandinavia (see Senghaas 1985).  
 A new type of state  371 
 
the work-place, pensions, health and sickness programmes, etc. The 
full-blown welfare state of the 1960's can be seen as a fulfilment of 
the idea that the state should control the imbalance between wages 
and investments created by the autonomous workings of the 
commodity markets (including the labour market). 
 The welfare demands were put forward by the working class, 
beginning in the last part of the nineteenth century. These demands 
were to a certain extent met by the bourgeois liberal governments. 
In particular, the demands for equal rights within the parliamentary 
system were met at that time. The demands were also absorbed and 
developed within the labour movement. The question in the 
interwar years, was how working-class demands should be 
implemented: through the organization of a new type of socialist 
state against the will of the bourgeoisie or by winning government 
position within the existing state apparatus and implementing the 
demands one by one through the established parliamentary and 
bureaucratic mechanisms. The latter strategy was chosen.  
 The bourgeoisie and the state laid down strict conditions for 
Labour Party participation, conditions that were accepted in the 
reformist labour movement, leading the way to stable government 
position in 1935. This acceptance of the reformist path by the 
Labour Party was more important for the Norwegian bourgeoisie 
than hindering the expansion of public welfare services. Rather the 
opposite. Once reformism was an established fact, the way was 
open both for a labour government and for a welfare state. That 
state, as I have shown, was acceptable to leading circles among the 
bourgeoisie. It was a way of regulating the wage structures so that 
productivity would stay high and radicalism low in the working-
class. 
 The welfare arrangements are political and willfull interventions 
into the distribution of the consumption fund in the population. But 
the welfare state also expresses how the 'private economy' is 
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increasingly public, how politics and economy are increasingly 
intertwined. The welfare state, through its mass of welfare workers 
at the municipal level introduces practical, context-specific use-
value considerations broadly into the essentially bureaucratic state 
apparatus. 
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      The role of the state 
      in the modernization process 
 
 
       "Harold Rosenberg remarked, in The Tradition of the New, that if an 
artist is in a given situation it doesn't follow that his consciousness will 
be there with him. Instead of exemplifying its conditions, he might 
choose to question them." 
 
 Denis Donoghue (New York Times Book Review, 22 June, 1986:37) 
 
 
     What role did the Norwegian state have in the 
modernization process, in the transformation of the Norwegian 
economy from a subsistence agriculture to a surplus producing, 
industrial economy? To develop an answer I have compared 
knowledge on processes of state and class formation with 
knowledge on the effects of state intervention into the economy and 
into the formation of organizations in the civil society (firms, 
interest organizations and political movements). In that interactive 
study of relations between state and society it is possible to avoid 
overly deterministic or voluntaristic theories. In that way it is 
possible to understand how action and action models are given form 
and influenced by institutions and how individual and group actions 
influence and change institutions. 
 Political science has long left the workings of the economy to the 
economists. That has led political science to intensive studies of 
political power and decision-making and economic theory to be 
reluctant to look into how institutions and organization affects and 
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limits economic production and distribution. Political science has 
been overly voluntaristic because the economic processes have been 
left out. Economic theory has been overly deterministic, in the sense 
that the economy has been seen one-sidedly as a market system 
with uncoordinated actors acting on demand and supply of price-set 
commodities. Widely accepted norms and politics has not been part 
of the economy. The present study suggests some possibilities for 
transcending that 'academic' division of labour: study capital as a 
social relation that gives form to relations between organizations 
and movements; study how political decision-making is limited by 
class relations and professions and how individual and collective 
action impacts both actors and their environments. 
 The thesis of the present study is that the state has played an 
autonomous and powerful role in the modernizing of the Norwegian 
economy, but that it in the whole period has been a bourgeois 
state.227 The state has been a central organizing agent in the 
modernization of an agricultural economy to industrial capitalism in 
a dependent, peripheral European state with weak feudal/aristocratic 
traditions, with a weak bourgeoisie and a strong, independent 
peasantry. The state was an arena for organizing the national 
liberation movement, it was a powerful organization in building 
infrastructure for a modern capitalist market economy, it played a 
role in the political organizing of the bourgeoisie, and through the 
postwar welfare state, became a manager of imbalances and crisis 
tendencies in the capitalist economy. The socalled 'market economy' 
in Norway was thus eminently a product public policies and 
dependent for its success on a strong and professionalized state. The 
study counters the idea that the development of the market economy 
                                           
     227
 How the fragmentation and perhaps dissolution of the class structure after 1970, generated 
by the impact of the international economy and technology, changed the state organization and 
how the (many-centered) state influenced political actors in the deeply politicized civil society, 
are questions for future study. 
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in Norway depended on pushing back and avoiding the state. The 
problem for the rising bourgeoisie was not to avoid the state, but to 
organize it to serve its interests without provoking too much social 
and political opposition. It was state actors, governments and 
professional bureaucrats that were the subjective, intellectual 
elements in this reorganization process. Thus institutional analysis 
and studies of decision-making are important for understanding 
both the modernization (change) and the sclerosis (crisis) of the 
economy. Through a new reorganization from 1930 to 1950 the 
state became an efficient manager of the crisis tendencies in the 
capitalist economy, so that after the war up to about 1965, in the 
expansive phase of capitalism globally, the state-organized capitalist 
economy in Norway expanded briskly. In the 1980's it can seem that 
both systems had reached their efficiency limits: the huge state 
apparatus no longer managed to absorb unemployed and otherwise 
debilitated and 'decommodified' labour power through the 
administration of welfare services to them, and the capitalist 
economy, once detailed state interventions into the firms are 
curtailed, does not have the capacity to overcome the structural 
crisis tendency, the structural unemployment and the concomitant 
development of culture-specific poverty in large sections of the 
population.  
 The academic field of political economy has moved from 
economics, studying the statistical relations between price-set 
demand for and supply of commodities (Samuelson 1964), into the 
study of how institutions affect transaction costs (North 1991). The 
present study suggests that the institutional analysis should be taken 
a step further, to the study of how constitutions (state organizations) 
codify class and power structures in society, open for certain 
changes, but close for others, and why the labour movement's 
radical project of political and especially economic democracy 
could not be implemented within the existing constitution. 




THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN NORWAY: 1850 
- 1970 
 
The bureaucracy has been an important elite and political class 
throughout the modern period. Its position has roots in Danish 
colonial rule of Norway. The ruling bureaucratic elite was not 
removed from the top echelons of the state before the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. But then it took on a new and powerful 
role through the public administration, managing infrastructural 
projects, a role that did not diminish with the social democratic 
regime after the Second World War. But it was a political class with 
learning ability. From the prevalence of paternalistic ideology in the 
Danish period it learned (through internal and external struggle) the 
ideology of national independence and the free market economy. In 
the interwar period social economists taught the growing 
bureaucracy Keynesian models of state intervention into the 
economy, and the bureaucracy taught the social democratic 
movement the same. 
 The bureaucracy was an elite and a political class. In the early 
period (to the 1880's) it had connections into the economy (as 
owners of farms and trading firms), but it was not, as far as I can 
see, an economic class, with an interest in economic exploitation of 
'foreign labour'. But it was economically important in the sense that 
it organized the economic arena, the 'space' where the bourgeoisie 
and the working classes could act and organize. So, if Norway has 
not had a strong feudal aristocracy, it has had a strong bureaucracy, 
an elite in the state, a political class, with basically conservative 
bureaucratic interests (pay, subordinates, status, power), but open 
for government guidance, with connections into the economy and 
with a learning capacity (perhaps because of its close connections to 
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intellectual and cultural circles in the country) and an interest in 
state expansion. 
 The bourgeoisie, in the sense of a class of capital owners 
exploiting labour to expand capital, has in the modern period been 
the dominant class in the economy. The state and the state 
bureaucracy has been a subordinate capital owner, with capital 
mainly in not very capital-productive infrastructure, through the 
whole modern period. The social democrats did not manage to 
change that relationship (through nationalizations of industry). But 
the bourgeoisie rose slowly to the status of an autocentric economic 
class. In the last part of the nineteenth century the bourgeoisie was 
busy transforming shipping from sail to steam engines, forestry to 
machine based industry and foreign owned firms to Norwegian 
controlled firms. In agriculture the transformation to farming 
developed slowly. In the financial sector and in industry the 
Norwegian firms were small and the few large undertakings were 
heavily dependent upon foreign capital and professional knowledge. 
Thus also the national academic institutions developed slowly, with 
the University in Christiania (Oslo) not very supportive of the 
natural sciences during the nineteenth century, with the establish-
ment of a technical college first in 1911 in Trondheim and a 
business college in Bergen, formally in 1915, but with teaching 
activity first in the 1936 (Waaler 1961). 
 With the labour movement under state control and with the social 
economists as the movement's economic ideologists, the 
bourgeoisie grudgingly accepted the Labour Party as government in 
1935 (the Hornsrud government of 1928 was not accepted). But the 
social democratic regime did not change the basic position of 
private capital and the bourgeoisie in the economy. The bourgeoisie 
kept its dominant and exploitative position, being in control of the 
investments in the private sector, however, increasingly dependent 
upon cooperation with the government and the state for 
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accumulation of profits. Important sections of the bourgeois 
political leadership adopted a form of social democratic thinking 
(organized capitalism), opening for a new political elite, including 
the leaders of Social Democracy, the top leaders in the public 




THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURES 
 
1970 can perhaps be termed a turning point in the development of 
the bourgeois class in Norway. The period of expansive (if 
increasingly state supported) industrial capitalism was over. The 
new capital expansive sectors, like shipping, oil production, media 
and electronic technology had radically different ownership 
structures from the typical Norwegian form, the small family 
company. 
 The working class, the class of exploited wage labourers without 
subordinates, working in material production and services, without 
ability to accumulate any production capital (but some consumption 
capital), developed as an economic appendage to private capital and 
to state productive activities. In a European and even a 
Scandinavian perspective, the working class in Norway was a 
latecomer. It was recruited largely from independent and dependent 
peasantry in the nineteenth century. It expanded quickly with the 
industrialization around the turn of the century. Its close 
connections to the peasantry probably supported reformist thinking 
among workers. Their lack of a social and cultural basis in towns, 
the isolated, quite rural locations of much of the new big industry, 
and the unity and power of the Norwegian bureaucracy were all 
factors that made parts of the class open to radical political and 
organizational ideas. 
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 The independent ownership in agriculture and the large public 
institutions (in administration, education and science, and 
infrastructure) made the middle classes important in the Norwegian 
economy. The middle classes are typically people with 
characteristics of other classes: owners of land who work that land 
themselves, managers with no capital ownership who have some 
subordinates and organize for maximization of profit. Middle 
classes are people torn between the main classes in the economy. It 
has been difficult to identify middle classes from the available 
statistics on occupations, wages and capital ownership. With the 
expansion of the public sector institutions after the Second World 
War, the middle class has expanded. Middle class members are 
often volatile, split between main class interests, pressured both 
ways and often on the move in the class structure (trying to move 
upwards, often pushed downwards). Stable middle class elements 
will typically not be engaged ideologically. Under pressure 
members of that class can develop ideas in many directions, and 
recruit to populist movements, both on the right and the left of the 
political spectrum. The middle classes in Norway can thus be part 
of the explanation of the basic stability in Norwegian politics (social 
democracy, reformism, a low degree of open class confrontations, 
little violence) and of the extreme radicalism that the country has 
experienced, both within the labour movement and within the 
bourgeois political movement. 
 In Norway in the nineteenth century the class structure was 
dominated by petty bourgeois formations rurally and a bureaucratic 
political class in the (small) urban centres. The main classes in the 
capitalist economy, the bourgeoisie and the working class took form 
only slowly up to 1900. The state influenced that class formation 
process through laws favouring the market economy, through 
infrastructural projects and through its opposition to working class 
organizing. Around the turn of the century both classes were 
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established in the Norwegian economy, the bourgeoisie heavily 
influenced by international capital, the working class torn out of the 
petty bourgeoisie and landed labour. The social democratic 
movement worked to 'normalize' and ameliorate the relations 
between the main classes.  
 After the Second World War the many parts of the working class 
were integrated into the state through different types of education 
and welfare programmes. The bourgeoisie was fragmented and 
integrated into the state, centrally and at the municipal level, 
through the corporative channel. The distinction between state and 
society became less clear as class members became dependent on 
state programmes and as the state increasingly intervened into 
business management. A public management system for an 
expansive capitalist economy ossified in the 1960's. As the 
economy went into depression, with investment possibilities 
dwindling, with new technology demanding new organizational 
forms and less labour, with increasing international competition and 
unemployment, the public management system was pressured for 
reorganization without being able to respond. The tripartite relations 
between the organizations of the bourgeoisie, the working class and 
the state were ossified with heavy vested interests in the established 





In the present study the bureaucratic elite emerges as an eminent 
state organizer. It organizes the state independently, but not 
primarily on the basis of its own economic or political interests. The 
elite was typically split, but the dominant part of it identified with 
the rising bourgeoisie and organized conditions for the expansive 
capitalist economy and played a role in developing collective 
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organizations in the bourgeoisie. The elite had an autonomous role 
relative to the classes, but identified gradually and with increasing 
administrative knowledge with the bourgeois industrial capitalist 
project. 
 The formation of the parliamentary state in 1814 was a key to 
independence. The politically conscious Norwegians, whether 
powerful or peripheral could identify with the Storting as a power 
centre. Up to 1884 there was a struggle in the bureaucratic elite 
between traditionalists and modernizers. The latter were a minority 
and an alliance between the up-coming bourgeoisie and the liberal 
farm and urban intellectual movement managed to oust the 
conservative bureaucratic elite from power in 1884. The 
representative parliament gradually got control of the political 
composition of the government and through it the public 
administration was put under political control and guidance. With 
that unification and centralization of political power, based in a 
bourgeois political programme of a market economy and profit 
oriented production and trade, the state was organized to enter 
actively into infrastructure. Gradually the new professions from the 
natural sciences managed to permeate into the public administration 
and establish administrative power centres in the directorates. As 
the turn of the century approached infrastructure was developed in 
most of the modern sectors of the economy (new technology in 
agriculture, fish production and forestry, railways, roads and 
telegraphs, new systems for distribution and control of medicines, 
for measures and weights, etc.). The basis for this modernization 
process was the political alliance between the independent owners 
of land and the new bourgeoisie. Thus the political consciousness 
and the organizational innovativeness of the bureaucratic-
professional elite and the centralized parliamentary form of 
government (based in the right to 'private' ownership of the products 
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of foreign labour) seem to be the crucial organizational variables in 
the modernization of the Norwegian economy. 
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THE SELECTIVITY OF STRUCTURES 
 
The parliamentary state, established in Norway in 1814 and 
changed during the crises of 1884 and 1905, was conducive to the 
bourgeois project of an autocentric, industrially based market 
economy in Norway. Parliament opened the way to a political 
alliance between the market-oriented farmers and the new 
industrially-oriented bourgeoisie, an alliance that was strong enough 
to dismantle the bureaucratic regime. After that the national 
independence movement gained strength towards the end of the 
century, the liberal movement allowing for a broad coalition 
including people from the authoritarian right (the state should 
operate above party politics) and from the labour movement. That 
coalition succeeded in 1905 in establishing national independence 
with a state organization adjusted to organizing infrastructure for an 
expanding market economy, guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the right 
to accumulate capital and supporting bourgeois economic interests 
internationally. 
 In the interwar period the reformist labour movement was 
coopted into Parliament and the political role and power of the 
public bureaucracy was strengthened by attracting interest 
organizations to participate in planning and decision-making (in 
boards, committees and councils - the corporative channel). In this 
way the parliamentary state was a structure congenial to bourgeois 
mobilization against the bureaucratic elite and the subsistence 
peasants in the nineteenth century and that allowed for the 
participation of private interest organizations in policy making in 
the bureaucracy in the twentieth. The parliamentary structure had a 
flexibility in both the parliamentary and the bureaucratic channels, 
allowing for organized private interests to participate in both, thus 
modifying the constitutional principle of popular control of 
parliament through personal votes for parliamentary representatives. 
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 Citizenship was gradually extended to non-capital owners and to 
women (in 1901 and 1910 for municipal elections, in 1913 for all 
national elections) and gradually to youth. In a second phase the 
system allowed for the participation of political parties in the 
Storting. In a third phase the executive branch of government was 
opened for direct participation from interest organizations, first the 
large employer organizations, later also the large labour 
organizations. However, to what degree this parliamentary 
bureaucratic state structure was a necessary condition for 
establishing an autocentric capitalism228 in Norway requires 
comparative studies. If there are many examples of very similar 
societies managing that transition without such a parliamentary 
form of state, the theory presented here is in trouble. That study is 
the next step. 
 As the size of the state increased and as the state took on 
functions within the economy, the power of the state increased. 
However, as the size of especially the welfare services increased, 
the state also contained large groups of employees, who in addition 
to being state employees, had traits in common with larger groups 
(the professions) and classes (working class, middle classes and the 
bourgeoisie). The autonomy of the state changed its content over 
time, from instrumental to programme autonomy, from an 
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 Simon Clarke (1983:119) suggests that capital accumulation does not require a state 
apparatus. Only the class struggle does: "If there were no class struggle, if the working class 
were willing to submit passively to their subordination to capitalist social relations, there would 
be no state." The present study of Norwegian state history suggests that the state was an 
autonomous organizer of the infrastructural conditions necessary for the penetration and 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production and a structural condition and organizer of class 
and group compromises conducive to continued capital dominance in the economy. The state 
played a central role in limiting the class struggle through ideological influence (we are all 
necessary members of one society) and organizationally (only responsible leaders and 
organizations are accepted into state decision-making). That complex task demanded a type of 
system knowledge and a use-value orientation in planning and decision-making that 
organizations in civil society could develop only with great difficulty. 
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independent role in keeping the peace and managing established 
programmes to an independent role in policy-making with a 
powerful administration to implement the decisions. The 
parliamentary state had class autonomy, the ability to act in basic 
contradiction to a class interest, relative to the working class in the 
whole period, structurally determined by the constitutional 
safeguard of the right to private accumulation of production capital. 
 Constitutions are important. They define in a binding fashion the 
existing power structure of a society. They define the structure of 
the state and the roles it can play. They define the room or the scope 
for independent policy-making in the state.229 The Norwegian 
Constitution established the parliamentary form of state and private 
ownership of capital as basic structures. It strictly limited voting 
rights to owners of real capital. Gradually voting rights were 
extended, changes that were recorded in the Constitution. The 
revolutionary changes implemented in 1884 and 1905 were also 
recorded (parliamentarianism and national independence). 
However, the new role of the political parties and the interest 
organizations was not brought explicitly into the Constitution. Since 
1905 no changes to the basic structure of the state have been 
recorded in the Constitution, except the new paragraph 93, which 
allows for supranational authority in Norway. The Constitution thus 
still reproduces a simple conception of the Norwegian state as a 
structure directly connected to each and every citizen, with no 
intervening bodies between the citizen and the Storting (comparable 
to a paradigm of individual capital owners interacting in markets, 
without intervening institutions). Why are these intervening 
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 Geoffrey Hosking says about the Tsarist state in Russia: "The real nature of the Tsarist 
state can be seen readily enough from its Fundamental Laws. Its two key articles read: "Russia 
is one and indivisible" and "The Russian Emperor is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God 
Himself commands obedience to his supreme authority, not only from fear but from 
conscience." (G. Hosking, Times Literary Supplement, 1 February, 1991:3). 
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organizations not recorded in the Constitution? Are they of no 
importance? Is it because the postwar regimes have not wanted to 
spoil the ultra-democratic message in the Constitution (all voters 
directly electing representatives, with the Storting as the power 
centre in the state)? Or is it because the intervening organizations 
could, if the process of constitutional change were started, raise an 
unwanted debate on democracy, both political and economic 
democracy? (The public has no influence as such on the member-
ship/leadership selections in interest organizations. Wage-workers 
do not have any right to control the use and/or placement of the 
privately owned means of production.) 
 The present study argues that the constitutional question, the 
question of the basic organization of the state, has been on the 
agenda of all the new social and political movements (the liberal 
farm movement, the industrial bourgeois movement and the labour 
movement). But it was the labour movement that first put forward 
radical alternatives to the existing Constitution (the ideas of a 
proletarian state in the 1920's and a parliamentary-corporative state 
in the 1930's). The labour movement had to suppress both these 
alternatives to become acceptable as a participant in the established 
state apparatus in the interwar period. If a social movement wants to 
develop new norms for the management of the production process 
(for example, use-value norms instead of the present exchange-
value norms, cooperative norms instead of competitive norms, 
ecological norms instead of profit maximization, etc.), the present 
study suggests that such changes are dependent on: (a) the success 
of the movement in society (its capacity to mobilize); (b) its ability 
to have its values permeat into education and science; and (c) the 
adjustment of the Constitution to accommodate the new values and 
norms into the state organization. 
 The present study is a case study of the state as an agent of 
modernization in Norway. It has looked into how state - class 
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relations in Norway took form within the global system of capitalist 
economies, how international capital penetrated the Norwegian 
economy, how that capital affected economic change and the 
development of an autocentric capitalism in Norway. The study 
suggests that the democratic state and the existence of a peasantry 
of independent land owners, constituting a base for a peasant 
movement demanding participation, are of importance for the 
emergence and later dominance of a national, industrially based 
bourgeoisie in the economy. It is argued that the parliamentary state 
organization is equally important in the next phase when the 
bourgeoisie wants to control the labour movement, to keep that 
movement and the working class within the circuit of private capital 
accumulation. It is argued that this containment became 
increasingly difficult as the limits of the capitalist mode of 
production became more obvious in the late 1960's and 1970's in the 
form of structural unemployment and environmental deterioration. 
This pressure from the crisis tendency in the economy produced a 
transfer of political power from the parliament to the bureaucratic 
corporative channel of decision-making. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF REGIMES 
 
In 1814 an elite, but a broadly composed elite of bureaucrats, large 
land owners and bourgeois industrialists and tradesmen, and a 
prince acted autonomously to create a new, independent Norwegian 
state. That undertaking was definitely of a revolutionary character, 
but carried out in a situation where Danish state control of the 
Norwegian territory was virtually non-existent. For that reason not 
very much force had to be employed. For that reason, too, it was 
rather easy for the Swedish state to establish its hegemony over 
Norway after Napoleon was beaten at Leipzig and England had 
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agreed that Sweden should take sovereignty over Norway. An 
agreement to that end was drawn up in Kiel 14 January, 1814. The 
Norwegian coalition was a bourgeois coalition, politically weak 
relative to the Swedish government, searching for a state 
organization that could maximize its possibilities for autonomy and 
profitable trade in the future. The question of alliance with Sweden 
or independence was the main organizational question. 
 In the 1880's the Norwegian government was strengthened. The 
Norwegian economy was in a new upturn. The bourgeoisie was 
stronger in industry and trade and the political movement among 
farmers, handicraftsmen in the towns and liberal intellectuals was 
gaining momentum. The transformation from movement to political 
parties was close at hand. The bureaucratic political class was on the 
defensive, with support from the Swedish monarch. The Storting 
wanted to inaugurate the right of government members to speak in 
parliament, so that the Storting's control of government could be 
strengthened. The success of parliament in that struggle led to a 
revolutionary change in the Constitution. From then on it was the 
Storting, with the political parties (Liberals and Conservatives) as 
the main actors, that determined the political composition of 
government. The state organization, especially the parliament, made 
it possible to concentrate the power of the complex political 
movement against the monarch and the bureaucratic elite in 
Norway. The Liberal Party's leadership under Johan Sverdrup was 
essential for organizing the movement into an efficient attack on the 
monarchical/bureaucratic state power. 
 Then the new bourgeoisie, the liberal intellectuals and the 
bureaucrats in the cities and the market-oriented farmers in the 
richer agricultural areas of Norway had state power. Towards 1905 
that power was used to organize a national movement in Norway 
strong enough to oust the Swedish monarch completely from the 
Norwegian state apparatus. The new labour movement was kept 
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within the bourgeois movement, not least by the Liberal Party's 
nationalist and social propaganda, arguing that the Liberal Party 
was the natural organization for working-class activists. The state 
kept a close watch over labour movement activities, suppressing 
revolutionary tendencies. Attempts at severing workers from the 
nationalist liberal, pro-market movement were gaining momentum 
in the labour movement. The struggle for national independence 
succeeded in 1905. Christian Michelsen, a leader with ideological 
conceptions more rooted in the classical Norwegian Constitution 
(people-state relations without intermediaries) than in the modern, 
parliamentarian multi-party state, and supporting ideas of strong 
personal leadership, symbolized the autonomy of the state in the 
crisis of 1905. 
 With the war of 1914-1918 the structure and the role of the state 
changed. The state became involved in the sphere of economic 
management. That expanded the size of the state and led to more 
internal specialization within administrative units. Leaders of 
industrial and trading companies were brought into state decision-
making. The Labour Party became an important participant in the 
political struggle, putting Venstre in a middle position between the 
Høyre and the Labour Party. The classical conflict in capitalist 
society between the bourgeoisie, the owners of capital and the 
working class became, rather abruptly, the main dimension in the 
political struggle. Comparatively this was the period when state 
autonomy was at a low ebb, when the regimes had relatively little 
room for political initiatives and manoeuvring. Capital and labour, 
and in a minor role the peasantry, were the main actors, acting out 
their conflicts mainly in civil society, with the state frantically 
preparing for military and police intervention to secure "law and 
order". Again we see that the autonomy of the state in periods of 
crisis is concentrated in organs that seemingly are organized above 
the political level of parties and movements. Just as Michelsen 
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represented the people in 1905, so the military apparatus, 
represented the concentrated will of the state in the interwar period. 
 The Labour Party regime from 1935 onwards had, as far as I can 
see, a new type of autonomy, a fully fledged programme autonomy, 
a role as a continuous, national, strategic organizer of the capitalist 
economy. Industry was spreading into all corners of the country, 
and the state took over several big industrial enterprises. The 
independent labour movement and the social economists' ideas of a 
national budget and a planned economy gave the Labour 
government management leverage. But it was an autonomy that had 
its price. It was an autonomy built on the bourgeois right to 
accumulation of capital, on accepting the established rules for 
resolving conflicts both in the state and in the economy, the rules 
for the organized determination of wage levels and for bourgeois 
sovereignty in the management of private companies. 
 The autonomy of the Labour regime was indisputable in 1945. 
The war had expanded the state apparatus and the arsenal of 
administrative instruments for economic planning. The labour 
movement was dominant in society. Norway moved into what Seip 
has characterized as a one-party state, a state dominated by the 
Labour Party coordinating the big economic interest organizations 
(on the capital and labour sides) in state policy-making. But the 
regime had to limit political participation. The Communists soon 
became a problem. They were vehemently attacked in speeches and 
in the press, openly and clandestinely, through the Labour Party 
controlled secret services within the labour movement and in the 
civil and military parts of the state. The power of the Storting 
dwindled while the power of the big organizations in the 
corporative channel increased, to the detriment of the smaller 
organizations and organizations in the social and cultural sectors 
("the closing of the membership markets in the corporate channel", 
Rokkan 1975b). The new corporative-type state managed by the 
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Labour Party leadership sapped the labour movement of initiative 
and grass roots activity. Labour politics was alienated from the 
labour movement. The political dialogue in the press, between and 
within the political parties became vociferous and highly 
ideological, and on the other hand muted and unclear about the 
more practical questions of economic and social management. The 
corporative channel turned politics into a matter of professional 
knowledge and professional jargon within a consensus culture. The 
corporative channel took the political questions from the agendas of 
the parliamentary organs and transformed them into technical 




GENERATING AUTONOMOUS STATE POWER 
 
State power, whether of an autonomous or heteronomous character, 
depends on the control of resources (land, means of production, 
means of administration and labour power). As described in the 
preceding chapters, state control over resources has increased, from 
a small public consumption-oriented state, via the transitional, 
investment-oriented state in the interwar period, to the large 
managerial state after the Second World War. Once the level of 
resource control has been decided upon, the state has powerful 
instruments to expropriate the resources from society: a bureaucracy 
with state authority, a police force that can use physical force 
against recalcitrant tax payers, and lastly the military itself. It can in 
principle intervene in any activity within the territory. If citizens 
have rights in relation to the state, it is the state that has agreed to 
transfer those rights (for example, rights of organization, of printing, 
of voting, of religion, etc.) to some/all individuals within the 
territory. Within this concept of state, people are perhaps born 
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equal, but the inalienable rights, if any, are assigned to people, and 
can in principle be taken away from them. State sovereignty is in 
principle absolute. Freedom to individuals and organizations is 
therefore historically (a) products of struggle against state 
powerholders and (b) freedoms assigned by (or taken from) the 
state. The resources the state controls relative to the private sector 
determine the strength of the state when confronted with 
competition, non-compliant groups, revolutionary attacks and 
attacks from foreign states. 
 State power also emanates from the representative parliament. 
Through it the making of compromises between political 
movements in society and the working out of policies that are 
acceptable to a majority in the parliament become a separate 
function, a special competence of the state. The ministries can also 
be decision-making and planning systems that over time develop 
knowledge of common interests in a policy area and suggest 
policies that cater to those interests. Sections of the bureaucratic 
elite in the nineteenth century had this competence. It took the 
initiative in developing a policy for infrastructures that could serve a 
new industrial market economy. Leaders of Venstre had this 
competence through the national liberation process and the Labour 
Party had it during the construction of the welfare state. 
 A second mechanism generating policy-making autonomy, is the 
professionalization of the state, that is, the incorporation of 
professionals in state administrative positions and state demands on 
the educational and research sectors to develop the type of 
professionals that the different state sectors need. Historically 
professionalization passed through three stages. First the legal, 
religious and military professions were dominant, when the 
Norwegian state was organized mainly to keep a given, law-defined 
order, an internal order, order in relation to other states and order in 
people's minds (mainly a strong belief in God and his (i.e. 
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Norwegian) church). Then the infrastructural professions were 
absorbed into the state: the engineers, the medical doctors, the 
agronomists. A third phase was connected with the Keynesian 
revolution, seeing the state as a separate, but constructive actor in 
the market economy, and an organization with an economic logic 
different from the private sector. The social economists were the 
prime carriers of this knowledge into the state.230 That profession 
entered the state administration as the Labour Party entered 
government. A fourth phase of professionalization occurred after 
the Second World War, with the welfare state and the expansion of 
the social sciences. These four waves of professionalization of the 
Norwegian state resulted in a stratified professionalized state, with 
new layers of professionals entering the state, generating new 
institutions and new organizational forms.  
 The professions are organization-forming and class-forming 
agents inside the state apparatus. Professionals create interest 
organizations that take on the defence of members' economic and 
social interests, in addition to the academic and educational 
interests. Through continuous interaction across institutional and 
within professional boundaries, state-employed professionals are 
able to develop common conceptions of policy questions. 
 While we have seen a tendency among professionals in the top 
echelons of the administration to move ideologically in the direction 
of the bourgeoisie, the welfare state creates a mass of professionals 
working at the street level, or working more or less directly with a 
large number of clients seeking state assistance. In these groups of 
professionals we have discerned tendencies to move in the direction 
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 In an interview with Ragnar Frisch I asked him to evaluate the relationship between the 
social economists in government and the politicians in parliament. He answered that as far as he 
could see the economists were pretty much in control. "If the economists ring a bell over here 
the politicians will follow their signal. If the economists ring the bell somewhere else the 
politicians will immediately follow." 
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of working-class and popular identifications. However, we would 
expect the top echelons of the state administration and the bourgeois 
regimes to seek to neutralize that kind of group formation among 
street-level bureaucrats by splitting them up, by producing more 
rules to regulate their work and by restricting their budgets. 
 The boards and commissions surrounding the central government 
administration have their own effect on state autonomy and state 
power. As we have seen, the members are on the whole selected by 
the government on personal, professional and political merit. There 
is little public competition for positions and hardly any electoral 
influence on recruitment. Recruitment is arranged at the discretion 
of the administrative leaderships in the ministries. In that way the 
boards and commissions can be seen as a corporative body, a pool 
of decision-making competence and a communication and influence 
system, quite hidden from public scrutiny, between the state 
bureaucracy and organizations and institutions in society. With a 
membership of 5500 people (in 1980), compared with around 2000 
employed in the ministries and some 13 000 employed if we include 
all the central external administrative institutions, the corporative 
body is a substantial part of the central government system. It is a 
power resource, a flexible, highly manipulable personnel pool, a 
system with detailed information about the complex of institutions, 
firms and movements in society, and an efficient communication 
channel between the central government and those institutions. The 
corporative body is mainly connected to government, with only 
marginal contacts with parliament and parliamentarians.231  
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 Compared with the American Congress the Norwegian Storting seems to have a very weak 
corporate system at its disposal. The Storting has its committees, but they seem to be dependent 
to a large degree on ad hoc contacts with organizations and institutions in society. The 
legitimate participants in policy making in the Storting are the political parties. The Storting has 
not used its power to set up corporate-type commissions, with representatives from interest 
organizations and public institutions, to take part in planning and policy making exercises. In 
the Norwegian state, that is, for some reason, investigations and planning exercises is the 
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A CLASS STATE? 
 
The Norwegian state was strong from its inception in 1814, but the 
type of muscle has changed. Its muscle in the first part of the 
nineteenth century was of an ideological type, with church and 
religion, supported by bureaucrats and the police, as its main 
instruments. From 1900 to 1945 the state's muscle was of a 
technical and police type, engaged in building infrastructure for an 
expanding market economy and keeping an unruly labour 
movement under control. Jittery, inexperienced bourgeois regimes, 
with disloyal supporters also on the extreme right wing (supporters 
of private capital, but against parliamentary government), probably 
put more emphasis on police and military preparations for internal 
control than was necessary. 
 The state as barrier against working class interests was taken care 
of by two mechanisms. First, the constitutional right to the private 
accumulation of capital (expressed in paragraph 105 in the 
Constitution, which states that everyone who gives up any material 
value to the state shall have full compensation for that value) 
excluded the state from redistributing capital to collectivities of 
workers (at whatever level, from the firm and upwards to the 
national level). Secondly, the systematic separation of the 
parliament and the political parties from the government and the 
bureaucracy has given especially the bourgeoisie a choice between 
two channels of political decision-making. When the labour 
movement was on the rise in parliament, bourgeois organizations 
could use the corporative channel, undermining the power of 
                                                                                                              
privilege of the state bureaucracy. Interest organizations, private institutions and social/political 
movements play a much larger role in the American Congress than in the Norwegian Storting. 
One reason is the independence of the President's power relative to Congress compared to the 
Storting's control over the political composition of the Norwegian government. One mechanism 
that could serve to increase the political power of the Storting might be a corporate-type 
planning system organized by the Storting and its committees. 
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parliament. Parliament thus became dependent on the knowledge 
accumulated in the bureaucracy and on the willingness of 
institutions connected with the bureaucracy to implement policy 
decisions made in the Storting. With access to the corporative 
channel limited to the large, responsible interest organizations in the 
economy this system limited the state's range of autonomous action 
to what Edvard Bull rightly called the project of "organizing 
capitalism". 
 This description of the Norwegian state does not tally with the 
crude instrumentalist, rationalistic theories of the state as an 
instrument of the bourgeoisie. What emerges is a state whose core 
function in this period of Norwegian political history was 
independent involvement in the bourgeois project of permeating the 
Norwegian economy with capitalism, with an exploitative economic 
system geared to expanding capital. But that core project is 
complex, a project which demands competences that only partially 
can be found within the bourgeoisie. Rather, the Norwegian state 
appears as a separate and powerful organizer of relations between 
groups and social classes, between the global and national economic 
processes, between old and new modes of production (subsistence 
agriculture and industrial capitalism), between trade and production, 
between national infrastructure and the specific technical needs of 
individual firms. The Norwegian state, rather than being an 
instrument controlled and managed by a bourgeois class, appears as 
an independent organizer of capitalism in a complex web of 
ideological, social and economic contradictions, with a fragmented 
bourgeoisie as the main entrepreneur in the economy, a bourgeoisie 
that the state to a large extent has organized at the political level. 
 State power has since the 1880's been located with the rising and 
later dominant bourgeois class. That class has effectively set the 
constitutional and organizational limits on state action. But the 
special traits of a capitalist economy - its connections with a 
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powerful global economic circuit, its class character, dividing 
society into a set of contradictory classes, its development 
contradicting earlier (and perhaps later) use-value-oriented modes 
of production, moving from one crisis to the next (unemployment 
and overproduction crises), and its tendency to overexploit 
employees and to create an ever-larger reserve army of unemployed 
workers - define the special tasks of the state.  
 The autonomy of the state may make ideological hegemony 
important for the continued existence of developed capitalism in 
Norway (as ideological/religious hegemony was important for the 
continued existence of the feudal mode of production in medieval 
Europe). If the legitimacy of the capitalist project should 
disintegrate in the working classes and in the middle, state-
connected classes at the same time, a bourgeois mobilization of 
state force against the new political movements may be difficult. 
 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE POWER STUDY 
 
The Norwegian Power Study was not able to say much about either 
the basic state project or the special competences of the state, 
mainly because it limited itself to describing the organization of the 
state at a point in time. It left out the tasks of the state. It did study 
some of the state's relations to institutions and organizations in 
society. A still-picture of organization forms appeared, but what 
went on in those organizations, what policies and interests they 
were designed to take care of, their relations to external actors and 
interests, was left out.  
 The NPS pointed to the "withering" of markets and the 
concomitant market power of organizations and large firms, the 
interpenetration of state and society, the internationalization of both 
the economy and politics, and the power of the interest 
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organizations in the corporative channel. It suggested that the 
modern Norwegian state was a segmented state, where the policy-
making units were not the formal institutions (the Storting, the 
government and the ministries), but elite groups (called segments) 
organized across the boundaries of formal institutions and within 
sectors of the economy (widely defined): agriculture, industry, 
trade, education, health, social welfare, etc. Each segment had 
members from parliament, ministries, interest organizations, 
science, the media etc. The NPS found that the segments had 
different conceptions of the good society and the role of the state. 
Thus in toto the decision-making system was different from the 
constitutional model, but all the same basically democratic and 
representative. Unanswered questions were: (1) Why had the 
policy-making system been changed? (2) Could it be that each 
segment handled a separate functional area within a larger capitalist 
market economy, and that a positive evaluation of that economy 
was a prerequisite for entry into all of the segments and the 
corporative decision-making bodies? 
 The NPS described how the administration was recruited mainly 
among upper class men from the Oslo/eastern region of the country, 
but found all the same that background variables of the bureaucrats 
were unimportant (except for education) in understanding the 
content of their decisions. The bureaucrats defended institutional-
ized values and policies. The question the NPS did not ask was 
whether these institutionalized values perhaps were exactly the 
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A materialist approach means getting into the study of state, politics 
and ideology through an analysis of social relations, interest 
formation and power in the economy, in the complex of modes of 
production and class formations there. It means combining 
historical, functional and dialectical analysis: the first describing 
concrete developments of economic, political and ideological 
phenomena over time;232 the second working out how developments 
within one structure are dependent upon and related to 
developments within others (e.g. how the state responds to 
developments in the capitalist economy, how the administration 
relates to political authority in government and parliament, how the 
division of labour in the administration is related to the structural 
development of the capitalist economy, etc.); the third attempting to 
clarify the contradictions in each unit of the political and economic 
system, investigating if the suppressed sides in those contradictions 
could be the nucleus of new forms of economic cooperation, 
political leadership and administration. 
 The materialist approach means testing a specific understanding 
of the relationship between organizational structures and action 
models. It implies searching for how decisions are influenced by 
organizational structures and the decision-makers' interpretations of 
                                           
     232
 As Perry Anderson (1986:10) points out - over different temporalities in the different 
arenas. This differentiation of tempos of development and of change should have been given 
more attention than I have managed in the preceding analysis. I have operated with two fairly 
parallel temporalities: (1) the temporality of state development itself, from independence in 
1814, to the creation of the parliamentary state in 1884, independence in 1905, social 
democracy in 1935, and majority social democracy and welfare state in the postwar period up to 
1970, and (2) temporality of the development of the labour movement, from, early formation in 
1850, via the creation of national, class-specific organizations in the 1880's and 1890's, the 
ideological struggle in the 1920's and the merger of social democracy and state from 1935 and 
onwards. The temporality of the class development has not been clarified, even if the main 
changes in the class formations, class interests and class strengths have been identified. And the 
temporality of everyday life within the main social classes has not been given attention at all, 
drastically reducing the possibility of comprehending the common ideological developments in 
the country. 
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those structures. It means studying how decisions are affected by 
the interactions with other decision-makers. Materialism does not 
mean that objective structures determine the way people think and 
interpret society and their (individual and collective) actions. 
Materialism means studying the economy and politics as social 
relations, as interpreted/constructed relations between people and as 
systems that are related. Materialism does not, in my interpretation, 
mean that the economy determines politics. The relative power and 
autonomy of different areas of human activity is basically an 
empirical problem. 
 Two theses emerge from the present study:  
 (1) Between 1850 and 1970 the Norwegian state was 
subordinated the capitalist project. The bourgeoisie had the power 
over the state organization. However, the state organization allowed 
and even furthered the development of an autonomous, 
democratically based political leadership, a leadership that was an 
elite and a political class in the first period (the bureaucracy 1814-
1884), a professionally based complex political elite in the period 
up to 1935, and a section of the new industrial corporative 
bourgeoisie in the postwar period. The state was strong and had an 
autonomous role in organizing the transformation of the economy. 
 (2) During the interwar and early postwar periods the capitalist 
economy in Norway gradually and unevenly lost some of its 
independence and expansionary capacity. The international 
economy took a tighter hold on the Norwegian economy and the 
overproduction crises set continuously stricter limits on the role of 
the state. 
 Both these trends threatened the popular legitimacy of the 
system. At the political level this reduction of the legitimacy of the 
capitalist economy was compensated for by increased influence of 
employer organizations in the corporate channel of decision-
making, a channel that is more efficient for the consolidated elites, 
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involving less time-consuming democratic bickering and less 
observation by critical mass media. 
 Both the subordination and the autonomy of the state in the 
analyzed period could be discerned in the action models and roles of 
leaders in government. Personal idiosyncrasies were more or less 
neutralized by the workings of decision rules in the state apparatus 
while at the same time leaving considerable power and discretion in 
the hands of the elite.  
 Abraham Berge's participation in the Trade Bank affair revealed 
a development from a radical/populist to an established, 
conservative 'state and people are one' conception of society, during 
a long career in the government system. Nicolai Rygg started out 
with an interest in working-class politics and social statistics and 
developed a political model of stability in the economic 
establishment as head of the National Bank. No one in the 
government or on the boards of the banks who knew about the 
unconstitutional support to the Trade Bank leaked that fact to the 
Storting or to the public. About 30 government officials and elected 
politicians knew about the illegal Trade Bank support, but the 
Storting was not informed. The financial elite and the government 
demanded secrecy. The state administration was malleable in that 
direction and kept all the bureaucrats in line.  
 Jonas Smitt was personally a member of the bureaucratic elite, 
had ideas about how the state should intervene in agriculture that 
could be partially predicted from that elite position, and rose to 
power in government when the state was under the control of the 
bureaucratic political class. Jonas Smitt became a maverick after the 
liberal Venstre regime took over government power. But then he 
was eliminated from the power structure in the administration, 
which was tightly controlled from above, and from the new 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
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 In the Kings Bay affair the social democratic government tried to 
bypass the Storting in an effort to secure its power position. The 
idea that the Storting was the sovereign authority and that it should 
decide on the consequences of the accident was subordinated to the 
government's interest in staying in power. 
 As Lægreid and Olsen succinctly put it, people employed in the 
administration with ideas about reforming decision-making routines 
and/or relations with clients leave their jobs more quickly than 
others. "This cleaning (renselsesmekanisme) and expulsion process 
is of crucial importance to the workings of the administration. It 




MODERNIZATION: NOT COMPLETED 
 
Dominant reformism in the labour movement was favoured by the 
democratic organization of the Norwegian state. Parliament invited 
participation and the bureaucracy was open for recruitment on 
academic merit and available, in principle, for implementing any 
policy parliament supported. Responsibility and respect for 
constitutional rules was internalized in the movement on its way 
toward government position. After coming to power on a reformist 
programme, the Labour government was obliged to defend the 
constitution. The movement had become state. The leadership of the 
movement became the prime organizers of a capitalist economy 
when both the economic efficiency and the legitimacy of that 
economy was waning. The democratic project of putting capital 
under collective, popular control and dismantling the elitist, anti-














THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE IN NORWAY, 1875-1970 
 
 1875 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 
A. Economically active 
1. Agriculture 






8. Financial institutions 
9. Water transport 
10. Other transport 
11. Government service 
12. Community service 
13. Personal service 






B. Service work in all 
7+8+11+12+13 
C. Economically inactive 
15. Housewives 
16. Children  
    working at home 
17. Capital/pension 
    income 
18. Recipients of 
    assistance 
C TOTAL 
D. Persons in all 
N=(,000) 
19. Persons over 15 as % 
    of whole population 
20. Women in % of total 
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